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Abstract 
 
One of the main aims of the underlying research is to respond to continuous calls for 
introducing and measuring a sound economic definition for best practice disclosure quality 
(e.g. Beyer et al., 2010) that is derived from a reliable guidance framework (Botosan, 2004) 
using an innovative natural language processing technique (Berger, 2011). It also aims to 
examine the impact of corporate governance on best practice disclosure quality. Finally, it 
aims to examine the joint effect of both best practice disclosure quality and corporate 
governance on firm value. 
 
The thesis contributes to disclosure studies in three principal ways. First, it introduces a 
new measure for best practice disclosure quality. Further tests show that the proposed 
measure is reliable and valid. A novel feature of this measure is that it captures all 
qualitative dimensions of information issued by the Accounting Standards Board, 2006 
(ASB) Operating and Financial Review (OFR) Reporting Statement. Second, it uses 
machine-readable OFR statements for financial years ending in 2006-2009, and develops a 
language processing technique through constructing five keyword lists. Third, it examines 
the extent to which disclosure quantity provides a proper proxy for disclosure quality. The 
analysis shows that disclosure quantity is not a good proxy for disclosure quality. 
Accordingly, results derived, using quantity as a proxy for quality, are questionable. 
Results of the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance 
mechanisms suggest that the most effective governance mechanisms in improving 
disclosure quality are leadership structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and audit 
firm size. 
 
Using a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms, the study also contributes to three 
research strands and explains the inconclusive results in relation to the association between 
disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. It provides empirical 
evidence as to which governance mechanisms promote the quality of voluntarily disclosed 
information in large UK firms. Additionally, it provides empirical evidence as to the joint 
effect of best practice disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms on firm value 
in the UK. Results also show that best practice disclosure quality enjoys a substitutive 
relationship with two corporate governance mechanisms (audit committee independence 
and audit committee size) and a complementary association with board independence in 
relation to firm value. 
 
The study has various research and policy implications. It suggests new research avenues 
for re-examining disclosure relationships, especially research areas that do not have 
persuasive conclusions such as the economic consequences of disclosure quality. Such 
research may inform both regulators and managers as to the costs and benefits of disclosure 
quality to both firms and stakeholders. It also provides feedback on the current disclosure 
practices by firms so that policy-makers can modify reporting frameworks/guidance 
accordingly. 
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1.1 Overview 
In recent years, considerable attention has been given to the association between disclosure 
quality (DQ) and corporate governance (CG). The route of this research commenced with 
the study of Ho and Wong (2001) as a reaction to the Asian financial crisis. They argue that 
this crisis was not only due to a loss of investor confidence, but also to ineffective 
corporate governance, coupled with insufficient transparency. The same notion has been re-
examined after other major financial crises, for example US and European crises and 
scandals such as Enron and Parmalat (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). In the aftermath of the 
most recent international financial crisis, these ideas continue to be worthy of examination. 
Waymire and Basu (2011) claim that the recent financial crisis raises the question of 
whether the quality of financial reporting in general can seriously harm the overall 
economy. 
Disclosure quality, and corporate governance have recently received wide attention, either 
at the academic level (e.g. Beyer et al., 2010; Berger, 2011; Brown and Tucker, 2011; 
Brown et al., 2011; Roulstone, 2011) or at the professional and policy-maker levels 
(examples include the latest revision of the UK governance code in 2010 and the new 
Management Commentary document (IFRS, 2010), intended to improve best practice 
disclosure quality reporting practice, issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board in December 2010).  Reasons for such increased attention are discussed in the next 
section. 
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1.2 Motivations 
 
Motivations to conduct the underlying research are basically two-fold, namely personal and 
research-led motivations. With regard to the personal motivations, the researcher is 
interested in market-based accounting research in general, and issues of financial reporting 
in particular. Following the submission of an MSc dissertation which examined the effect 
of mergers and acquisitions on the performance of Egyptian firms. The researcher earned a 
good experience   in financial statements reporting, and how these statements were 
perceived to be becoming less relevant to their users. This motivated the researcher to look 
at the other part of the annual report, the narrative sections in general and the OFR in 
particular. It was observed that this area of research has received limited attention in 
disclosure studies. Looking at the OFR statements, the researcher observed that the length 
of this statement is not the same for all UK firms, this motivated the researcher to think 
about two important questions: first, what factors affect OFR disclosures? Second, what is 
the impact of this disclosure on firm value? For that reason, the researcher came to UK to 
conduct this research and find answers for these particular research questions. 
In relation to the research-led motivations, there are two general motivations, which are 
then sub-divided into six specific motivations. With respect to the general motivations, 
firstly, the financial statements as the main channel for information to investors have lost 
their relevance over the past 20 years (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). This suggests that investors 
do not use historical information as a basis for valuing firms. Additionally, increasing 
complexity of business strategies makes it difficult for investors to appreciate financial 
information by itself without more detailed information (Marston and Shrives 1991). One 
12 
 
way to fulfil the needs of the stakeholders is improving communication skills and 
enhancing the value-relevance of information through best practice disclosure (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004). Thus, the first research motivation is the need to enhance the quality of 
best practice narrative disclosure. The increased attention given to corporate governance 
(i.e. the latest revision of the UK governance code in 2010) and best practice disclosure 
quality reporting (e.g. the new Management Commentary document in 2010) represents the 
second general motivation of this research. 
 The underlying research adds to the accounting literature on the association between 
disclosure quality, corporate governance and their relationship with firm value. It also gives 
insights to the regulatory bodies and has some policy implications in the UK context. The 
following paragraphs discuss these points. 
From the above two general motivations, six more specific motivations are discussed. 
When reviewing the extant literature on the association between disclosure quality and 
corporate governance, many limitations and research gaps have been identified, which 
reinforces the importance of the current research. The first research motivation arises from 
the significant challenge of measuring best practice disclosure quality (Berger, 2011). 
Currently, the disclosure literature employs various proxies for best practice disclosure 
quality assuming that disclosure quality and quantity are positively correlated (e.g. 
Hussainey et al., 2003). This assumption, however, has been criticised in prior research 
(e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a; 2008). In a recent article, Beyer et 
al. (2010) review prior research that considers different proxies for the quality of corporate 
disclosure. They conclude that: 
13 
 
 “A sensible economic definition of voluntary disclosure/financial reporting 
quality and direct derivation of measures from that definition is missing from the 
literature. This lack of an underlying economic definition hinders our ability to 
draw inferences from this work, and we recommend that future research address 
this issue” (p. 311). 
Therefore, the current research is important as it responds to continuous research calls 
and provides a sound economic definition of best practice disclosure quality. As such, 
the proposed disclosure measure improves researchers’ ability to draw inferences from 
disclosure studies. 
The second motivation stems from the need to develop a computerised approach for content 
analysis to allow for undertaking large-scale disclosure studies. Prior literature usually 
manually analyses the content of disclosure (e.g. Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003).  However, this approach is labour intensive and therefore the sample size is often 
small, which raises concerns on the generalisability of the results. An innovative approach 
involves using natural language processing techniques.  
In a recent article, Grüning (2011) introduces a new computerised language technique. He 
proposes an artificial intelligence measurement of disclosure (AIMD). AIMD is a software 
that enables quantifying the extent of information along ten disclosure topics in the annual 
reports. Although Grüning’s (2011) attempt is a step toward improved computerised 
content analysis, it suffers from some limitations. The first limitation is that AIMD 
concentrates on only one dimension of disclosure quality (i.e. comprehensiveness). AIMD 
measures the intensity of information disclosed in isolation from other quality dimensions, 
such as verifiability, comparability, and balance and neutrality. A second apparent 
limitation is the lack of a reliable and solid regulatory/guidance framework for selecting the 
disclosure topics. The third limitation is that the reliability of AIMD is not assessed in 
14 
 
Grüning (2011). By contrast, the underlying proposed disclosure quality measure is a 
computerised technique that allows the evaluation of all OFR quality dimensions- the 
guidance framework used to derive the quality dimensions- not just the comprehensiveness 
of disclosure. Moreover, the proposed disclosure quality measure is tested for reliability.  
While innovative language processing techniques provide premises for innovative 
disclosure quality measurement, current attempts to develop a computerised approach for 
content analysis do suffer some weaknesses (Berger, 2011). One common limitation is the 
use of ready-made language processing software1 (e.g. Henry, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; 
Li, 2010a). Berger (2011) questions the ability of such general dictionary software to 
analyse the special corporate filing language. Using N6 software, Hussainey et al. (2003) 
developed a customised forward-looking keywords list and were able to perform a 
computerised content analysis for UK annual report narratives. However, Hussainey et al.’s 
approach suffers from various limitations. The most important is that this approach was 
able to correctly capture only 55% of the actual forward-looking disclosure released in the 
narratives. In other words, Hussainey et al. (2003) captured 55% of what they could have 
captured if they had manually analysed the narratives. Accordingly, there is a need to 
develop a multi-dimensional computerised approach (not only for forward-looking 
disclosure) that is highly reliable and substitute the manual content analysis approach. 
Accordingly, the underlying research is important as it introduces a computerised approach 
for content analysis, which should help in undertaking large-scale disclosure studies. 
                                                 
1 Ready-made language processing software includes imbedded dictionaries to allow for automated word 
search and count. Such general dictionaries are not tailored for specific context such as financial reporting. 
This type of software does not allow the user to develop a customised dictionary to fit the corporate filling 
context. 
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In line with the two previous motives, the third research motivation arises from the need to 
explain and justify the inconclusive and conflicting results surrounding the association 
between corporate governance and disclosure quality. It is likely that such mixed results are 
due to improper measures of disclosure quality. This assumption is consistent with the 
argument that “researchers investigating the determinants and consequences of disclosure 
quality could be wasting their efforts if the primary variable of interest is not being 
measured with a sufficient degree of accuracy” (Beattie et al., 2004: 233). Another 
potential reason for the inconclusive results is the use of narrow proxies of corporate 
governance when examining the association between disclosure quality and corporate 
(García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Studying narrow proxies of corporate 
governance neglects the potential interactions between corporate governance mechanisms 
and thus, may fail to provide a comprehensive picture of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms (Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013). Thus, it is important to re-
examine the association between disclosure quality –rather than a proxy for disclosure 
quality- and a wide range of corporate governance mechanisms, in an effort to mitigate the 
mixed results issue in similar studies.  
A third related research strand examined in the thesis is the joint effect of disclosure quality 
and corporate governance mechanisms on firm value. Examining such relationship helps to 
identify whether there is a complementary or supplementary effect between disclosure 
quality and corporate governance in terms of their association with firm value. The fourth 
motivation of the current research stems from the limited literature on this association and 
the contradictory results prevailing in the extant literature (Black et al., 2006; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010). Similarly, such mixed results might be backed by using improper proxies 
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for disclosure quality and/or limited or aggregated numbers of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Accordingly, the current research is worthy of study as it investigates the joint 
effect of disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms on firm value since to 
the researcher’s knowledge, this research strand is not tested in the literature, particularly in 
the UK. 
Additionally, the current research earns its importance from its implications for the 
financial reporting in general, which is, therefore, the fifth research motivation. More 
specifically, developing a new best practice disclosure quality measure opens avenues for 
re-examining disclosure relationships, especially in research areas that do not have 
persuasive conclusions. Moreover, the present study promotes the efficiency of the 
financial reporting research areas with a low-cost, time-saving approach. This would help 
in undertaking large studies and hence deriving more reliable results than previous findings 
based on small-sample, manual analysis studies. In addition, this research has implications 
pertaining to the financial reporting studies, which link disclosure with corporate 
governance, and firm value. It helps to mitigate the conflicting results persisting in the 
current studies prevailing in the literature.  
The sixth motivation to conduct the underlying research is concerned with the practical 
implementation of the OFR statement. This research is hoped to  provide in-depth empirical 
feedback on the practical implementation of a multidimensional quality concept in the UK. 
Interestingly, with the new best practice disclosure quality score, regulatory bodies (e.g. 
Accounting Standard Board) can evaluate the applicability extent of their guidance. ASB 
can assess the strength and weakness of the current OFR requirements and make 
informative decisions to promote current reporting standards or induce new modifications.  
17 
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
In response to Beyer et al.’s (2010) call for researchers to consider a sound definition of 
best practice disclosure quality and to directly derive a proper measure from that definition, 
the research’s first objective is to introduce a sound and acceptable definition and a new 
valid and reliable measure for disclosure quality.  
The second objective is to respond to Berger’s (2011) calls for improving language-
processing techniques used in content analysis. Prior research uses disclosure quantity as a 
proxy for disclosure quality (e.g. Hussainey et al., 2003; Beekes and Brown, 2006; Celik et 
al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; and Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 
2007), assuming that disclosure quality and quantity are positively correlated. The third 
objective, therefore, is to empirically examine the extent to which disclosure quantity 
provides a proper proxy for disclosure quality.  
The fourth objective of the thesis is to provide potential explanations for the mixed results 
on research related to the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance, 
which in many cases contradicts with agency theory. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2010) contend that one of the possible reasons for such mixed results is the use of narrow 
proxies of corporate governance. Additionally, Beattie et al. (2004) argue that a well-
developed disclosure quality measure might lead to the fundamental re-interpretation of 
certain relations associated with disclosure. Thus, using different proxies for disclosure 
quality instead of a disclosure quality measure could also be a source for such mixed results 
on the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance. 
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Finally, the fifth objective of the thesis is to fill an important gap in literature related to firm 
value. In particular, the thesis aims to mitigate the commonly omitted variables bias by 
including corporate governance and disclosure quality as well as the joint effect of both 
(i.e. corporate governance and disclosure quality).  
1.4 Research Questions 
Four research questions are developed to achieve the aforementioned research objectives.  
The first research question: Is it possible to provide a practical definition and a reliable 
measure for disclosure quality? If so, to what extent are the OFR quality dimensions 
recommended by The Accounting Standard Board (ASB)2 (2006) measurable? The first 
research question covers the first and the second research objectives (i.e. introducing an 
acceptable definition and a new valid and reliable measure for disclosure quality and 
improving language-processing techniques used in content analysis to respond to recent 
calls). 
 This research question is answered through the first study (chapters Three and Four). More 
specifically, chapter Three corresponds to the first research objective. It introduces a new 
definition of disclosure quality and develops a new measure for it. This measure overcomes 
the limitations of prior attempts. The principles of OFR is used as the guidance on the 
                                                 
2 Whereas accounting standards were previously set by the ASB, this became the responsibility of the FRC 
Board on 2 July 2012. On that date, reforms were carried out to enable the FRC to operate as a unified 
regulatory body with enhanced independence. A new structure was implemented to ensure effective 
governance of all of the FRC's regulatory activities under ultimate responsibility of the FRC Board. The 
Accounting Council also replaced the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), assuming an advisory role to the 
Codes & Standards Committee and the FRC Board. As part of the reforms, the Codes and Standards 
Committee was established to advise the FRC Board on maintaining an effective framework of UK codes and 
standards.  
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dimensions of high-quality information. The chapter ends up by defining an aggregated 
disclosure quality measure composed of seven quality dimensions. Chapter Four 
corresponds to the second research objective. It develops five highly reliable keyword lists 
pertaining to narrative reporting (forward-looking, quantitative, bad news, good news and 
scope). This improves the content analysis techniques and more importantly, allows for the 
computerisation of the content analysis. 
The second research question: Is disclosure quantity a proper proxy for disclosure quality? 
This question is linked to the third research objective (i.e. to empirically examine the extent 
to which disclosure quantity provides a proper proxy for disclosure quality). This research 
question in answered in chapters Four, and Six. In chapter Four, the first validity test 
examines whether disclosure quantity could be used as an explanatory variable for 
disclosure quality. In chapter Six, one of the main robustness tests examines whether 
corporate governance mechanisms, which affect disclosure quality, differ from those 
relating to disclosure quantity. This in turn provides further evidence on whether disclosure 
quantify is a proper proxy for disclosure quality. 
 The third research question: What are the corporate governance and firm characteristics 
that influence best practice disclosure quality in the UK? Such a question corresponds to 
the fourth research objective (i.e. to provide potential explanations for the mixed results on 
research related to the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance, 
which in many cases contradicts with agency theory). 
This research question is answered through the second study (chapters Five and Six). 
Chapter Five sets out 14 research hypotheses to answer the third research question. These 
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hypotheses are concerned with the relationship between 14 corporate governance 
mechanisms and disclosure quality. Chapter Six tests these hypotheses and concludes with 
those corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics that influence disclosure 
quality in the UK.  
 The last research question is: What is the joint effect of best practice disclosure quality and 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm value in the UK? This research question is 
linked to the fifth research objective (i.e the fifth objective of the thesis is to fill an 
important gap in literature related to firm value), which is addressed in the third study, 
chapters Seven and Eight.  In chapter Seven, 15 research hypotheses are theoretically 
developed to test the effect of disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms, and 
the joint effect of both on firm value in the UK. Chapter Eight tests these hypotheses and 
concludes with answering the fourth research question. 
1.5 Research Contributions 
By achieving the first research objective, the current research contributes to the disclosure 
literature by introducing a measure for disclosure quality. The proposed measure is mainly 
based on all qualitative dimensions of information issued by the Accounting Standards 
Board (ASB, 2006) that aims to enhance the usefulness of information to stakeholders. This 
allows for a more considered definition of disclosure quality, rather than using proxies for 
disclosure quality. 
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The measure comprises the OFR quality dimensions. The Accounting Standard Board 
(ASB) sets the principles, which represent the quality dimensions as follows (ASB, 2006, 
Summary, para. b & c): 
“b. The Reporting Statement recommends that directors prepare an OFR addressed to 
members, setting out their analysis of the business, with a forward-looking orientation in 
order to assist members to assess the strategies adopted by the entity and the potential for 
those strategies to succeed. The information disclosed in the OFR will also be of relevance 
to other stakeholders. The OFR should not, however, be seen as a replacement for other 
forms of reporting addressed to a wider stakeholder group”.  
“c. The Reporting Statement sets out a number of other principles regarded as best 
practice in the preparation of an OFR, namely that the review  should: both complement 
and supplement the financial statements; be comprehensive and understandable; be 
balanced and neutral; and be comparable over time.” 
 
Based on the Reporting Statement, the proposed quality measure comprises the above 
mentioned principles as follows; forward-looking orientation, relevance, supplement and 
complement the financial statements, comprehensiveness, understandability, balance and 
neutrality, and comparability.  
The second contribution, which is realised through the second research objective, is the 
introduction of five keyword lists that are necessary for the computerised content analysis, 
and are relevant to the narrative disclosure context. The forward-looking keyword list 
improves Hussainey et al.’s (2003) forward-looking keyword list to progress from 
capturing only 55% of actual forward-looking disclosure, to capturing 95.3% (see Table 4.1 
and the related discussion). This innovative computerised approach will help to save costs 
and effort associated with manual content analysis, and help in undertaking large-scale 
disclosure studies. 
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The third contribution of the current research is realised through meeting the third research 
objective. Mainly, results of the current research suggest that disclosure quantity is not an 
appropriate proxy for disclosure quality. Analysis shows that there is no correlation 
between disclosure quality and disclosure quantity. Using firm-specific characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms, the study also finds that determinants of disclosure 
quality and disclosure quantity are not identical.  
The fourth research contribution, which corresponds to the fourth objective, is investigating 
the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance using the proposed 
disclosure quality measure, and a wide set of accounting-based corporate governance 
mechanisms. In doing so, this research uses wide proxies of governance. This might lead to 
explaining the problem of some results contradicting agency theory. Correlation analysis 
reveals that almost all corporate governance mechanisms are in line with the predicted 
association based on agency theory. Accordingly, mixed results on the association between 
disclosure quality and corporate governance are attributed partly to the use of improper 
proxies for disclosure quality, and partly to uses of narrow proxies for corporate 
governance. 
Finally, the fifth contribution corresponds to the fifth research objective. The current 
research contributes to firm value literature by introducing empirical evidence on the joint 
effect of disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms on firm value.  
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1.6 Research Methodology 
This section elaborates the research methodology adopted in the current research. The 
researcher explains the philosophical approach, which frames the underlying study. An in-
depth discussion of the different research philosophies generally applied in the financial 
and accounting research paradigm is provided. The relative merits of the applied research 
philosophy are elaborated. Then, the research design and the theoretical framework are 
discussed. 
Research methodology is the strategy or design lying behind the choice of a particular 
methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes (Crotty, 1998). 
It includes research philosophy, design, and methods used to achieve the research 
objectives and provide answers for the research questions discussed earlier. As articulated 
by Bisman, “Methodology, in turn, reflects an underlying philosophy comprising an 
ontological view and associated epistemological assumptions. Thus, the most fundamental 
consideration in posing and answering research questions is the researcher’s philosophical 
or meta-theoretical position (2010, p.5). Broadly speaking, any research idea is formulated, 
developed, investigated, and illustrated based upon the researcher’s epistemological beliefs 
in terms of how knowledge is acquired and illustrated research philosophy.   
The approach employed in the current research is a theory testing (deductive) approach. It 
is a top-down approach that works from the general to the specific. Stated differently, the 
starting point is the identification of a relevant theory (i.e. agency theory in the underlying 
research). A set of hypotheses are then developed to test the theory. Afterwards, using the 
suitable research method, the hypotheses are tested. Results suggest either accepting the 
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hypotheses (and thus confirmation of the theory) or rejecting them. At the end, the research 
reports the contribution made to the understanding of the theory.  
1.6.1 Research Philosophy 
A valid research philosophy is fundamental to any research. Any raised dispute over the 
methodological approach of a certain study would simply impair the validity of its results. 
A research philosophy is “the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus 
providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria (Crotty, 1998; p. 3). 
In other words, it is about a belief regarding the way in which data about a phenomenon are 
gathered, analysed and used. Lopes (2015) provides a perfect summary for the most 
popular classification of research philosophy in the finance and accounting fields. Four 
main philosophical approaches are normally used in the finance and accounting research 
namely: positivism; constructionism; critical realism; and pragmatism. The first 
philosophical approach is the positivist (mainstream).  Positivist evidences the way to 
achieve the truth, believing that it is always possible to predict that world. The featured 
assumptions of this research philosophy are that: it is a replicable research, depends on 
finding generalization, and employs a deductive reasoning tests the cause and effect 
relations within structured and multilateral frameworks. Positivism relies on the objective 
measures, the direct observation and the dismissal of research emotions and thoughts 
(Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Ryan et al., 2002; and Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). 
 The second philosophical research approach is constructionism. Constructionism as a 
research philosophy assumes that the reality is mentally constructed (Sekaran and Bougie,  
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2013). This approach thus focuses on the comprehensiveness of the procedures used to 
achieve connections in the real world (Lopes, 2015). From this perspective, the capture and 
creation of knowledge is based on observations and interpretations of social practices 
(Ryan et al., 2002). It is mainly built on qualitative analysis. As documented by Senik 
(2009), constructionism has social subjectivity and accordingly, declared disagreement 
between positivist approaches. 
The third philosophical research approach is critical realism. Critical realism perspective is 
an intermediary approach, which assumes that an objective truth exists but cannot be 
objectively and reliably measured (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). It assumes that the 
researcher would tend to bias his understanding. Behavioural theories can support those 
biases, especially phenomena that, researcher cannot observe and measure directly, as 
satisfaction, motivation, organizational or knowledge management culture and values 
(Lopes, 2015).  
Finally, According to Lopes (2015), the forth research philosophy; “pragmatism” emerges 
as a pluralist but practical perspective. Its transversal practical view aligns research 
methodologies as a mix of research aims and objectives, observable phenomena, and 
research questions.  
For several decades, theory construction and verification in accounting has been dominated 
by ‘mainstream’ research conducted within the positivist paradigm (Bisman, 2010). That is, 
a strong commitment is demonstrated to what would be labelled as ‘objective’ research, 
where, research  is viewed as a process of constructing precise and economic theories 
validated by well-designed tests using large and unbiased samples (Rayan et al., 2002).  
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With the research philosophy being crucial in validating an entire research study, 
“positivism” as the research philosophy applied in the underlying research is thoroughly 
explored in the remainder of this section. 
Positivism means, “what is posited or given in direct experience is what is observed, the 
observation in question being scientific observation carried out by way of the scientific 
method” (Crotty, 1998, p. 20). Positivism is a highly objectivist view of a common, single 
reality, so reality is an externality which exists independently of human thought and 
perception (Bisman, 2010). Crotty (1998) contends that, positivists believe in scientific 
objective findings that are derived from a well-designed research.  
The emergence of positivism dates back to, 1920s and 1930s. It started as a consequence 
ideas of a discussion group of philosophers, mathematicians and scientists organized by 
Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) to investigate scientific language and methodology. The group 
is known as the “Vienna Circle”. David Hume (1711-1776), an empiricist, and the 
physicist, Ernest Mach (1838- 1916) influenced the development and underlying 
philosophy of the Vienna Circle, in particular its first idea of empiricism. Bertrand Russell 
(1872-1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein influenced this group with their logical approach. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus logico-philosophicus” had a significant influence on the 
circle’s main tenet – the verification principle.” 
Afterwards, Russell and Whitehead (1913) formulated a new form of logic in their work 
“Principia Mathematica”, which applied the logical tools of analysis to empirical 
investigation. This new logic was then adopted by the circle in their analysis and named 
“Logical Positivism”. 
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The main distinction between “Positivism” and “Logical Positivism” is that the later term 
proposes that meaningful statements are only those which can, in principle at least, be 
verified by appeal to observation. Juma'h (2006, p. 89) presents a simple and clear 
distinction between positivism and logical positivism: 
“Positivism is a theory of knowledge which only allows statements that are based on 
empirical data, collected through experience. Logical positivism is an extension of this 
concept and as is logical analysis and mathematical techniques. Logical positivism is a 
form of reasoning based on two key concepts, the collection of experiences yielding 
empirical data and the logical analysis of this data. Therefore, it imposes on its 
practitioners a structure of thinking and leads to a particular form of theory because only 
certain types of knowledge are allowed”. 
 
There are two main assumptions/ principles for positivism and logical positivism; the 
meaning of verification and the theoretical terms. Logical positivists assert, “Only 
meaningful statements were to be permitted scientific consideration and accorded the status 
of knowledge claims” (Caldwell, 1984). Accordingly, a meaningful statement is either 
analytic or verifiable (Juma'h, 2006). Analytical statements are concerned with tautologies; 
it is true for all values, or self-contradictions.  The central doctrine of logical positivism is 
the verification theory of meaning, that is, a proposition is meaningful if and only if it can 
be empirically verified or if and only if there exists an empirical method or evidence for 
deciding the truthness and falseness (Brown, 1977). Logic and mathematics were 
meaningful since they tell us nothing but what was implicit in what we knew already, as 
their procedures defined a way of verifying any statement made within them (Juma'h, 
2006). 
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An alternative notion of confirmation is proposed to overcome the problems implicit in this 
approach. Although it is not possible to verify the law, it is possible to gradually increase 
confirmation of the law (Caldwell, 1984). This is to say, if in a continued series of a testing 
experiments no negative instance is found but the number of positive instances increases, 
then the confidence in the law will grow step by step (Juma'h, 2006). 
The second significant difficulty is concerned with the ontological status of theoretical 
terms, which are non-observable. Logical positivists held a dominant view that theories do 
not explain a phenomenon, a generic term used to cover both events and process (Ryan et 
al, 2002). Instead, logical positivists believe that theories are only tools for describing 
certain correlation between observed phenomena (Juma'h, 2006). At the observational 
level, logical positivists argue through the verification principle for a correspondence 
theory of truth, while at the theoretical level they would argue that truth is what is 
convenient rather than what is coherent at either the individual or social level (Aliyu et al, 
2014). 
There have been two broad strategies for dealing with these difficulties: the first simply 
denies the distinction between observational and theoretical terms. The second admits the 
distinction between theoretical and observational terms yet argues that theoretical terms 
have no real observational meaning. In this view, theoretical terms are merely convenient 
analytical constructions of observational terms whose purpose is to help in the derivation of 
novel observational implications and predictions. This latter approach has become known 
as ‘instrumentalism’ (Ryan et al, 2009).   
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The point at issue here is that the merits of the positivism outweigh its above discussed 
limitations. Importantly, it entails a great level of objectivity, has a strong predictive power 
and utilises quantitative analysis, which in turn allows for generalisation (Lopes, 2015). 
It is well documented that a good research is the one where the method chosen is driven by, 
and appropriate to, the research questions. Recalling the underlying research questions and 
objectives, the most appropriate research method that best serves the study’s objectives and 
promptly addresses the study’s questions is the “logical positivism“ research philosophy. 
The current research is scientific, structured, has a prior theoretical base, seeks to establish 
the nature of relationships and causes and effects, and employs empirical validation and 
statistical analyses to test and confirm theories and thus it is under the logical positivism 
research philosophy.  
Applying logical positivism in the current study rests on several reasons. Firstly, over the 
past decade, positivism has been, and continues to be regarded as the most suitable 
philosophy for accounting research. In particular, it fit perfectly the financial accounting 
and corporate governance research (Lopes, 2005). As mentioned by Bisman (2010), logical 
positivism presupposes that the scientific approach is appropriate to the discovery, 
explanation and prediction of accounting phenomena. Secondly, positivism suggests that 
“the research pursed is a scientific, structured, has a prior theoretical base, seeks to 
establish the nature of relationships and causes and effects, and employs empirical 
validation and statistical analyses to test and confirm theories” (Bisman, 2010; p.5). 
Thirdly, positivism as a research philosophy entails that the researcher is independent form 
the study and there are no provisions for human interests within the study (Crowther and  
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Lancaster, 2008). With adopting a positivism paradigm in the current study, the researcher 
maintains objective judgement and relies on facts and tests’ results for deriving conclusions 
and assuming generalisation of results. 
Up until this point, the discussion has been particularly concerned with introducing the 
different research philosophies with a coherent focus on the positivism approach, its 
assumptions, limitations, merits, and justifications for adopting it in the underlying 
research. To sum up and conclude this sub-section, a research method starts with a 
formulated theory emerged from literature review, and derives in the form of a 
mathematical model or in an interpretive or critical systematization. It is intended that from 
this process may result new knowledge towards the confirmation or refutation of the theory 
that have been supporting each research (Lopes, 2015). 
1.6.2 Research Design 
The two popular research designs are quantitative and qualitative research approaches. 
Quantitative approach measures things while qualitative approach aims to obtain insights 
about observations (Hague, 1998). The choice of the research design depends on the 
research philosophy adopted, the nature of the research objectives, and the research 
questions. The research design most suited to the logical positivism philosophy is the 
quantitative approach (Crotty, 1998, Lopes, 2015). Moreover, the nature of the research 
questions suggests the use of quantitative techniques. Recalling the research questions and 
objectives, quantitative techniques are more likely to provide valid answers, with a strong 
predictive power that could be generalised. Thus, in the underlying research, a quantitative  
approach is used to test for the hypothesis and reflect on the theoretical framework. 
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1.6.3 The Theoretical Framework 
The conceptual framework underlying the premises of the current research is the agency 
theory. Agency theory models the relationship between the principal (and agent). The 
nature of an agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Additionally, according to the agency theory, there is potential for 
a conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Generally, managers are 
perceived to have a tendency to maximise their own benefits. On the other hand, the 
celebrated goal is presumed to be maximising shareholders’ wealth (Loderer et al., 2010).  
Agency theory offers a fertile framework for addressing the association between disclosure 
quality and corporate governance. It is the most dominant theory in the governance 
literature (Carcello et al., 2006), and in particular is heavily used in explaining motivations 
for disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Similarly, agency theory frames the association 
between disclosure quality, corporate governance, and firm value (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
Therefore, agency theory is the most suitable theoretical framework to the current research 
that would best help to properly answer the research questions and achieve the research 
objectives. 
Notably, it is well documented in the literature that there are various theories other than 
agency theory which explain disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001; and Celik et al. 2006), for 
instance, signalling theory, attribution theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and 
institutional theory. Signalling theory assumes that managers of higher quality firms will 
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wish to distinguish themselves from lower quality firms through disclosures (Eccles et al., 
2001). According to the signalling theory, a firm’s performance will affect the extent of 
disclosure. Firm performance could be reflected by many performance measures, such as 
profitability, liquidity, and dividends paid. Attribution theory suggests that managers 
disclose bad information and attribute it to external causes beyond the management’s 
control (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). Legitimacy theory assumes that firms tend to disclose 
social and environmental information to indicate adherence to certain laws and related 
regulations (Shocker and Sethi, 1973; and Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). However, 
Oliveira et al. (2008) argue that legitimacy theory is more related to the reporting of 
intellectual capital. Stakeholder theory is similar to legitimacy theory in that it targets 
external users of financial reports other than shareholders such as employees, customers, 
government agencies, and lobby groups. Institutional theory suggests that managers are 
assumed to respond to institutional pressures in their corporate reports (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007).   
It is apparent from the above discussion that, unlike the agency theory, those theories 
explains the association between firm characteristics and disclosure but do not explain the 
relationship between corporate governance and disclosure or the association among 
disclosure, corporate governance, and firm value. Therefore, they are not best suited to the 
underlying research and, hence, agency theory is used as the main theoretical framework in 
the current research. The detailed aspects of the research methods; including sample 
selection, procedures of developing the disclosure quality measure, and statistical models 
used are discussed thoroughly in chapter Two. 
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1.7 Research Outline 
Chapter Two presents a through and detailed discussion of the research methodology 
employed in the current research. The research philosophy, theoretical framework, research 
design and research method of the three empirical studies are discussed. Each of the study’s 
method is discussed in details in separate sub-sections, including sample selection, data 
collection, type of models, and tests used to examine the related research questions. 
Chapter Three discusses voluntary disclosure definition and how it differs from mandatory 
disclosure. It also discusses different definitions of voluntary disclosure quality. 
Additionally, the chapter provides a wide review of various proxies for disclosure quality 
and discusses their limitations. Prior attempts to develop measures for disclosure quality 
are also reviewed, and the chapter then introduces an overview of the OFR Reporting 
Statement, the basis for developing the proposed measure. Accordingly, the chapter 
provides an innovative definition for disclosure quality and presents a detailed discussion 
of the seven quality dimensions, detailing how each dimension is measured to reach the 
overall quality score. 
Chapter Four develops an aggregated disclosure quality score. It starts by discussing the 
main steps followed to reach an aggregated quality score and highlights the methodology 
adapted in this regard; in doing so, it employs a content analysis approach that uses both 
computerised and manual methods. Five reliable keyword lists are developed. It then 
presents the formula used to derive the aggregated quality score. Finally, three reliability 
tests and three validity tests are conducted. Chapters Three and Four represent the first 
strand of the empirical work conducted in the thesis.  
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Chapter Five starts by discussing agency theory as the theoretical premise that backs the 
association between disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms, and their 
potential impact on firm value. It then reviews prior literature on the association between 
disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms. Additionally, it develops 
individual research hypotheses for the potential association between 14 corporate 
governance mechanisms and disclosure quality. 
Chapter Six presents the study design and the empirical analysis of the association between 
disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms. It begins by illustrating the 
reasons for using an OLS regression model in conducting the cross-sectional analysis. It 
discusses the sample selection process, empirical model and variable definitions. It also 
presents a descriptive analysis and discusses the interpretation of the empirical results. It 
ends by describing several robustness tests, which are also considered to validate the 
proposed disclosure quality measure developed in chapters Three and Four. Chapters Five 
and Six, then, represent the second strand of empirical work in the thesis. 
Chapter Seven provides the theoretical arguments in drafting the relationship between 
disclosure quality and firm value, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value, and 
the joint effect of both; disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
value. Moreover, it develops 15 hypotheses to answer related research questions.  
Chapter Eight contains an empirical examination of the 15 hypotheses developed in chapter 
Six. It starts by elaborating the study design and then discusses the endogeneity problem 
and the use of a fixed-effect panel data model to mitigate it. It then defines the sample and 
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the variables tested, and the empirical tests are presented and interpreted. Finally, the 
chapter discusses various robustness tests. 
Chapter Nine summarises the research aims, questions and main findings. It then discusses 
the implications of the results for academia and regulatory bodies. Finally, the research 
limitations and suggestions for future research are discussed.   
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The following figure 1.1 summarises the research objectives, questions, and research 
outline 
 
Figure 1.1: The Link between Research Objectives, Questions, and Research Outline 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 
No. 1&2 
Objective 
 No. 3 
Objective 
No. 4 
Objective 
No. 5 
Question 
No. 1   
Question 
No. 2 
Question 
No. 3 
Question 
No. 4 
 
 
 
Chapters  
2 & 3 & 4 
Chapters 
4 & 6 
Chapters 
5 & 6 
 
Chapters 
7 & 8 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
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2.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the detailed steps of the study design, sample selection, different models 
and tests used in the underlying research are thoroughly explained and justified. As detailed 
earlier in chapter One, chapters numbers Three, Five, and Seven set the theoretical 
background of the underlying research. Particularly, the nature, concept, and assumptions 
of agency theory are explored in depth in chapter Three. Chapter Five discusses the 
literature  regarding the relationship between different corporate governance mechanisms 
and disclosure quality. Based on agency theory, 14 research hypotheses are developed. 
Chapter Seven serves as a theoretical review of the relevant literature concerning the 
association between disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. 
Driven from the agency theory, 15 research hypotheses shaping the relationship among 
disclosure quality, corporate governance mechanisms and firm value are introduced.  
2.2 Research Method 
A research method is a technique or procedure used to gather and analyse data related to 
some research question or hypothesis (Crotty, 1998). In this sub-section, the researcher 
demonstrates the method followed in undertaking the underlying research to answer the 
research questions and meets the research objectives successfully. This section presents a 
detailed map of how the current study is conducted in terms of sampling, data gathering, 
the statistical models used, explaining results and deriving conclusions.  
 
39 
 
This study consists of three inter-related studies, for convenient presentation purposes, the 
upcoming sub-section elaborates firstly the common methodological aspect of the three 
studies, and then a separate sub-section will be devoted to the explanation of the research 
method(s) associated with each of the individual studies. 
 
2.2.1 Sample Selection 
This sub-section discusses the sample selection process. The basis of developing the 
proposed disclosure quality measure is the UK disclosure guidance issued by the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB, 2006). The sample used in the three studies is a UK-
based. The initial sample consists of FTSE 350 companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. FTSE 350 is chosen because it covers the economically most important 
companies (Abdullah and Page, 2009). The sample covers all industry sectors, except the 
financial sector. Financial firms are excluded because of the special nature of their 
operations, which differs from that of the non-financial firms (Schleicher and Walker, 
2010). Financial firms are concerned with financial products and instruments, which are 
regulated by different set of rules. Apparently, the OFR statement is mainly directed 
towards providing disclosure guidelines for non-financial firms and hence, it follows that 
the current study focuses only on non-financial firms. This gives a sample of 232 non-
financial firms.  
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In identifying industry sectors, level two Datastream industry classifications is used, which 
consists of ten industry sectors. More firms are lost for a number of reasons; these include 
missing annual reports (23 firms); missing data regarding some firm characteristics which 
could not be obtained elsewhere (42 firms); and an inability to convert PDF-format annual 
reports to text files (23 firms). Finally, firms remaining after these prior steps and were 
included in the pilot study (11 firms) are excluded. This results in a sample of 133 firms for 
each year.  
The sample period covers four years from 2006 to 2009. The analysis starts with 2006, 
because this is the first year the OFR reporting statement became a best practice statement. 
The analysis period ends with the latest available annual reports (annual reports for firms 
whose financial year ends in 2009) when the data for the current research is being collected 
in 2009. Accordingly, the final sample contains 133 firms. Each firm is analysed over the 
four years. Thus, the final sample consists of 532 firm-year observations.  
It is worthwhile to discuss whether there is a survivorship bias in the sample selection 
process. Survivorship bias is the tendency for failed firms to be excluded from performance 
studies due to the fact that they no longer exist, i.e. those companies which were 
unsuccessful enough to survive until the end of the analysis period) (Investor words. com). 
In the sample selection process, the researcher excluded firms for which annual reports 
were not available for the four years of the analysis. These firms only count for almost 10% 
of the sample (23/133). This percentage (17%) is not solely excluded due to, survivorship 
issue (i.e. firms that were unsuccessful enough to survive until the end of the analysis 
period).  
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However, some firms are excluded because they have entered the market after the 
beginning of the analysis period (i.e. 2006). For example, one company just entered the 
market in 2008, and thus has only 2 observations (2008 and 2009). Accordingly, the 
possibility of a survivorship bias is even less than 17% of the observations. There are two 
reasons, which justify including only firms that have annual reports in the four years of the 
analysis, namely: 
1- In the second and third studies, governance variables are included as the main 
independent variables. Governance variables are somewhat unchanged over very short 
time periods; therefore, continuous time series for each firm are more preferable in 
order to catch any change in governance variables. Notably, as discussed above, the 
four year time period is chosen because the OFR became a best practice statement in 
2006 and the analysis ends with the latest available annual reports (annual reports for 
firms whose financial year ends in 2009) when this research started in 2009. 
2- Another important reason is the need to have a balanced data set in the third study since 
a fixed effect model is used. It is worthwhile here to define balanced data: “In balanced 
panel data, all entities have measurements in all time periods. …When each entity in a 
data set has different numbers of observations due to missing values, the panel data are 
not balanced” (Park, 2009). The main limitation of unbalanced data is that it entails 
some computational and estimation issues (Park, 2009).  
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Therefore, based on the above mentioned reasons, the decision was to include only firms 
that have continuous observations over the four years. The trade-off between having 
insignificant survivorship bias and the accuracy of the empirical analysis in chapters Six 
and Eight, which is best achieved using balanced data (four observations for each firm), is 
in favour of the latter. Accordingly, the survivorship bias (less than 17%) does not affect 
the findings. The final sample contains 532 firm-year observations. Table 2.1 elaborates the 
sample selection steps. 
    Table 2.1: Sample Selection Process 
FTSE 350 350 firms 1400 firm-year observations 
Less non-UK firms 19 76  
Total  331 1324  
Less financial UK firms 99 396  
Total 232 928  
Less firms with missing reports (2006-2009) 23 92  
Total 209 836  
Less firms with missing firm characteristics 42 168  
Total 167 668  
Less firms with files that cannot be converted to text 
format 
23 
92  
Total 144 576 
Less firms remaining after the prior steps yet was 
included in the pilot study 
11 
44 
Final Sample 133 532 
        Table constructed by author. 
This sample is used for the first and second studies (chapters Four and Six). As for the third 
study (chapter Eight), some observations are lost. In particular, six firms are required to be 
deleted due to unavailable data on daily stock prices, which is used to calculate firm value.  
Another 5 firms were required to be deleted due to of unavailable data on sales growth.3 
Accordingly, 11 firms were lost, i.e. 44 firm-year observations (11 firms * 4 years). 
                                                 
3Sales growth is used as a control variable. This variable is mainly extracted from Datastream, as detailed later. The 
researcher tried to hand-collect the missed data from the annual reports; however, the dropped observations are related to 
firms that were not listed before 2005 and 2004, whereas data on sales of 2003, 2004, and 2005 is needed to calculate 
sales growth for 2006. Another difficulty faced is determining the annual compound rate used. Therefore, those firms are 
excluded from the sample. 
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 Therefore, the final sample used for investigating the joint effect of disclosure quality and 
corporate governance on firm value is reduced to 488 firm-year observations.  
 
2.2.2 Study One: Developing the Disclosure Quality Score 
 This is the first study in the underlying research. As outlined earlier in chapter One (figure 
1.1), this study is associated with two research objectives and answers two research 
questions. In correspondence to the first research objective, this study (chapter Three) 
involves introducing and developing a sound measure for disclosure quality (disclosure 
quality hereafter) that overcomes limitations imbedded in prior attempts to develop such 
measures. Chapter Four is related to the second research objective where five highly 
reliable keyword lists pertaining to narrative reporting (forward-looking, quantitative, bad 
news, good news and scope) are developed. 
Indeed, prior attempts (these attempts and their limitations are discussed in details in 
chapter Three, section 3.5) to develop disclosure quality measures have many limitations. 
First, there is no clear definition for the concept of disclosure quality. Second, there is no 
justification for the assumption that disclosure quality is a function of the stated disclosure 
quality dimensions; thus, Botosan (2004) argues that any measure for disclosure quality 
should start with a well-supported and convincing discussion of the information dimensions 
proposed by a regulatory framework. Third, some of these measures are restricted to one 
type of best practice disclosure (i.e. risk disclosure in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a, and 
forward-looking disclosure in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Finally, these measures 
overemphasise quantity in their way of calculating disclosure quality. 
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In an attempt to propose a sound measure for disclosure quality, the study employs an 
innovative computerised4 content analysis approach and develops new keyword lists 
relevant to the OFR disclosure context, which will enable large-scale disclosure studies to 
be conducted.  
 As detailed later in chapter Three, there are continuous calls (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004; 
Beyer et al., 2010, and Berger, 2011) in the recent literature to improve content analysis 
and introduce a reliable computerised content analysis technique. The current study 
answers these calls.  
 
2.2.2.1 Content Analysis as a Research Methodology 
Content analysis has a long history of use by a growing array of researchers (Neuendorf, 
2002). It is defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from data to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 21). It is “an observational research 
method that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of recorded 
communications [that] can also be analysed at many levels (image, word, roles, etc.), 
thereby creating a realm of research opportunities” (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991, p. 243). It is 
the “systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 
2002, p. 1). The underlying principle of content analysis is that “the many words of a text 
can be classified into many fewer content categories, where each category consists of one 
or many similar words or word phrases, and that each word or phrase occurrence can be 
counted and the counts compared analytically“ (Kothari et al., 2009, p. 1649). 
                                                 
4 Of the seven quality dimensions, only one dimension (comparability) is captured through manual content 
analysis. 
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Content analysis as research technique provides new insights, representation of facts, and a 
practical guide to action (Krippendorff, 1980). Moreover, it is useful in analysing different 
levels of communication, as defined by the meanings of the words themselves (Kothari et 
al., 2009).  It fits the positivism paradigm of social research (Gunter, 2000).  
Despite the merits of content analysis in general, however, traditional (manual) content 
analysis entails several limitations: it is labour intensive, time consuming, tiresome and 
costly; consequently, studies using manual content analysis are rarely implemented or 
extended into other research areas (Nacos et al., 1991). This fact is also documented by 
Shevlin (2004), who argues that studies requiring extensive manual data collection – or 
even data analysis – entail high implementation costs and subjective judgements that are 
limited in value. Arguably, manual content analysis is highly subjective and the probability 
of human mistakes is high, thereby affecting the reliability of the measure. Additionally, 
traditional content analysis hinders the analysis of large sample size, and hence result 
accuracy is questioned. Examples of prior studies employing manual content analysis 
include: (Ho and Wong, 2001; Peters et al., 2001; Evans, 2004; Willekens et al., 2005; 
Lakhal , 2005; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; Celik et al., 2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007;Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; 
O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Laksamana, 2008; 
Li et al., 2008; and Hoitash et al., 2009). 
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Nevertheless, if computers could be programmed to perform sophisticated coding with the 
degree of reliability expected from human coding, this opens the generalisation opportunity 
of the research findings (Nacos et a l., 1991). Krippendorff (1980) limits the term 
“computerised (computational) content analysis” to situations in which a computer is 
programmed to mimic, model, replicate, or represent some aspects of the social context of 
the data it processes; (Hussainey et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2004; Henry, 2008; Kothari et 
al., 2009; and Grüning, 2011) are examples of studies using computerised content analysis. 
The advantages of using computerised content analysis are apparent. The first obvious 
merit is the ability to test large sample size and consequently increase the credibility of 
findings and improve generalisability. Krippendorff (1980) believes that computerised 
processes are deterministic, highly reliable, and allow control over the behaviour of the 
computer, and that they are therefore equivalent to a perfect theory of representation. 
Moreover, Hussainey et al. (2003) argue that comparability among firms is easy when 
using computerised content analysis, as the keywords and topics are unified across different 
firm years. Finally, the ability to replicate the disclosure score adds to the merits of 
computerised content analysis.  
However, as discussed earlier in chapter One, Section 2, while innovative language 
processing techniques provide premises for innovative disclosure quality measurement, 
current attempts to develop a computerised approach for content analysis do suffer some 
weaknesses (Berger, 2011). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the current 
computerised content analysis approaches in the literature suffer from some limitations. 
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One common limitation is the use of ready-made language processing software5 (e.g. 
Henry, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; and Li, 2010a). Berger (2011) questions the ability of 
such general dictionary software to analyse the special corporate filling language. 
For instances, Grüning (2011)’s proposed computerised language technique is a step 
toward improved computerised content analysis, however, it suffers from some limitations. 
The first of which is the focus on only one dimension of disclosure quality (i.e. 
comprehensiveness). A second apparent limitation is the lack of a reliable and solid 
regulatory/guidance framework for selecting the disclosure topics. The third limitation is 
that the reliability of AIMD is not assessed. By contrast, the underlying proposed 
disclosure quality measure is a computerised technique that allows the evaluation of all 
OFR quality dimensions- the guidance framework used to derive the quality dimensions- 
not just the comprehensiveness of disclosure. Second, the proposed disclosure quality 
measure is tested for reliability.  
Irrespective of being traditional or computerised, the content analysis in the form of mere 
counting of certain information neglects the relative difference in value of different 
information for users (Hussainey et al., 2003).  
                                                 
5 Ready-made language processing software includes imbedded dictionaries to allow for automated word 
search and count. Such general dictionaries are not tailored for specific context such as financial reporting. 
This type of software does not allow the user to develop a customised dictionary to fit the corporate filling 
context. 
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After reviewing the related disclosure literature (e.g. Beekes and Brown, 2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; and Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011), one can argue that a more serious 
limitation of this type of content analysis – as employed in prior studies (e.g. Celik et al., 
2006; and Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007) as well as other index-based disclosure scores (e.g. 
Cheung et al., 2010; and Jiang et al., 2010) – is that it is not a good indicator for the level of 
disclosure quality. 
Yet, in using content analysis as a research technique in this study, the researcher avoids 
the mere counting of sentences, and thereby overcomes the inherent limitation of the 
content analysis outlined previously. In short, it is not a limitation incorporated in the 
content analysis itself; rather, the limitation lies in the way in which the content analysis is 
used. The next section elaborates steps employed to report a score for a firm’s disclosure 
quality. 
2.2.2.2 Steps for Calculating the Disclosure Quality Score 
The proposed disclosure score is derived through a series of sequential steps. Figure 2.1 
shows these steps.  
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Figure 2.1: Steps for Developing the Disclosure Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selecting the Sample  
 
Preparing the Text for Coding 
 
 Identifying the Text Unit of Analysis  
 
Constructing Keyword Lists (Customised Dictionaries) 
 
 
 
Surveying Prior Lists (Preliminary List) 
Reading a sample of OFR Statements and Refining the Preliminary 
List (Refined List) 
 
Checking the Reliability of the Refined List (Accuracy) 
 Approving the Final Keyword List 
Reliability of the Coding Sachems (Stability and Reproducibility) 
 
Validity Tests  
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Step One: Sample selection-Pilot study  
The first step is the sample selection process. Sample selection procedures are detailed 
above in the previous section (2.2.1). Of particular interest to this study is the pilot study.  
Given the nature of the current research, a pilot study is first undertaken to check the 
reliability of the underlying research methodology. It examines five dissimilar industry 
sectors to control for industry characteristics. These include oil and gas, consumer goods, 
consumer services, healthcare and telecommunications. For each industry sector, three 
firms are randomly selected. The first firm is the market leader6 over the analysis period. 
To detect differences – if any – in profit- and loss-making firms, the second firm is 
randomly selected from the profit-making firms and the third firm is the one with the 
highest loss figure in the latest available year (2009). Overall, the pilot study embraces 15 
firms analysed over three years, therefore, the pilot study contains 45 firm-year 
observations extracted from FTSE 350 index. After confirming the reliability of the 
research method, the same methodology (as discussed below) is applied for a large-scale 
sample in order to gain generalised results. Firms used in the reliability test are not included 
in the main study.  
Step Two: Preparing the Text for Coding 
The second step is text preparation for coding. Firstly, annual reports are downloaded in 
PDF format from the Northcote Database. The QSR N6 software is used to code the 
narrative statements. QSR N6 codes text files only. Therefore, each annual report is then 
converted to a text file. Afterwards, the OFR statement is saved in a separate text file.  
                                                 
6Market leadership is based on the market share. For more details on the definition of market leader and calculation 
procedures, see chapter Four, section 4.7.7.  
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There is rarely a definitive document entitled OFR in the annual reports. When the 
researcher scans the annual reports to identify the OFR statements, it was noticed that, most 
firms produce a best practice statement under many different titles. Only 16.7% of the firms 
use the term OFR. Notably, 33% of firms display the same contents under the titles 
“Business Review”. Few firms (1.7%) use the title “Chief Executive’s Review”. The 
majority of firms (35.6%) include two separate sections called “Operating Review” and 
“Financial Review”. This totals 505 firms, representing 87% of the sample. The remaining 
13% produce either an “Operating (Business) Review” only (11%), or a “Financial 
Review” (2%).  
On 2007, The ASB surveyed the UK narratives on a review statement. The review 
concludes that: 
 “The companies reviewed are titling their narrative reporting sections using a variety of 
names, such as Business Review, OFR, or Performance review, as well as the more 
traditional Chairman’s and Chief Executive’s reviews (ASB, 2007, Summary of 
conclusion, para. 1.10). 
 
“In this survey when scoring for compliance against the Reporting Statement (OFR) all 
narrative sections of the annual report have been reviewed irrespective of the title of the 
section. Deloitte, in their survey, noted that approximately 75 per cent of companies either 
prepare a formal OFR or show clear recognition of OFR principles when preparing their 
annual reports. A similar outcome is shown in this survey with generally high levels of 
compliance to Reporting Statement requirements even from those companies not preparing 
a formal OFR” (ASB, 2007, Summary of conclusion, para. 1.11). 
 
 “While narrative reporting is still evolving, and whatever name is given to the narrative 
sections of the annual report, the overall impression is that there appears to be a 
willingness among many companies to go beyond strict legal requirements and to move 
towards best practice reporting. The ASB hopes that trend will continue” (ASB, 2007, 
Summary of conclusion, para. 1.13). 
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Similarly, the ASB’s 2009’s survey did not evaluate the narratives based on its content. 
However, the content of the narrative is analysed and accordingly is classified as 
mandatory (compliant with the Companies Act 2006) or best practice (OFR).  
From the above discussion, it could be concluded that: firstly, the ASB does not 
differentiate between mandatory or best practice disclosure based on the title of the 
statement, i.e. Business Review versus OFR. Secondly, since most companies, as 
documented in the ASB (2007)’s survey are attempting to comply with the best practice 
OFR even when not formally naming the statement, “OFR” excluding those companies that 
have a title “Business Review” from the analysis will bias the sample. 
Additionally the researcher conducts in-depth analysis of the narratives of some firms in 
the sample, in order to investigate whether the title of the narrative is associated with its 
content. The analysis is sub-divided into two parts. The first part (A) related to statements 
titled “Business Review”. The second part (B) related to statements titled “OFR”.   
A- Below are examples for companies producing “Business Review” while acknowledging 
that recommendations of the OFR have been followed: 
Example 1: Daily Mail and General Trust plc (2009) 
This company has a heading “Business Review”; however, it is stated on p. 6 of its annual 
report that:  
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“This business review is addressed to the members of the company. Its purpose is to help 
them assess how the directors have performed in their duty to promote the success of the 
company. It is framed by the principles and guidelines for OFRs published by the UK 
Accounting Standards Board in 2006. It outlines the main operational and financial factors 
underpinning the development, performance and position of the Group as well as those 
likely to affect performance over the coming year, illustrating this with key performance 
indicators”.   
 
Example 2: Pearson plc (2009) 
This company has a heading “Business Review”. However, it is stated on p. 2 of its annual 
report that:  
“Our Business Review on pages 8 to 43 has been prepared in accordance with the 
Directors’ report Business Review Requirement of section 417 of the Companies Act 2006. 
It also incorporates much of the guidance set out in the Accounting Standards Board’s 
Reporting Statement on the OFR”.  
 
Example 3: Kesa plc (2008) 
This company has a heading “Business Review”. However, one of the sub-headings is 
“Operating business and Financial Review”. 
Example 4: Ultra plc (2009) 
This company does not provide a “Business Review” nor an “OFR”, rather, separate 
sections titled: “performance”, “risks” and “corporate social responsibility” are included. 
However, in the directors’ report, under the title Business Review, it is stated on p. 36 that:  
“Business review: The company is required to set out in this report a fair review of the 
business of the Group during the financial year ended 31 December 2009 and of the 
position of the Group at the end of that financial year, together with a description of the 
principal risks and uncertainties facing the Group. The information that satisfies these 
requirements can be found in the following sections: Ultra’s performance in 2009 on pages 
14 to 24 and Management of risks and uncertainties and corporate responsibility on pages 
25 to 31”. 
54 
 
In conclusion, in line with the ASB’s survey, analysing some narratives shows that there is 
a clear recognition of the OFR principles in annual reports even when the title given to the 
statement is “Business Review”. 
B- Below are examples for companies producing “OFR” statement while acknowledging 
that requirements for “Companies Act” have been followed: 
Example 1: Cook plc (2006) 
This company titled two statements: “Operating Review” and “Financial Review”. 
However, in the directors’ report under the title “Business Review”, it is stated (p.35) that: 
“As required by the Companies Act 1985, the Company must provide a fair review of the 
development and performance of the Group during 2006, its financial position at the end of 
the year and likely future developments in the Group’s business, together with information 
on environmental matters and employees and a description of the principal risks and 
uncertainties facing the Group. The information which satisfies these requirements, to the 
extent that it is not included in this report, is to be found in the Chief Executive’s Review on 
pages 12 to 13; the Operating Review on pages 14 to 27; the Financial Review on pages 
28 to 32; and the Corporate Social Responsibility section on pages 33 and 34; each of 
these is incorporated in this report by reference”. 
 
Example 2: National plc (2007)   
This company titled a statement of “OFR”. It is stated (p.38) that: 
“Reviews of the business, likely future developments and details of principal risks and 
uncertainties as required by Section 234ZZB of the Companies Act 1985 can be found in 
the following pages and are incorporated into this report by reference: Chairman’s 
Statement on pages 7 to 9, Chief Executive’s Review on pages 10 to 13, OFR on pages 14 
to 35”. 
 
Example 3: Dairy  Crest Group plc (2008)  
This company titled statements of “Operating” and “Financial Review”. However, in the 
directors’ report under the title “Business Review”, it is stated (p.43) that: 
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“The information satisfying the Business Review requirements is set out in this report: the 
Chairman’s statement on page 3; Chief Executive’s review on pages 4 to 5; Operating 
review on pages 6 to 21; and Financial Review on pages 22 to 24, all of which are 
incorporated into this report by reference”. 
 
Example 4: Lonmin plc (2009) 
This company titled a statement of “Operating” and “Financial Review”. However, in the 
directors’ report under the title “Business Review”, it is stated (p.62) that: 
“The Companies Act 2006, Section 417 requires that the Directors present a Business 
Review in this report to inform shareholders of the Company and help them assess how the 
Directors have performed their duty to promote the success of the Company. The 
information that fulfils this requirement can be found in the sections set out below and is 
incorporated by reference into this report: The Chairman’s Letter on pages 4 and 5; The 
Chief Executive’s Review (including discussion of the main trends and factors likely to 
affect the future development, performance and position of the Company’s business) on 
pages 6 to 8; The Operational Review on pages 9 to 15; The Financial Review on pages 18 
to 25”. 
In sum, companies are producing “OFR” statements, while incorporating in this statement 
Business Review requirements as well as OFR best practice principles. Additionally, 
Business Review requirements are usually incorporated in many sections of the narrative, 
not only in the “OFR”. Examples include Chairman Statement. 
The above discussion reinforces the overlap between OFR and the Business Review 
discussed in chapter Three, section 3.9. In summary, following the approach adopted by the 
ASB, all titles of narrative (i.e. OFR, Business Review, Chief Executive’s Review, 
Operating Review, and Financial Review) are included in the analysis to avoid selection 
bias.  
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In preparing the text for coding, the researcher manually scans the narrative section of the 
annual report of each firm to locate and identify those sections to be considered as part of 
the OFR statements. This is done based on the scope and framework defined by the ASB. 
To check the reliability of this step, the researcher identifies OFR statements in a separate 
text file, and then Dr. Hussainey who possesses a comprehensive knowledge in the content 
analysis field randomly checks a sample of these files prepared by the researcher before 
coding. No disagreement was identified in this regard.  
Step Three: Define the Analysis Text Unit  
The two most commonly used analysis text units in prior literature are “word” and 
“sentence”. Using “sentence” as the analysis text unit is generally considered more reliable 
than “item”, “paragraph”, or “word” (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Following Muslu et al. 
(2010), the researcher uses the sentence as a unit of analysis for five information 
dimensions which needs keywords list (understandability and comparability does not 
require the construction of keywords list).  
Step Four: Constructing Keyword Lists (Customised Dictionaries) 
As mentioned earlier, a pilot study for a random sample of 45 firm-year observations is 
utilised to check the reliability of the content analysis; therefore, the discussion on 
constructing the keyword lists is based on the pilot study. A keyword list is a customised 
dictionary, which the computer uses to code the OFR statements.  
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In order to content analyse and measure some qualitative dimensions of disclosure, several 
keyword lists are required. Indeed, determining the frequency of occurrence for a specific 
word criterion via the computer software requires the development of a set of keywords 
(keyword list) to search for such criterion (the remaining of this sub-section elaborates this 
process in details).  
In this research, five keyword lists are developed to help identify and evaluate five of the 
quality dimensions, namely; forward-looking, quantitative, bad news, good news, and 
spread. The readability dimension does not need a keyword list; rather, it is captured via the 
LIX score. Similarly, since KPIs are analysed manually, it does not require a keyword list 
either.  
Typically, three steps are followed in developing each keywords list. The first step involves 
reviewing existing keyword lists developed through prior disclosure studies and 
accordingly, creating a preliminary keyword list. The extant literature is prone to several 
limitations in this regard. The prime limitation in the available keyword lists, with the 
exception of Abrahamson and Amir (1996), and Hussainey et al. (2003), is that they do not 
discuss the procedures undertaken to ensure the reliability of such lists. The reliability of a 
keyword list means the accuracy of the list in reflecting what it is designed to reflect. 
Importantly, accuracy is deemed the strongest reliability test available (Krippendorff, 
1980). Accuracy is “the degree to which a process functionally conforms to a known 
standard, or yields what it is designed to yield” (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 131).  
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Abrahamson and Amir (1996) is an example of the few studies, which assess the reliability 
of keywords in their keywords lists. Abrahamson and Amir (1996) use “words” as a text 
unit to measure bad news information. They created a final list of bad news keywords that 
appeared more than 30 times in a US president’s letter, according to the computerised 
analysis. They then manually read each paragraph in which the bad news keyword was 
coded to judge the reliability of the keyword. Hussainey et al. (2003) demonstrate that their 
keywords list was able to capture only 55.2% of the actual forward-looking sentences in the 
narrative section. 
The second limitation of the available keyword lists is that most of them are derived from 
different information contexts rather than those of financial reporting and, more precisely, 
voluntarily disclosed information. For example, Abrahamson and Amir’s (1996) study is 
focused on a president’s letters, whilst the studies of Henry (2008) and Henry and Leone 
(2009) look at earnings press releases. Different information contexts probably contain 
words that are different from those usually used in best practice reporting sections in 
financial statements. The study of Hussainey and Walker (2008) is an exception, since the 
authors investigate the narrative section in analyst reports.   
Given these limitations, it is evident that prior keyword lists need to be refined. 
Refinements should meet two objectives: first, there is a need to develop keyword lists that 
reflect the particular UK OFR context. Second, there is a need to develop keyword lists, 
which are demonstrably reliable. To meet these objectives, a random selection of 45 firms 
from five different industries are used as a pilot study to facilitate the reliability tests.  
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If the current study develops reliable keyword lists relevant to the OFR context, the study 
will have invoked a novel contribution to the literature by developing multiple reliable 
keywords lists suitable for the context of OFR disclosures in the UK, which can facilitate 
future research and avoid limitations associated with manual content analysis such as 
extensive time and cost, and consequently enable large-scale sample studies to be 
conducted.  
The second step aims to figure out related keywords used in OFR statements other than 
those utilised in prior studies; this step ends by creating a refined keywords list. This is 
done through reading a sample of five OFR statements, representing 11% of the pilot study 
sample. Step three is focused on checking the reliability of each keyword. A reliability test 
is performed through reading a random sample of 30 sentences for each keyword in the 
refined list and evaluating it. In those few cases where there was ambiguity in coding the 
sentences, the researcher consulted the second supervisor to obtain a second independent 
opinion.   
For all keyword lists except the good news list, a word is included in the final keyword list 
if it appears in its relevant context at least in 90% of the sentences. For good news 
keywords, the ratio is 80%. The reliability percentage of the keywords is generally lower in 
the case of good news keywords than it is for forward-looking and bad news keywords. 
Only three keywords exhibit 100% reliability, denoting a good news sentence, and four 
keywords range from 90% to 100%. Accordingly, it was decided to decrease the minimum 
acceptable percentage to 80%.   
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Thus, for a word to be included in the good news keywords list, this word should at least 
reflect a good news context in 80% of the sentences in which, such a word appears. On this 
basis the keywords list contains 23 good news keywords. The following sub-sections 
elaborate the steps for developing each keywords list.  
1- Forward-Looking Keywords List 
To measure the forward-looking orientation and relevance dimensions, the researcher 
creates a forward-looking keywords list (the proposed measures for each of the OFR 
quality dimensions is discussed in details in chapter Three, section 3.7). The first step is to 
use three keyword lists from prior research as preliminary lists; these include Hussainey et 
al. (2003), Morgan (2008) and Muslu et al. (2010). Table 2.2 details the preliminary list, 
which includes 73 words. 
Table 2.2: Preliminary Forward-Looking Keywords List 
Common keywords 
among the three lists 
Anticipate, Estimate, Expect, Intend, Intention, Will. 
Morgen (2008) only Contemplate, Continue, Projection. 
Muslu et al. (2009) only Aim, Assume, Commit, Following (month; quarter; years; period), Future, Project. 
Hussainey et al. (2003) 
only 
Accelerate, Await, Confidence, Confident, Envisage, Eventual, Forthcoming (month; 
quarter; years; period), Likely, Look-ahead, Look-forward, Novel, Optimistic, Planned, 
Planning, Prospect, Remain, Renew, Scope for, Scope to, Shall, Shortly, Soon, 
Subsequent (month; quarter; year; period), Unlikely, Well-placed, Well-positioned. 
Common keywords 
between Morgan (2008) 
and Muslu et al. (2009) 
Plan, Target. 
Common keywords 
between Hussainey et al.  
(2003) and Morgan 
(2008) 
Outlook, Predict, Should.  
Common keywords 
between Hussainey et al. 
(2003) and Muslu et al. 
(2009) 
Coming (month; quarter; year; period), Foresee, Hope, Incoming (month; quarter; year; 
period), Next (month; quarter; year; period), Seek, Upcoming (month; quarter; year; 
period). 
Table constructed by author.  
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Importantly, following  Hussainey (2004) in eliminating verbs that may come in the past 
context, the use of verbs as keywords is restricted into certain conjugations that always 
come only in the forward-looking context. This approach improves the accuracy of the 
content analysis in capturing only forward-looking sentences. These conjugations are 
illustrated using the verb “anticipate”:  
 
 
The use of these conjugations avoids capturing sentences including “anticipate” in the past 
context, for instance “was anticipated”, “were anticipated”, “was anticipating”, and “were 
anticipating”.  
The second step in constructing the forward-looking keywords list involves reading a 
sample of five OFR statements for potential keywords that were not previously identified in 
the preliminary list. This step reveals a new keyword that was not previously included in 
relevant lists – “investment” – which is used in the forward-looking context in OFR 
statements. Therefore, the refined list consists of 74 keywords. 
Additionally, reading a sample of OFR statements highlights an important observation: 
successive years always denote a forward-looking orientation. Meanwhile, including these 
years may cause issues when coding sentences including both quantitative and forward-
looking keywords. To illustrate, the software may consider the following sentence as 
quantitative and forward-looking, when in fact it is qualitative and forward-looking: 
 
Anticipate, anticipates, is anticipating, is not anticipating, are anticipating, are not 
anticipating, is anticipated, is not anticipated, are anticipated, are not anticipated. 
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To overcome this issue, after constructing the quantitative keywords list explained in the 
next section, a report of all sentences containing both forward-looking and quantitative 
keywords is obtained through the software. Afterwards, 100 sentences were randomly 
selected in order to analyse this problem at a deeper level. Results show the following: 
firstly, 43% of the sentences are qualitative, yet are considered as quantitative by the 
software because of the inclusion of the year number. Secondly, 30% (out of 43%) of the 
sentences contain the next successive year number. Thirdly, firms use the term “next year”, 
or “following year” to indicate an event in the next successive year. The following example 
illustrates this: 
 
 
Notably, firms usually include another forward-looking keyword in addition to the 
successive year in numbers (e.g. 2007), as the following example illustrates:  
 
 
 
The privatisation of state-owned Connexxion is expected in 2007(Arriva – OFR, 2006). 
 
This total offer of 3,400 items will be rolled out to additional stores over the next year 
(Sainsburys – OFR, 2008). 
 
In 2007, a further ten leadership teams are expected to participate in a well-being program (Unilever – 
OFR, 2006). 
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Fourthly, firms use numerical years to indicate a plan beyond one year, and 13% of such 
sentences do not include another forward-looking keyword, as seen in the following 
example: 
 
 
Fifthly, by observation, the numerical years usually used are those from a five-year time 
period. Drawing on the above observations, two trade-offs are available. The first involves 
overlooking the successive years as forward-looking keywords. Such an approach would 
result in losing 13% of forward-looking sentences, which in turn is likely to affect both the 
forward-looking and the forward-looking quantitative dimensions. 
 At the other end, including the four future years as keywords whilst ignoring the year 
immediately following the report’s current year would result in getting 12% noise only in 
the quantitative dimension.7 Accordingly, evaluating these two alternatives drives the 
decision in favour of the second. Therefore, only four successive years will be included as 
forward-looking keywords. For example, for 2006 OFR statements, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 
2011 are included as forward-looking keywords. 
                                                 
7Notably, there is no quantitative dimension in the aggregated score; however, the qualitative dimension is calculated as 1 
– the quantitative dimension. 
The contract has been extended to March 2011 (Kcom Group – OFR, 2008). 
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After refining the preliminary forward-looking keywords list based on the modifications 
highlighted in step number two, the researcher writes a separate command file8 for each 
year in the pilot study. The QSR N6 then is run and the 45 OFR statements are coded 
accordingly. After getting the reports generated by the software, the next step is to test the 
reliability of each of these keywords individually. 
In determining the benchmark for our reliability test, the researcher refers to Hussainey et 
al.’s (2003) study. The authors include a word as forward-looking if it denotes a forward-
looking sentence in at least 67% of the sentences. This benchmark is not chosen on a 
specific base, but it is a subjective benchmark (Hussainey, 2004). However, they contend 
that this benchmark allows the computer software to correctly identify only 55% of 
forward-looking sentences actually included in the annual report narrative sections. This 
means, 45% of the forward-looking sentences are missed, which presents a crucial 
limitation. This would significantly affect the accuracy of the results and may question any 
conclusion derived from the empirical tests. 
In an effort to promote and improve the computer’s ability to capture a forward-looking 
sentence, the researcher increases the benchmark for the reliability test to 90% instead of 
Hussainey et al. (2003)’s of 67%.  As detailed later in the validity tests, chapter Three, 
setting the benchmark at 90% promotes the software ability to successfully identify 
forward-looking sentences. 
                                                 
8 To increase the speed of coding, the researcher writes a command file. The command file is a batch of order to tell the 
software how to code the text based on the keywords list. The command file is written once, and can then be reprocessed 
endless times.  
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 When comparing a sample of the manual and computerised content analysis, results show 
that the proposed keywords list successfully captures 97% of actual forward-looking 
sentences. This conclusion enforces the validity of the results driven using this modified 
computerised content analysis. Accordingly, a word is included in the final forward-
looking keyword list if at least 90% of the sentences including such keywords discuss 
future-related events. This approach is known as a meaning-oriented approach 
(Krippendorff, 1980).  
Table 2.3 shows the results of the reliability test of the refined keywords list. Column 1 lists 
the refined keywords list (74 words). Column 2 indicates the number of sentences in which 
the word occurs in a forward-looking context. Column 3 indicates the total number of 
sentences checked. For each word, a random sample of 30 sentences is checked. Those 
words, which occur less than 50 times in the whole sample are fully checked without 
sampling. Column 4 shows the occurrence percentage of each word. This is the result of 
dividing column 2 over column 3.  
 Looking at Table 2.3 indicates that 26 words always occur in a forward-looking context, 
i.e. percentage of occurrence –column 4- is 100%. Additionally, nine words usually occur 
in a forward-looking context. These are words meeting or exceeding the pre-determined 
benchmark of 90%. The reliability test of the refined keywords list leads to the 
identification of 35 keywords, which indicate a forward-looking sentence in at least 90% of 
the sentences in which such keywords appear. 
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Nonetheless, to further strengthen the reliability of the keywords, words occurring between 
Hussainey et al. (2003)’s benchmark (67%) and that of the current study (90%) are 
investigated further. These count for seven words: “remain”, “investment”, “renew”, 
“should”, “hope”, “intention” and “prospect”. For each keyword, a sample of 30 sentences 
where such keywords come in a forward-looking context is examined. The extent to which 
such words are accompanied by other forward-looking keywords from the approved list is 
calculated. Table 2.3 reports the results of these reliability checks. 
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Table 2.3: Reliability Test of the Refined Forward-Looking Keywords List 
Forward-Looking Keywords Number of Sentences 
Detected 
Total Number of 
Sentences 
Percentage 
[Looks|looking|look][forward|ahead] 1 1 100 
Anticipate 30 30 100 
Estimate 30 30 100 
Intend 30 30 100 
Expect 30 30 100 
Predict 26 26 100 
Seek 30 30 100 
Year ahead|years ahead 16 16 100 
Will 30 30 100 
Aim 30 30 100 
Future 30 30 100 
Well-positioned|well-placed 4 4 100 
Outlook 18 18 100 
Could 30 30 100 
[(Up)(forth)(in)coming||next|subsequent|following] 
[month] 
30 30 100 
Shortly 16 17 94.11 
Goal 28 30 93.33 
Likely|unlikely 28 30 93.33 
Shall 11 12 91.66 
Confident 11 12 91.66 
Eventual 10 11 90.90 
Soon 9 10 90 
Potential 27 30 90 
Continue 27 30 90 
Remain 26 30 86.66 
Investment 23 30 76.66 
Renew 6 8 75 
Should 21 30 70 
Hope 11 16 68.75 
Intention 30 44 68.18 
Prospect 20 30 66.66 
Target 20 30 66.66 
Envisage 3 5 60 
Objective 17 29 58.62 
Accelerate 11 19 57.89 
May 17 30 56.66 
Believe 16 30 53.33 
Projection 6 12 50 
Scope for|scope to 9 18 50 
Assume 7 19 36.84 
Effort 11 30 36.66 
Current 10 30 33.33 
Plan 10 30 33.33 
Novel 7 30 23.33 
Approximately 7 30 23.33 
Project 5 30 16.66 
Guidance 4 49 8.16 
Contemplate 0 0 0 
Await 0 0 0 
Convince 0 0 0 
Optimistic 0 0 0 
Table constructed by author. Column 1 lists the 74 forward-looking keywords included in the refined list. Column 2 shows the number of 
sentences detected where the keyword comes in the forward-looking context. Column 3 lists the total sentences. Column 4 presents the 
percentage of sentences where the keyword comes in the forward-looking context. [next|subsequent|following] [Month] means next 
month, subsequent month, and following month. 
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Table 2.4: Doubtful Forward-Looking Keywords 
Doubtful Forward-
Looking  Keywords 
Number of Sentences 
Having Another Forward-
Looking Keyword. 
Total 
Sample 
Percentage of Sentences Including 
Another Forward-Looking Keyword 
Intention 18 30 60 
Remain 28 30 93.33 
Renew 5 6 83.33 
Should 27 30 90 
Prospects 16 20 80 
Hope 5 11 45.45 
Investment 28 30 93.3 
Table constructed by author. Column 1 presents doubtful forward-looking keywords; words that range between the current study’s 
benchmark (90%) and Hussainey et al. (2003)’s (67%). Column 2 shows the number of sentences where another forward-looking 
keyword accompanies the doubtful forward-looking keyword. Column 3 shows the total number of sentences included in the sample. 
Column 4 presents the percentage of other forward-looking keywords; it denotes the percentage of sentences where another forward-
looking keyword accompanies the doubtful one. 
  
 Table 2.4 shows that, in most cases, all keywords except “hope” are accompanied by other 
forward-looking keyword(s). The following example clarifies this point:9 
 
 
 
When the researcher firstly examines the presence of the word “Intention” in a forward-
looking context, the ratio is 68%, which falls between the current study’s benchmark (90%) 
and Hussainey et al.’s (2003) (67%). Then the probability that this word is accompanied by 
another forward-looking word that meets the current study’s benchmark is examined. It is 
found that, “intention” is accompanied by another forward-looking word (e.g. “future”) in 
60% of cases.   
                                                 
9 For more examples on the other doubtful keywords see Appendix 3.   
It is the intention to grow future dividends on an annual base in line with underlying earnings growth, 
maintaining dividends per share at approximately 60% of adjusted earnings per share (Vodafone – OFR, 
2006). 
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Accordingly, it was decided to exclude “intention” from the final list since it is captured 
through “future”. On the other hand, when the researcher follows the same process, the 
researcher decides to include “hope” in the final forward-looking list because it is not 
usually accompanied by another forward-looking word (45%). The following example 
illustrates a case where “hope” comes solely in a forward-looking context. 
 
 
 
 
The preceding steps lead to a final list of 31 forward-looking keywords, as reported in 
Table 2.5. 
              Table 2.5: Final Forward-Looking Keywords List 
Forward-Looking Keywords Percentage 
[Looks|looking|look][forward|ahead] 100 
Anticipate 100 
Estimate 100 
Intend 100 
Expect 100 
Predict 100 
Seek 100 
Year ahead, years ahead 100 
Will 100 
Aim 100 
Future 100 
Well-positioned, well-placed 100 
Outlook 100 
Could 100 
[(Up)(forth)(in)coming||next|supsequent|following] [month] 100 
Shortly 94.12 
Goal 93.33 
Likely, unlikely 93.33 
Shall 91.67 
Confident 91.67 
Eventual 90.91 
Hope 68.75 
Table constructed by author. Column 1 lists the final forward-looking keyword; column 2 shows the probability of the word to occur in a 
forward-looking context. 
 
To aid this process we appointed a Code Compliance Officer to hear formal complaints, confidentially if 
requested, and we hope that our annual Supplier Viewpoint Survey encourages suppliers to give us more 
feedback on our relationships (Tesco – OFR, 2006). 
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2- Quantitative Keywords List 
As discussed earlier, the proportion of forward-looking quantitative information is used to 
measure the forward-looking orientation of OFR statements. This sub-section elaborates 
the steps involved in developing the quantitative keywords list. The same steps followed 
for the forward-looking keywords list are followed for the quantitative list. Hussainey and 
Walker (2008) and Muslu et al.’s (2010) lists are used as the preliminary list and then, a 
random sample of five OFR statements is read to add any new keyword(s). Therefore, the 
preliminary quantitative list consists, firstly, of alphanumeric words in writing ranked from 
one to twenty and in numerical characters supplemented with at least one of the following 
symbols/letters: (,), L, p, m, –, x, ,, ., €, £, $, US$, %. Secondly, the list contains units such 
as hundred(s), million(s), billion(s) and trillion(s). Thirdly, it contains keywords that refer 
to currencies such as; pence, yen, dollar, euro, and other words like percent and percentage. 
Fourthly, it contains all alphanumeric words (both in numerical characters and writing) and 
number-related keywords such as “half”, “quarter”, “double”, “triple”, and “quadruple”. 
As far as the second step is concerned, reading a sample of OFR statements reports a 
couple of observations and therefore, suggests some amendments to the preliminary 
keywords list. The first observation shows that tables included in OFR statements usually 
have headings containing symbols/letters; for example, “%”, “£”, or “Million(s)”, and then 
figures listed in the table below.  
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Accordingly, Hussainey and Walker’s (2008) suggestion of considering a number as a 
keyword only if it is supplemented with some symbols/letters will result in miscoding 
numbers included in tables as qualitative information. Based on this conclusion, any 
number will be recognised as a quantitative keyword. The second notable issue from 
reading the OFR statements is the inclusion of some numbers that initially do not represent 
quantitative information in the context of the OFR, such as year numbers (e.g. 2006). 
Consider the following example:  
 
 
 
 
The issue now is to find a way to avoid capturing these numbers. In relation to year 
numbers (for example 2006, 2007, 2007, and 2009), there is no way to make the software 
neglect them. The second problem is how the software will differentiate between a number 
when it comes in the OFR quantitative context and when the same number does not reflect 
quantitative information (e.g. a product number). Efforts to overcome these conflicts are 
exerted while checking the reliability of the refined keywords list. 
 
Not only does this approach make economic sense for the drug industry, it also helps the industry in its aim 
to implement the “3 Rs” in pharmaceutical research; that is, to Reduce, Refine and Replace the use of 
higher animals in drug research (Summit – OFR, 2006). 
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Step three is focused on checking the reliability of keywords identified through steps one 
and two. To resolve the conflicts explained in step two, 30 quantitative sentences are 
randomly selected and read by the researcher. The target is to detect the extent to which 
this problem affects the reported results. Results show that 24% of the sentences are 
considered as quantitative, even though they are not, because of the previously discussed 
unavoidable noise. The trade-off is now between the merits of automating the search 
process and the relatively limited noise effect (i.e. 24%). The predicted noise will apply 
evenly to all OFR statements, and thereby cancels the effect of the unavoidable noise on the 
sample level. The proper decision is in favour of accepting the minor noise in return for the 
paramount rewards of the computerised quantitative keywords list. Therefore, the final 
quantitative keywords list consists firstly of numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) 
supplemented with at least one of the following symbols/letters: (,), L, p, m, -, x, ,, , £, $, 
US$. Secondly, number-related keywords (zero, hundred(s), million(s), billion(s), 
trillion(s), half, quarter, double, doubled, triple, and quadruple). Thirdly, currency (pence, 
cent, dollar, pound, sterling) percentage(s), %.  
In an attempt to measure the extent to which OFR statements are balanced and neutral, two 
further keyword lists – bad news and good news – must be identified.  
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3- Bad News Keywords List 
Following the same steps discussed previously, a preliminary list of bad news including 92 
keywords from prior research is developed (i.e. Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Henry, 2008; 
Henry and Leone, 2009; Hussainey and Walker, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009 and Schleicher 
and Walker, 2010). Table 2.6 presents the preliminary keywords list.  
Table 2.6: Preliminary Bad News Keywords List 
Common Keywords Difficult, Difficulties, Difficulty, Disappoint, Disappoints, Disappointing, 
Disappointed, Disappointment(s), Fail(s), Failed, Failing, Failure, Negative(s), 
Negatively, Unfavourable, Weak, Weakens, Weaken, Weaknesses, Weakening, 
Weakened, Weaker, Worsen, Worse, Worst, Worsening. 
 
Henry (2008) 
 
Below, Challenge(s), Challenging, Challenged, Decline(s), Declining, Declined, 
Decrease(s), Decreasing, Decreased, Deteriorate(s), Deteriorating, Deteriorated, 
Down, Drop(s), Dropping, Dropped, Fall(s), Falling, Fallen, Fell, Hurdle, 
Hurdles, Less, Least, Low, Lower, Lowest, Obstacle(s), Penalty, Penalties, 
Risk(s), Risky, Shrink(s), Shrinking, Shrunk, Slump(s), Slumping, Slumped, 
Smaller, Smallest, Threat(s), Uncertain, Uncertainty, Under, Unsettled. 
 
Hussainey and Walker 
(2008) 
 
Arrears, Awful, Complex, Dangerous, Deadfall, Debit, Disaster, Discrepancy, 
Dissatisfied, Frustrated, Hard, Harsh, Inferior, Insufficient, Mistake, Not easy, 
Not pass, Not success, Pessimistic, Saddened, Scarcity, Shortage, Shortfall, 
Static, Terrible, Tough, Undesirable, Unhelpful, Unpleasant, Unsuccessful, 
Upset. 
 
Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996) 
 
Concern(s), Concerned, Crash, Hazardous, Inability, Inadequate, Missed, 
Problem(s), Shortage, Sluggish, Suffered, Tough, Troubled, Unable, 
Unfortunately, Unprofitable, Unrealised. 
Common between 
Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996) and Hussainey 
and Walker (2008) 
 
Accident, Adverse, Adversely, Bad, Bankruptcy, Crisis, Deficit(s), Deficits. 
Delay(s), Delayed, Lack, Lose, Loss, Losses, Loser, Losing, Poor. 
 
 
Common between 
Abrahamson and Amir 
(1996) and Henry (2008) 
 
Depresses, Downturn, Deterioration. 
Table constructed by author.  
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While reading a random sample of five OFR statements, six new keywords are identified as 
bad news keywords, which were not previously considered in the related literature. These 
words are “bane”, “impair”, “dismiss”, “contested”, “infringement”, and “modest”. It is 
worth mentioning that the computer program is written in a way that detects the keyword in 
whatever form it may take.  
Afterwards, the reliability of each keyword is evaluated using a sample of 30 sentences 
covering different industry sectors for each keyword. Similar to the reliability test 
conducted in the construction of the forward-looking keywords list, the extent to which the 
keyword appears in an overall bad news context is identified. Table 2.7 delineates the 
results of the keywords reliability check. Columns 1 & 5 list the refined keywords list (98 
words). Columns 2 & 6 show the number of sentences in which the words occur in a bad 
news context. Columns 3 & 7 report the total number of sentences checked. For each word, 
a random sample of 30 sentences is checked.  
Those words, which occur less than 50 times in the whole sample, are fully checked 
without sampling. Columns 4 & 8 show the occurrence percentage of each word. This is 
the result of dividing column 2/6 over column 3/7. Note that some of the words checked 
were not found to reflect a bad news context in any of the words checked. In such a 
situation, columns 2 & 6 shows ‘zero’ whereas columns 3 & 7 report the total number of 
sentences checked. 
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 Following the same reasoning explained in deriving the final forward-looking keywords 
list, a keyword is included as a bad news one if 90% of the sentences associated with this 
keyword are bad news. Out of the 132 keywords, only 16 keywords always come in a bad 
news context. Another 11 keywords indicate bad news in a minimum of 90% of the 
sentences in which these keywords appear.  
Table 2.7: Results of Reliability Test of the Refined Bad News Keywords 
Bad News 
Keywords 
Number of 
Sentences Detected   
Total Number 
of Sentences 
Percentage Bad News 
Keywords 
Number of 
Sentences Detected   
Total Number 
of Sentences 
Percentage 
Disappoint 3 3 100 Modest 3 30 10 
Unfavourable 8 8 100 Down 2 22 9.090 
Downturn 14 14 100 Banning 1 12 8.333 
Deteriorate 8 8 100 Small 1 30 3.333 
Drop 5 5 100 Disaster 0 0 0 
Obstacle 4 4 100 Discrepancy 0 0 0 
Dissatisfied 1 1 100 Harsh 0 0 0 
Insufficient 2 2 100 Inferior 0 0 0 
Unsuccessful 3 3 100 Mistake 0 0 0 
Inability 14 14 100 Saddened 0 0 0 
Unfortunately 1 1 100 Noteasy|Not pass 0 0 0 
Lack 7 7 100 Pessimistic 0 0 0 
Unknown 5 5 100 Scarcity 0 0 0 
Hinder 9 9 100 Shortage 0 0 0 
Not enough 1 1 100 Static 0 0 0 
Contested 2 2 100 Tough 0 0 0 
Risk 29 30 96.666 Unhelpful 0 0 0 
Uncertain 29 30 96.666 Unpleasant 0 0 0 
No assurance 29 30 96.666 Upset 0 0 0 
Delay 29 30 96.666 Crash 0 0 0 
Decline 27 28 96.429 Hurdle 0 0 0 
Negative 20 21 95.238 Least 0 0 0 
Penalty 16 17 94.118 Slump 0 0 0 
Difficult 28 30 93.333 Shrink 0 0 0 
Fail 28 30 93.333 Shrank 0 0 0 
Adverse 28 30 93.333 Unsettled 0 0 0 
Loss 27 30 90 Arrears 0 0 0 
Deficit 11 15 73.333 Awful 0 0 0 
Worse 3 5 60 Danger 0 0 0 
Problem 3 5 60 Dead 0 0 0 
Weak 11 20 55 Debit 0 0 0 
Challenge 12 22 54.545 Disaster 0 0 0 
Decrease 16 30 53.333 Deteriorate 0 0 0 
Suffer 1 2 50 Inadequate 0 0 0 
Crisis 5 12 41.666 Missed 0 0 0 
Fell 2 5 40 Slug 0 0 0 
Threat 8 20 40 Trouble 0 0 0 
Fall 15 42 35.714 Unable 0 0 0 
Low 10 30 33.333 Unrealised 0 0 0 
Impair 5 15 33.333 Bankruptcy 0 0 0 
Poor 6 20 30 Frustrated 0 0 0 
Severe 10 35 28.571 Under 0 30 0 
Complex 7 27 25.926 Terrible 0 1 0 
Shortfall 1 4 25 Undesirable 0 2 0 
Accident 1 4 25 Hazardous 0 1 0 
Concern 2 12 16.666 Unprofitable 0 1 0 
Infringement 5 30 16.666 Bad 0 10 0 
Below 1 7 14.285     
Dismiss 4 29 13.793     
Depressed 3 23 13.043     
Hard 1 8 12.5     
Less 1 10 10     
Table constructed by author. Columns 1 and 5 list the 98 bad news keywords included in the refined list. Columns 2 and 6 show the number of sentences 
detected where the keyword comes in the bad news context. Columns 3 and 7 list the total sentences. Columns 4 and 8 present the percentage of sentences 
where the keyword occurs in a bad news context. 
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To fortify the reliability of the keywords, words lying between Hussainey et al. (2003)’s 
benchmark (67%) and the current research’s benchmark (90%) are further investigated. 
Only one keyword lies in this range: “deficit”.  A sample of 30 sentences in which “deficit” 
comes in a bad news context is drawn. The researcher then investigates whether this word 
is accompanied by other bad news keyword(s) from the approved list. The investigation 
shows that 18.1% of sentences in which “deficit” represents a bad news context include 
other bad news keyword(s). Accordingly, the trade-off is between including the word 
“deficit” in the final bad news keywords list while having an error of 27%, or excluding the 
word “deficit” and losing, in this case, 45% (73%-18%) of bad news sentences including 
the word “deficit”. The decision is in favour of including “deficit” as a bad news keyword. 
Table 2.8 presents the 28 keywords constituting the final bad news keywords list. 
 
                 Table 2.8: Final Bad News Keywords List 
Bad News Keywords Percentage  Bad News Keywords Percentage 
Disappoint 100 Not enough 100 
Unfavourable 100 Contested 100 
Downturn 100 Risk 96.67 
Deteriorate 100 Uncertain 96.67 
Drop 100 No assurance 96.67 
Obstacle 100 Delay 96.67 
Dissatisfied 100 Decline 96.43 
Insufficient 100 Negative 95.24 
Unsuccessful 100 Penalty 94.13 
Inability 100 Difficult 93.33 
Unfortunately 100 Fail 93.33 
Lack 100 Adverse 93.33 
Unknown 100 Loss 90 
Hinder 100 Deficit 73.33 
Table constructed by author. Columns 1 and 3 list the final bad news keywords, columns 2 and 4 show the percentage, which indicates 
the probability that the word will come in a bad news context. 
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The reliability of results may contrast with the common view fundamentally held regarding 
certain words as bad news keywords. The ultimate example10 of these words is the word 
“decrease”, which is blindly recognised in the consciousness as negative. However, the 
decrease could be in cost, and therefore become favourable. Thus, “decrease” is not always 
a bad news keyword. The reliability check shows that “decrease” denotes a bad news 
context in only 53% of the sentences. Below is an example where “decrease” comes in a 
good news context: 
 
 
In the OFR context, the word “drop” always represents a bad news and perhaps substitutes 
“decrease” in terms of its bad news implication. For example: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10Other examples of words that are generally perceived as bad news keywords when in fact they are not are presented in 
Appendix 4. 
Interconnect costs decreased by 0.3%, as the termination rate cuts in the current and previous 
financial years more than offset the effect of higher voice usage (Vodafone – OFR, 2006). 
 
Prices dropped sharply in the first couple of months of 2007, but have since recovered, and at the 
time of writing remain around the 2006 Brent average (Dana – OFR, 2006). 
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This conclusion supports the argument that one cannot apply a keyword list designed for 
use in one specific context to another. Similarly, one cannot use vocabulary lists imbedded 
in computer software without checking the reliability of such lists with regards to the 
unique information context being investigated. Most prior studies have this limitation (e.g. 
Henry, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Ernstberger and Grüning, 2010; and Li, 2010a). 
4- Good News Keywords List 
The second keywords list necessary to measure the balance and neutrality quality 
dimension is the good news keywords list. Importantly, a distinction is held between 
“positive” and “good” news; such a distinction has not been introduced before in the extant 
literature (i.e. Henry, 2008; Hussainey and Walker, 2008; Schleicher and Walker, 2010). In 
the underlying study, positive news is that which merely represents good intentions but 
does not directly entail any procedures taken by management to achieve or ensure such 
good intentions. The following example clarifies this point: 
 
 
 
 
 
We aim to lead in the downstream markets in which we chose to operate (Royal Dutch A – OFR, 2006). 
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The above example shows that “Royal Dutch A” does not mention any procedures to 
accomplish its aim. Therefore, it is good news but without established procedures, and will 
thus be considered as positive news by the interested parties. At the other end, good news 
reflects either “an actual event”, or “procedures taken that are expected to turn into 
achievements for the firm in the future”. 
In constructing the good news keywords list, the starting point is identifying keywords 
identified in the prior literature. Therefore, based on Henry (2008) and Hussainey and 
Walker (2008), the preliminary list consists of 64 good news keywords, as shown in Table 
2.9. Notably, the program is written to allow the capture of all forms a keyword may take 
(e.g. positive and positively). 
Table 2.9: Preliminary Good News Keywords List 
Common 
keywords  
Achievement, Better, Strong, Beat, Encouraging, Excellent, Good, Higher, Improved 
Increase, Opportunity, Positive, Success, Up. 
 
Henry (2008) 
only 
 
Above, Accomplish, Accomplishes, Accomplishing, Accomplished, Accomplishment, 
Accomplishments, Best, Certain, Certainty, Definite, Deliver, Delivers, Delivered, 
Delivering, Enjoy, Enjoys, Enjoying, Enjoyed, Exceed, Exceeds, Exceeded, Exceeding, 
Expand, Expands, Expanding, Expanded, Expansion, Greater, Greatest, Grow, Grows, 
Growing, Grew, Grown, Growth, Larger, Largest, Leader, Leading, More, Most, Pleased, 
Progress, Progressing, Record, Reward, Rewards, Rewarding, Rewarded, Rise, Rises, 
Rising, Rose, Risen, Solid.  
Hussainey and 
Walker (2008) 
only 
 
Accelerate, Activist, Adequate, Affirmative, Ahead, Constructive, Desirable, Easy, 
Enhance, Enough, Favourite, Fine, First class, First-rate, Healthier, Healthy, Helpful, High-
quality, In time, New, Novel, On-time, Optimistic, Peak, Satisfactory, Simple, Sufficient, 
Superior, Win, Winner. 
Table constructed by author.  
Secondly, nine more words are added to the preliminary list from reading a random sample 
of five OFR statements. These are: “launch”, “gain”, “save”, “innovate”, “develop”, “rolled 
out”, “introduce”, “steady”, and “outstanding”. 
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The third step involves testing for the reliability of each keyword while differentiating 
between positive and good news information using a random sample of 30 sentences. 
Additionally, how often a keyword comes in an overall good news context is evaluated. 
Table 2.10 presents the results of the reliability test. Columns 1 & 5 list the refined 
keywords list (84 words). Columns 2 & 6 show the number of sentences in which the 
words occur in a good news context. Columns 3 & 7 report the total number of sentences 
checked. For each word, a random sample of 30 sentences is checked. Those words, which 
occur less than 50 times in the whole sample are fully checked without sampling. Columns 
4 & 8 show the occurrence percentage of each word. This is the result of dividing column 
2/6 over column 3/7. Note that, some of the words checked did not appear to reflect a good 
news context in any of the words checked. In such a situation, columns 2 & 6 shows ‘zero’ 
whereas columns 3 & 7 report the total number of sentences checked.  
Through the snapshot glimpse offered by Table 2.10, one can notice that unlike forward-
looking and bad news keywords lists, the reliability percentage is generally lower in the 
case of good news keywords. Only three keywords are 100% in terms of denoting a good 
news sentence, and four keywords range from 90% to 100%. Accordingly, it was decided 
to decrease the minimum acceptable percentage to 80%. Therefore, for a word to be 
included in the good news keywords list, this word should reflect a good news context in at 
least 80% of the sentences in which the word appears. By doing this, the keywords list 
contains 23 good news keywords. 
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To further strengthen the keywords list, words lying between Hussainey et al. (2003)’s 
benchmark (67%) and the current study’s benchmark (80%) are examined again to 
determine whether these words are usually accompanied by another good news keyword(s). 
These words are: “good”, “win”, “better”, and “strong”. Further examination of these 
words shows that these words do not usually come with another supporting good news 
keyword(s). Consequently, the trade-off is between the noise these words may cause (if 
they are to be considered as keywords) and the sacrifice of some good news sentences (if 
these words are to be excluded from the keywords list); this suggests that it is prudent to 
consider these words as good news keywords.   
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Table 2.10: Results of Reliability Test of the Refined Good News Keywords List 
Good News 
Keyword 
Number of 
Sentences 
Detected 
Total 
Number of 
Sentences 
Percentage Good 
News 
Keyword 
Number 
of 
Sentences 
Detected 
Total 
Number 
of 
Sentences 
Percentage 
Rolled out 2 2 100 Develop 13 30 43.33 
Steady 16 16 100 Enjoy 10 24 41.66 
Introduce 30 30 100 Helpful 12 30 40 
Gain 28 30 93.33 Great 12 30 40 
Pleased 27 30 90 Innovate 12 30 40 
Launch 27 30 90 Easy 10 30 33.33 
Save 27 30 90 Accomplish 2 6 33.33 
Improve 26 30 86.66 Best 10 30 33.33 
Ahead 25 30 83.33 Enough 5 16 31.25 
Grow 25 30 83.33 Health 9 30 30 
Rise 25 30 83.33 Deliver 8 30 26.66 
Opportunity 25 30 83.33 High-
quality 
8 30 26.66 
Adequate 25 30 83.33 Solid 4 16 25 
Record 24 30 80 Beat 1 4 25 
Expand 24 30 80 Reward 7 30 23.33 
Up 24 30 80 Superior 6 28 21.42 
Good 23 30 76.66 High 6 30 20 
Win 23 30 76.66 Outstanding 3 16 18.75 
Better 22 30 73.33 Sufficient 3 30 10 
Strong 21 30 70 More/most 2 25 8 
Progress 19 30 63.33 Certain 1 30 3.33 
Large 18 30 60 Helpful 1 30 3.33 
Positive 18 30 60 Above 1 30 3.33 
Success 17 30 56.66 Favourite 0 30 0 
Lead 17 30 56.66 Fine 0 4 0 
Accelerate 17 30 56.66 Definite 0 30 0 
Simple 17 30 56.66 First 
class/rate 
0 30 0 
Peak 15 27 55.55 Activist 0 30 0 
Exceed 16 30 53.33 Affirmative 0 30 0 
Achieve 16 30 53.33 Desirable 0 7 0 
Construct 16 30 53.33 On/in time 0 1 0 
Increase 14 30 46.66 Optimistic 0 1 0 
Novel 14 30 46.66     
Table constructed by author. Columns 1 and 5 list the 73 good news keywords included in the refined list. Columns 2 and 6 show number of 
sentences detected where the keyword comes in the bad news context. Columns 3 and 7 list the total sentences. Columns 4 and 8 present the 
percentage of sentences where the keyword comes in a bad news context. 
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“Strong” is often accompanied by another keyword(s). The associated error of “strong” is 
30%. Meanwhile, in 73.3% of sentences where “strong” appears, there is another keyword(s). 
Thus, these sentences will still be coded as good news sentences if we drop “strong” from the 
keywords list, and avoid the 30% error. Table 2.11 lists the detailed percentages of each 
keyword. 
Table 2.11: Doubtful Good News Keywords List 
Doubtful Good News  
Number of Sentences 
Containing Another 
Good News Keyword 
Total Sample 
Number of Sentences 
Containing Another  
Good News keyword 
Win 7 30 23.33 
Strong 22 30 73.33 
Good 16 30 53.33 
Better 8 30 26.66 
Table constructed by author. Column 1 presents doubtful good news keywords; words that range between the current study’s benchmark 
(80%) and Hussainey et al. (2003)’s (67%). Column 2 shows the number of sentences where another good news keyword accompanies the 
doubtful keyword. Column 3 shows the total number of sentences included in the sample. Column 4 presents the percentage of other good 
news keywords, and denotes the percentage of sentences where another keyword accompanies the doubtful one. 
 
In conclusion, this process yields a final list of 19 good news keywords, as presented in Table 
2.12. 
 
 
Table 2.12: Final Good News Keywords List 
Keyword Percentage Keyword Percentage 
Rolled out 100 Rise 83.33 
Steady 100 Opportunity 83.333 
Introduce 100 Adequate 83.333 
Gain 93.33 Record 80 
Pleased 90 Expand 80 
Launch 90 Up 80 
Save 90 Good 76.67 
Improve 86.667 Win 76.67 
Ahead 83.33 Better 73.33 
Grow 83.333   
Table constructed by author. Columns 1 and 3 list the final good news keywords; columns 2 and 4 show the percentage probability of the 
word to come in a good news context. 
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Some keywords typically might indicate good news but not in the OFR context.11 The word 
“Success” is a clear example.  “Success” is a word that implies achievement, but when it 
comes to OFR review, reliability results show that this is only 56% true. Consider the 
following example: 
 
 
 
 
In this example, “success” comes in a neutral context. The next example presents “success” 
when it comes in a bad news context. 
 
 
 
 
5- Scope Keywords List 
To test for comprehensiveness, the main concern is to investigate whether firms disclose 
information about each of the topics/sub-topics suggested by the OFR framework (see Table 
2.13) totalling 15 items, regardless of the extent of each a topic is disclosed. In this 
subsection, a keywords list that facilitates the process of evaluating firms as to the scope of 
topics disclosed is developed.    
In view of the fact that there is no prior developed scope keywords list for OFR statements, 
the first step is to identify the topics suggested by The Accounting Standards Board (ASB). 
Secondly, a sample of 15 OFR statements, representing the 15 different firms included in the  
                                                 
11 See examples of other keywords in Appendix 5. 
Successful companies will be those that enhance their productivity in the discovery and development of 
new and differentiated medicines designed to meet the growing demand (Astrazeneca – OFR, 2006). 
 
“The board has identified the following factors as principles potential risks to the successful operation 
of the business. “Sainsbury-OFR 2007 
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pilot study, is carefully read to identify how the main topics are disclosed in OFR statements 
and identify the proper keyword lists. Thirdly, as a reliability test, a sample of coded OFR 
statements is drawn to ascertain that these proposed keywords capture the topics and 
subtopics detailed in Table 2.13. Following these steps, it is evident that the scope keywords 
list is 100% able to address what it should. Table 2.13 lists the topics and sub-topics along 
with the keywords used to code them. Reliability and validity tests are elaborated and 
thoroughly discussed in chapter Four, sections 4.2, 4.3 respectively. 
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Table 2.13: Scope Keywords List 
Topic Sub-Topic(s) OFR 
Paragraph 
Number 
Keywords 
Nature of the 
Business 
Market (industry). 
Competitive environment. 
Regulatory environment. 
Objectives. 
Strategies. 
27(a) Market, industry, market 
place. 
Competitor, competitors. 
Rules, laws, regulation(s), 
regulatory. 
Objective(s), goal(s). 
Strategy, strategies. 
Development of 
Performance 
Present and future. 27(b) Financial performance, 
Financial review, key 
performance trend(s), 
results. 
Resources, 
Risks, 
Relationships 
Resources. 
Commercial and financial risks. 
Customers, suppliers, strategic alliances, creditors. 
27(c) Resources, tangible 
resources, intangible 
resources, employees. 
Commercial risk(s). 
Financial risk, currency risk, 
interest rate risk, commodity 
risk, credit risk. 
Relationship(s), customers, 
suppliers, alliances, 
creditors. 
Position of the 
Business 
Disclosure about financial instruments. 
Accounting policies used in the financial statements. 
Capital structure (balance between equity and debt, 
capital instruments used, currency, regulatory capital, 
interest rate structure, funding plans, and reasons for 
such capital structure). 
Treasury policies (effect of cost of interest on profit, 
and impact of interest rate changes). 
Cash flows (in and out), with appropriate segmental 
analysis. 
Liquidity of the entity. 
27(d) Financial instrument 
derivatives. 
Accounting policy, 
accounting policies. 
Capital structure, interest 
rate structure, funding plans. 
Treasury policy, treasury 
polices, treasury. 
Cash flow. 
Liquidity, leverage, debt, 
borrowing(s). 
Table constructed by author using information from OFR reporting statement (2006). The table lists the OFR disclosure framework used to 
measure the comprehensiveness quality dimension. Columns 1 and 2 display the main and sub-elements, column 3 shows the keywords used 
to computerise the content analysis.  
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2.2.3 Study Two: The association between DQ and CG mechanisms 
The second strand of the current research examines the association between disclosure quality 
and corporate governance mechanisms. It identifies those governance mechanisms that are 
efficient in improving disclosure quality, and those that need further improvement and 
consideration. The second study (chapters Five and Six) successfully meets the fourth 
research objective and provides an answer to the related research question number three, on 
what are the corporate governance and firm characteristics that influence disclosure quality in 
the UK?  
Chapter Five sets out 14 research hypotheses to answer the third research question. These 
hypotheses are concerned with the relationship between 14 corporate governance mechanisms 
and disclosure quality. Chapter Six tests these hypotheses and concludes with those corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm characteristics that influence disclosure quality in the UK. 
The reaming part of this sub-section lists the research hypotheses and drafts the research 
method employed to test these hypotheses. 
2.2.3.1 Regression Model: 
In testing the above listed hypotheses, the second study uses an ordinary least square 
regression model (OLS) to investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and 14 
corporate governance mechanisms. It is important to bring into discussion here the 
justification for using OLS model.  
OLS model is considered optimal in examining the associations between DQ and CG. The 
reasoning for using OLS is backed by several justifications.  
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 Firstly, this is in line with the majority12 of studies examining the association between 
disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms. Secondly, disclosure quality is not 
considered as endogenous variable in similar studies (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Celik et al., 2006; Beak et al., 2009; and Jiang et al., 2010).  To check whether there are 
omitted variables in the model, the Ramsey test is used. This is a test for the omitted variables 
in the model (Goldstein, 1992). Makhija and Patton (2004) also utilise the Ramsey test to 
check the omitted variables in their study where they investigate the association between 
ownership structure and disclosure. Conducting The Ramsey (RESET) test using powers of 
the fitted values of quality score shows a significant F value of 1.27 with a probability of 
0.284. Accordingly, it could be argued that the threat of omitted variables in the model is 
minimised. Consequently, the threat of endogeneity is minimised.13 Thirdly, OLS model 
requirements (linearity assumptions) and, more interestingly, normality, are perfectly met in 
the present study (see Appendix 7). Fourthly, OLS permits investigation into the cross 
sectional effect of the variables of interest. Given these reasons, there is no valid justification 
to waive from the OLS model or to favour other models over OLS. 
 
The relationship between different corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure quality is 
predicted through an OLS regression model as illustrated in section 6.3. Descriptive statistics 
is presented in Table 6.2 and discussed in Section 6.3.1. Univariate analysis is covered in 
Section 6.3.2. The main analysis is discussed in Section 6.3.3. Finally, Robustness tests are 
elaborated in Section 6.3.4.  
 
                                                 
12 Refer to Appendix 6, only one study (i.e. Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011) uses fixed effect model to examine 
the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms. However, conducting 
Haussman test suggests that fixed effect model does not offer the best estimates since Chi square is very small 
and insignificant. Some other studies use two-stage least squares (2SLS). However, such instrumental variables 
(IV) method is fraught with some limitations as explained later in chapter Eight. 
13 The endogeneity problem is discussed in details in the following section. 
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2.2.4 Study Three: The Joint effect of DQ and CG Mechanisms on VF 
The third strand of the underlying research answers the forth research question of whether 
firm value is jointly affected by disclosure quality and certain corporate governance 
mechanisms in the UK large firms. This research question is linked to the fifth research 
objective, which is addressed in the third study (chapters Seven and Eight).  In chapter Seven, 
15 research hypotheses are theoretically developed to test the effect of disclosure quality, 
corporate governance mechanisms, and the joint effect of both on firm value in the UK. 
Chapter Eight tests these hypotheses and concludes with answering the fourth research 
question.  
2.2.4.1 Endogeneity and the Use of Fixed effect Model 
In general, firm value has always been considered as an endogenous variable in the literature 
(e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006; and Benson and Davidson, 2010). The following sub-section 
describes the nature of endogeneity and approaches used to mitigate it. 
 An endogenous variable is correlated with the error term in the model; in contrast, an 
exogenous variable is one that is not correlated with the error term in the model (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010). Moreover, endogeneity has always been a concern in studies linking 
corporate governance, disclosure quality and firm value (Ammann et al., 2011). Core (2001, 
p. 442) demonstrates this observation: “corporate finance theory predicts that shareholders 
endogenously optimize disclosure policy, corporate governance, and management incentives 
in order to maximize firm value”. 
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Endogeneity problems in management and financial accounting have only recently been 
posited as an important issue affecting results’ validity (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). Its 
prominence stems from it influences on the proper model estimation method (Lent, 2007). In 
the main, endogeneity can be expressed differently depending on its causes. In other words, it 
is defined through its causes. In general, there are two main causes lead to endogeneity 
problems, namely; omitted variables, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions. When 
endogeneity is caused by omitted variables, this means the explained (dependent) and 
explanatory (independent) variables have systematic relationships with other variable(s) that 
are not included in the model (i.e. omitted variable(s)) (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). In such a 
case, the explained variable is mistakenly considered as exogenous while in fact is it an 
endogenous variable. Most extant literature of firm value suffers from the omitted variable 
problem. It considers corporate governance mechanisms in isolation from disclosure or 
considers disclosure in isolation from corporate governance. 
The second cause of endogeneity is simultaneity. Simultaneity occurs when the causal 
relationship between an explained and explanatory variable runs both ways. In this case, “one 
or more of the explanatory variables are jointly determined with the explained variable” 
(Chenhall and Moers, 2007, p. 182). Another definition posits, “simultaneity occurs when 
both the dependent and the independent variable are determined together by another variable” 
(Lopes and de Alencar, 2010, p. 461).  
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In the present study, theoretically, corporate governance could affect firm value, and firm 
value can also cause the firm to change its control devices. However, the current study 
employs the fixed effect model to mitigate the simultaneity problem. The fixed effect model 
controls for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and, thus, any firm fixed effects are 
cancelled (McConnell et al., 2008). Consequently, any relation that holds thereafter cannot be 
attributed to an endogeneity issue (Brown et al., 2011). Additionally, the current study uses 
industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q to reflect firm value. Using the industry-median adjusted 
Tobin’s Q, rules out the potential for simultaneity (Brown and Caylor, 2006). 
The literature also addressees the sever implications of endogeneity, for example, Larcker et 
al. (2007, p. 984) point out that “this econometric problem will produce inconsistent estimates 
for both the coefficients and standard errors”. Additionally, Chenhall and Moers (2007, p. 
174) argue that: 
“In essence, endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent estimators within equations used to 
test theoretical propositions, which make inferences problematic and consequently reduces 
the confidence we have in drawing conclusions from research”. 
 
 Moreover, “results can only be interpreted as partial correlations without identification of 
causality” (Beiner et al., 2006). Up to this point of the discussion, after defining possible 
endogeneity forms (i.e. causes) and acknowledging underlying caveats, it is important to find 
out how this problem is resolved in the extant literature. 
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Researchers tackle the endogeneity problem in different ways. Chenhall and Moers (2007) 
argue that if endogeneity is backed by an omitted variable which cannot be included in the 
model for any reason (e.g. data availability problems or because this variable is hardly 
observable), there are two ways to resolve this situation. The first is to include a proxy for the 
omitted variable to substitute the original one in the model. This approach is referred to as a 
“plug-in solution to the omitted variables problem” (Chenhall and Moers, 2007, p. 187). 
However, one problem with this practice is how accurately the proxy represents the omitted 
variable. The second way of dealing with the omitted variable is to use the Instrumental  
Variables (IV) method (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; and Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
Arguably, “instrumental variables are variables that are correlated with the explanatory 
variable and uncorrelated with the omitted variables (structural error term)” (Chenhall and 
Moers, 2007, p. 187).  
Concerning simultaneity, one view holds that the theory should guide the model structure as 
to the direction of the causal relationship (Lent, 2007). In corporate governance literature, the 
relationship is found to be from corporate governance to firm value and not vice versa (e.g. 
Beiner et al., 2006). In general, if simultaneity is likely to be present, IV methods are used to 
overcome such a problem using a multiple equation model (i.e. multiple equations instead of 
only one equation used in case of omitted variables). In a typical application of the IV 
method, a set of exogenous variables are selected firstly, then the researcher uses two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) or three-stage least squares (3SLS) depending on how many instruments 
are required in the analysis (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; and Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
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While a vast number of studies in the accounting research context use the IV method (e.g. 
2SLS and 3SLS), yet, such method is fraught with severe limitations that have been 
overlooked in the extant empirical literature. The ultimate crucial limitation is inaccurate 
identification of IV due to the notion that it is “impossible” or a kind of “magic” to find 
variables that fulfil the definition of an instrumental variable (Larcker et al., 2007; Chenhall 
and Moers, 2007; and Lent 2007). Nonetheless, most researchers (about 80%) fail to justify 
their choice of IV and why they believe such variables exhibit a lower correlation with the 
structural equation error term than the endogenous regressor variable (Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010). 
In conclusion, the IV method does not solve endogeneity in corporate governance research 
(Brown et al., 2011). Surprisingly, in their review article, Larcker and Rusticus (2010, p. 187) 
document that: 
“When the instrument is only weakly correlated with the regressor, IV methods can 
produce highly biased estimates when the instrumental variable is even slightly 
endogenous. In those cases, it is likely that IV estimates are more biased and more 
likely to provide the wrong statistical inference than simple OLS estimates that make 
no correction for endogeneity”. 
 
Lent (2007, p. 198) goes a far step further in dealing with endogeneity, adding “I argue that 
researchers should be courageous enough to set aside endogeneity concerns when their 
research question is important”. 
Based on the above discussion, it is not easily justifiable to concede OLS to SLS regression 
and be confident that endogeneity has been resolved unless IV perfectly meets the 
aforementioned requirements, which are argued to be a formidable obstacle in practice.  
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With IV methods being deeply contested, a lot of research is being done in the corporate 
governance field –more specifically in market value relationships– without mitigating 
endogeneity and just considering it as a research limitation (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Larcker et al., 2007; and Hassan et al., 2009). However, recently,  few studies have adopted 
an alternative method to overcome possible endogeneity problems. Primarily, a fixed-effect 
panel data technique is being used as a substitute to the IV method due to the extensive 
criticism of the latter. 
The introduction of panel data techniques to mitigate endogeneity dates back to Himmelberg 
et al. (1999), yet, it had not gained as wide an application as the Instrumental Variables 
method. One likely reason for this is availability of data which meets the requirements of 
panel data techniques (Lent, 2007). This was the exact argument used by Klapper and Love 
(2004) in justifying their results’ subjectivity to endogeneity problems. 
One of the few studies using the fixed-effect panel data analysis is Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
which used fixed-effect to test the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, 
and find that the fixed effect technique provides consistent estimates of the residual in the 
endogenous variable (market value). Another pioneering study is Palia (2001), which 
examined the link between various corporate governance mechanisms and firm value and 
concludes that among three estimation methods, namely; ordinary least square (OLS), random 
effect regression, and fixed effect regression, fixed-effect model is the optimal estimation 
methodology in overcoming endogeneity.  
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Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) study employs a fixed-effect technique in testing the association 
between corporate governance and firm value. Similarly, Cheung et al. (2010) use a panel 
regression model with fixed effect to address endogeneity in the association between firm 
value and disclosure level. Lopes and de Alencar (2010) also use the fixed-effect technique to 
resolve the endogeneity problem apparent in the association between disclosure and cost of 
capital.  
Henry (2010) employs the fixed effect model to mitigate endogeneity in the association 
between firm value. Similarly, Bozec et al. (2010) argue that fixed effect technique is efficient 
in handling endogeneity associated with governance and firm value. Most recently, Braga-
Alves and Shastri (2011) tackle endogeneity between corporate governance, firm value, and 
firm performance through a fixed-effect model. 
The fixed-effect model cancels out the impact of time-invariant omitted variables (Bebchuk et 
al., 2009). It also controls for company-invariants (such as macroeconomic movements) that 
influence firm value (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2003). Additionally, it controls for unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneity by considering changes in each of governance mechanisms and 
disclosure quality as well as changes in firm value rather than levels. Therefore, any firm 
fixed effect is canceled (McConnell et al., 2008). Consequently, any relation that holds 
thereafter cannot be attributed to an endogeneity issue (Brown et al., 2011). The only 
limitation of this approach is its reliance on within-firm variation solely to derive results 
(Brown et al., 2011), yet it still gives robust regression estimates (Henry, 2008). Drawing on 
the above discussion, the fixed-effect technique is the least contentious and most appropriate 
method for mitigating the endogeneity problems. 
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In conclusion, the extant literature points out that fixed-effect panel data analysis is the best 
approach available to mitigate endogeneity. Arguably, if data is not available to run fixed-
effect, endogeneity should be “a low-ranking priority” (Lent, 2007), and researchers should 
focus on more apparent research problems such as measurement of variables, because using 
improper remedies such as IV will be worse than accepting the inherent endogeneity (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010). Indeed, since fixed-effect panel data requirements are available for the 
current study. Therefore, following the recent research trend of studying endogeneity with 
regards to the effect of corporate governance on firm value (e.g. Brown et al., 2011), the 
current study uses the fixed-effect panel data technique to overcome endogeneity-associated 
problems. 
Up until this point, the researcher has been particularly concerned to identify the endogeneity-
associated problems and ways the extant literature suggesting in addressing such concerns. Of 
special interest is the use of fixed effect regression model. To be more confident about the use 
of panel data (more specifically fixed effect) instead of OLS, following Palia (2001), the 
current study compares three estimation methods, OLS, random effect, and fixed effect 
estimations.  
In doing so, a Lagrangian Multiplier test is conducted which compares OLS estimations 
versus random effect estimations. Results recommend the use of random effect over OLS, this 
is clear with Chi2 = 85.27, at the 1% significance level. Then, Hausman test of fixed versus 
random effects estimations is conducted. To decide between fixed or random effects a 
Hausman test is run where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. 
the alternative the fixed effects.  It basically tests whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated 
with the regressors, the null hypothesis is they are not. 
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 Results of Hausman tests provide evidence to support the use of fixed effect over random 
effect technique. Chi2 = 617.49, at the 1% significance level. Accordingly, and in line with 
Palia (2001), the fixed effect is the optimal estimation method to mitigate endogeneity. 
In addition to using the fixed effect model, the current study also tackles endogeneity in 
general, and particularly the omitted variables problem, through three more approaches. First, 
following Beiner et al. (2006), the study considers an extensive set of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Second, following Cheung et al. (2010) and Lopes and de Alencar (2010), the 
study examines an extensive set of control variables to minimise the omitted-variables bias. 
Third, the study considers the joint effect of disclosure quality and corporate governance to 
mitigate omitted-variables bias. 
2.2.4.2  Examining the Joint Effect of DQ and CG 
Although many researchers examine the association between corporate governance and firm 
value, few studies examine the link between disclosure quality, corporate governance and firm 
value. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the underlying study is the first to 
investigate the joint effect of disclosure quality and corporate governance on firm value. The 
trend of examining the joint effect of two variables on a third one is new in the accounting 
literature (e.g. Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013; and Cormier and Magnan, 2014).   
One of the ways to improve the overall firm governance is to improve the transparency of 
disclosure (Nowland, 2008). Meanwhile, disclosure and transparency is one of the main 
principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
principles of corporate governance, which is internationally recognised as an effective 
framework for corporate governance (2004).  
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In addition, the corporate governance ranking in Russia developed by the Brunswick Warburg 
investment bank assigns the biggest weight to the disclosure and transparency aspect 
(Rutherford and Costello, 1999). Nonetheless, greater transparency prompts corporate 
governance. Furthermore, transparency is hoped to reduce the diversion of cash flow to the 
management and the controlling shareholders (Coffee, 1999). Additionally, corporate 
governance may improve operational transparency by improving the ability of shareholders to 
discern the quality of management and the true value of a firm (Chung et al., 2010). Beekes 
and Brown (2006) report a positive relationship between better-governed firms and 
disclosure14 informativeness. They posit that better corporate governance structure leads to 
more informative disclosure, and definitely influences market efficiency. Their results suggest 
that if the quality of corporate governance affects the quality of  disclosure, then corporate 
governance will be valued more highly by the market. In this vein, Beekes and Brown (2006) 
implicitly refer to the importance of considering disclosure quality when evaluating the 
influential nature of corporate governance with regards to the market valuation.  
Surprisingly, although the link between disclosure and corporate governance is well 
established in the literature, and the effect of disclosure quality on firm value is paramount at 
least, in the theory, very few studies have examined some proxies for disclosure quality in 
conjunction with corporate governance when assigning the effect of corporate governance on 
firm value (Cheung et al., 2010; Shue et al., 2010; Al-Najjar et al., 2011; and Nekhili et al., 
2010).  
 
                                                 
14 The disclosure here is price-sensitive announcements.  
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Generally, those studies have many caveats, including the use of proxies for quality disclosure 
(i.e. Cheung et al., 2010), the restriction to only one type of disclosure (i.e. Shue et al., 2010; 
Al-Najjar et al. 2011; and Nekhili et al. 2010), the use of a small set of governance 
mechanisms (Chueng et al., 2010), or utilising a composite measure of governance (Al-Najjar 
et al., 2011). In conclusion, the empirical evidence on the joint effect of disclosure and 
corporate governance structure on firm value is limited and suffers from many limitations.  
Generally, Larcker et al. (2007) attribute the mixed results to a modest level of reliability and 
validity in examining governance measures (few individual mechanisms or composite 
measure). In line with this reasoning, the mixed results regarding the link between disclosure 
quality and firm value are likely to hold inaccurate quality measurements. 
The third research objective; determining the extent to which disclosure quality and corporate 
governance mechanisms are substitutes or complements is achieved through model number 3. 
Following Henry (2008), and Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), the current study generally 
proposes three different scenarios. First, if the coefficient of the interaction is insignificant, 
this indicates that the effect of disclosure quality on firm value does not vary with the 
existence of a certain corporate governance mechanism. This means that, disclosure and 
corporate governance are different ways of conveying the same information, then firms 
having higher disclosure quality but lower governance quality should exhibit roughly the 
same value as firms with higher disclosure quality and governance quality. Similarly, firms 
that have higher governance quality should have roughly the same value irrespective of their 
level of disclosure quality.  
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Second, a positive significant interaction coefficient indicates a complementary effect 
between disclosure quality and a certain corporate governance mechanism. Stated differently, 
disclosure quality and governance quality produces related information that is ‘reinforcing’ 
(i.e. if there is a multi-applicative effect), then firm value would be the greatest for firms that 
have high disclosure quality and governance quality. 
Third, a negative significant interaction coefficient indicates a substitutive effect between 
disclosure quality and a certain corporate governance mechanism. If disclosure quality and 
governance quality convey related information, but some of the information is common to 
both, i.e. ‘partially additive’, then firm value for firms that have high levels of disclosure  
quality and governance quality should be higher than firm value when firms have high levels 
of disclosure quality but with low governance quality or firm value. In this case, there is a  
partial substitution effect and the interaction term should be negative and statistically 
significant. To sum up, results of the present study determines which of these three 
possibilities is present in the data by allowing for an interactive effect in our model. 
In sum, drawing on the previous discussion, the current study regresses industry-median 
adjusted Tobin’s Q on disclosure quality, 14 corporate governance mechanisms, and the 
interaction between disclosure quality and each of the corporate governance mechanisms to 
investigate the joint effect, and lastly control variables using the following fixed-effect model 
(for i firms over t years). The model is discussed thoroughly in section 8.3.2.3. The detailed 
tests and results are reported in chapter Eight. Particularly, univariate analysis is presented 
section 8.3.1, Multivariate analysis is discussed in section 8.3.2, and the robustness tests in 
section 8.3.3. 
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2.3 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter provided a coherent discussion about the research methodology undertaken in the 
current research. It started by elaborating different research philosophy, with an in depth 
discussion of the logical positivism, its historical emergence, assumptions, merits and, 
limitations. Second, the chapter discussed the relevant theories in place with a focus on the 
agency theory, which formulates the assumptions and hypotheses of the current research. 
Third, the chapter presented different research methods employed to reach out to scientific 
answers for the pre-stated research questions and meets the research objectives in statistically 
proper procedures, which allows for results generalisation.  
 
The research method sub-section is sub-divided into three main sections, each of which is 
devoted to discuss the featured methodological issues of each of the three studies under 
examinations in the current research. The first study covered in chapters Three and Four uses 
mainly the content analysis approach. The second study covered through chapters Five and 
Six employs mainly an OLS regression model. Lastly, the third study utilizes a fixed effect 
regression model. The following figure 2.2 summarises the research methodology applied in 
the underlying research. 
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3.1 Overview 
The separation between ownership and management creates agency problems, particularly 
information asymmetry problems where market participants believe that managers tend to 
behave to their own benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, any mechanism 
intended to narrow this information asymmetry gap is profound to the success of the 
financial market (Ronen and Yaari, 2002). One of the most effective mechanisms in bridging 
such a gap is keeping investors informed through disclosure. This chapter responds to 
continuing calls for a sound definition of disclosure quality and proposes a valid disclosure 
measure.  
The chapter starts with section 3.2 by explaining the importance of disclosure quality and 
more specifically, the importance of high quality disclosure. Then, the chapter proceeds and 
introduces disclosure concepts in general and the concept of disclosure quality in particular 
in section 3.3. Additionally, section 3.4 works to build a rich understanding of difficulties 
encountered in measuring disclosure quality and various proxies used. It also provides a 
synthesised review of prior attempts to measure disclosure quality in section 3.5. An 
overview of the framework used as the base for developing the proposed disclosure quality, 
the OFR, is introduced in section 3.6. The proposed framework for measuring disclosure 
quality is discussed in section 3.7. The details for the calculations of the aggregated 
disclosure score is discussed in section 3.8. The overlap and the differences between the 
Business Review and the OFR are then elaborated in section 3.9. Finally, section 3.10 
summarises and concludes. 
Disclosure, in general, is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). It is defined as “any deliberate release of financial information, whether 
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numerical or qualitative, required or best practice, or via formal or informal channels” 
(Gibbins et al., 1990, p. 122). Arguably, while this definition is explanatory, it abstracts 
disclosure into the provision of financial information only. However, firms usually disclose 
various types of non-financial information as well, including strategic information about the 
firm –for instance, new market entrance plans, intentions to expand into new product lines, 
and so on. In this vein, other researchers (e.g. Armitage and Marston, 2008) recognise a 
broader scope of information when defining disclosure, arguing that disclosure involves the 
provision of information of all types by a firm, both to the public in general and to restricted 
groups of information users in particular (e.g. analysts and creditors). 
From a legal point of view, there are two types of disclosure, namely mandatory and 
voluntary/best practice. Mandatory disclosure is the type of information firms are legally 
required to provide through regulated annual reports and accounts including the financial 
statements, footnotes and other regulatory filings (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Mandatory 
disclosure is determined either by company status as set out by law, for example, company 
law in the UK, or enforcement by professional regulatory bodies in the form of standards 
such as Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP) required by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US. The third channel of mandatory disclosure 
is that which makes disclosure necessary for listing on various stock exchanges (Marston 
and Shrives, 1991), for instance, the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
 The primary motive for such regulations is to manage and judge the management’s 
stewardship function on behalf of and for the interest of shareholders (Burton, 1981; Kam, 
1986). Another motive is to ensure the provision of sufficient information to keep 
shareholders informed and enable them to make better-informed decisions (FASB, 2009). 
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Information reported by firms in excess of the minimum requirements is classified as best 
practice disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 1991). For example, in the UK, the Companies Act 
imposes minimum requirements “Business Review” while the Accounting Standard Board 
(ASB) set out recommendations for best practice disclosure. ASB (2007, p. 2) clarifies the 
difference as such: 
 
 “Best practice - the degree to which companies are reporting above and beyond the legal 
requirements and have adopted the recommendations in the ASB’s Reporting Statement on 
the (OFR). 
  
Compliance - how UK companies are performing in the light of the requirement under the 
Companies Act 1985 to provide a Business Review within the directors’ report”. 
 
Another distinction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is based on the nature of 
the narrative. Generally, narratives in the annual reports are divided into two categories 
(Beattie et al., 2008). The first comprises descriptive narratives, which present specific data; 
examples include: the directors’ report, the corporate governance report and the 
remuneration report. The second comprises story-telling narratives. These include the chief 
executive’s review, the financial executive’s review, and the OFR statement. Based on the 
examples given by Beattie et al. (2008, p. 186), for each type of narrative, usually, 
mandatory disclosure takes the form of descriptive narratives (e.g. the directors’ report) 
while best practice disclosure is considered as story telling narrative (e.g. the OFR 
statement). 
 Management usually discloses additional information through various means, including 
press releases, conference calls, monthly newsletters, and field visits with existing and 
potential institutional investors (Graham et al., 2005). Other disclosure channels include 
management forecasts, internet reporting, and interim reports. Additionally, intermediaries 
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such as financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press represent other channels 
for disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
3.2 Importance of Narrative Disclosure 
The thesis focuses on one of the most important areas in financial reporting: narrative 
disclosure. Narrative disclosure attracts accounting researchers for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, additional disclosure is valuable as it: 
“Can generate change by bringing hitherto ungathered or unnoticed information 
and issues to the attention of directors and company managers. Secondly, it can 
also provide information that company stakeholders and external commentators 
can use to put pressure on the company to raise standards” (Williamson, 2003, p. 
523). 
 
In this sense, “disclosure strategies then provide a potentially important means for corporate 
managers to impart their knowledge to outside investors even if capital markets are efficient” 
(Healy and Palepu, 1993, p. 1). Secondly, such disclosure is crucial in reducing information 
asymmetry among the market participants, as well as between managers and investors 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011). It is particularly useful as a means to manage users’ impressions 
about the firm’s annual performance (Beattie et al., 2008). As such, providing high-quality 
additional disclosure helps in correcting firms’ mis-valuation in the stock markets as well as 
in increasing institutional interest and liquidity of their stocks (Healy et al., 1999, p. 488).  
Generally, a better information environment is associated with higher market valuation 
(Lang et al., 2004). Accordingly, additional disclosure adds more credibility to financial 
statements and enhances investors’ perception of the firm; in turn, such perception is 
reflected in firm value (Healy et al., 1999). Narrative disclosure is said to be the most 
powerful communication tool (Bhasin and sheikh, 2013). Importantly, the above-mentioned 
assumptions rely heavily on the quality of information disclosed to the market. Investors are 
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expected to value disclosure if it is of high quality and not just “cheap talk” from 
management. 
Content analysis (i.e. analysing words), either manually or using the computer, is extensively 
used in the literature (Li, 2010) and, therefore, is acceptable as a fair approach in analysing 
disclosure in the academia. To a great extent, the empirical literature finds that words reflect 
reality. This is apparent from the following empirical evidence. Hussainey and Walker 
(2009) use some forward-looking keywords to analyse UK narratives and conclude that 
forward-looking information improves a market’s ability to anticipate future earnings 
changes in high growth firms. Stated differently, forward-looking words used in Hussainey 
and Walker’s (2009) study give an indication of the reality (future earnings changes). A 
second example of the empirical evidence that words largely reflect reality is Clatworthy and 
Jones’s (2003) study. Using bad news and good news keywords, Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003) find that companies with improving performance concentrate on good news. 
Therefore, words reflecting good news disclosed in the UK narratives actually reflect the 
company’s real situation. The third evidence is presented by Abrahamson and Amir (1996). 
They use a words-based content analysis approach to analyse the president’s letter. Results 
suggest that the letter contains information that may be used to assess the future performance 
of the firm.  
In conclusion, the empirical literature finds evidence that words reflect reality and even 
more, could be used to anticipate future performance. For further details on content analysis, 
see Li (2010). 
An important point to bring into the discussion of disclosure quality is the difference 
between ‘incremental information’ and ‘impression management’. Both terms are alternative 
justifications for disclosing additional information in excess of the minimum requirements. 
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Mainly, the first approach views narrative disclosure positively. The second, views narrative 
disclosure as an “opportunistic behaviour whereby managers exploit information 
asymmetries between them and firm outsiders through engaging in biased reporting” (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan, 2007, p. 3). 
Incremental information is defined as value relevant voluntarily disclosed information 
intended to help in overcoming information asymmetry (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). 
Incremental information is based on the assumption of an efficient market. The efficient 
market hypothesis assumes all market participants have rational expectations about future 
returns. In turn, investors usually are able to deduct biased reporting (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). This would result in higher cost of capital and reduced share price 
performance. As managers’ compensation is linked to stock price performance, managers 
have no economic incentives to engage in impression management and would prefer to 
provide incremental information to advocate their positions (Baginski et al., 2000; 2004). 
On the other side, the term ‘impression management’ is taken from social psychology. It is 
defined as “a field of study within social psychology studying how individuals present 
themselves to others to be perceived favourably by others.” (Hooghiemstra 2000, p. 60). In 
other words, it means influencing how others think about you through pretending.  
In the disclosure context, many researches provide definitions for impression management. 
However, the definition provided by Godfrey et al. (2003) seems to be the simplest, and 
more precise. They define impression management as the process of influencing outsiders’ 
impressions of firm performance by manipulating the content and presentation of 
information in corporate documents with the purpose of distorting readers’ perceptions of 
corporate achievements in favour of the management (Godfrey et al., 2003). This definition 
implies that like earnings management, management have the intention to deceive users of 
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financial reports. Accordingly, impression management has the potential for the same 
serious risk of adverse capital misallocations as earnings management (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). 
It has been argued that the opportunity for impression management in corporate reports is 
increasing over time (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). The most obvious evidence for this 
belief is that narrative disclosures have become longer and more sophisticated over the last 
few years (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007; and Banghoj and Plenborg, 2008). Impression 
management is based on weak market efficiency where investors are unable to assess 
managerial bias in the short term, and, consequently, managers engage in impression 
management to influence the firm’s share price (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). More 
particularly, impression management occurs in less regulated narrative disclosures, which 
focus on interpreting financial outcomes (Niamh et al., 2009). This situation will certainly 
lead to capital misallocations and increased compensation for managers, via stock options 
(Adelberg 1979; Rutherford 2003; and Courtis 2004).  
Although these two approaches “impression management” and “incremental information” 
provide alternative justifications for best practice disclosure, however, most studies examine 
disclosure on the basis of the “incremental information” approach (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 
2001). The reason for the adoption of the “incremental information” approach by many 
research, is the widespread use of the agency theory in explaining motivations for best 
practice disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). As discussed previously in chapter One, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) models the agent- principle relationship and contend that 
managers have advantages over shareholders by virtue of having access to information not 
available to other users. This situation creates an information asymmetry problem. One of 
the most common approaches to mitigate information asymmetry is voluntarily providing 
more information to shareholders (e.g. Bartov and Bodnar, 1996; and Jones, 2007).  
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There is a fear that, additional disclosure may be provided on the basis of “impression 
management”, (i.e., managers provide information that deceive users of financial reports). 
Because confidence in words might be questioned, continuous efforts have been exerted 
from well recognised Accounting boards -such as the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) in 
the UK, and The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB)- to provide guidance and 
recommendations for preparing the narratives in order to promote the quality of financial 
reporting (e.g. Reporting statement (OFR), 2006 and Management Commentary (2010)). The 
higher the quality of words disclosed the higher the confidence in the disclosure. Moving 
from this point, the underlying research develops a disclosure quality measure. Such measure 
is based on the recommendations for a best practice disclosure presented in the OFR 
statement (2006). 
Drawing on the influential role of disclosure in capital markets, the study seeks to investigate 
disclosure over three main axes. These are measurement, determinants, and impact aspects 
of disclosure. The current chapter and chapter Four deals with the measurement of disclosure 
quality, chapters Five and Six handle determinants of disclosure quality, and chapters Seven 
and Eight test firm value as an example of one impact of disclosure quality. 
 The thesis measures and examines the determinants and economic consequences of the 
quality of disclosure in annual reports. Other measures for economic consequences include: 
cost of capital, informativeness of stock prices, and investors’ ability to better anticipate 
future earnings changes. These measures provide areas for future research as discussed later 
in chapter Seven, section 7.3, and in chapter Eight, section 9.5. 
The decision to focus on annual reports is justified by two reasons. First, these reports are 
considered as a very important official means of disclosure (Marston, 2008) and as an 
influential source of information about a firm’s performance for investors (Marston and 
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Shrives, 1991). Second, the literature finds a high and significant positive correlation 
between annual report disclosures and other forms of disclosure (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002).  
In addition to focusing on one channel of disclosure (i.e. annual reports), the current research 
takes an even sharper focus by being restricted only to the OFR statement included in annual 
reports. One of the aims of this research is to introduce a new measure for disclosure quality. 
To this end, it is suggested that a reliable and solid generally accepted conceptual 
frameworks should be used (Botosan, 2004). Looking at UK narrative, the OFR is the only 
part that is based on a framework stating the best practice recommendations for a high 
quality disclosure.  
3.3 Disclosure Quality Definitions 
Marston (2008) suggests that disclosure in general is perceived as an abstract concept, which 
is difficult to measure directly. In this sense, disclosure is viewed as a latent variable.15 In 
other words, it is not amenable for observation and direct measurement. Hence, it needs to be 
indirectly observed through the sample values of an observed variable(s). 
Disclosure quality definitions could be categorised based on their perspectives as either 
investor-or- firm-driven. One investor-driven quality definition contends that disclosure 
quality is the accuracy of investors’ beliefs about stock prices following disclosure 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). In a related definition, Hopkins (1996) defines disclosure 
quality as the extent to which current and potential investors can read and interpret the 
information easily. One of the concerns in opertionalising these definitions are related to the 
difficulty inherent in measuring investors’ perceptions of disclosure quality. 
                                                 
15
Bollen (2002) defines a latent variable as an observed variable that is influenced by unobservable causes and 
is difficult to measure. 
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From a firm-driven perspective, King (1996) defines disclosure quality as the degree of self-
interested bias in the disclosure. It is extremely difficult to measure the management’s bias 
in the information disclosed, as suggested by King’s definition. Another definition in this 
context holds that disclosure quality involves “the firm’s ongoing ex-ante commitment to 
provide disclosure” (Core, 2001, p. 48). Unfortunately, both definitions are indirect and 
hence, there is a problem in quality measurement.  
Beattie et al. (2004) maintain a more comprehensive definition where they define disclosure 
quality as a complex, multi-dimensional, context-sensitive and subjective concept. Due to 
such obvious difficulty in developing a meaningful and operational measure of disclosure 
quality, researchers commonly use various proxies for disclosure quality. The following 
section discusses these proxies in detail.  
3.4 Proxies for Disclosure Quality 
Disclosure quality has always been (e.g. Core, 2001) and continues to be (e.g. Berger, 2011) 
a hot research question that captures researchers’ interests. Measuring disclosure quality has 
been regarded as a problematic issue in the literature due to the lack of a clear definition of 
disclosure quality (Beyer et al., 2010). It is argued that, developing a quality measure is 
extraordinarily difficult (Botosan, 1997; 2004). This is also evidenced by the continuous 
attempts in the literature to measure disclosure quality.  
Botosan (2004) identifies three reasons for such difficulty. The first is the difficulty in 
defining what constitutes quality. The Accounting Standard Board (ASB), as a part of its role 
to promote high quality financial reporting, has issued a Reporting Statement (2006), see 
section 3.7 for a detailed discussion of this statement. The objective of this statement is to 
specify the best practice for disclosing an OFR statement (ASB, 2006, Objectives, para. 1). 
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The current research uses the recommendations set out by the ASB as a basis for defining 
disclosure quality (see section 3.7 for the full discussion). As stated in ASB (2007, p. 2) 
“…the recommendations in the ASB’s Reporting Statement on the OFR, which the FRC 
believes is the most up-to-date and authoritative source of best practice guidance”. 
Accordingly, the first difficulty argued by Botosan (2004) is eliminated.   
The second reason for the said difficulty in measuring disclosure quality, is the need for 
researchers to recognise that effective frameworks for assessing quality are usually context 
specific (i.e. measures for disclosure quality of the OFR statements differs from that of the 
press release). The current research admits this notion and recognises that the proposed 
quality measure works only for annual reports narratives, rather than other disclosure 
channels. It is also restricted to English language financial reports. The third reason 
addressed by Botosan (2004) is the difficulty inherent in the practical implementation of the 
scoring procedure. Problems in implications could arise because of lack of information, 
excessive judgement, or prohibitive costs. In order to develop a practical measure for 
disclosure quality, the underlying research eliminated -as much as possible- the personal 
judgement through using computerised content analysis as detailed earlier in chapter Two 
(figure 2.2). Additionally, all steps for scoring disclosure are clearly mentioned in detail. 
Finally, the computerised content analysis is used heavily, and a minimal use of manual 
content analysis is included in the scoring procedures. 
The literature does not provide effective guidance on the measurement of disclosure quality, 
and yet, it leaves the researcher to defend their choice based on the relative advantages of 
each approach (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). In conclusion, measuring disclosure quality is a 
challenging task. Despite the difficulty encountered in developing a measure for disclosure 
quality, such a notion does not eliminate continuous attempts to measure disclosure quality.  
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The inherent difficulty of defining disclosure quality has led to the use of several proxies.16 
This section reviews prior literature on proxies for disclosure quality. The review implies 
that there are primarily four approaches used to proxy for disclosure quality, namely; 
objective ratings, subjective ratings, other measures, and using the quantity (i.e. level) of 
disclosure.  
Figure 3.1, which is derived from literature review conducted by the researcher, illustrates 
these different approaches. These four approaches include, objective ratings discussed in 
sub-section 3.4.1, subjective ratings discussed in sub-section 3.4.2, other measures discussed 
in sub-section 3.4.3, and disclosure quantity discussed in sub-section 3.4.4.  
Figure 3.1: Proxies for Disclosure Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 For a comprehensive review of these proxies, see Healy and Palepu (2001), Core (2001), Beyer et al. (2010) and Berger 
(2011). Recent papers on the measurement of corporate narrative reporting include Brown and Tucker (2011) who introduce 
an algorithm based on word counts to measure the usefulness of year-over-year MD&A modifications. However, Roulstone 
(2011) suggests that Brown and Tucker’s (2011) measure needs further refining.       
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3.4.1 Objective Ratings 
The first approach is objective ratings. It involves assigning a disclosure score through 
objective ratings. An objective index is usually based on a checklist of items where a score is 
given for each item disclosed, without counting the occurrence times of such information. 
This approach is referred to as the “occurrence” (Joseph and Taplin, 2011). Occurrence 
enables the variety of disclosure to be compared across different firms (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007). Figure 3.2 illustrates the steps typically followed in developing a 
disclosure score through objective ratings. 
 
Figure 3.2: Steps for Developing Disclosure Score through Objective Ratings 
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  117 
The first step involves constructing a disclosure index. The index is a list of criteria against 
which the disclosure information is evaluated to reach a disclosure score. To construct these 
indices, some studies use questionnaires to determine important or relevant disclosure items, 
for instance, Ho and Wong (2001) and Willekens et al. (2005). Others depend on some 
principles or regulations in constructing their disclosure indices. For example, Celik et al. 
(2006) construct their own disclosure score based on Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) requirements; Abraham and Cox (2007) use principles of risks in the UK17 to 
construct their disclosure index; McChlery et al. (2011) use Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP) and the OFR to evaluate the quality of voluntary information disclosed on 
oil and gas reserves. They use a score from zero to three to represent the quality of 
information disclosed based on SORP and OFR dimensions.  
Another approach utilised by some scholars involves developing self-constructed disclosure 
indices in the light of reviewing the literature. Examples of such studies include Mangena 
and Pike (2005), Barako et al. (2006), Marshall and Weetman (2007); O’Sullivan et al. 
(2008), and Laksmana (2008). Self-constructed indices are either weighted or un-weighted. 
Weights are given based on financial analysts’ perceptions of certain items in the statements. 
It is argued that a weighted disclosure index reflects the perceived disclosure required by 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). An alternative view argues that weighted disclosure 
indices do not alter the results significantly because firms disclose important items as much 
as they disclose unimportant items (Ho and Wong 2001; and Mangena and Pike, 2005). 
Notably, self-constructed disclosure scores could be biased unless clear justification is 
provided for the elements included in the proxy. 
Lastly, another group of studies uses disclosure indices developed and empirically tested in 
prior research. Such studies contend that, those indices have been tested and are more likely 
                                                 
17The Orange Book Management of Risk—Principles and Concepts (HM Treasury, 2004) 
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to be perceived as reliable and valid indices. However, care should be taken here, especially, 
if these indices were developed in specific contexts or country conditions. Examples of these 
studies include: Peters et al. (2001) who use the disclosure score of Peters (2000); Evans 
(2004) who relies on Botosan’s (1997) disclosure score; Leventis and Weetman (2004) who 
use Meek et al.’s (1995) index; Boesso and Kumar (2007) who use the disclosure score 
developed by Boesso (2003); Lim et al. (2007) who use Meek et al.’s (1995) disclosure 
score; Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) who use the disclosure score of Eng and Mak (2003); 
and Li et al. (2008) who rely on Haniffa and Cooke (2005).  
After building the checklist (disclosure index), the second step in developing a disclosure 
score is determining the extent of information disclosed. In other words, this step analyses 
the content of disclosure, bearing in mind that the step involves only evaluation of the 
occurrence of each piece of information in the checklist, with no attention being given to the 
frequency of occurrence. In doing so, all prior research uses content analysis that is either 
traditional (manual) (e.g. Chen et al., 2008; Dedman et al., 2008; Cheung et al., 2010; 
Stephen et al., 2014) or, recently, computerised (e.g. Kothari et al., 2009; Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2011). 
A disclosure index could be designed for an overall corporate disclosure score (i.e. Botosan, 
1997; Ho and Wong, 2001; Willekens et al., 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Luo et al., 
2006; Barako et al., 2006;Wang et al., 2008; and Jiang et al., 2010). Otherwise, the index 
might be specific to certain types of corporate disclosure, such as oil and gas reserves (e.g. 
McChlery  et al., 2011). Research and Development disclosure (Swift, 2014), Corporate 
social responsibility disclosure (i.e. Hasseldinea et al., 2005; Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; 
Beck et al., 2010; Elsayed and Hoque, 2010; Campbell and Slack, 2011; Cowan and Deegan, 
2011; Elijido-Ten, 2011; Khan et al., 2013; Wegener et al., 2013; Cormier and Magnan, 
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2014; and Grigoriset al., 2014), intellectual capital disclosure (i.e. Li et al., 2008; Striukova 
et al., 2008), and corporate governance disclosure (i.e. Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; 
Laksamana, 2008; Ernstberger and Gruning, 2010; Cheung et al., 2010, and Bhasin and 
Shaikh, 2013). 
This approach (objective ratings) focuses on one dimension of quality (occurrence). In other 
words, it abstracts quality in one dimension and uses it as a proxy for the overall quality 
concept. Opponents of this approach maintain that “occurrence” as a quality dimension 
should not be evaluated in isolation from its information content (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Arguably, it is not proper to evaluate the overall quality based only on one individual 
dimension and overlooking others, such as the qualitative characteristics of the information 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Another caveat of this approach is the subjectivity in the 
development and application (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011) of the developed index. In 
addition, such scores are difficult to be replicated because of the personal judgement of the 
researcher(s) involved and the intensive labour nature of the coding process, which affects 
the reliability of findings and limits the sample size (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
Conversely, the main advantage of objective ratings is the applicability to a wide cross 
section of firms (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). 
3.4.2 Subjective Ratings 
The second approach to proxy for disclosure quality involves subjective ratings. Subjective 
ratings are pre-assigned disclosure scores. The most well-known example of subjective 
rating is the Association for Investment Management Research – Financial Analysts 
Federation (AIMR-FAF) database (e.g. Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Felo et al., 2009; Zhao et 
al., 2013). Notably, the use of AIMR-FAF is dated, since in 1995 the Financial Analysts 
Federation discontinued the rating (Hussainey et al., 2003). This measure uses key financial 
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analysts to develop ranking lists for US firms in each industry sector. More specifically, it 
represents an annual survey by assigning aggregate subjective ranks for both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure in annual and quarterly financial reports, as well as in firms’ investor 
relations. Other types of subjective ratings are summarised by Hussainey (2004). These 
include Financial Post ratings (Sutley, 1994), Australian Stock Exchange ratings (Brown et 
al., 1999), SEC ratings (Barron et al., 1999), Society of Management Accountants of Canada 
(SMAC) ratings (Richardson and Welker, 2001), Actualidad Economica Ratings (Blasco and 
Trombetta, 2002) and Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) 
ratings (Hope, 2003a, b). Hussainey (2004) contends that these studies do not specify 
whether these ratings are based on investigating firms’ publications, or whether they just 
reflect analysts’ and accountants’ general opinions regarding the firm’s disclosure policy.  
Opponents of this approach believe that it is based on the subjective judgement of the 
financial analysts (Healy and Palepu, 2001; and Cheung et al., 2010). This might therefore 
bias the sample toward firms followed by the analysts (Botosan, 1997). Luo et al. (2006) add 
that, this measure is a noisy proxy for disclosure quality. Finally, the composition of the 
analysts committees varies by industry and time period (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). The 
main advantage, however, of this kind of scores is that the disclosure scores are based on a 
broad range of disclosure channels which in turn, allow for a more comprehensive evaluation 
of the best practice disclosure quality of the firm (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011).   
It is worth noting that the first approach (objective ratings) and the second (subjective 
ratings) approach to proxy for disclosure quality suffer from many limitations, as discussed 
earlier in the relative sections. Mainly, objective ratings evaluate the overall quality based 
only on the occurrence of information while ignoring other quality dimensions (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). The most apparent limitation of the second approach is the subjective 
judgement involved, which limits the reliability of the score (Cheung et al., 2010). 
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3.4.3 Other Measures 
The third approach to proxy for disclosure quality encompasses other measures such as 
management earnings forecasts (e.g. Chen et al., 2008; Li, 2010b18). Advantages of 
management earnings forecasts include being accurately measured, as this represents either a 
point or a range of earnings and revenues; additionally, it is easy to determine the precise 
timing of disclosure, which enables testing for motivations and the consequences of 
disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Despite these merits, one limitation of management 
forecasts is that they do not provide an accurate proxy for subjective un-verifiable types of 
disclosure such as customer satisfaction (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Additionally, Cheung et 
al. (2010) cast doubt on the ability to generalise results derived from management forecasts 
with regards to other kinds of best practice disclosure. A second example for other measures 
includes the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). It represents analysts’ 
forecasts of firms’ future earnings (e.g. Frankel et al., 2006). The main limitation of 
(I/B/E/S) is that it entails a great deal of subjective judgement (e.g. Frankel et al., 2006). 
3.4.4 Disclosure Quantity 
Unlike the afore-mentioned three approaches, the fourth approach involves using disclosure 
quantity19 as a proxy for quality. This approach assumes that the importance of information 
is reflected by the extent of its disclosure (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007, p. 504) argue that “all existing studies retain only the quantity of disclosure 
(or the disclosure level)”. 
In doing so, the most common approach in the literature to measuring disclosure quantity is 
the frequency of forward-looking information disclosed (i.e. Hussainey et al., 2003; 
                                                 
18 Li (2010b) uses management forecasts on earnings and capital expenditures as a proxy for voluntary 
disclosure quantity and uses the accuracy of management forecasts as a proxy for disclosure quality. 
19Literature also uses the term “disclosure level” as being equivalent to disclosure quantity. 
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Gietzmann, 2006; Schleicher et al., 2007; and Stephen et al., 2014). Prior studies justify the 
use of forward-looking information in many ways. 
 Firstly, forward-looking information conveys value-relevant information for investors, 
which in turn improves the market’s ability to anticipate future earnings (i.e. Amir and Lev, 
1996; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; and Hussainey and Walker, 2009). 
Gietzmann (2006) also finds that firms with timely and forward-looking information face 
higher share price volatility. This reflects investors’ abilities to anticipate future earnings, 
which reflects the relevance of forward-looking information. Secondly, firms with effective 
corporate governance systems release more forward-looking information (O’Sullivan et al., 
2008). Investors view forward-looking information as more credible (Athanasakou and 
Hussainey, 2010). Thirdly, Bozzolan et al. (2009) use the level of forward-looking 
information to reflect the quality of best practice disclosure and report that analyst forecast 
accuracy is positively related to the frequency of forward-looking information disclosed. 
Fourthly, Muslu et al. (2010) find that the level of forward-looking information improves the 
ability of stock prices to predict future earnings information. Fifthly, Morgan (2008) 
examines the precision of forward-looking information in terms of Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A), and concludes that quantitative forward-looking information is more 
precise than qualitative forward-looking information. At the other end, Baginski et al. (2014) 
document that, managers use positive forward-looking information to protect their 
employment. They report that managers influence shareholders during the proxy contest 
periods by increasing the number of forward-looking disclosures. They notice subsequent 
decreases in the post contest periods.   
Although disclosure quantity is extensively used in the literature to reflect disclosure quality, 
such an approach is a controversial issue and is highly criticised as being improper and 
inaccurate (Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a). Simply disclosing more 
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information does not make disclosure more understandable or relevant (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004b). Accordingly, owing to the well-acknowledged use of the proportion 
and/or frequency of forward-looking information to reflect disclosure quantity, the current 
study defines disclosure quantity as “the proportion of forward-looking information 
disclosed in narrative statements”. This definition of disclosure quantity is used hereafter in 
this research.  
Notably, a distinction is made between “frequency” and “proportion” of forward-looking 
information. The first term reflects the number of occurrences while the second refers to a 
percentage relating the number of occurrences to the overall length of the disclosure 
statement. The researcher argues that using the “proportion” rather than the “frequency” is 
more precise because it considers and controls for the length of the disclosure statements. 
To conclude, the four approaches used in the extant literature as proxies for disclosure 
quality are prone to various limitations. The most significant one relates to the improper 
measures used, which yield misleading inferences (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a; and 
Ernstberger and Grüning, 2010). Consequently, such proxies should not be viewed as a solid 
substitute for a quality-based measure.  
Based on the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that developing a measure for disclosure 
quality is important for a number of reasons (Beattie et al., 2004). First, a practical and 
reliable measure for evaluating disclosure quality makes inter-firm, inter-industry and 
international comparisons and benchmarking feasible. Second, measuring quality helps to 
provide reliable answers to different research questions related to disclosure quality. For 
example, Mouselli et al. (2011) find that firms with high levels of disclosure quality engage 
less in earnings management. However, the authors use only one dimension of information 
quality –the proportion of forward-looking statements – as a proxy for disclosure quality. 
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This gives an incomplete understanding of the association between disclosure quality and 
earnings quality. Therefore, there is still a need to develop a reliable disclosure quality 
measure to provide complete answers to many research questions. The next section provides 
an overview of these attempts. 
3.5 Prior Attempts to Measure Disclosure Quality 
Despite the importance of a disclosure quality measure, little efforts have been made to 
provide tentative frameworks that could be regarded as first steps toward developing a well-
structured model for a disclosure quality measure. These include Beattie et al. (2004) and 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a; 2008). 
The first framework (Beattie et al., 2004) is a mixture of the first approach (the occurrence) 
and a new attempt to measure quality through evaluating some informational characteristics 
of disclosure. The second and third frameworks (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a; 2008) are 
mixtures of the third approach (the proportion of forward-looking information) and also 
evaluate some informational characteristics of the disclosure context. The three frameworks 
are discussed respectively.  
Beattie et al. (2004) represent the first pioneering attempt to develop a disclosure quality 
measure. They claim that disclosure quality is a function of multiple dimensions. The first 
quality dimension is disclosure quantity, measured by the actual amount of disclosure 
relative to the amount expected given the company’s size and complexity (Beattie et al., 
2004). The second dimension is the spread, which represents percentages of disclosures 
spread across different topics. Such topics were identified based on the Jenkins report, which 
was developed in the US to improve business-reporting quality. The remaining dimensions 
are captured through percentages of sentences representing the time orientation (historical or 
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forward-looking), financial orientation (financial/non-financial), and quantitative orientation 
(quantitative/ qualitative). Beattie et al. (2004) argue that identifying several dimensions of 
the disclosed information should have reasonably widespread support as a measure for 
disclosure quality. Through this approach, they claim to overcome the problem of using one 
information dimension – “occurrence” – as extensively appears in the literature. They add 
that, given the complexity and subjectivity inherent in measuring disclosure quality, no 
specific quality measure should be supported or otherwise rejected.  
Nevertheless, the framework suggested by Beattie et al. (2004) possesses several limitations. 
First, it lacks the proper foundation needed to support and strengthen it (Botosan, 2004; 
Bramer and McMeeking, 2010). The disclosure quality definition proposed by Beattie et al. 
(2004) is not supported by regulatory bodies or well recognised framework of disclosure 
quality. Second, there are doubts concerning the generalisation ability of their study due to 
the small sample size (only 12 firms in the food industry sector). Third, Beattie et al. (2004) 
overemphasise quantity as a quality component.20 Fourth, they highlight that “the 
contribution to quality made by assigning attributes21 is rather unclear and might depend on 
the type of topic being disclosed” (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 233). Fifth, they believe that their 
coding scheme involves inherent subjectivity.  
Notably, Beattie et al. (2004) do not justify their “key” assumption that firms disclosing 
more information are more likely to have a greater level of quality. This assumption is highly 
questionable. Firms may disclose more information, yet such information could lack 
accuracy. Nonetheless, the idea of incorporating dimensions of information disclosed is of 
                                                 
20 As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, the quality score firstly counts percentages of sentences disclosed relative to a 
benchmark. The score also contains percentages of disclosures in each topic, and the quantity is then involved again in 
determining the percentages of disclosures representing time orientation, financial and non-financial, and finally qualitative 
versus quantitative dimensions.  
21 Beattie et al. (2004) use the term “attributes” interchangeably with “quality dimensions”. 
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interest and could be considered as a first step towards developing a comprehensive quality-
based disclosure measure. 
The second attempt to develop a disclosure quality measure is developed by Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004a). They propose a framework for analysing firms’ risk communication 
processes. This framework captures four dimensions. The first dimension is the content of 
information disclosed. This dimension reflects the quantity of disclosure based on pre-
determined topics. Such topics were selected using the guidance on voluntary risk reporting 
issued by professional bodies (i.e. AICPA, 1994; CICA, 2002; FASB, 2001; and ICAEW, 
2003), as well as some suggestions by practitioners (Bell et al., 1997; and De Loach, 2000). 
The second dimension is the economic sign reflecting whether the information disclosed 
represents a positive or a negative situation. The third dimension is the type of measures 
used. This dimension intends to divide information into four sub-categories: financial 
qualitative information, non-financial qualitative information, financial quantitative 
information, and non-financial quantitative information. The fourth dimension is the outlook 
orientation of risk communication. Outlook orientation reflects both the time orientation of 
the information disclosed (information may refer to present state or future projections) and 
the approach of management towards risk (disclosed information could simply communicate 
general hypotheses or expectations concerning the future, or provide information concerning 
management programmes or action to be taken in order to face the exposed risks). 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a)’s framework has attracted considerable attention in the 
literature. Botosan (2004) holds that Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a) are unable to provide 
justification for the assumption that quality is a function of the four stated dimensions. She 
adds that a framework for measuring risk disclosure quality should begin with a well-
supported and convincing discussion of the information dimensions that define disclosure 
quality.  
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Accordingly, Botosan (2004) suggests that a disclosure quality framework should be based 
on the IASB (1989) framework. The IASB (2010) framework identifies two main qualitative 
dimensions of information indented to enhance the usefulness of information to economic 
decision-makers, and therefore might be used as a reflection for disclosure quality. These 
two dimensions are relevance and faithful presentation. Yet, the identified information 
dimensions are highly subjective and could hardly be measured without employing some 
kind of counting approach (Botosan, 2004). Additionally, it is too abstract to be 
operationalised (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004b). 
Unlike Botosan (2004), Shevlin (2004) believes that the dimensions of the proposed 
framework are all reasonable, arguing that these dimensions are representative of disclosure 
quality. Yet, he maintains that applicability to a large sample size might be difficult.22 
Nevertheless, he accepts that the index, conceptually and operationally, represents a major 
step forward in the construction of a measure that researchers can use in best practice 
disclosure research.  
In conclusion, one could argue that it is difficult to have a disclosure quality measure that is 
completely free of counting. However, a multi-dimensional, comprehensive quality measure 
certainly appears to be superior to merely counting the disclosed items. As a response to 
Botosan’s (2004) claim that disclosure quality should be defined in relation to a specific 
research question, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) introduce the third framework for measuring 
disclosure quality, where they refined their prior risk framework.  
Here, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) define disclosure quality as the efficiency of forward-
looking information in improving financial analysts’ capabilities to evaluate the value-
creation strategy and expected financial results of a firm. Notably, such an assumption 
                                                 
22This is because Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a) use manual content analysis; however, such limitation will be covered in 
the current measure since it is basically based on computerised content analysis. 
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narrows the quality definition of best practice disclosure and restricts it to forward-looking 
information. Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) believe that disclosed information is considered to 
be of high quality if it leads to better inferences from analysts and supports better estimates 
of future earnings.  
They argue that a disclosure quality framework should be a multi-dimensional one that 
jointly combines, first, disclosure quantity23 and, second, richness of information. Richness 
is defined as a function of both width and depth. Disclosure width deals with the question of 
how information is disclosed. It encapsulates, first, disclosure coverage (COV) and, second, 
disclosure dispersion (DIS). Coverage refers to the extent of disclosure of relevant topics. 
This is equivalent to the use of a disclosure index (the occurrence) approach. It is statistically 
measured as the percentage of topics filled in by at least one piece of information out of the 
total number of topics. It ranges from zero to one and assumes its maximum value when a 
firm makes a disclosure over each of the topics considered. Dispersion, in contrast, is the 
spread of disclosure across different topics. It is measured in terms of the concentrated 
disclosed items. Consequently, width24 is the average of coverage and dispersion.  
Disclosure depth, which is the second component of disclosure richness discussed in the 
above paragraph, addresses the question of what information is disclosed. Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2008) define three information dimensions, which help define disclosure depth. 
The first is the outlook profile which reflects the time dimension; for example, forward-
looking information. The second is the information measurement type; that is whether 
information is qualitative or quantitative, financial or non-financial. The final information 
dimension is the economic sign of the information disclosed. Information disclosed could 
                                                 
12Quantity is measured by the relative number of disclosed items, adjusted for size and industry using ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression. 
24 Width (WIDi) = ½ ( COVi + DISi ). 
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indicate positive or negative news statements. The three dimensions constitute the depth of 
disclosure richness. Together disclosure quantity and richness constitute disclosure quality.  
Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) compare between using their suggested quality model and a 
quantity score. The quantity score is based on the proportion of forward-looking disclosures. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2008)’s results hold that disclosure quantity and quality are not 
correlated, and thus quantity cannot be regarded as a proxy for disclosure quality. They 
conclude that researchers should be cautious in interpreting results based on quantity 
measures.  
When comparing Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a)’s framework with that of Beattie et al. 
(2004), many differences become apparent. Firstly, Beattie et al. (2004) provide a general 
framework applicable to various types of disclosure. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), however, 
develop a framework specifically designed for risk disclosure, which with some 
modifications could be applicable more generally. The second difference is that Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004a) extend the quality dimensions suggested by Beattie et al. (2004) by adding 
the economic sign. The two frameworks, however, share spread and density dimensions.  
Despite covering some limitations of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a)‘s framework, other 
limitations still exist in Beretta and Bozzolan’s (2008) revised disclosure quality framework. 
The most important of these is the lack of a well-conceived foundation for identifying 
specific quality dimensions.  
It is also noted that the three frameworks overemphasise “quantity” in calculating the 
“quality” scores. In fact, they include the quantity dimension twice – once as an independent 
quality dimension, and then again in counting the frequency of specific information, for 
instance the number of sentences that are forward-looking, financial, and so on. 
Consequently, a problem relating to double counting arises. However, in the proposed 
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quality measure, disclosure quantity (i.e. the length of the OFR statement) is not included as 
a separate dimension in the score (see section 3.7), and thus, such type of double counting 
does not affect the proposed disclosure measure.25   
Nonetheless, one could contend that content analysis in general might include a double 
counting problem. For example, a sentence reflecting a forward-looking context could be at 
the same time reflecting a qualitative context. In this way, the sentence will be counted 
twice, once as a forward-looking sentence and another as a qualitative sentence. However, 
such a situation –if applicable- is not avoidable, all prior attempts have the same limitation, 
and it does not, therefore, limit the contribution of these attempts. 
To conclude, prior attempts to develop best practice disclosure quality measures have many 
limitations. First, there is no clear definition for the concept of disclosure quality. Second, 
there is no justification for the assumption that disclosure quality is a function of the stated 
disclosure quality dimensions; thus, Botosan (2004) argues that any measure for disclosure 
quality should start with a well-supported and convincing discussion of the information 
dimensions proposed by a regulatory framework. Third, some of these measures are 
restricted to one type of disclosure (i.e. risk disclosure in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a, and 
forward-looking disclosure in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Finally, these measures 
overemphasise quantity in their way of calculating disclosure quality. 
Arguably, an approach, which overcomes existing limitations in the literature, is expected to 
represent a step further for developing a sound quality measure (Beyer et al., 2010). Beyer et 
al. (2010) contend that: 
                                                 
25 The researcher would like to thank Kate Howie for reviewing the formulas used in the calculation of the 
aggregated score and assuring that the double counting problem of the score does not contaminate the proposed 
quality score.  
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“A sensible economic definition of voluntary disclosure/financial reporting quality and 
direct derivation of measures from that definition is missing from the literature. This 
lack of an underlying economic definition hinders our ability to draw inferences from 
this work, and we recommend that future research address this issue” (p. 311). 
 
Additionally, Beattie et al. (2004) stress the importance of developing a disclosure quality 
measure that overcomes the limitations of the current attempts. They argue that” (2004, p. 
233): 
  “It is emphasised, however, that the present study is exploratory in nature and hence the 
suggestions made are tentative and incomplete. Further research that builds on and extends 
the ideas presented in this paper is essential. The incorporation of type-based quality 
dimensions, and (perhaps more importantly) topic/type quality dimensions, will further 
refine the composite quality index”. 
 
Such continuous calls for developing disclosure quality measures -other examples include 
Berger (2011) - suggest that the literature recognises the limitations of the current attempts, 
which do not fulfill the research gap of presenting disclosure quality measure, and admit the 
need for further research, which mitigates these limitations to provide a more improved 
disclosure quality measure.  
The most apparent limitation that the current study attempts to mitigate is the lack of a solid 
framework for defining disclosure quality. Botosan (2004) contends that depending on a 
well-known framework provides the foundation needed to support a proposed framework for 
disclosure quality. Moreover, Botosan (2004) lists three main challenges, which could hinder 
the development of a sound disclosure quality measure (see discussion in section 3.5). 
Accordingly, a proposed framework for assessing disclosure quality, which considers these 
challenges, brings the literature closer to measuring disclosure quality.  
 
Therefore, with the absence of a well-established model for evaluating disclosure quality, 
and with the apparent limitations of various proxies for disclosure quality, there is still a 
  132 
need for a multi-dimensional measure for disclosure quality (Beattie et al., 2004; Shevlin, 
2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008) which is backed by a valid framework (Botosan, 2004).  
3.6 Operating and Financial Performance Statement: An 
Overview 
Botosan (2004) recommends that improved disclosure quality measures should use a well-
established and convincing framework that clearly defines disclosure quality and introduces 
proper measures for dimensions of information. As a response to Botosan’ (2004)’s 
recommendation, and in order for the current research’s proposed framework to gain 
credibility and overcome limitations of previously suggested frameworks for measuring 
disclosure quality, OFR best practice framework (ASB, 2006) is the prime base for 
developing the proposed disclosure quality measure.  
This decision to use OFR as the guiding foundation for the proposed disclosure quality 
measure is triggered by two reasons. Firstly, the OFR is broader in scope than other 
disclosure frameworks (e.g. Management Commentary (MC)). The OFR incorporates 
“balance” as a principle of disclosure quality, which is not covered in MC. Other quality 
dimensions are common between OFR and MC either explicitly or implicitly. As such, this 
allows for wide application and generalisation of the proposed quality framework. Secondly, 
MC became effective only recently, on 8 December 2010 (IASB, Management Commentary, 
2010, para. 41). Thus, there is not enough time span to test for the application of MC, 
findings based on a one-year analysis will hardly be generalisable. 
Given the time at which the present study commenced (2009), the current research considers 
the OFR (2006) as the prime basis for developing a valid disclosure quality measure. 
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An OFR statement is defined as:  
“A narrative explanation provided in or accompanying the annual report, of the main 
trends and factors underlying the development, performance and position of an entity 
during the financial year covered by the financial statements, and those which are likely to 
affect the entity’s future development, performance, and position” (ASB, 2006, Definitions, 
para. 3). 
 
The OFR Reporting Statement was originally issued by the ASB in July 1993. The statement 
was founded to guide firms as to the best practices in disclosure by providing a framework 
within which the directors discuss the main factors underlying their firm’s performance, as 
well as their financial position.  
Generally, it is noticed that disclosure of narrative information has been increased in UK 
large listed companies over time (Beattie et al., 2008). As stated in the OFR reporting 
statement (2006, Introduction, para. 2): 
“Following a recommendation in the final report of the Company Law Review (CLR) 
Steering Group (2001), and the Government response on The White Paper ‘Modernising 
Company Law’ (2002), the Government decided to require quoted companies to prepare and 
publish OFRs. In May 2004, the Government issued proposals on the detailed 
implementation of this new requirement in a consultation document ‘Draft Regulations on 
the OFR and Directors’ Report’. The consultation document contained draft secondary 
legislation to implement a new statutory OFR as well as certain provisions of the EU 
Accounts Modernisation Directive requiring an enhanced review of a company’s business 
(the Business Review) in the directors’ report. Following consultation, the final OFR 
Regulations were passed into law in March 2005, taking effect for financial years beginning 
on or after 1 April 2005”. 
 
“The Government also gave the ASB a statutory power to make reporting standards for the 
OFR. In November 2004, the ASB issued Reporting Exposure Draft (RED) 1 ‘The OFR’. 
Following consultation, Reporting Standard (RS) 1 was issued in May 2005” (ASB, 2006, 
Introduction, para. 3). 
 
 “On 28 November 2005, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the government 
intention  to remove the statutory requirement on quoted companies to publish OFRs on the 
grounds that the central requirements on the Business Review are largely identical to those 
of the statutory OFR and the government has a general policy not to impose regulatory 
requirements on UK businesses over and above the relevant EU directive requirements. 
Regulations to repeal the requirement for the OFR were laid in December 2005 and came 
into force on 12 January 2006” (ASB, 2006, Introduction, para. 4). 
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 “The statutory underpinning for RS1 has been removed as a result of the removal of the 
statutory requirement for the OFR. As a consequence, RS 1 has now been formally 
withdrawn and the ASB has ‘converted’ RS 1 into a statement of best practice on the OFR, 
which is set out in this document. In preparing this statement, the ASB has sought to limit the 
changes to those required as a consequence, of the repeal of the OFR legislation, and to 
make the language consistent with a voluntary statement of best practice rather than a 
standard. Given the extensive consultation that took place in developing RS 1, and the need 
to continue to give entities guidance in preparing OFRs, the ASB is issuing this as a final 
Reporting Statement, rather than engaging in a further round of consultation”  (ASB, 2006, 
Introduction, para. 5). 
The prime objective of an OFR reporting standard is “to specify the best practice for 
disclosing OFRs prepared so as to assist members to assess the entity’s strategies and the 
potential for those strategies to succeed. Although not clearly defined by the statement, it is 
implicitly understood that the members26 are the current shareholders” (ASB, 2006, para. 1). 
It worth noting that although the main target user group for the OFR is current and potential 
investors, this does not exclude other stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, and 
creditors who may need relevant information necessary for their decision making process 
(ASB, 2006, para. 7). In doing so, the OFR describes some general principles that implicitly 
identify required attributes for high quality information. Importantly, “the quality of the 
information produced is of central importance to the extent to which OFRs are likely to 
generate positive changes in company behaviour” (Williamson, 2003, p. 523). 
There is an overlap between OFR and the Business Review, however, the main difference is 
that the enhanced Business Review or simply Business Review is a legislative requirement 
by Companies Act 2006 whereas, OFR is a best practice statement of best practice. The 
overlap between Business Review and OFR is implicitly recognised by the companies Act as 
highlighted in the following paragraph: 
                                                 
26 It is explicitly stated in the exposure draft of Reporting Standard 1 OFR that “The [draft] Reporting Standard requires 
directors to prepare an OFR addressed to investors, setting out their analysis of the business, with a forward-looking 
orientation in order to assist investors to assess the strategies adopted by the entity and the potential for those strategies to 
succeed” (ASB, 2004, Summary, para. b).  
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 “The Companies Act 1985 requires that the Business Review is identified as part of the 
directors’ report. The Government has confirmed that it is acceptable to cross-refer in the 
Business Review section of the directors’ report to information contained in a voluntary 
OFR (or other parts of the annual report), provided that they are published together in a 
way that users can easily refer to both sections” (ASB, 2006, p. 25, parg. 3.3). 
 
The Accounting Standards Board identifies the overlap between the Business Review and 
the OFR in a table form. For convenience, discussion of such overlap is discussed in section 
(3.9) after presenting the proposed quality measure.  
3.7 The Proposed Disclosure Quality Measure 
Section 3.6 discussed alternative disclosure quality frameworks and decides on the most 
suitable framework (OFR reporting statement). Based on the conclusions outlined earlier, 
this section defines the concept of disclosure quality. Afterwards, an attempt is made to 
operationalise the quality definition through identifying a reliable measure for each quality 
dimension. 
3.7.1 Disclosure Quality: A proposed Definition 
OFR involves principles for best practice disclosures. Such statement defines what constitute 
disclosure quality. This statement is considered as “…….the most up-to-date and 
authoritative source of best practice guidance” (ASB, 2007, p. 2). The first is a general 
principle holding that “the OFR should set out an analysis of the business through the eyes of 
the board of directors” (ASB, 2006, para. 4). The remaining principles identify very specific 
dimensions for the quality of information disclosed. These include: forward-looking 
orientation, relevance, supplement and complement the financial statements, 
comprehensiveness, understandability, balance and neutrality, and comparability over time 
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(ASB, 2006, para. 6,8,13,16,22,24). These specific principles are discussed in the next 
section. 
Based on the OFR framework identification of what constitutes a best practice disclosure in 
an OFR statement, the researcher defines a best practice disclosure quality as “the totality of 
inherent qualitative characteristics of information in the OFR best practice statements that 
enable it to increase users’ ability to assess firms’ strategies and the potential for those 
strategies to succeed”. This proposed measure of disclosure quality represents a sum of the 
desired information dimensions recommended by the Accounting Standards Board (2006). 
These include; forward-looking orientation, relevance, supplements the financial statements, 
complement the financial statements, comprehensiveness, understandability, balance and 
neutrality, and comparability. 
3.7.1.1 Forward- looking Orientation  
The ASB holds that an OFR statement should have a forward-looking orientation (ASB, 
2006, Summary, para. b). Lev and Zarowin (1999) document a systematic decline in the 
usefulness of historical information in the financial statements to investors over the past 20 
years. They argue that the decline is represented in the weakening association between 
capital market values and earnings, cash flows, and book values over this period of time. 
This suggests that investors do not use historical information as a basis for valuing firms. 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) find that forward-looking information increases analysts’ accuracy 
of forecasts, whereas historical information does not affect the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. Lang and Lundholm (1996) report that analysts rely on value relevant information 
in deriving their forecasts. Such findings support Lev and Zarowin’s (1999) notion that the 
value relevance of historical information is decreasing. 
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The principle of forward-looking orientation contends that, an OFR statement prepared by 
directors should be “addressed to members, setting out their analysis of the business, with a 
forward-looking orientation in order to assist members to assess the strategies adopted by the 
entity and the potential for those strategies to succeed” (ASB, 2006, Summary, para. b). In 
this sense, forward-looking information is critical in two ways. First, it provides a key tool to 
evaluate management’s ability to successfully run the business in the future. Second, it plays 
a profound role in shaping the firm’s competitive position. Investors will always value firms 
that have a promising future, and thus forward-looking information affects firms’ status in 
the stock markets, either positively or negatively. Forward-looking information is highly 
relevant to users (IASB, Conceptual Framework, 2010), and therefore the greater the portion 
of forward-looking information, the more relevant the statement (Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Gietzmann, 2006; Bozzolan et al., 2009).27 
Nevertheless, not all forward-looking information indicates high-quality disclosures, since 
information could be future-oriented but inaccurate. For forward-looking information to 
shape a firm’s competitive position effectively, it should be reasonably accurate. This raises 
a problematic point, in the sense that it is not easy to assess accuracy. Therefore, instead of 
evaluating the accuracy of forward-looking information, it may be easier to evaluate its 
verifiability.  
Theoretically, verifiability means, “the information presented is capable of being tested, 
either by observation or experiment” (IASB, Management Commentary, 2010, para. BC44). 
Although the ASB does not present verifiability as a separate principle in OFR statements, it 
does require directors to write a cautionary statement for forward-looking information, 
which they think, is not easily verifiable. Such a requirement for a cautionary statement on 
forward-looking information that is difficult to verify indicates that not all forward-looking 
                                                 
27 Relevance as a separate quality dimension will be discussed in the following sub-section. 
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information can be easily verified (ASB, 2006, para. 10). This point leads to further 
examination of the verifiability concept in the coming paragraphs.   
Empirically, forward-looking information reflects the expected impact on company 
performance; this provides a “measure” of such an impact that is verifiable and, hence, more 
effective at improving the accuracy of forecasts (Bozzolan et al., 2009). Moreover, investors 
consider quantitative information to be more precise, useful, and credible (Botosan, 1997). 
Mercer (2004) argues that greater quantitative precision in management forecasts improves 
investors’ assessments of the credibility of management disclosure. Arguably, forward-
looking quantitative information is the most precise forecast of future performance, while 
qualitative forward-looking information is deemed to be vague (Morgan, 2008). 
In that vein, quantitative information in general is more verifiable than qualitative 
information. Stated differently, when a firm discloses the basis for an expected factor, such 
as income, and details of its calculation, this in turn indicates that such information bears a 
higher degree of quality than if the firm makes a qualitative statement about the expected 
income. Additionally, such information becomes easily verifiable in the future by third 
parties. 
Hutton et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence on this notion. This study investigates 
whether supplementary disclosures affect the forecast news and whether they affect the 
credibility of forecasts. The study focuses on the supplementary narratives for earnings 
forecasts. The authors classify these supplementary disclosures to qualitative “soft talk” or 
verifiable forward-looking statements.  
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Hutton et al.’s (2003) results reveal that soft talk, such as discussion on reasons behind a 
forecast, does not increase credibility while a verifiable forward-looking statement, such as 
sales forecasts, does increase credibility. This study suggests that quantitative rather than 
qualitative forward-looking information is more credible.  
Based on the above discussion, quantitative forward-looking information is more accurate 
and could be easily verified by other stakeholders such as financial analysts. Therefore, the 
proposed disclosure quality measure assumes that the higher the proportion of forward-
looking quantitative information, the higher the quality of the disclosure.  
3.7.1.2  Relevance 
It is argued that “the OFR should focus on matters that are relevant to the interests of 
members” (ASB, 2006, para. 6). In applying this principle, The ASB displays a disclosure 
framework for the OFR statements in which it recommends key elements to be disclosed for 
users in an effort to assist them in their firms’ performance evaluation. However, 
management shall decide on the level of details given under each element based on each 
firm’s circumstances. The researcher summarises and categorises these elements in Table 
3.1. Accordingly, an OFR disclosure framework captures relevance as a quality dimension 
by definition.  
Information is considered relevant “if it is capable of making a difference in the decisions 
made by users” (IASB, Conceptual Framework, 2010, p. 17). Looking at Table 3.1, which 
presents the OFR disclosure framework, it is evident that each topic and sub-topic could 
make a difference in users’ decisions in their capacity as capital providers and can be used in 
making predictions about the eventual outcomes of past, present or future events or their 
effects on future cash flows. Accordingly, the OFR statement is basically relevant. 
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Table 3.1: Topics and Sub-Topics of OFR Disclosure Framework 
Topic Sub-Topic Paragraph 
Number 
1. Nature of 
business 
 Market (industry).  
 Competitive environment. 
 Regulatory environment. 
 Objectives. 
 Strategies. 
27(a) 
2. Development of 
performance 
 Present and future. 27(b) 
3. Resources, 
risks and 
relationships 
 Resources. 
 Commercial and financial risks. 
 Customers, suppliers, strategic alliances, creditors. 
27(c) 
4. Position of the 
business 
 Disclosure about financial instruments. 
 Accounting policies used in the financial statements. 
 Capital structure (balance between equity and debt, 
capital instruments used, currency, regulatory capital, 
interest rate structure, funding plans, and reasons for such 
capital structure) 
  Cash flows (in and out), with appropriate segmental 
analysis. 
 Treasury policies (effect of cost of interest on profit, and 
impact of interest rate changes). 
 Liquidity of the entity. 
27(d) 
5. KPIs  Definition, calculation method, assumptions, source of 
data. 
38 
Table constructed by author using information from OFR reporting statement (2006).  
Nonetheless, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) provides a more specific 
definition of relevance, stating that “financial information is capable of making a difference 
in decisions if it has predictive value, confirmatory value or both” (IASB, Conceptual 
Framework, 2010, para. QC6).  
Information is said to have a predictive value “if it can be used as an input to processes 
employed by users to predict future outcomes” (IASB, Conceptual Framework, 2010, para. 
QC8). On the other hand, “information is said to have a confirmatory value if it provides a 
feedback about (confirms or changes) previous evaluations” (IASB, Conceptual Framework, 
2010, para. QC9). Additionally, information that has predictive value usually has 
confirmatory value. 
The IASB (Conceptual Framework, 2010, para. QC8) maintains that, forward-looking 
information always has a predictive value, yet some other information could also have a 
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predictive value if such information is used to predict the future. This is consistent with the 
empirical evidence. Amir and Lev (1996) argue that forward-looking information conveys 
value relevance to external users. Beest et al. (2009) believe that the predictive value is the 
most important indicator of relevance. They use the extent of forward-looking information as 
one of the measures of predictive value. Muslu et al. (2010) show that the level of forward-
looking information reveals useful information to the stock market by increasing the ability 
of current stock returns to predict future earnings.  
Athanasakou and Hussainey (2010) conclude that investors view forward-looking 
performance disclosures as credible. Disclosure credibility refers to “investors’ perceptions 
of the believability of a particular disclosure” (Mercer, 2004, p. 186). This definition 
highlights that the credibility of forward-looking disclosure –as a type of disclosure- depends 
on investors’ perceptions. However, Mercer (2004) contends that investors’ perception is not 
the only factor affecting disclosure credibility.  Other factors affecting the perceived 
credibility of forward-looking information include disclosure channel, precession of 
estimates, time horizon, amount of supporting information, and inherent plausibility.  
While there is no definite conclusion on which disclosure channel is more credible, 
psychological research suggests a link between the disclosure venue and credibility of 
disclosure (Mercer, 2004). Mercer also argues that a more precise point estimate is more 
credible than range estimates. Moreover, short-term forecasts are more credible than long-
term forward-looking information. Additionally, detailed statements supporting the forecasts 
increase the credibility of forward-looking information. Finally, “the content of 
management’s prior disclosures affects the inherent plausibility of its subsequent 
disclosures” (Mercer, 2004, p. 193). In conclusion, credibility of forward-looking 
information is difficult to assess as it depends on various factors, which normally differ 
across firms.   
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Therefore, while credibility of forward-looking information is not unconditionally ensured, 
however, the afore-mentioned discussion suggests that at both the regulatory and academic 
levels, relevance of forward-looking information is not a debatable issue.  
In conclusion, in an effort to generalise the proposed measure so that it is applicable 
worldwide, the detailed definition of relevance suggested by the International Accounting 
Standard Board will be considered and the argument that the OFR is relevant by itself will 
not be adopted. In closing, the proposed measure uses the proportion of forward-looking 
information disclosed – the most widely used measure for the predictive value – to reflect 
the relevance dimension.  
3.7.1.3  Supplement and Complement the Financial Statements 
The third OFR principle maintains that disclosure of high quality should supplement the 
financial statements. In doing so, “the OFR should where relevant; provide additional 
explanations of amounts recorded in the financial statements, [and] explain the conditions 
and events that shaped the information contained in the financial statements” (ASB, 2006, 
para. 15). Conditions, events, and more explanations of numbers reflect qualitative 
information. Clearly, the ASB then calls for more qualitative information to supplement the 
quantitative information already addressed within the financial statements. 
While quantitative information is valued in the verification sense – post verification of 
forward-looking information after it became a historical event– qualitative information is 
valued by analysts for being more informative and gives wider scope for understanding the 
firm’s environment. 
Empirically, prior studies reveal that financial analysts – as important annual reports users – 
value qualitative information and rely more heavily on it rather than quantitative information 
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(Previts et al., 1994; Rogers and Grant, 1997; Bricker et al., 1995; Nielsen, 2005; and Orens 
and Lybaert, 2007; 2010). Bell (1984) examines the extent to which analysts’ use of 
information is affected by alternative forms of information (qualitative and quantitative) in 
chairman statements. He finds that financial analysts give more weight to qualitative 
information when evaluating research and development firms. Breton and Taffler (2001) 
examine the drivers of UK financial analysts’ stock recommendations. They considered the 
content of 105 analysts’ reports and then linked the content of the reports with “buy”, “sell”, 
and “hold” recommendations. They find that analysts rely heavily on non-financial, soft, 
qualitative information when making their stock recommendations. Drawing on the 
theoretical background of the OFR, and the empirical evidence, it appears prudent to 
measure the supplement the financial statements dimension via the proportion of qualitative 
information disclosed. 
In complementing the financial statements, it is argued that “OFR should provide useful 
financial and non-financial information about the business and its performance that is not 
reported in the financial statements” (ASB, 2006, para. 14). Notably, the definition of 
additional disclosure, in general, is the release of any piece of information that is not 
required to be disclosed (Celik et al., 2006). In other words, narrative statements will always 
provide information not included in the financial statements.  
More significantly, the topics and sub-topics disclosed under OFR -discussed in the previous 
sub-section- is useful financial (e.g. present and future performance- the second topic in 
table 3.1) and non-financial information (e.g. market, competitive environment, objectives- 
the first topic in table 3.1) about the business and its performance that is not reported in the 
financial statements. This is the same way OFR defines complementing the financial 
statements. Accordingly, including this quality dimension independently in the proposed 
quality measure would result in a duplicated score. Based on these propositions, 
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complementing the financial statements will not be included in the proposed disclosure 
quality measure as a quality dimension. 
3.7.1.4 Comprehensiveness 
Comprehensiveness is defined as the inclusion of relevant key issues (ASB, 2006, para. 20). 
Since the word “comprehensive” can be variously interpreted, it has been made clear that 
comprehensive does not mean the coverage of all possible matters. The ASB believes that 
the objective of the OFR statements is quality, not quantity, with regards to the content. 
Consequently, “the inclusion of too much information may obscure judgements and will not 
promote understanding” (ASB, 2006, para.20). The reporting statement suggests the 
disclosure of relevant key topics covering firm performance.28  
Given the comprehensiveness definition discussed above, it can be measured through a score 
reflecting the spread of topics disclosed. Since it is a quality measure, and this research is not 
concerned with quantity, the researcher will check whether these topics are disclosed or not, 
regardless of the number of sentences discussing each topic. It is calculated as the number of 
topics addressed in an OFR statement divided by 15. The ‘15’ reflects the maximum number 
of topics that could be disclosed. Note that, originally, there were 16 key elements, but the 
16th element is the presence of KPIs. Since KPIs capture the comprehensiveness dimension 
in the proposed measure, it is excluded it from the list to avoid double counting. 
3.7.1.5 Understandability 
The ASB does not provide a definition of understandability; it only demonstrates that “the 
OFR should be comprehensive and understandable” (ASB, 2006, para.16). However, the 
IASB Conceptual Framework (2010, para. BC3.40), defines understandability as the quality 
                                                 
28  These items are listed in Table 3.1 the main topics are 5 (listed in column 1 of the table, and the sub-topics are 16 
(listed in the column 2).  
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of information that enables users to comprehend its meaning. The IASB Conceptual 
Framework (2010, para. QC30) argues that understandability is enhanced when information 
is classified, characterised and presented clearly and concisely. Although it seems that the 
definition of understandability is simple and direct, it is not. Arguably, the classification and 
presentation of information has to do with comparability but not understandability. In other 
words, information could be clearly classified into categories but still not easy to understand. 
This could be the reason why the IASB (2008) does not suggest a measure for 
understandability and claims that comparability enhances understandability. 
 Beest et al. (2009) believe that the extent of graphs used in financial statements could be 
used to measure understandability. However, using the number of graphs as a proxy for 
understandability seems doubtable as a method, and ignores the evaluation of other textual 
context in the statements. Moreover, graphs entail significant measurement distortion, which 
yields a bias toward favourable performance vision (Beattie and Jones, 1992; 2002). Beattie 
and Jones (2008) maintain that graphs are used in annual reports to give a more favourable 
impression about the firm than it actually warranted. Muiño and Trombetta (2009) confirm 
Beattie and Jones (2008)’s argument and find that there is a positive relationship between 
favourable distorted graphs and investors’ perception of corporate performance including 
disclosure policies. Notably, some studies distinguish between the complexity of the 
information’s “readability” and the capability of users to comprehend the appropriate 
meaning “understandability” (Smith and Taffler, 1992). The former is text-centred while the 
latter is user-centred and affected by the individual characteristics of the user, such as 
experience, educational level, and nature (whether an investor, financial analyst, or a 
creditor).  
Based on the above discussion, readability is believed to be more valuable to users compared 
to understandibility as a quality dimension. A decision in favour of readability rather than 
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understandability can be supported on several grounds. First, readability is generally used as 
a proxy for understandability (Smith and Taffler, 1992). Adelberg and Razek (1984) use 
cloze29 procedure to examine the understandability of accounting textbooks. They argue that 
the readability of information might be used as an indicator of understandability. Second, the 
dominant understandability measure is determined by cloze procedure, which is impractical 
and includes a high level of subjectivity. In addition, other controlling variables, such as 
educational background, might affect the measure and raise doubts as to its credibility. 
Finally, there is a consensus that annual report narratives suffer from a readability problem 
(Courtis, 1995; and Beattie et al., 2004). Empirically, annual narratives are very difficult to 
read (Jones and Shoemaker, 1994). Accordingly, readability is considered as a quality  
dimension in the proposed disclosure quality measure. 
Another question that follows is how readability should be measured. Smith and Taffler 
(1992) review different reliability measures and justify the existence of different formulas by 
different measures of word length and different weighting applied to the component parts. 
Generally, three indexes are widely used to measure readability: FLESCH, FOG, and LIX. 
The researcher employs LIX30 because it uses a particular word length as a benchmark. 
Additionally, the application of LIX is found as both reliable and consistent for passages 
using five languages (see for example Anderson, 1983; and Bjornsson, 1983). Smith and 
Taffler (1992) argue that, given the limitations of other formulas, the LIX index is very 
appropriate in terms of speed and reliability of calculations.  
LIX  index = W + S 
                                                 
29Cloze procedure was introduced by Taylor (1953) as a measure of the effectiveness of communication (Adelberg and 
Razek, 1984).  For more information, see Adelberg and Razek (1984), Smith and Taffler (1992), and Torres and Roig 
(2005). 
30
LIX was first introduced by Anderson (1983) and Bjornsson (1983) from Sweden. 
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Where W = percentage of words of seven or more letters, and S = average number of words 
per sentence. LIX measures how complex the text is in terms of word complexity and the 
sentence itself. The two factors of the formula are then added together. This enables 
diagnosis of which factor contributes more to reading difficulty in any given text (Courtis, 
1987). Consequently, a low LIX index is consistent with high levels of readability.  
The main limitation argued in relation to readability formulas in general, is that their validity 
is a concern (Sydserff and Weetman, 1999). Consequently, Sydserff and Weetman (1999) 
developed a new texture index, which addresses the validity aspects. An example of the 
problematic nature of readability formulas such as LIX is that, they do not measure 
understandability. As discussed earlier, in the current framework, readability of the text is 
the concern and not understandability. Accordingly, such limitation does not present a threat 
to the validity of the readability measure used (i.e. LIX index). Moreover, although the 
texture index developed by Sydserff and Weetman (1999) overcome criticism to readability 
formulas, however, it still suffers from another limitation. As maintained by Sydserff and 
Weetman (1999, p. 477):  
“The authors recognise that satisfying validity concerns is not sufficient. As a research 
instrument, texture index is more time-consuming than using computer-based readability 
formulas”.  
Therefore, in comparing the merits of readability formulas, such as, objectivity, reliability, 
and efficiency in terms of time and costs (Sydserff and Weetman, 1999) to their limitation, 
and given the time consuming nature of the texture index, using LIX formula is preferable 
for the design of the current research.  
Based on the above-presented arguments, the proposed disclosure quality measure will use 
the LIX index as a measure for readability. The researcher uses an on line LIX index 
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calculator31 to calculate the LIX index. However, LIX is inversely related to disclosure 
quality. Thus, for the purpose of the analysis, the researcher instead uses 30/LIX to measure 
the readability. 
 
 
3.7.1.6 Balance and Neutrality 
OFR disclosure is not subject to auditing by the external auditor. Consequently, the 
likelihood that management discloses good information and avoids disclosing bad 
information might be high (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). This fact is also emphasised in the 
OFR reporting statement, whereby “the directors should ensure that the OFR retains balance 
and the members are not mislead as a result of the omission of any information on 
unfavourable aspects” (ASB, 2006, para. 22). Thus, high quality disclosure is when the firm 
has a transparency concerning disclosing bad as well as good news. Therefore, based on the 
reporting statement definition of balance and neutral disclosure, an OFR statement should 
include bad news, which the firm is already affected by. One empirical difficulty arises in 
judging the balance and neutrality of bad to good news disclosed. Stated differently, the 
researcher cannot simply assume that the more bad news disclosed the better. The objective 
is assessing whether firms are biased against the bad news they have. Notably, prior 
frameworks of disclosure quality do not include the balance in their measure, nor does the 
ASB suggest a measure for this.  
Li (2010b) claims that industry leaders face less competitive pressures compared with 
industry followers. She finds that the association between disclosure and competition is less 
pronounced for industry leaders than for industry followers. This is consistent with prior 
literature arguing that firms with greater market shares – namely, industry leaders – typically 
face lower competition (Nickell et al., 1992; and Nickell, 1996). Moreover, empirical 
                                                 
31 The program available at; http://www.standards-schmandards.com/exhibits/rix/.  
  149 
evidence finds that firms with large impending performance (i.e. those with large impending 
year-on-year increases in sales and operating profit margins) have lower tone bias in the 
annual report narrative sections (Schliecher and Walker, 2010). Industry leaders will have 
then less resistance to disclosing bad news. 
Accordingly, the current research assumes that the market leaders in certain industry sectors 
will have a satisfactory balance of bad to good news. That is to say that since industry 
leaders are neutral, and are not biased against bad news, it follows that, under normal 
circumstances, they will disclose a fair balance. The proportion of this balance is then used 
as a benchmark. Hence, the current research presumes that followers should disclose at least 
the benchmark proportion.  
Accordingly, in measuring the balance and neutrality dimension, the leader of each industry 
is identified. Following Melnik et al. (2005), leadership is determined by market share. 
Leading firms in the sample have large impending increases in sales and profits over the 
sample period. Thus, the proportion balance between bad and good news released by these 
leaders is used as the benchmark. Followers meeting or exceeding the benchmark are scored 
1. Followers falling below the benchmark are given a percentage relative to the benchmark.  
 
3.7.1.7 Comparability 
ASB (2006) recommends that OFR should be comparable over time. In particular, 
“disclosure should be sufficient for the members to be able to compare the information 
presented with similar information about the entity for previous financial years” (ASB, 2006, 
para. 25). Therefore, comparability is the quality of information enabling users to identify 
similarities in, and differences between, two sets of economic phenomena (IASB, 
Conceptual Framework, 2010, para. QC22). Comparability as a quality dimension works to 
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facilitate the identification of main trends and the analysis of the firm’s performance over 
time (ASB, 2006, para. 25).  
Clearly, if a firm provides the same set of information over time, comparability would be 
achieved. This idea is consistent with using financial statement format as one indicator for 
comparability of financial statement quality (Jonas and Blanchet, 2000). However, the 
proposed disclosure quality measure utilises a more specific measure of comparability. In the 
current research, the disclosure of key performance indicators (KPIs) is used as a measure of 
comparability. KPIs are “a set of measures focusing on those aspects of organisational 
performance that are the most critical for the current and future success of the organisation” 
(Parmenter, 2007, p. 18). KPIs provide insights into the principal firm activities and enable 
an in-depth view of firm performance. Thus, it could be used as a basis for comparing the 
firm’s results over time. This argument is consistent with the OFR, which claims that KPIs 
enhance the comparability of disclosure (ASB, 2006, para. 40).  
So far, literature on KPIs in general is limited. It is expected that principal KPIs will differ 
among different industries. Arguably, “KPIs should be measured, and should therefore be 
quantitative in nature” (DEFRA, 2006).  
The ASB (2006) does not call for a specific set of KPIs, which firms need to disclose to 
conform to the best practice regarding comparability. Therefore, the number and type of 
KPIs disclosed is considered to be a firm’s choice. Stated differently, there is no benchmark 
against which the disclosed set of KPIs could be compared for the same firm as well as 
across different firms.  
Nonetheless, the ASB sets out the information that should be provided for each KPI. It is 
stated (ASB, 2006, para. 76) that: 
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“For each KPI disclosed in the OFR: 
 the definition and its calculation method should be explained; 
 its purpose should be explained; 
 the source of underlying data should be disclosed and, where relevant, assumptions 
explained.  
 Quantifications or commentary on future targets should be provided; 
 where information from the financial statements has been adjusted for inclusion in 
the OFR, that fact should be highlighted and a reconciliation provided; 
 where available, corresponding amount for the financial year immediately preceding 
the current year should be disclosed and;   
 Any changes to KPIs should be disclosed and the calculation method used compared 
to previous financial years, including significant changes in the underlying 
accounting policies adopted in the financial statements, should be identified and 
explained.” 
 
As noted from the above paragraph, when disclosing KPIs, the best practice is to disclose at 
least five elements of information regarding each KPI, namely, 1- Definition and calculation 
method, 2- Purpose, 3- Source of data, 4- future target, and 5- comparison with the previous 
financial year. There are two information elements about KPIs, which the ASB has 
suggested as a best practice in disclosing KPIs, which are: 
 
6- Any changes to KPIs should be disclosed and the calculation method used 
compared to previous financial years, including significant changes in the 
underlying accounting policies adopted in the financial statements, should be 
identified and explained. 
 
7- Where information from the financial statements has been adjusted for inclusion 
in the OFR, that fact should be highlighted and reconciliation provided. 
 
However, when scoring KPIs in the current research, only the above mentioned five 
information elements will be considered. The other two information elements about KPIs are 
excluded due to their inapplicability and assessment difficulty.  This is explained more in the 
coming paragraphs.  
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If point number (6) is to be considered, in this case, a company disclosing a change to a 
certain KPI would be given one; however, how can one judge that there was a change in the 
KPI’s calculation but not disclosed? There are two main reasons behind the difficulty of 
identifying the change in each KPI’s calculation. First, there is an interrelationship between 
point 1 (i.e. the definition and calculation method for each KPI should be explained) and 
point (6). To identify whether there was any change in the KPIs’s calculation (point 6), one 
needs to compare the calculation methods for each KPI over two years. With many firms not 
disclosing the calculation method (almost 40% of the sample), one cannot evaluate the 
change for all firms in the sample. Accordingly, judging on whether there was any change in 
the KPI’s calculation method would be inapplicable. Second, to judge on such comparison, 
one needs information about years 2005 and 2010 which are not included in the sample and, 
even if available, this process would include extensive human (manual) coding and would be 
ineffective in terms of both time and costs. One of the main advantages of the current 
proposed approach for measuring quality is the minimal use of manual coding and 
employing a computer-based content analysis approach. This should facilitate its use in other 
research areas as well as in the practice field by analysts and interested regulatory bodies. 
Therefore, it is not wise to include point number 6 in the scoring because this will hinder the 
applicability of the proposed quality measure.   
Similarly, the same logic applies to point 7 (i.e. where information from the financial 
statements has been adjusted for inclusion in the OFR, that fact should be highlighted and 
reconciliation provided). A firm, which discloses the adjustment, will take 1. However, 
unfortunately, there is no way to identify the case where a firm has adjusted information 
from the financial statement but did not disclose it. Therefore, point number 7 is inapplicable 
and hence is not included in the score calculation.  
  153 
Importantly, the researcher assessed point numbers 6 and 7 (i.e. whether there are some 
firms disclosing information about a change on the KPIs calculation method or about any 
adjustment to the financial statements’ figures). Almost, no firm has mentioned any of these 
points (i.e. 6 & 7). Therefore, if these two items were applicable and considered, all 
companies would take zero in these two information elements. Consequently, there is no 
problem for the score being calculated based on 5 rather than 7 items. 
Accordingly, in an effort to evaluate the comparability of OFR statements, the underlying 
study scores each OFR statement in relation to KPI disclosure based on the fulfilment of 
these five items. Each item is given a score of “1”. For a company disclosing only one item, 
it takes 0.2 (i.e. 1 divided by 5); a company that discloses the five items takes 1 (i.e. 5 
divided by 5); and a company which fails to disclose any of these items takes zero (zero 
divided by 5). This approach allows evaluating the usefulness of the KPIs disclosed.  
The evaluation is done for the firm as a whole, not for each KPI. Stated differently, if the 
company satisfied these five elements in at least one KPI but not for all KPIs disclosed, the 
company will be given 1 (5/5), even though not all these elements were not met in the other 
KPIs. The decision not to calculate the quality score for each KPI and then to calculate the 
average quality score of KPIs for each firm is based on the following justifications. First, this 
approach is very time consuming, impractical, needs very intensive manual coding, and will 
be a limitation to the proposed measure. This is because one of the advantages of the applied 
approach is that it is easy to be replicated and practical in time and cost, and would limit the 
applicability of the quality score. 
Second, this approach is also inaccurate and has many limitations in the following sense: the 
ASB did not state an optimal number for KPIs disclosed, i.e. it is the company’s choice to 
disclose how many KPIs. Therefore, a company may define two KPIs only; for example, if 
  154 
this company did the two perfectly (5 items), it will take 1(5/5). Consider now another 
company, disclosing 5 KPIs; three of them are reported perfectly, and two are not; in this 
case, therefore, this company will take a smaller score than the first company although it is 
reporting three KPIs perfectly and the first company reports only two KPIs perfectly. 
Moreover, this approach will no doubt consider the number of KPIs disclosed and, with the 
absence of guidance in this regard and because including too many KPIs is a limitation 
(ASB, 2009), calculating the quality score for each KPI would result in imprecise scoring. 
Accordingly, the KPI score is a continuous score ranging from zero for a company that does 
not disclose any of the above stated items to 1, representing a company which discloses the 
above stated five items.   
The researcher manually read and analysed the KPI section in each annual report and scores 
each firm as to what extent it discloses the five items stated by the ASB in relation to KPIs 
disclosure, in the manner explained above. Examples of the calculation procedures are 
provided in Appendix 1. 
In summary, derived from the above-discussed OFR principles, this research suggests a 
multi-dimensional and comprehensive definition for a best practice disclosure quality. The 
current proposed disclosure quality measure, therefore, captures seven information 
dimensions. Three of these dimensions are quantity-based, namely, proportion of forward-
looking quantitative information, proportion of forward-looking information, and proportion 
of qualitative information. 
As discussed previously in section (3.5), it is hard to develop a quality measure totally free 
of a kind of quantity or counting (Botosan, 2004). Beattie et al. (2004, p. 230) also highlight 
this point, arguing that: “companies that say relatively more can be expected to provide 
disclosure of higher quality, all other things being equal. However, relative amount is only 
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one quality dimension”. To conclude, the main limitation of most prior studies is using the 
mere quantity as a proxy for quality. In the underlying study, the researcher uses disclosure 
quantity as an unavoidable component of the overall quality score and not as a proxy for 
disclosure quality. 
Table (3.2) lists the quality dimensions (OFR principles) and the related measures used to 
evaluate each of these dimensions.  
Table 3.2: OFR Quality Dimensions and the Related Measures 
OFR Principle(s) Measures of Quality Dimension(s)  
Forward-looking  orientation  Forward-looking quantitative information. 
Relevance Forward-looking information. 
Supplement the financial statements  Qualitative information 
Comprehensiveness Scope of topics disclosed. 
Balanced and Neutral   Bad news relative to good news. 
Comparability  KPIs. 
Readability LIX Index. 
 Table constructed by author. 
 
3.8 The Aggregated Disclosure Quality Score 
In this section, the researcher elaborates the prime methodological approach employed in 
calculating the aggregated disclosure quality score. The proposed disclosure score is derived 
through a series of sequential steps, chapter Two section 2.2.2.2 discusses these steps in 
details (see Figure 2.1). In summary, these steps include sample selection, preparing the text 
for coding, defining the analysis text unit, constructing keyword lists all of which are 
elaborated in section 2.2 of chapter Two. The upcoming section presents the model used to 
calculate the disclosure quality and details the calculations method. 
The aggregated quality score is a function of seven measures (refer to Table 3.2) for a list of 
these measures) representing seven quality dimensions (forward-looking orientation, 
relevance, supplement the financial statements, comprehensiveness, Balance and neutrality, 
and comparability). The definition and measurement of each of those dimensions are 
presented in chapter Three, section (3.7.1). 
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The proposed disclosure quality measure is articulated in the following formula: 
 
 
Where; 
FLQ = the proportion of forward-looking quantitative sentences. This is a continuous 
variable from 0-1, reflecting the forward-looking orientation of OFR statements. It is 
calculated as the number of forward-looking quantitative sentences scaled by the number of 
forward-looking sentences in OFR statements.  
 
FL = the proportion of forward-looking sentence. This is a continuous variable from 0-1, 
reflecting the relevance of the OFR disclosure. It is calculated as the number of forward-
looking sentences in an OFR statement divided by the total number of sentences in the OFR 
statement.  
 
QUAL = the proportion of qualitative sentences. This is a continuous variable from 0-1. It 
reflects to what extent an OFR statement supplements the financial statement. It is calculated 
as the number of qualitative sentences divided by the overall number of sentences in an OFR 
statement. 
 
SPREAD = the scope of topics disclosed. This is a continuous variable from 0-1, 
representing the comprehensiveness quality dimension. It is calculated as the number of 
topics addressed in an OFR statement divided by 15. The ‘15’ reflects the maximum number 
of topics that could be disclosed. Note that, originally, there were 16 key elements, but the 
16th element is the presence of KPIs. Since KPIs capture the comprehensiveness dimension 
in the proposed measure, it is excluded it from the list to avoid double counting. 
 
BGL = this is a continuous variable from 0-1, reflecting the balance and neutrality of the 
disclosure. It is measured as the proportion of bad to good news sentences given the industry 
leader percentage of bad to good news. Examples in Appendix 2 show the calculations in 
detail. 
 
KPIs = this is a continuous variable from 0-1, reflecting the comparability dimension. It is 
calculated as the number of disclosed items about KPIs relative to the number of items that 
should be disclosed (i.e. 5). The minimum score of zero shows a company which fails to 
disclose any of the required 5 items (zero divided by 5).  A maximum score of 1(i.e. 5 
divided by 5) represents a company that discloses the five items. Examples in Appendix 1 
show the calculation in detail. 
 
LIX = the readability score assigned by the computer software. LIX is inversely related to 
disclosure quality. Thus, readability is measured through the inverse of LIX. The researcher 
firstly tried 1/LIX, however, the magnitude of this figure is too small compared to other 
quality dimensions. Therefore, the researcher finds that (30/LIX) is the best to standardise 
the overall quality score (see descriptive analysis Table 3.3). This is a continuous variable 
from 0-1, reflecting the readability dimension.  
 
 
  157 
Notes on the Calculation of the Aggregated Score: 
1-Frequency versus Proportion: 
The proportion and not just the frequency of any measure (e.g. FL, qualitative, etc.) is used 
to control for the size of the OFR statement. Using the frequency will not allow to control for 
the OFR statement size. Consider the following example of two OFR statements: 
The first (A) consists of 1000 sentences, of which 200 are forward-looking sentences.  
The second (B) consists of 100 sentences, of which 40 are forward-looking. 
 Calculating the forward-looking measure using frequency 
Firm (A): 200 sentences                                                 Firm (B): 40 sentences 
Judging on the frequency (i.e. ignoring the length of the OFR statement) shows that firm (A) 
is more forward-looking oriented. 
Calculating the forward-looking measure using Proportion 
Firm (A): 200/1000 = 0.2 i.e. 20% of the OFR statement is forward-looking oriented. 
Firm (B): 40/100 = 0.4 i.e. 40% of the OFR statement is forward-looking oriented. 
Judging on the proportion (i.e. considering the length of the OFR) shows that firm (B) is 
more forward-looking oriented than firm (A). 
In conclusion: 
Frequency leads to mistakenly considering firm (A), as more forward-looking oriented than 
firm (B), i.e. receives a higher score in this quality dimension. Accordingly, the proportion 
of each measure results in evaluation that is more accurate because it controls for the length 
of an OFR statement. 
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2-Calculation of FL versus FLQ 
FL (capturing the relevance dimension) =  
Number of Forward-Looking Sentences in an OFR Statement 
Total Number of Sentences in an OFR Statement 
 
FLQ (capturing forward-looking dimension) = 
Number of Forward-Looking Quantitative Sentences in an OFR Statement 
Number of Forward-Looking Sentences in an OFR Statement 
As noticed from these two formulas, both the nominator and the denominator are different 
and there is no double counting in either measure. 
3- Appendix (3) shows three examples on how each of the above dimensions are calculated 
and how the aggregated score is reached. The first example shows a very low quality score 
(eleventh lowest firm). The second example presents a below average quality. The third firm 
displays the highest quality score. 
 
3.8.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Quality Dimensions 
The following Table 3.3 provides some statistics for the overall quality score and for 
individual quality dimensions.  
Regarding the overall quality score (QUALITY), the greater the score achieved, the higher 
the disclosure quality level. The mean and median are 3.619 and 3.624 respectively. The 
maximum quality score attained is 4.528, while the minimum is 2.481. This implies a wide 
variation in disclosure quality among firms. Where some firms provide the market with high-
quality disclosures and others opt to disclose at low quality.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Individual Quality Dimensions 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum 
QUALITY  3.619 0.391 2.481 3.383 3.624 3.901 4.528 
FL 0.156 0.044 0.019 0.123 0.154 0.185 0.306 
FLQ 0.390 0.119 0.097 0.311 0.380 0.468 0.796 
QUAL 0.582 0.090 0.295 0.526 0.585 0.643 0.927 
SPREAD 0.752 0.116 0.333 0.667 0.733 0.867 0.933 
BGL 0.843 0.229 0.08 0.690 1 1 1 
30/LIX 0.497 0.039 0.417 0.469 0.492 0.517 0.769 
KPIs 0.395 0.250 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 1 
 (QUALITY) is the disclosure quality score, (FLQ) denotes forward-looking qualitative dimension, measured by the frequency of forward-
looking quantitative information scaled by the frequency of forward-looking sentences. (FL) is forward-looking dimension, measured by 
the proportion of forward-looking information. (QUAL) is the qualitative dimension measured through the proportion of qualitative 
information. (SPREAD) is the spread of key topics addressed. This is the number of actual topics disclosed divided by the maximum 
number of topics that could be disclosed (i.e. 15). (BGL) is the proportion of bad to good news given the industry leader percentage. (LIX) 
is the readability score assigned as numbers by computer software. (KPIs)  reflects the comparability dimension and is calculated as the 
number of disclosed items about KPIs relative to the number of items that should be disclosed (i.e. 5). 
Table constructed by author based on the quality score calculations as discussed in Section 3.7.1.  
In analysing the individual quality dimensions, it is worth noting that there is no optimal 
level or benchmark – for most of the individual dimensions – either proposed by the ASB or 
supported by the academic research. Exceptions include, first, the spread dimension, which 
reflects the comprehensiveness of the disclosure statement. The optimal level is 1 (i.e. 
15/15). Second, KPI score which measures the comparability over time. The optimal score is 
one where the company discloses 5 items about KPIs (i.e. definition and calculation, 
purpose, source of data, future target, and comparison with the previous financial year). Each 
of these five items takes a score of one when disclosed, the KPI score is the sum of items 
disclosed divided by the maximum items that should be disclosed (i.e. 5). 
 It is probable that the selection of quality dimensions is a managerial decision based on 
many inputs such as the firm’s size, industry type and objectives. Yet generally, the higher 
the score is, the better the firm is at fulfilling the quality dimension. 
 Table 3.3 shows that forward-looking information (FL) reports a mean and a median of 
15.6% and 15.4% respectively. On average, 16% of firms’ OFR focus on the future. The 
lowest relevant OFR statement has almost 2% future-oriented information whilst the most 
relevant statement devotes 31% of its disclosure to the firm’s future aspects. The forward-
looking quantitative information (FLQ) dimension shows a mean of 39% and a median of 
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38%. Given the use of forward-looking quantitative information as a measurement for the 
verifiable forward-looking information dimension, it is arguable that 39% of firms’ future-
oriented information is verifiable. This suggests that firms are interested in being viewed as 
providing a verifiable future-oriented picture of the firm’s status. The maximum percentage 
is as high as 80% and the minimum is 10%. Notably, there is a wide range of dispersion 
among firms in terms of how verifiable their OFR statements are.  
Table 3.3 reveals that more than half of the OFR statement is in a qualitative form, indicated 
by a mean and a median of 58.2% and 58.5% respectively. Such percentages suggest that 
OFR successfully supplement the information provided in financial statements. The 
maximum supplementation level is as high as 92.7% and the lowest is 29.5%.  
The spread of disclosure (SPREAD) has a mean of 75.2% and a median of 73.3%. Some 
firms in the sample provide a highly comprehensive disclosure, implied by a maximum score 
of 93% (those are firms which disclose 14 topics out of the benchmark, i.e. 15). Other firms 
provide a less comprehensive disclosure covering only 5 topics (almost achieving a 33% 
comprehensiveness level).  
The balance dimension (BGL) reports a mean of 84.3%. Bearing in mind the approach used 
in calculating the balance dimension,32 a fairly balanced disclosure is expected when the 
score is 1. Therefore, on average, firms in the sample do not provide a good level of 
balanced disclosure and are biased in favour of good news. This is consistent with 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) and Dedman et al.’s (2008) findings using UK samples. More 
significantly, some firms have a very low score of 0.08.  Readability measured by (30/LIX) 
shows a mean of 0.497 and a median 0.492 respectively. According to Courtis (1987; 1995), 
a LIX score of 60 represents a very difficult readability level. Therefore, generally, OFRs are 
                                                 
32 See chapter Two, section 2.7.5 
. 
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very difficult in terms of the readability aspect. The minimum score is 72 LIX, which 
reflects an easy text, whereas the maximum score of 39 LIX implies increased difficulty.  
The final individual dimension is (KPIs). It reflects the comparability of disclosure over time 
as suggested in ASB (2006, para.40). It is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. The 
statistics show that the mean and median are 0.395 and 0.4 respectively. This indicated that 
on average, firms disclosed only two items about KPIs. During the manual content analysis, 
the researcher finds that these two items are usually the definition of the KPI and a 
comparison of the current year results with the previous financial year. The maximum score 
attained is 1. Only five observations (i.e. 0.9%) meet the OFR best practice regarding KPIs 
and disclose the five suggested items. The minimum score is zero, 68 observations (i.e. 
12.6%) fail to provide any of the five items about KPIs suggested by the OFR best practice 
reporting statements.  
In sum, the individual quality dimensions vary across the sample. However, notable 
conclusions can be drawn. The first is the high degree of difficulty in terms of readability of 
the OFR statements. Secondly, OFR statements in general are biased towards good news. 
Accordingly, the ASB is advised to highlight to firms the preference of making their 
disclosures easily readable. Additionally, the findings reveal that UK firms tend to be biased 
against the disclosure of bad news.  
 The first column of Table 3.4 lists the OFR principles/quality dimensions. The second 
column displays the corresponded measure for each quality dimension. The first and second 
columns correspond to Table 3.2. Column 3 shows explicitly the calculation method for each 
measure. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of the Proposed Disclosure Quality Measure 
OFR Principle(s) Measures of Quality 
Dimension(s)  
Calculation Method Magnitude 
Forward-looking  
orientation  
Forward-
looking 
quantitative 
information. 
Section 
3.7.1.1 
Number of Forward-
Looking Quantitative 
Sentences in an OFR 
Statement / Number of 
Forward-Looking 
Sentences in an OFR 
Statement. 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable from 
0-1.  
Section 
3.8 
Relevance Forward-
looking 
information. 
Section 
3.7.1.2 
Number of Forward-
Looking Sentences in 
an OFR Statement / 
Total Number of 
Sentences in an OFR 
Statement. 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable from 
0-1. 
Section 
3.8 
Supplement the 
financial statements  
Qualitative 
information 
Section 
3.7.1.3 
Number of Qualitative 
Sentences in an OFR 
Statement / Total 
Number of Sentences 
in an OFR Statement. 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable from 
0-1. 
Section 
3.8 
Comprehensiveness Scope of 
topics 
disclosed. 
Section 
3.7.1.4 
Number of topics 
disclosed / Maximum 
number of topics to be 
disclosed (i.e. 15). 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable from 
0-1. 
Section 
3.8 
Balanced and 
Neutral  
 Bad news 
relative to 
good news. 
Section 
3.7.1.6 
The proportion of bad 
to good news given the 
industry leader 
percentage. 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable from 
0-1. 
Section 
3.8 
Comparability  KPIs. Section 
3.7.1.5 
Number of items 
disclosed on KPIs / 
Maximum number of 
items to be disclosed 
(i.e. 5). 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable, 0-1 
Section 
3.8 
Readability LIX Index. Section 
3.7.1.5 
30/LIX, LIX is 
electronically 
calculated according to 
the formula discussed 
in Section (3.7.1.5). 
Section 
3.8 
Continuous 
variable from 
0-1. Where 0 
indicates a very 
difficult to read 
text and 1 is 
very easy text. 
Section 
3.8 
     Table constructed by author. 
 
Adding up those individual scores gives the aggregated quality score as explained in the 
examples provided in Appendix 2. Appendix 2 corresponds to column three in the above 
table. Quality dimensions in the above table are presented in the same consequence of 
Appendix 2. 
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3.9 The Overlap between Business Review and OFR  
After presenting the proposed quality measure, this section discusses the link/overlap 
between the Business Review (BR) and the OFR reporting statement. Table 3.5 drafts such 
overlap; columns 1 and 2 are extracted from the ASB press release of 2008. Column 3 is not 
provided by the ASB; rather, the researcher provides it for a more clarified picture on the 
overlap between the (BR) and the OFR. It shows the quality dimensions/principles common 
between the two statements. Column 1 lists the elements of the BR; column 2 shows the 
section and/or paragraph reference of the Companies Act and the OFR respectively; column 
3 lists the OFR quality dimension corresponding to each BR element. 
Table 3.5: The Overlap between the BR and the OFR  
Companies Act 2006: Elements of the Business Review 
 
Section/Paragraph 
References: 
 
OFR Quality Dimensions/ 
Principles 
For all companies (other than those subject to the small companies’ 
regime), the Business Review must contain:  
Companies 
Act Sections  
 OFR 
Paragraphs  
 
A fair review of the business and information to enable users to assess 
how directors have performed their duties under section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 (duty to promote the success of the  company)  
417(2)  
417(3)(a)  
 
22, 30-32, 
36-37  
 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: first topic* 
(Nature of the business). 
A description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company  417 (3)(b)  
 
27(c), 52 
c\azxfty-56 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: third topic* 
(Risks).  
A comprehensive analysis of the development and performance of the 
business during the financial year  
 
417 (4)(a)  
 
27(b), 30-
32, 43-46 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: second topic* 
(Development of performance 
– past performance). 
A comprehensive analysis of the financial position of the business at the 
end of the year 
 
417 (4)(b)  
 
27(d), 30-
32, 50-51,  
60-74 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: fourth topic* 
(Position of the business).  
An analysis of the main trends and factors likely to affect the future 
development, performance and position of the business  
 
417 (5)(a)  
 
8-12, 27(b), 
33-35,  
47-49 
1-The comprehensiveness 
dimension: second topic* 
(Development of performance 
– future performance). 
2-The forward-looking 
orientation dimension. 
Information regarding environmental matters and the impact of the 
business on the environment including any related policies and the 
effectiveness of those policies  
 
417 (5)(b)(i) 28(a), 29, 
35 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: first topic* 
(Competitive and regulatory 
environment). 
Information regarding employees and social and community issues 
including any related policies and the effectiveness of those policies  
 
417 (5)(b)(ii) 
& (iii)  
 
28(b) & (c), 
29 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: third topic* 
(Relationships-employee).  
Information about persons with whom the company has contractual or 
other arrangements which are essential to the business of the company  
 
417 (5)(c)  
 
28(d), 57-59 The comprehensiveness 
dimension: third topic* 
(Relationships (e.g. 
customers, supplier, strategic 
alliances, and creditors).  
Analysis using financial and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and, 
where appropriate, other KPIs, including information relating to 
environmental matters and employees. (Medium-sized companies need 
not comply with the requirements that relate to non-financial matters)  
417 (6)(a) & 
(b)  
417 (7)  
 
38-42, 75-
77 
The comprehensiveness 
dimension: fifth topic* 
(KPIs). 
The review must, where appropriate, include references to, and additional 
explanations of, amounts included in the company’s annual accounts  
 
417 (8)  
 
13-15 Supplement the financial 
statements dimension. 
Table is constructed by author using data from Companies Act (2006) and OFR reporting statement (2006). Refer to Table 3.1 for a list of the topics (elements) of an OFR statement. 
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As shown in the above Table 3.5, the Companies Act requires that BR must include forward-
looking information, be comprehensive, and supplement the financial statements. 
Accordingly, the common elements/principles between BR and OFR statements, are 
forward-looking orientation, comprehensiveness, and to supplement the financial statements. 
Other elements of the OFR are not included in BR (i.e. relevance, balance and neutrality, 
understandability, and comparability). Accordingly, BR could be considered a part of the 
OFR; stated differently OFR as a best practice statement is wider and encompasses more 
principles than the mandatory BR. 
Notably, the ASB release of 2008 (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5) gives the reader an 
indication that all the elements called for by the Companies Act (2006) -column 1- in the BR 
are identical to the elements of the OFR. Such indication is given through listing the relevant 
section and paragraph references –column 2. However, the ASB published a report in 2009 
titled ‘A Review of Narrative Reporting by UK Listed Companies in 2008/2009’ which 
cancels this indication. This report highlights that, while most elements of the BR seem to be 
similar to that of the OFR, the later provides a space for best practice which is not required 
under the BR.  
Similarly, the review report of 2007 undertaken by the ASB staff contends that (ASB, 2007, 
Summary of Conclusions, p. 2): 
“ Best practice - the degree to which companies are reporting above and beyond the legal 
requirements and have adopted the recommendations in the ASB’s Reporting Statement on 
the OFR (OFR), which the FRC believes is the most up-to-date and authoritative source of 
best practice guidance (covered in section 2); and  
 
“ Compliance - how UK companies are performing in the light of the requirement under the 
Companies Act 1985 to provide a Business Review within the directors’ report”. 
 
To illustrate this distinction, for example, in relation to the first element of the Business 
Review (i.e. a fair review of the business), “The Companies Act (2006) does not elaborate on 
  165 
what is meant by a “fair review” (ASB, 2009, parg. 3.1). On the other hand, the ASB 
contends that, “OFR should include: description of the business and the external 
environment in which it operates, and the objectives of the business and the strategies for 
achieving these objectives” (ASB, 2009, para. 3.1). Moreover, ASB (2006, para. 32) states 
that “…the OFR should include discussion of matters such as the entity’s major markets and 
competitive position within those markets…”.  
As a second example, The Companies Act (2006) requires that BR reports key performance 
indicators, while no guide given as to the required level of details about each key 
performance indicator. On the other hand, the ASB recommends that OFR includes some 
specific information about each KPI (e.g. definition, purpose, source of data, etc.). 
Notably, the proposed quality measure evaluates detailed aspects of business and its external 
environment as required by OFR (i.e. strategy, market, regulatory and competitive 
environment) (refer to Table 3.1). Additionally, the proposed measure evaluates the detailed 
aspects of key performance indicators (see section, 3.7.1.7). Thus, the proposed quality 
measure evaluates the best practice disclosure based on the OFR quality dimensions. 
The following Table 3.6 summarises the differences between the BR and OFR based on the 
ASB review report of 2009 as well as the reporting statement of OFR (2006). Based on the 
below differentiation between BR and OFR, it is clear that the proposed quality measure 
evaluates the elements of the OFR best practice statements, not merely the BR requirements. 
In other words, to recognise the previously discussed overlap between OFR and the BR, it is 
claimed that the current research provides a best practice disclosure quality measure for the 
OFR narrative in UK annual reports. 
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Table 3.6: Elements included in the OFR Reporting Statement but not in the BR 
Elements/Principles of OFR 
not included in the Business 
Review 
Comments 
 
Comprehensiveness 
In the Business Review, this quality dimension is mentioned only in regards 
to performance and position of the business with no elaboration given to the 
word comprehensive (ASB, 2009, para. 3.5). 
 
In OFR, this is a quality dimension for the whole statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Description: 
Objectives  
 
None of these elements are not included in the Business Review. 
Strategies  
Market  
Regulatory environment  
Competitive environment  
Development and performance  
of Business and Position 
 Financial instruments 
 
Accounting policies  
Capital structure  
Treasury policies  
Liquidity  
KPIs  
Definition, purpose, source of 
data, future target, and 
comparison with the previous 
year.  
 
Under the Business Review, KPIs are stated very generally as follows: (see 
Table 2.3). Analysis using financial and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
and, where appropriate, other KPIs, including information relating to 
environmental matters and employees. (Medium-sized companies need not 
comply with the requirements that relate to non-financial matters).  
 
Relevance Not required under the Business Review. 
Balance and neutrality In the Business Review, this quality dimension is mentioned only in regards 
to performance and position of the business with no elaboration given to the 
word Balance (ASB, 2009, para. 3.5). 
 
In the OFR, this is a quality dimension for the whole statement. 
 
There is no mention for neutrality in the Business Review. 
Comparability Not required under the Business Review. 
Table is constructed by author using data from Companies Act (2006) and OFR reporting statement (2006). 
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3.10 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter illustrated the general aspects of disclosure, particularly definitions and various 
proxies for disclosure quality. It also considered prior attempts to develop a measure for 
disclosure quality. Such attempts entail many limitations, and consequently the literature still 
suffers from a gap in defining a disclosure quality measure. Importantly, this chapter mainly 
aimed to develop a new measure for disclosure quality that overcomes the limitations of 
prior attempts. In doing so, the principles of OFR reporting statement issued by the ASB 
provide guidance on the dimensions of high-quality information.  
The aggregated quality score is a function of seven measures representing seven quality 
dimensions. The frequency of forward-looking quantitative information scaled by the 
frequency of forward-looking sentences in the OFR statement reflects the forward-looking 
orientation dimension. The proportion of forward-looking information captures the relevance 
dimension. The proportion of qualitative information measures the how the disclosure 
supplement the financial statement. The disclosure spread reflects the comprehensiveness of 
the disclosure. The proportion of bad to good news given the industry leader measures the 
balance and neutrality of the disclosure. Comparability is measured using the usefulness of 
KPIs as suggested by the ASB. Finally, the LIX index measures the readability. 
Accordingly, the current research provides a multi-dimensional definition of disclosure 
quality as follows: “the totality of inherent qualitative characteristics of information in OFR 
best practice statements that bear on its ability to increase the users’ ability to assess firms’ 
strategies and the potential for those strategies to succeed”. 
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The chapter also introduced the steps followed to produce a disclosure quality score; the 
output of the disclosure quality measure. Both traditional (manual) and computer-based 
content approaches are used in developing this score. A computerised content analysis is 
used to automate the calculation of forward-looking orientation, relevance, supplement the 
financial statements, comprehensiveness, understandability, and balance and neutrality. The 
traditional content analysis is used in evaluating the comparability of disclosure.  
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Chapter Four : Reliability and Validity of the 
Proposed Disclosure Quality Measure 
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4.1  Overview 
Chapter Three developed a measure for DQ based on qualitative information dimensions 
recommended by the OFR guiding principles. It introduces the steps followed to produce a 
disclosure quality score; the output of the disclosure quality measure. This chapter is devoted 
for the reliability and validity tests of the proposed measure. Chapter Four is organised as 
follows. Section 4.2 introduces several tests for the reliability of the proposed disclosure 
score. Section 4.3 discusses the validity of the proposed disclosure score. The chapter ends 
by section 4.4 which summarises and concludes. 
It is crucial for a new methodology to be reliable and valid if it is to gain acceptance in the 
literature. For a valid inference, Weber (1990) argues that the classification procedure should 
be reliable and valid. Reliability refers to “the ability of different people to code the same 
text in the same way” (Weber, 1990, p. 12). Validity refers to the extent to which the 
variables generated from the classification procedure represent what the researcher intends it 
to represent. In the coming sections, the reliability and validity of the proposed measure for 
best practice disclosure quality are discussed. 
4.2 Assessment of Reliability of Disclosure Scores 
Reliability of the content analysis is usually an issue whenever manual content analysis is 
used or where multiple coders are involved. Prior literature argues that content analysis is 
not considered reliable if it is conducted only once or only by one particular person 
(Neuendorf, 2002). Typically, “computational content analysis is deterministic and hence 
perfectly reliable. No ambiguities and uncertainties are tolerated within a computer” 
(Krippendorff, 1980, p. 119). Owing to the fact that the current study uses a computerised 
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content analysis approach, and mainly one coder is involved, reliability should not be a 
concern. 
Despite this argument about reliability, the reliability of the computerised content analysis is 
based on the reliability of the coding schemes – keyword lists – designed by the researchers. 
This is important as the computer then processes this scheme. Sydserff and Weetman (2002) 
establish that researchers should be cautious about using computerised content analysis as a 
proxy for the manual content analysis without verifying this assumption empirically. 
Accordingly, the reliability of the keyword lists used in the computerised content analysis is 
of great importance. There are three types of reliability tests: stability, reproducibility and 
accuracy (Krippendorff, 1980). 
The vast majority of prior studies do not utilise the three tests simultaneously. Abrahamson 
and Amir (1996), Beattie et al. (2004), and Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) use reproducibility, 
while Hussainey (2004) uses stability and accuracy. Others do not test for reliability (e.g. 
Henry, 2006; 2008; Morgan, 2008; Henry and Leone, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009; and Muslu 
et al., 2010). Interestingly, the current study applies the three types of reliability tests for all 
keywords lists.  
The first reliability aspect is stability. Stability is defined as “the degree to which a process is 
invariant or unchanging over time” (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 130). Arguably, the stability of 
the coding procedures is guaranteed as long as it is computerised.33 As for the stability of 
keyword lists, the researcher coded five OFR statements manually at one time. After a 
period, a sample of sentences from the five OFR statements was coded again. The resulting 
coding generated from the second time phase coincides exactly with those arriving the first 
                                                 
33 The researcher writes a coding program for each keyword list. Each program will yield the same scores over time for a 
typical OFR statement. For example, the forward-looking program for Arriva in 2006 will always show that 37 sentences 
represent a forward-looking context, which is almost 15% of the total OFR statements for this firm. 
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time round. Stability, however, is the weakest reliability indicator and should not be trusted 
on its own (Krippendorff, 1980).  
Reproducibility is the second measure of reliability. Marston and Shrives (1991) contend 
that the index scores awarded to firms could be considered reliable if other researchers could 
replicate (reproduce) the same results. The authors maintain that whenever the score is 
extracted from annual reports, which remain constant over time, there is no obstacle to 
repetition. Nevertheless, Marston and Shrives (1991) believe that the reproducibility problem 
is more apparent in behavioural science. Krippendorff (1980) defines reproducibility as the 
degree to which a process can be replicated under different circumstances and using different 
coders. Again, reproducibility of the score itself produced by the computer is feasible and 
therefore reliable. 
As to the reproducibility of the manual coding when deciding on the final keywords list, the 
researcher and an independent coder34 individually coded a randomly selected sample of 30 
sentences for forward-looking, bad news and good news keywords lists. With respect to 
forward-looking keywords, one sentence was disagreed upon; however, this disagreement 
was resolved. For bad news, disagreement arose over two sentences only, and such 
disagreements were resolved. There was no disagreement over the good news list. 
Consequently, drawing from Krippendorff’s (1980) arguments that for a process to be 
reliable, the rules governing it must be explicit and applicable equally to all units of analysis, 
the level of reliability from a reproducibility viewpoint is generally highly satisfactory. 
 
                                                 
34 This is Dr Khaled Hussainey, the second supervisor, who has extensive experience in the computerised content analysis 
approach.  
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The last test of reliability is accuracy. As discussed before, the accuracy of each word in 
every keywords list is checked before considering it a keyword. Each keyword is examined 
as to whether it really indicates what it should. A word is included in the final keyword list if 
it appears in its relevant context in at least 90% of the sentences.35 
In addition, the accuracy tests are extended to investigate how well the computerised coding 
is correlated to the manual coding. In an attempt to draw a conclusion on this, four steps are 
followed. At the first step, the researcher and an independent coder manually coded five 
OFR statements independently. At the second step, to avoid subjectivity and human errors, 
the manual coding of both the researcher and the independent coder was compared; the 
correlation between both coders was 96%. At the third step, disagreements between both 
coders were discussed and resolved. Two examples of disagreements are given below: 
"Almost 6,000 of our qualified drivers attended courses on customer care or defensive 
driving during 2009, and we also invested almost £1,000 in our vocational qualifications 
programme" (National- OFR, 2009). 
 
The principal researcher coded this sentence as quantitative forward-looking since the 
investment indicates a forward-looking context. The researcher agreed that the sentence is 
quantitative; however, the researcher claimed that the sentence should not be considered as 
forward-looking. The sentence by itself does not show any plans or outcomes in the future. 
Notably, during the reliability test of the forward-looking keywords, the manual coding of a 
sample shows that "investment" comes in a forward-looking context only in 77% of the 
sentences and, thus, was excluded from the final keywords list. After the discussion, the 
principle coder agreed not to consider it as a forward-looking sentence. Consider the second 
example: 
“Rob Walker retired as CEO of Sainsbury’s Bank earlier this month as planned after 
completing his two year contract” (Sainsbury’s - OFR, 2008). 
 
                                                 
35 See section (4.2) for a detailed illustration of this accuracy test. 
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The principal researcher coded this sentence as quantitative on the grounds that it quantifies 
the number of years for which the CEO was employed. However, the second coder argued 
that it is qualitative. After the discussion, the principle researcher agreed to consider it as a 
qualitative sentence since no quantitative information about the firm's performance was 
provided. 
At the fourth step, after solving disagreements, the final agreed-upon coding, is correlated 
with the computerised coding. Table 4.1 shows the correlation analysis between manual 
coding and computerised coding. 
The Pearson correlation test shows that manual coding is significantly correlated with the 
computerised coding. The correlation for each type of coding is statistically significant at the 
1% level, except for the forward-looking quantitative aspect, which is significant at the 5% 
level. Such rigorous correlation supports the veracity of the overall methodology employed 
for calculating disclosure quality scores.  
 
Table 4.1: Pearson Correlations between Manual and Computerised Content Analysis 
 Pearson 
Correlation 
P-value 
Manual forward-looking vs. computerised forward-looking 0.969*** 0.007 
Manual quantitative vs. computerised quantitative 0.962*** 0.009 
Manual forward-looking quantitative vs. computerised forward-looking 
quantitative 
0.953** 0.012 
Manual bad news vs. computerised bad news  0.981*** 0.003 
Manual good news vs. computerised good news 0.993*** 0.001 
Total manual score vs. computerised total score 0.985*** 0.002 
Table is constructed by author. The table shows the Pearson correlation between the manual and computerised content analysis for forward-
looking, quantitative, bad news and good news coding. The last row shows the correlation between the total manual/computerised coding.  
***, ** = Significant at 1%, 5% respectively.  
 
 
4.3 Assessment of Validity of Disclosure Scores 
The purpose of validity tests is to ensure that a study accurately reflects or assesses the 
specific concept that the researchers are attempting to measure; furthermore, validity 
provides assurances that research findings have to be taken seriously in constructing 
scientific theories or in making decisions on practical matters (Krippendorff, 1980). A new 
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methodology is welcomed if other researchers could easily implement it, and if it is a valid 
measure for the intended construct (Shevlin, 2004). In this section, the reasons why the 
proposed disclosure quality measure is believed to be valid are highlighted. 
Well-known frameworks which provide guidance regarding generally accepted quality 
dimensions for information is a solid support for a new framework measuring disclosure 
quality (Botosan, 2004). A similar study (i.e. Beattie et al., 2004) validated its quality 
measure on the grounds that it is based on a rigorously grounded framework in the literature 
(Jankins framework). Accordingly, the current research’s measure gains its validity basically 
from being based on the OFR principles. 
Typically, one can validate a new methodology in many ways. Shevlin (2004) summarises 
three types of validation tests: first, analysing the logic underlying the proposed 
methodology; second, comparing the results obtained from the proposed methodology with 
other findings; and third, analytical analysis, which involves using empirical evidence to 
support the developed framework. The current study goes through logical and analytical 
analysis. Comparison with prior quality measures is not applicable, because prior studies 
only focus on one sort of disclosure (i.e. risk in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a; forward-
looking information in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008) or the authors themselves have restricted 
the comparability of their measure due to methodological limitations (i.e. Beattie et al., 
2004). The present study empirically validates the proposed measure in three ways in this 
chapter. The first is a simple regression between disclosure quality and disclosure quantity. 
The quality is the dependent variable and disclosure quantity is the independent variable. 
The second test is a multiple regression analysis using disclosure quantity as the independent 
variable, with some controls. The third is a correlation analysis between disclosure quality 
and the number of analysts following a firm at one side, and disclosure quantity and the 
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number of analysts following a firm at the other. In addition, the score is further validated in 
chapters Five and Seven. The reminder of this section elaborates these tests. 
4.3.1 Disclosure Quantity as a Predictor for Disclosure Quality 
1-Simple Regression 
As discussed earlier, prior studies use disclosure quantity to proxy for disclosure quality. To 
test this proposed association between disclosure quantity36 and quality, the researcher uses a 
simple regression to examine if the quantity could be used as an explanatory variable for 
disclosure quality. The simple regression is intended to test whether disclosure quantity is a 
good predictor of disclosure quality. The simple regression is presented in the following 
equation: 
QUAL = 3.580+ 0.247 QUANTTY 
Running the simple regression analysis yields a very poor R-square of 0.0008. This means 
disclosure quantity explains only 0.08% of the variation in disclosure quality, the quantity 
coefficient is insignificant though. Moreover, the model is insignificant with an F value of 
0.520. Therefore, disclosure quantity is not a proper predictor of disclosure quality, 
therefore, studies using quantity as a proxy for quality are concluding imprecise inferences.  
2-Multiple Regression 
This test investigates whether disclosure quantity can be adequately used as a predictor for 
disclosure quality in the presence of control variables. Seven control variables are used. 
These controls are; firm size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, investment growth, risk, and 
analyst following. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior study controls for this 
                                                 
36 Disclosure quantity is defined as the proportion of forward-looking information disclosed in OFR statements (see chapter 
Two, section, 4.3.2). 
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comprehensive set of variables. The following paragraphs highlight the definition of each 
control variable, source of data, and justification of variables. 
Firm Size 
The most widely used firm characteristic in relevant literature is firm size (SIZE). It is 
usually regarded as a significant explanatory variable in disclosure studies (Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004). It is hypothesised that larger firms are more likely to disclose information 
at a high level of quality for various reasons. First, large firms have higher information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997), and therefore 
employ disclosure quality to mitigate agency problems (O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Second, 
political-cost hypothesis predicts that larger companies have a stronger incentive to enhance 
their corporate reputation and public image, as they are more publicly visible, and attract the 
attention of governmental bodies (Debrency et al., 2002). Additionally, as argued by 
Abdullah and Page (2009), larger firms are exposed to higher levels of media enquiry than 
smaller firms when they fail to comply with regulatory requirements. Consequently, large 
firms are more likely to conform to the OFR and provide high-quality information. Third, 
large firms have a greater need for capital and can therefore be expected to disclose at a 
higher level (Hossain et al., 1995). Fourth, large firms are more likely to afford the cost of 
complying with regulatory requirements, such as those of The Code (Abdullah and Page, 
2009) and those of OFR. Fifth, large firms are more likely to provide information of a high 
quality to attract more analysts (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy et al., 1999). Sixth, unlike 
large firms, small ones are more exposed to competitive disadvantage when they provide 
voluntary information (Alsaeed, 2006).  
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The current study measures firm size using the natural logarithm of total assets following an 
extensive number of studies (e.g. Ahmed et al., 2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Lim et 
al., 2007; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Laksamana, 2008; 
Aggarwal et al., 2009; Jaggi et al., 2009; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; and Sun and Liu 
2011). The study employs the total asset Datastream item no. WC02999, this is defined as: 
the sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
Profitability 
It is well known that disclosure is a costly decision. Therefore, one can expect that profitable 
firms are more likely to be keen to disclose more information (Abdullah and Page, 2009). 
The same argument could be applied to disclosure quality. Subject to a cost-benefit analysis, 
more profitable firms are likely to offer disclosures of a high quality to attract more finance 
providers and to increase access to external funds. However, one can argue that profitability 
is not the most suitable definition for available funds, and this justification best fits the 
liquidity measure rather than profitability. Based on signalling theory, Eccles et al. (2001) 
argue that more profitable firms have a motivation to clearly emphasise their success to 
stakeholders. Therefore, these firms are more likely to disclose high levels of information to 
reduce information asymmetry (Eccles et al., 2001). 
Consistent with many studies, (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; 
Kelton and Yang, 2008) profitability (PROF) is measured using Return on Equity (ROE). 
This is Datastream item no. WC08301, which is defined as: (Net Income before Preferred 
Dividend– Preferred Dividend Requirement) / Last Year’s Common Equity * 100. 
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Liquidity 
There are two main views on the relationship between liquidity (LIQ) and disclosure quality. 
One view suggests that firms with low liquidity are more likely to disclose information at a 
high quality level to justify their liquidity status (Wallace et al., 1994). The other view 
argues that high-liquidity firms will be more influenced to disclose information to strengthen 
their market position, retain investors’ confidence, and gain potential shareholders 
(Belkaoui-Riahi and Kahl 1978; and Cooke 1989). This is consistent with signalling theory 
that managers will disclose any information that will be perceived as a good signal of 
performance. Liquidity is measured using current ratio. Current ratio is the most widely used 
liquidity measure (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; and Bamber and 
McMeeking, 2010). Current ratio is Datastream item no. WC08106, defined as: Current 
Assets/Current Liabilities.  
Leverage 
In relation to a firm’s leverage (LEV), disclosure can alleviate information asymmetry, 
thereby decreasing the borrower’s apparent risk of default, and in turn reducing the cost of 
capital (Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; and Sengupta, 1998). Corporate information 
disclosure is often considered as an instrument to reduce monitoring costs for creditors. 
Moreover, firms having high leverage are more likely to disclose more information to 
minimise litigation risk (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Thus, a positive link could be 
expected between a firm’s disclosure level and its indebtedness (Chavent et al., 2006). 
In line with prior studies (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Willekens et al., 2005; Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Jaggi et al., 2009; and 
Aggarwal et al., 2009), leverage is measured using the percentage of total debt – Datastream 
item no. WC03255 – divided by total assets – Datastream item no. WC02999. Total debt is 
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defined as all interest bearing and capitalised lease obligations. It is the sum of long- and 
short- term debt.   
Investment Growth 
Another firm characteristic tested in the literature is investment growth rate (INVEST). A 
firm’s information environment shapes their disclosure policy. This characteristic is used to 
reflect the information environment (O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Therefore, to decrease the 
unacceptably high level of information asymmetry faced by high-growth firms, these firms 
have an incentive to increase their disclosure to minimise the cost of capital (Strebel, 1996) 
and to improve investors’ ability to predict future earnings (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). 
According to both agency and signalling theory, high-growth firms will disclose more 
information to maintain current shareholders’ trust and capture potential shareholders’ 
investments.  
Following prior research (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Beak et al., 2009; and 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011), investment growth is measured using the percentage of 
market to book value of equity. This ratio is calculated as the market value of the equity 
divided by the balance sheet value of the equity. Market value is Datastream item MV, 
which is calculated as the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. 
Book value of equity is Datastream item no. WC03501, defined as: common shareholders’ 
investment in a company, it includes but is not restricted to: common stock value, retained 
earnings, capital surplus, and capital stock premium. 
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Risk  
Beretta and Bozzolon (2004a) argue that risk (RISK) is positively related to disclosure – the 
more open to risk the firm is, the greater the need for disclosing more information. This view 
could be illustrated by attribution theory. Risk is captured through earning volatility, 
Datastream item no. 458E. 
Analyst Following 
Traditionally, it was not common to include the number of analysts following the firm as a 
control variable in disclosure and corporate governance literature (Eng and Mak, 2003 is an 
exception). However, the number of analyst following has been tested as a control variable 
in studies examining the association between disclosure and corporate governance (e.g. 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). Recently, it has also been examined as a corporate governance 
characteristic, yet the research on the analysts’ governance role is still limited (Sun and Liu, 
2011). Accordingly, the underlying study controls for the number of analysts (ANALYST) 
following a firm. The number of analysts following is obtained from FACTSET database.  
The multiple regression equation is presented below: 

k
k
controlQuantityQUAL 018.0012.2 . 
Running the multiple regression shows that the coefficient of disclosure quantity (0.018) is 
insignificant (0.538). Disclosure quantity thus is not a proper predictor for disclosure quality. 
Therefore, disclosure quantity should not be used as a proxy for disclosure quality. R square 
is 0.079, adjusted - R- square is 0.063. F-value is 5.49 at the 1% significance level.  
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In sum, the same conclusion of the simple regression applies for the multiple regression test, 
disclosure quantity is not a proper proxy for disclosure quality even in the presence of seven 
control variables. To conclude, the prevailing assumption in the literature that disclosure 
quantity is a good proxy for disclosure quality is imprecise. 
Notably, the coefficient of the control variables and their descriptive are not discussed in this 
section since the main objective of this regression is to show whether disclosure quantity is a 
good predictor for disclosure quality, and not to investigate determinants of disclosure 
quality. Determinants of disclosure quality are investigated in chapter Six, where coefficients 
of these control variables are discussed in details (section 6.3.3). Descriptive statistics of 
these control variables are presented with the descriptive of corporate governance variables 
in Table 6.2. 
4.3.2 Disclosure Quality/ Quantity and Analyst Following 
The proposed disclosure quality measure is further validated by testing its relation with a 
variable on which agreement is settled. It is believed that more analysts will follow firms 
providing high-quality disclosures (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; and Healy et al., 1999) and 
not just firms that disclose more. Yu (2008) also finds that firms with more analyst coverage 
exhibit less earnings management. Stated differently, the main concern of analysts is the 
quality of financial reporting and not the mere quantity.  
The present study conducts Pearson correlation analysis between disclosure quality and the 
number of analysts following a firm at one side, and disclosure quantity and the number of 
analysts following a firm at the other. Data for analyst followings is extracted from 
FACTSET. The test is conducted using the Pearson correlation test.  
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Consistent with the literature (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; and 
Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2010), the Pearson correlation shows that the number of 
analysts is significantly and positively associated with the disclosure quality. The correlation 
is 0.118 at the 1% significance level. This suggests that the higher the quality of information 
disclosed, the more analysts follow the firm. On the other hand, the results hold an 
insignificant correlation between analyst following and disclosure quantity. Thus, results 
suggest that firms focusing on eliciting more information, with no concern given to the 
quality level, will find it difficult to capture analysts’ interests. 
It is worth noting that the proposed disclosure measure is further validated in chapters Six 
and Eight. Chapter Six shows evidence that determinants of disclosure quality differ from 
those of disclosure quantity. More interestingly, chapter Eight reports a positive association 
between firm value and disclosure quality, but no association is reported with disclosure 
quantity.  
4.4  Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter Four assessed the reliability and validity of the proposed disclosure quality measure 
developed in chapter Three. This research is the first to offer a valid and reliable disclosure 
quality measure that is derived from a well-recognised guiding framework (i.e. OFR). It was 
found that the disclosure quality measure is reliable and valid. Being valid, the current 
study’s measure has important implications for academia. It provides the first empirical 
evidence that disclosure quantity is not a precise proxy for disclosure quality. It evokes the 
possibility of reshaping some unsettled disclosure interrelationships that are commonly mis-
investigated using disclosure quantity. One stream could examine the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure quality. Chapters Six and eight discuss and 
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examine this association. In addition, chapter Seven empirically examines the impact of 
disclosure quality and corporate governance on firm value.  
The present study (chapters Four and Five) successfully develops five highly reliable 
keyword lists pertaining to narrative reporting (forward-looking, quantitative, bad news, 
good news and scope), which allow for the computerisation of the content analysis. This 
results in promoting the efficiency of the related research areas with a low-cost, time-saving 
approach. Moreover, this would help with undertaking large studies, and hence derive more 
reliable results than previous findings based on small sample manual analysis studies. 
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Chapter Five :  Disclosure Quality and Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms: Review and 
Hypotheses Development 
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5.1 Overview 
The previous chapter developed a new measure for disclosure quality (DQ) and concludes 
that disclosure quantity is not a proper proxy for disclosure quality. Bearing in mind that the 
literature does not provide empirical evidence on the association between disclosure quality 
and corporate governance (CG), but instead, uses several quantity measures as a proxy for 
quality, there exists a strong need to examine which CG mechanisms are associated with 
disclosure quality. The aim of this chapter is to fill this research gap. Chapter Five therefore, 
draws on two streams of research: DQ and CG. 
CG is a multi-disciplinary concept, which is interpreted differently by each discipline. Such 
disciplines include accounting, finance, management, law, micro-economics, organisational 
economics, psychology, sociology, organisational theory, information theory and politics 
(Turnbull, 1997).  
Over recent years, considerable attention has been given to the association between DQ and 
CG. However, the literature does not address this relationship directly; instead, prior 
research uses disclosure quantity as a proxy for disclosure quality. The route of this research 
commenced with the study of Ho and Wong (2001) as a reaction to the Asian financial crisis. 
They argued that the crisis was not only due to a loss of investor confidence, but to 
ineffective corporate governance coupled with insufficient transparency. The same notion 
has been re-examined in the context of US and European crises and scandals such as Enron 
and Parmalat (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). In the aftermath of the most recent international 
financial crisis, these ideas continue to be worthy of examination. 
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Disclosure and transparency is regarded as one of the corporate governance principles. These 
principles set forth by the international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) state that “the corporate governance framework should ensure that 
timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, 
including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company” 
(OECD, 2004, p. 22). In sum, the OECD principles of CG, which gained worldwide 
recognition as an international benchmark for effective CG, posit that a sound CG structure 
should promote the disclosure practices of a firm.  
Owing to the existing gaps in the extant literature, the objective of this chapter is to present 
the first empirical evidence on the association between DQ and CG mechanisms. The 
chapter uses a multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses and identify the CG 
mechanisms that are associated with disclosure quality.  
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The trend of analysing the association between various disclosure aspects and CG is 
increasingly capturing the interest of researchers. No one can question the fact that financial 
reporting and disclosure are potentially vital means by which to communicate firm 
performance and governance to shareholders and outsiders (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Transparency and disclosure practice followed by firms is an important component and a 
leading indicator of corporate governance quality (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006). Meanwhile, 
this stream of research is a response to different international and European accounting 
crises (Ho and Wong, 2001; Celik et al., 2006; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; and Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008). Importantly, there is still a gap in analysing the relationship between DQ 
and CG. With the use of disclosure quantity as a proxy for disclosure quality, which has been 
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evidenced in the previous chapter to be inaccurate and misleading, the results of prior studies 
cannot be taken as unquestionable. 
The extant literature on the association between DQ and CG suffers from various limitations. 
The first is the mixed and conflicting results, as shown in Table 5.1. With the exception of 
audit committee meeting frequency and threat to auditor independence, all other corporate 
governance mechanisms suffer from inconclusive evidence. It may be such mixed results are 
due to the improper measure of DQ. This proposition is consistent with the argument that 
“researchers investigating the determinants and consequences of disclosure quality could be 
wasting their efforts if the primary variable of interest is not being measured with a sufficient 
degree of accuracy” (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 233). The second limitation of prior research in 
this area, is the use of narrow proxies for corporate governance (García-Meca and Sánchez-
Ballesta, 2010). Most studies focus on the board (e.g. Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; and 
Cheung et al., 2010), audit committee (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005), or a few variables of 
both (e.g. Li et al., 2008; and O’Sullivan et al., 2008). The third limitation entails the use of a 
summary variable to reflect CG structure (e.g. Krishnan and Lee, 2009). This approach does 
not help to identify which CG mechanisms effectively improve DQ. Recently, Daines et al. 
(2010) call for more research to identify the most predominant corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
The current study therefore attempts to overcome these limitations. In doing so, it uses a new 
measure for DQ and a comprehensive set of CG mechanisms, which are individually 
examined rather than summarised into one variable. This should help in providing an in-
depth analysis and would be of particular interest to policy-makers and regulatory bodies. 
Reviewing the key disclosure studies helps to identify fourteen CG mechanisms empirically 
investigated with regards to disclosure. Table 5.1 displays these studies. The review begins 
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with Ho and Wong’s study (2001) and ends with Mendes-Da-Silva and Onusic (2014), the 
most recent study examining the association between DQ and CG. Appendix 6 
comprehensively summarises 35 main prior studies. The following section discusses 
corporate governance definitions and mechanisms.  
CG Mechanisms 
Over the last decade, corporate governance has gained extensive attention from academic 
scholars both within the UK and internationally (Fraser and Henry, 2003). As pointed out 
earlier in chapter Two, the separation between ownership and management creates agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). CG helps to solve the agency problems (Haka and 
Chalos, 1990). Moreover, the expansion of capital markets in the 1990s, with increasing 
numbers of companies listed (i.e. there is a separation between ownership and management), 
and the globalisation of investors increased the need for good corporate governance 
mechanisms (Cuervo, 2002). The importance of CG became even more prominent after the 
many scandals that swept the world starting from the financial crisis in July 1997 (Johnson et 
al., 2000, Ho and Wong, 2001; Abdullah and Page, 2009) – for example the Enron case in 
2002 – and ending with the international financial crisis that affected the world late 2008. 
There is no universally accepted, well-established definition of CG. Professional bodies such 
as ASB and The Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors stick to a concise and succinct 
definition of CG. For example, the latest version of The UK Code on CG 37 (2010) holds to 
the classic definition primarily introduced by The Cadbury Report in 1992, which states that 
“corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (FRC, 
2010, p. 1). Similarly, the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors prefers this definition as 
well. Clarke (2007) views this definition as the most direct and useful one regarding 
                                                 
37The dominant UK regulatory framework for CG is the UK Code on CG hereafter, “The Code”. 
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corporate governance. However, Sternberg (1998) states that this definition will be 
applicable also to company law or organised psychological manipulation.  
The OECD (2004) provides a wider description of CG. It posits that “corporate governance 
involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004, p. 11). Notably, this definition takes into account 
stakeholder groups other than shareholders. Additionally, it emphasises the corporate 
governance role in setting, monitoring and achieving the firms’ objectives (Mallin, 2006). 
On an academic level, scholars have also introduced various definitions of CG. Typically, 
different academic perspectives (finance versus accounting) provide different CG 
definitions. Finance literature argues that “corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737).  From an accounting perspective, most 
literature views CG as a group of control mechanisms designed to monitor managerial 
decisions in an effort to mitigate agency problems, and therefore ensure efficient decision-
making and maximise the value of the firm (Cuervo, 2002; Weir et al., 2002; Andres et al., 
2005; Larcker et al., 2007; and Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Brown et al. establish that 
“corporate governance is to do with corporations and it is also to do with determining the 
activities in which they are properly engaged” (2011, p. 98). Bhasin and Shaikh define CG as 
“a set of relationships between a corporation’s management, its board, its shareholders, and 
other stakeholders. It also provides a principled process and structure through which the 
objectives of the corporations, the means of attaining the objectives, and systems of 
monitoring performance are set” (2013, p. 80).  Such definitions are too broad in scope and 
emphasise the objectives of CG and its corporate impact on firm value in its broad sense. 
Another definition clarifies the main players in the CG system. Abdullah and Page argue 
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“corporate governance deals with the rights and responsibilities of a company’s board of 
directors, its shareholders and various stakeholders” (2009, p. 3). 
While the definitions above acknowledge a broad CG concept, the following are narrower in 
scope. Sternberg (1998) defines CG as “ways of ensuring that corporate actions, assets and 
agents are directed at achieving the corporate objectives established by the corporation’s 
shareholders. The later definition limits the scope of CG to current shareholder’s interests 
ignoring the accountability of the management towards other stakeholders. Keasey et al. 
(2005) view CG as a group of mechanisms that improve the firm’s performance efficiency 
whilst controlling management’s behaviour. In their survey of the most important definitions 
of CG to the institutional shareholders, Solomon and Solomon (2005) find that the 
shareholder-oriented definitions are ranked first. This is not surprising since each group of 
shareholders normally tends to prefer the definition that best serves its needs and interests.   
In conclusion, although CG definitions seem to be diverse, such definitions share a common 
view on CG as a way of mitigating agency problems and restoring market credibility, 
whereas Keasey et al.’s (2005) definition adds another angle for CG, which is to improve the 
firm’s performance.   
The afore-mentioned classification of CG with regards to finance and accounting 
perspectives is consistent with that of Rahman (2006), who states that CG literature has two 
strands: the first regards CG as guiding and improving management’s performance and the 
other sees it as a mechanism for fulfilling an investor-protection function. 
In line with its accounting basis, the current study is confined to the accounting definitions of 
CG. Owing to the diversity of CG definitions, the current study adopts the academic 
definition used heavily in the accounting context. Hereafter, CG is composed of a group of 
interrelated and complementary controls or mechanisms, which work to mitigate agency 
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problem and its associated costs such as information asymmetry and adverse selection, while 
promoting the efficiency of the firm’s performance.  
Arguably, good governance improves relationships among the primary corporate 
participants, as long as it holds management accountable to the board and the board 
accountable to shareholders. Particularly, the market reaction to management forecasts 
depends on board and audit committee efficiency (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In sum, 
“good corporate governance should contribute to better company performance by helping a 
board discharge its duties in the best interests of shareholders; if it is ignored, the 
consequence may well be vulnerability or poor performance” (FRC, 2008, p. 1). By contrast, 
poor governance is likely to result in value losses and significant externalities (Ezzamel and 
Watson, 1997). 
Eventually, more attention has been placed on corporate governance’s contribution to a 
comprehensive disclosure (Ernstberger and Grüning, 2010).  At the academic research level, 
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) argue that the 1992 UK Cadbury Committee report on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was the primary motive for the emerging body 
of research in the CG area – specifically, the implementation of certain CG mechanisms in 
relation to financial reporting quality, disclosure transparency, and the extent of disclosure 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Willekens et al. (2005) also point to the increased attention given 
to CG mechanisms in general. In addition, accounting scandals have put discussions on 
reforms to the current financial reporting model at the top of the political agenda (O’Sullivan 
and Diacon, 1999; and Willekens et al., 2005). 
Moving from The Code (2008)’s definition of CG as a system for controlling and directing 
the company or as a group of mechanisms helps mitigate the agency problem. CG can be 
classified as internal and external mechanisms, both of which collaborate to strengthen the 
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governance of the firm (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Internal CG mechanisms are those related 
to the internal activities of the firm (Curevo, 2002) or those processes that are within the 
firm’s control (Brown et al., 2011). Internal mechanisms therefore include the board, 
ownership structure, and the audit. External governance mechanisms are those external to the 
firm (Curevo, 2002) or beyond its control (Brown et al., 2011), such as external auditor 
mechanisms.  
Surveying the related literature on the association between DQ and CG unveils four main 
CG mechanisms. These four mechanisms are sub-divided into 14 CG mechanisms. 
Appendix 6 displays examples of prior studies, which test the relationship between some CG 
mechanisms and different proxies for DQ. Notably, up to the researcher’s knowledge, no 
prior study investigates the relationship between a measure of DQ and CG. Appendix 6 
includes a table that provides a comprehensive summary on each study. Column 1 lists the 
authors’ names and year of publication. Column 2 shows the sample size and the analysis 
period. Column 3 documents the empirical settings, including both developing and 
developed countries. Column 4 lists the disclosure type. Column 5 presents the proxy of 
disclosure used in each of the studies as the dependent variable. Column 6 lists CG 
mechanisms used in each study. Column 7 presents the methodology employed by each 
study in investigating the relationship between DQ and CG. Column 8 documents the results 
of each study. The last column, (9) highlights the limitations of each study. The most 
apparent limitation is the measure used for disclosure, i.e. proxies for disclosure quality and 
not a direct measure of DQ. Another limitation is the use of limited mechanisms of CG in 
each study.   
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Appendix 6 is used in developing an illustrative Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1. Moving from 
Appendix 6, which gives an overall view of the relevant literature, Figure 5.1 is developed. 
This figure is derived from column 6 of the appendix 6. This column  lists the different CG 
mechanisms tested in the literature. Additionally, using the definitions for internal and 
external CG mechanisms discussed previously (see Curevo, 2002; Cremers and Nair, 2005; 
and Brown et al., 2011), these mechanisms are subdivided into internal and external 
components. In summary, Figure 5.1 delineates the various CG mechanisms tested in the 
literature. This figure represents the framework of CG that will be tested in the current 
underlying study. It consists of three internal CG mechanisms, namely the board, ownership 
structure, and audit committee. The client’s auditor represents the external corporate 
governance mechanism. The first internal mechanism (the board) is sub-divided into board 
independence, board size, leadership structure, board meeting frequency, remuneration 
committee independence, and remuneration committee size. The second internal mechanism 
is ownership structure, which is sub-divided into managerial ownership, and ownership 
concentration. The third internal governance mechanism is the audit committee, which is 
sub-divided into audit committee independence, audit committee size, the presence of a 
financial expertise in the audit committee, and audit committee meeting frequency. 
Table 5.1 is also derived from Appendix 6. The table is designed mainly to show the mixed 
results of the association between disclosure quality and corporate governance. Column 1 
lists corporate governance mechanisms (column 6 of Appendix 6). CG mechanisms are 
presented in the same order of Figure 5.1 which is the order followed in the coming section 
when developing research hypotheses. Columns 2 to 28 list the authors’ names and 
publication year (column 1 of Appendix 6).  
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Generally, the literature is mixed with regard to the association between most of the CG 
mechanisms and disclosure quality. Notably, although the most widely tested CG in the 
literature is board size, however, there is no agreement about the relationship between board 
size and disclosure quality. Moving along the row of “board size”; the first study (i.e. Ho and 
Wong, 2001) does not find a significant association between disclosure and board 
independence. The third study (i.e. Anderson et al., 2004) documents a positive association 
between disclosure and board independence. The sixth study (i.e. Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005) however, finds a negative association between DQ and board independence. 
Therefore, looking at the row correspondent to a specific governance variable shows to what 
extent the literature has reached to a conclusion about the relationship between this variable 
and disclosure. 
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Figure 5.1: CG Mechanisms  
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Table 5.1: Relevant Studies on the Relationship between Disclosure and CG Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table is Table constructed by author using relevant literature. (+) Denotes a significant positive relationship, (-) Denotes a significant negative relationship, (?) Denotes an insignificant relationship. 
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Notably, the extant literature links CG mechanisms with various proxies for disclosure 
quality, not a direct measure of disclosure quality (see Figure 3.1 for details of these proxies). 
In addition, due to the problem of mixed results and the fact that with few exceptions, prior 
studies do not justify their findings, results are not comparable. In other words, the literature 
does not answer the question of why results are mixed, and researchers cannot draw 
conclusions around most of the CG mechanisms. It would be more useful to use an example 
in trying to answer such a question. Board independence is a good example, as it is the most 
widely examined corporate governance mechanism in the literature. In this vein, it is expected 
that board independence will bear the most suitable evidence. 
One explanation for the inconclusive results is that different CG systems have different 
implications. For example, in their meta-analysis study, García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2010) suggest that the direction of the relationship between board independence and 
disclosure depends on the CG system prevailing in the country. The study concludes that in 
capitalist Anglo-Saxon (e.g. UK, Kenya, New Zealand, and the US) and Asian countries (e.g. 
Hong Kong and Malaysia), disclosure is not affected by board independence.  
At the other end, in Communitarian countries (e.g. Germany, France, and Sweden) the 
relationship is positive.38 Oddly, the study does not suggest reasons for this conclusion. 
Importantly, even in the Anglo-Saxon countries empirical evidence is inconclusive. For 
example, Anderson et al. (2004), Laksamana (2008), Li et al. (2008), Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008), Fleo et al. (2009) and Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) report a positive relationship 
between board independence and disclosure. Conversely, Barako et al. (2006) find a negative 
relationship. Frankel et al. (2006), Lakhal (2005) and Mangena and Pike (2005) argue that 
                                                 
38
The term “Communitarian” refers to those countries with a business system which emphasises government role in social 
and economic affairs. These countries consider the linkage between banking and industry (Miller et al. 2005). For more 
information about different CG systems see Choi et al. (1996) and Miller et al. (2005). 
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board independence does not affect disclosure levels. Further, even on the UK context results 
are mixed. While Li et al. (2008) and Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) report a positive 
association, Mangena and Pike (2005) and Brammer and Pavelin (2006) show a non-
significant association. Accordingly, mixed results cannot be attributed to different 
governance systems. A second explanation for the inconclusive results is that the country’s 
regulatory environment influences the effectiveness of CG mechanisms ((Ernstberger and 
Grüning, 2013). 
Consequently, drawing on the above-stated reasons, developing the underlying study’s 
hypotheses will be generated from the relevant theory and not from prior studies’ findings. 
Agency theory offers a fertile framework for addressing the association between disclosure 
quality and corporate governance. Notably, it is the most dominant theory in the governance 
literature (Carcello et al., 2006), and in particular, is heavily used in explaining motivations 
for disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Agency theory models the relationship between 
the principal (and agent). The nature of agency relationship is defined as “a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). In this essence, shareholders are the ‘principals’ 
who delegate the running of the firm to managers ‘agents’. Such separation between 
ownership and control causes an agency problem. The first theoretical framework for agency 
theory was introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They establish that managers have 
advantages over shareholders by virtue of having access to information not available to other 
users. This situation creates an information asymmetry problem. Additionally, according to 
the agency theory, there is potential for a conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Generally, managers are perceived to have a tendency to maximise their own 
benefits. On the other hand, the celebrated goal is presumed to be maximising shareholders’ 
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wealth (Loderer et al., 2010). These divergent targets are called the “adverse selection” 
problem (Bharath et al., 2009).   
It is worth bringing into discussion here that results usually vary among studies based on the 
different empirical settings. Since countries differ with regard to the governance system 
prevailing in the country, the agency relationship differs accordingly. The OECD clarifies this 
notion. OECD (1990, Summary, para. 2) contends that: 
“One of the most striking difference between countries’ corporate governance systems is the 
difference in the ownership and control of firms that exist across countries. Systems of 
corporate governance can be distinguished according to the degree of ownership and control 
and the identity of controlling shareholders. While some systems are characterised by wide 
dispersed ownership (outsider systems), others tend to be characterised by concentrated 
ownership or control (insider systems). In outsider systems of CG (notably the US and UK), 
the basic conflict of interest is between strong managers and widely-dispersed weak 
shareholders in insider systems (notably Germany and Japan. On the other hand, the basic 
conflict is between controlling shareholders (block holders) and weak minority shareholders.     
Since the underlying study is UK-based, more emphasis is given for understanding the 
outsider systems. The OECD recognises that outsider systems, such as the UK, “tends to 
foster a more open and equitable distribution of information and place stronger emphasis on 
the protection of shareholders’ rights and, in particular, those of minority interests” (OECD, 
1990, para. 47). This highlights the importance of motivating companies to disclosure 
information of high quality.    
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The preceding discussion frames the nature of the agency problem; nonetheless, identifying 
the potential consequences of this problem is important for determining possible mitigation 
approaches. Indeed, agency problems have several implications. Firstly, information 
asymmetry may result in distorting investor trust, since investors are unable to evaluate the 
decision-making process, and thereby may have several suspicions regarding management 
performance; consequently, the cost of raising capital will increase (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
A second cost associated with information asymmetry is the risk premium claimed by 
investors (Graham et al., 2005). 
Reducing agency problem results in fruitful outcomes to shareholders, firms and the financial 
market. First, it increases returns to shareholders via reducing transaction and agency costs 
(Hooper et al., 2009); additionally, it restores market confidence and results in more equity 
financing (La Porta et al., 1997); it also contributes to the success of financial markets (Beak 
et al., 2004). Lastly, reducing agency problem leads to a decrease in information asymmetry 
between owners and managers and hence promotes firm value (Gompers et al., 2003), this is 
tested in chapter Eight. 
Theoretically, there are several ways to eliminate agency problem, essentially through 
aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. These include compensations and debt 
contracts; yet, the ability to enforce optimal contracts is questionable (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Additionally, it is extremely difficult to write contracts to cover all eventualities 
(Abdullah and Page, 2009). Moreover, these contracts are deemed costly to shareholders 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2005), including, as argued by Abdullah and Page (2009), timing 
cost, cost of negotiation and enforcement of these contracts. Therefore, alternative approaches 
have been evolved to address agency problem. The most common ones are disclosing more 
information than required (e.g. Bartov and Bodnar, 1996; Jones, 2007) and CG (Healy and 
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Palepu, 2001). Both approaches attempt to eliminate information asymmetry problem. 
Therefore, this chapter discusses these two approaches.   
To sum up, hypotheses will be developed mainly from agency theory. Agency theory 
dominates Anglo-American corporate governance debates. Most significantly, agency theory 
is the principle underlying corporate governance in the UK, as highlighted by Johnston: “since 
the 1980s, and justified by reference to agency theory, the wider corporate governance 
environment has increasingly pressurised management to prioritise shareholder interests” 
(2006, p. 823). 
Beside the relevant theory, the current study focuses on CG regulations prevailing in the UK. 
This decision is derived from the fact that, as justified in chapter Two, the sample consists of 
UK listed firms. Given the objective of the current study – examining the extent to which CG 
mechanisms promote the quality of disclosure practices – it becomes necessary to define CG 
mechanisms based on a UK corporate governance regulation, namely; the UK Code on 
Corporate Governance “The Code”. 
The first version of The Code was published in 1992 by the Cadbury Committee and was 
known at that time as the Cadbury Report. Since this date, The Code has been reviewed 
periodically and modified as necessary based on the feedback gained from firms operating in 
the market, for example the review of 2005 (FRC, 2005), or in response to public demand 
such as the  review of 2010 (FRC, 2010) caused by either changing market conditions or 
developments in the accounting and auditing professions. In fact, reviews have taken place in 
1998, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2010. 
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At this point of the discussion, it is important to decide which version of The Code will be the 
basis for defining corporate governance remuneration. Importantly, this study will consider all 
modifications to The Code until the review of 2007, which became effective from 29 June 
2008. Therefore, the basis here will be The Code as it stood in 2008. Obviously, the latest 
revision of The Code cannot be considered in this study since it only became effective on 29 
June 2010 (FRC, 2010), and it will take at least a year before it is possible to examine the 
impact of the modified code.  
5.2.1 Board Literature 
A board of directors is delegated from shareholders to perform four primary functions. The 
first is to monitor management behaviour, whilst the second is strategic decision-making and 
policy support (Abdullah and Page, 2009) or, more specifically, approving business decisions 
and strategies, disposal of assets, and investments (Tirole, 2006). The third is a governance 
role, namely managing the assets on the shareholders’ behalf and being accountable for their 
stewardship (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). The fourth role is the maintenance of firm 
reputation (legitimacy role) (Filatochev et al., 2007). 
It is well acknowledged that the board have a significant role in determining disclosure 
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2006). Indeed, the board39 is an effective controlling mechanism 
that maximises shareholders’ wealth and mitigates agency problems (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008), and as such is expected to contribute toward high-quality disclosure. McKinsey and 
                                                 
39Two types of board structure exist, namely the one-tier (unitary) board and the two-tier board. The first type is where one 
board manages and oversees the firm’s performance; this type is criticised in the sense that it performs incompatible 
corporate functions (Spisto, 2005). However, this limitation is debatable as the presence of independent directors may help to 
reconcile the conflicting roles. This type of board is widely adopted in many European countries; examples include the UK 
and Ireland. A two-tier board is one where the supervisory board is distinct from the management board (Kong and Tang, 
2008). Germany, Finland, and Denmark adopt the two-tier board structure (Jungmann, 2006). Worldwide corporate 
governance guidelines focus on the single-tier board system, since it is the most common board system in the majority of 
westernised economies (Yeh et al, 2009). Such CG guidelines do not provide specific recommendations for two-tier boards. 
Keeping silent about the applicability of the corporate governance principles on countries that apply such principles allows 
the conclusion that CG principles apply to different types of boards. Empirically, some evidence exists from countries 
allowing the two types of boards as to the lack of difference between the board type in relation to firm performance (see, for 
example, Benedicteand Ronald, 2010).  
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Company’s global investor opinion survey (2002) reports that institutional investors perceive 
that the most important mechanism of CG are effective boards of directors, disclosure, strong 
rights and equal treatment of shareholders. This may justify the intensive examination of 
board mechanisms in the literature and their relationship with DQ. Furthermore, Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2006) claim that board may has an effect on the process of stakeholders’ 
engagement in general, and on the choice of disclosure policy in particular. 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) argues that a key element of board supervision is 
working with management to achieve corporate legal and ethical compliance. Such 
supervision includes ensuring the use of quality accounting policies, internal controls, and 
independent as well as objective external auditors. This supervision is expected to deter fraud, 
anticipate financial risks, and promote accurate, high-quality and timely disclosure of 
financial and other material information. This, in turn, should benefit the board, the public 
markets, and the shareholders. 
In the CG literature, there is no full agreement among researchers on what constitutes board 
mechanisms. Some researchers identify a vague concept of board mechanisms, for example 
Hoitash et al. (2009), who test board strength, whilst other studies identify a more detailed list 
of board mechanisms (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; and Laksamana, 
2008). Ahmed et al. (2006) use board independence (board composition)40 and board size as 
the only determinants of CG and board mechanisms in particular. Ahmed et al. (2006) believe 
that those two mechanisms have a vital influence on the overall CG structure. Willekens et al. 
(2005) state that board effectiveness is influenced by its size and its independence.  
 
                                                 
40 These two terms are used interchangeably in the literature. 
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In short, the first internal CG mechanism is the board. It is assumed that the board plays an 
important role in managing the financial reporting process and hence is likely to affect 
disclosure in one way or another. The board is regarded as the most pivotal internal CG 
mechanism, which controls the management and eliminates managerial fraud (Iqbal et al., 
2011). An overview of the literature suggests that the board as a CG mechanism has six 
aspects. These include; board independence, board size, lack of separation in leadership 
structure, frequency of board meetings, and finally the size and independence of the 
remuneration committee. The current study uses agency theory to formulate the hypothesised 
association between these governance mechanisms and DQ. In the absence of sufficient 
arguments by agency theory to support the association between governance mechanisms and 
DQ, other theoretical frameworks are used. The study also uses CG code to support the 
research hypotheses. The rest of this section discusses these mechanisms in detail. 
Board Independence 
The first CG mechanism to be extensively examined in the literature is board independence; 
in other words, to what extent the board is composed of independent directors. It is believed 
that the more independent the board is, the fewer agency problems there are (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Drawing on agency theory, firms should attempt to reduce information 
asymmetry and promote investor confidence by having a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board. The underlying logic suggests that the independent directors work for 
the shareholders and thus are motivated to improve the overall quality of the financial 
reporting process (Jiang et al., 2010) – in particular, disclosure quality – and consequently 
reduce agency costs (Beekes et al., 2004). Prior studies examining this mechanism advocate 
this argument (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010).   
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Another view advocating the importance of independent directors claims that non-
independent directors have an advantage over other shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010). That is 
to say, such directors will not be interested in DQ since they already have access to the 
information they need. Additionally, agency theory claims that managers will withhold 
information for their own benefit either to cover a negative performance or to take advantage 
of a positive performance, and therefore the need arises for independent directors to control 
management behaviour.   
This argument is reinforced by The Code, which states: “The board should include a balance 
of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular independent non-executive 
directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s 
decision taking” (FRC, 2008, p. 7). 
At this point of discussion, it is useful to clearly define the concept of “independent director”. 
Anderson et al. (2004) provide a detailed definition of “independence”, defining independent 
directors as those who have no relation of any kind with the firm other than their appointment 
as a director. More specifically, they are not current or former employees, not related to 
managers, and their firms do not do business with the firm on whose board they sit. On the 
other hand, affiliated or “gray” directors are those who have a business relationship with the 
firm or who were previously employed by the firm (Raghunandan et al., 2001). According to 
this definition, non-executive directors could be “gray” directors as long as they are not 
defined as independent in the firm’s annual reports. Nevertheless, some studies regard non-
executive directors as independent, where in fact they might be affiliated directors (e.g. 
Barako et al., 2006). 
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This observation is considered by The Code as follows: “the board should identify in the 
annual report each non-executive director it considers to be independent” (FRC, 2008, p. 7). 
The Code goes a step further and requires that at least half of the board, excluding the 
chairman, be independent directors. Such board structure is believed to represent an optimal 
outcome given costs and benefits associated with different types of directors (i.e. executive, 
non-executive and non-executive independent directors) (McKnight and Weir, 2009). 
Since The Code does not recognise all non-executives as independent, studies using the 
proportion of non-executives to measure board independence are misleading. Indeed, one of 
the possibilities on which prior studies have reported mixed results in relation to board 
independence is the use of different measures for “independence”, such as non-executive and 
non-executive independent directors (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). 
Consequently, the current study’s definition of “independence” is restricted to those directors 
clearly defined as independent in the firm’s annual reports.41 
Based on the above discussion, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H1: There is a positive association between board independence and disclosure quality. 
Board Size 
The second common board mechanism is board size. Two theoretical views exist regarding 
the relationship between board size and its supervisory role in terms of management practices,  
and accordingly its influence on disclosing information. From an agency perspective, larger 
boards have a greater knowledge base to fulfil their advisory role, thereby allowing for better 
workload distribution and committee assignments (Ahmed et al., 2006; and Laksamana, 
                                                 
41 In the annual report, three types of directors are highlighted: executive directors, non-executive directors (gray directors), 
and non-executive independent directors. The current study considers only non-executive independent directors in calculating 
board independence. 
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2008). Large boards are less likely to be dominated by management (Hussainey and Wang, 
2011). The second view stems from the organisational behaviour research. This view 
maintains that smaller boards facilitate more frequent and intense information sharing and 
processing than larger boards (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; and Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). Additionally, large boards might destroy corporate value (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007). 
The Code maintains that the board’s size should be reasonable – not too large or too small. 
“The board should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient size 
that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirements of the business 
and that changes to the board’s composition can be managed without undue disruption” (FRC, 
2008, p. 7). 
Accordingly, having two ambivalent contradictory viewpoints, in addition to the absence of a 
suggestion for suitable board size by The Code, leads the current study to predict the second 
hypothesis (with no specific direction) as follows: 
H2: There is an association between board size and disclosure quality. 
Leadership Structure 
The third board-related CG mechanism is leadership structure, which refers to the existence of 
a dominant authority within the board. Dominant authority means a duality in the leadership, 
where the chairman also holds the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO)42 (Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004; and Chahine and Tohmé, 2009). 
 
                                                 
42 One may argue that there might be dominant personality acting on the board even if there is a separation between the CEO 
and the chairman. However, such an argument will not hold in face of the fact that a high independence rate on the board 
would mitigate such a dominant personality, if one existed.  
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According to agency theory, such combined functions can significantly impair boards’ pivotal 
monitoring and controlling functions (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; and Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). Leadership duality enables the CEO to engage in opportunistic behaviour, 
because of his/her dominance over the board (Barako et al., 2006). Consequently, the 
presence of a dominant personality within the ranks of executive management is thought to 
hinder effective CG (Lakhal, 2005; and O’Sullivan et al., 2008). 
On the regulatory level, one of The Code’s (2008) main principles is concerned with the 
leadership structure of the board. It states: “there should be a clear division of responsibilities 
at the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility 
for the running of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers 
of decision” (FRC, 2008, p. 6). Leadership structure is measured through the variable “Lack 
of separation in leadership structure. 
Consistent with the theory and The Code principle, the third hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
H3: There is a negative association between the lack of separation in leadership structure and 
disclosure quality. 
Board Meeting Frequency 
While the literature has mostly focused on board size and independence as measures for board 
oversight, the intensity of board monitoring activities such as, meetings frequency and board 
sub-committees are of equal importance (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). The number of 
meetings is usually used as a proxy for board diligence43 (e.g. Carcello et al., 2006). 
According to agency theory; any mechanism that helps to improve management’s 
                                                 
43 Diligence refers to the quality of directors’ supervisory process (Brenner and Schwalbach, 2009). 
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performance toward shareholders’ interest mitigates agency conflict. Frequent board meetings 
arguably facilitate greater information sharing among directors (Laksamana, 2008). Generally, 
after crises, boards meet more frequently and this improves the firm’s performance (Vafeas, 
1999). Laksamana (2008) claims that for effective disclosure decisions, boards need to devote 
a significant amount of time and resources. Laksamana’s study posits that the time and 
resource commitments of directors are positively associated with the extent of compensation 
practice disclosure as a type of disclosure, whereas the presence of overcommitted directors 
reduces the oversight of the management practices. This is consistent with The Code’s 
provision. It argues: “the board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties 
effectively” (FRC, 2008, p. 6). The Code specifies the board’s duties as follows: 
“The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of 
prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed. The board should 
set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in 
place for the company to meet its objectives and review management performance. The board 
should set the company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders 
and others are understood and met” (FRC, 2008, p. 10). 
In sum, one of the board duties is to oversee management practices, and one of those practices 
is best practice disclosure. Therefore, the more frequently meetings are held, the more 
effective the board will be or, more specifically, the more time will be expected to be 
allocated for overseeing disclosure, and thus promoting disclosure quality.  
Accordingly, with the consensus about the positive influence of board meeting frequency, the 
fourth hypothesis is developed as:  
H4: There is a positive relationship between board meeting frequency and disclosure quality. 
Independence and Size of the Remuneration Committee 
Board sub-committees (i.e. remuneration and audit committees) are meant to offer more scope 
for independent directors to discuss financial disclosures (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). 
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Historically, the relationship between the existence, as well as the independence, of the 
remuneration committee and disclosure quality has not been empirically tested. Remuneration 
committees are supposed to advice on directors’ emoluments and service contracts (Ezzamel 
and Watson, 1997). The Code’s principle holds that “the board should establish a 
remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies44 two, 
independent non-executive directors” (FRC, 2008, p. 15). Nonetheless, agency theory deals 
with the overall board independence and not the independence of its sub-committees such as 
the remuneration or nomination committees. Since The Code (2008) values the independence 
of the remuneration committee, the current study posits the following hypotheses based on 
The Code’s provision: 
H5: There is a positive association between the independence of the remuneration committee 
and disclosure quality. 
Remuneration committee size has not been sufficiently examined in the literature; however 
the debate could be very similar to that arising around board size, as discussed earlier. Unlike 
the absence of a theoretical consensus on remuneration committee size, The Code (2008) 
requires a minimum size of three independent directors. However, no preference is given for a 
large/small size. Consequently, the following additional hypothesis is predicted (with no 
specific direction as such): 
H6: There is a relationship between the size of the remuneration committee and disclosure 
quality. 
 
 
                                                 
44 A smaller company is one that is below the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the reporting year (FRC, 
2008, footnote no. 2). 
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5.2.2   Ownership Literature 
Many studies suggest that the structure of ownership should have an impact as a CG 
mechanism on disclosure (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Two main ownership 
mechanisms are being tested in the literature: the type of ownership and the shareholding 
concentration. 
Type of Ownership 
The type of ownership structure provides explanations for many governance issues, namely 
managerial power, shareholders’ monitoring role, financing and investment decisions and 
disclosure policies (Jiang et al., 2010). Moreover, as claimed by Eng and Mak (2003, p. 326), 
“the structure of ownership determines the level of monitoring and thereby, the level of 
disclosure”. It is assumed that certain types of owners have the knowledge and motivation to 
reduce management concealment of information, whereas others may be motivated to hide 
information.  
Managerial Ownership 
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) convergence of interest hypothesis,45 managers 
are assumed to have less incentive to maximise job performance when they are not 
shareholders. Indeed, a lower level of managerial ownership is associated with increased 
agency problems (Eng and Mak, 2003). Thus, when agency problems decrease, managers will 
not instigate high-quality disclosure since they are not motivated to mitigate agency problem. 
In contrast, another view holds that up to a certain level, management and shareholders’ 
interests are aligned (Stulz, 1988; and Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) and that managerial 
                                                 
45This hypothesis maintains that directors manage the money of shareholders and not their own. Accordingly, it 
is expected that managers will not work with the same level of efficiency with which the shareholders will work 
for their own (Jensen and Meckling’s, 1976). 
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ownership will promote best practice disclosure. Nevertheless, based on Fama and Jensen’s 
(1983) view, managers’ and shareholders’ interests are aligned only at a low level of 
ownership. Stated differently, after a certain level, increased managerial ownership results in 
low-quality disclosure (Luo et al., 2006; and Kelton and Yang, 2008). Overall, it is recognised 
that managers’ and shareholders’ interests are less aligned when there is a greater separation 
between ownership and control (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Additionally, prior 
literature provides support for Jensen and Meckling’s proposition (Beak et al., 2009). 
Consequently, based on agency theory, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H7: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and disclosure quality. 
Ownership Concentration46 
The theoretical literature on CG provides conflicting views as to whether concentration of 
shareholdings improves managers’ activities (Konijn et al., 2011). In this context, one view 
maintains that “holders of small proportions of shares have little prospect of changing 
company policies and consequently are unlikely to incur the costs of monitoring 
management” (Abdullah and Page, 2009, p. 24). This is particularly true for firms, which are 
characterised by a greater concentration of ownership and have substantial shareholders with 
increased power due to the size of their shareholdings. Thus, it is easier for fewer substantial 
shareholders to voice an opinion to which management will be forced to listen (O’Sullivan et 
al., 2008).  
The other view is backed by agency theory, which asserts that the potential for conflict would 
be greater in firms where shares are widely held, than when they are in the hands of a few 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Nonetheless, the degree of information asymmetry between the firm 
and its shareholders increases when ownership is widely dispersed (García-Meca, and 
                                                 
46 This is referred to as “block holdings” in some studies (e.g. Abdullah and Page, 2009). 
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Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Consequently, based on agency theory, agency costs increase in case 
of ownership dispersion and thus firms would attempt to provide high-quality disclosure to 
avoid unfavourable investor reactions. Managers may therefore voluntarily disclose 
information to reduce agency conflicts with the owners (Ho and Wong, 2001; and Barako et 
al., 2006). Because agency theory is the main platform for developing hypotheses, the 
following hypothesis is derived: 
H8: There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and disclosure quality. 
5.2.3 Audit Committee Literature 
The role of the audit committee as a CG mechanism is apparent (Barua et al., 2010) and has 
captured researchers’ interests in the past in the wake of high-profile accounting scandals 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). Based on agency theory, the audit committee acts as an 
important CG mechanism, that mitigates the information asymmetry problem, improves 
investors’ confidence in the financial reporting system, and consequently reduces agency 
costs. An audit committee acts as a controlling mechanism for the financial reporting process, 
external auditing function, and internal control effectiveness (Sharma et al., 2009). Being an 
effective monitoring device, the audit committee contributes towards a higher disclosure 
quality (Forker, 1992), and more value-relevant information disclosure ( Samy, 2009; and Li 
et al., 2008).  
Corporate failures have led to increased attention being paid to audit committee regulations. 
For example, in the UK, the Smith Report (2003) recommends that audit committees review 
the significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection with the 
preparation of the company’s financial statements, interim reports, preliminary 
announcements and related formal statements. 
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Audit committee mechanisms have been extensively tested in the literature, either separately 
or in connection with other corporate governance mechanisms. Audit committee mechanism 
is sub-divided into: independence, size, financial expertise, and meeting frequency. 
Audit Committee Independence 
In line with agency theory, and similar to the discussed debate regarding board and 
remuneration committee independence, it is presumed that independent audit committee 
members are more objective and less likely to overlook possible deficiencies in financial 
reporting. Further, the importance of audit committee independence has been reemphasised 
after the many recent accounting scandals (Bronson et al., 2009), where external users such as 
investors value the independence of audit committees. Indeed, this works towards restoring 
investor confidence. In addition, disclosure quality may suffer if the audit committee members 
fail to question management adequately (Felo et al., 2009; and Samy, 2011).  
The Code (2008) recognises the importance of the independent audit committee and posits 
that “the board should establish an audit committee of at least three or in the case of smaller 
companies two, independent non-executive directors” (FRC, 2008, p. 17). In summary, based 
on agency theory, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between audit committee independence and disclosure 
quality. 
Audit Committee Size 
There is no optimal size for the audit committee. The Code (2008) requires that the audit 
committee be composed of at least three members, yet it is silent as to the preferable size. 
Therefore, as discussed in relation to board size earlier, two views are addressed in this 
regard. The first relates to the notion that having more members will lead to more effective 
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monitoring (Mangena and Pike, 2005), through having a wider expertise and strength 
(Be´dard et al., 2004), and meeting more frequently (Li et al., 2008). Moreover, small 
committees may constrain the resources available to the audit committee and adversely affect 
the quality of its oversight (Fleo et al., 2009). At the other side, the organisational behaviour 
research maintains that large committees are less productive (Jensen, 1993; and Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005).  
Given the two contrasting views in predicting the association between audit committee size 
and disclosure quality, and with the absence of regulatory guidance in this sense, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
H10: There is an association between audit committee size and disclosure quality. 
Accounting Expertise 
Literature studies the association between the presence of the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and disclosure practices. Empirically, unlike other CG mechanisms, there is an 
agreed consensus as to its effect on disclosure. However, one debatable issue in the extant 
literature is whether audit committee members should posses accounting expertise, or whether 
it is enough to have only financial expertise.  
Financial expertise refers to “financial experts with more general experience in analyzing 
financial statements or as CEOs” (Krishnan and Lee, 2009, p. 242). At the other end, The 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) initial proposal defines a person with 
accounting expertise as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial officer, 
controller, or principal or chief accounting officer (2002). Any other financial expertise is 
regarded as financial non-accounting expertise and not as accounting expertise under this 
specific definition.  
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Regulatory statements such as the Smith Guidance (FRC, 2005) in the UK or Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) in the US call only for financial expertise. The SEC’s (2002) initial proposal 
advocates accounting expertise, presuming that it improves the monitoring process. Yet, 
opponents of this approach claim that small firms will fail to attract members with accounting 
expertise. Moreover, they believe that the monitoring role is simply achieved by financial 
expertise and that accounting expertise is not necessary (Krishnan and Lee, 2009). Because of 
this feedback, the SEC (2002) asks only for the presence of financial expertise in the audit 
committee.  
Empirical results find that it is the accounting expertise and not the financial expertise of the 
audit committee that enhances financial reporting quality (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). 
In addition, external auditors value accounting expertise of the audit committee members over 
financial expertise (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). The market reacts positively to the 
appointment of directors with accounting expertise to the audit committee, but no reaction to 
appointments of those with financial expertise has been observed (Defond et al., 2005). 
Additionally, an audit committee with accounting expertise is less likely to have internal 
control weaknesses (Zhang et al., 2007).  
This implies that by having such mechanisms, the audit committee is more effective and 
reduces the internal control risk. Be´dard et al. (2004) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find a 
positive association between accounting expertise, and less earnings management and better 
internal control.  
To conclude, the theoretical proposition of the initial SEC (2002) proposal is sound enough to 
be defended. However, there is no prior study examining the impact of this proposition on 
disclosure quality. Therefore, based on this conclusion and the fact that all audit committees 
nowadays have at least one financial expert, it is more worthy to test the association between 
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audit committees having at least one member with accounting expertise as defined by the SEC 
(2002), and disclosure quality. This produces the following hypothesis: 
H11:  There is a positive association between the presence of an accounting expert in the audit 
committee and disclosure quality. 
Audit Committee Meeting Frequency 
The governance role of the audit committee is very apparent, as emphasised earlier. To act as 
an effective CG mechanism, the audit committee should maintain diligence (Barua et al., 
2010). Since it is difficult to observe diligence, studies use the number of committee meetings 
to proxy for audit committee diligence (Sharma et al., 2009). The number of meetings is 
regarded as the only quantitative measure of diligence (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). It is 
believed that audit committees which meet more frequently play a more effective supervisory 
role than audit committees that meet less frequently (Felo et al., 2009). Audit committees that 
meet more frequently are more likely to discuss the remediation of material weaknesses in the 
internal control system (Goh, 2009). 
Similar to the foundations discussed in relation to board meeting frequency, this mechanism is 
enhanced by agency theory. Regulatory bodies in general are silent as to the sound number of 
meetings (see, for example, SOX in the US and Smith Guidance in the UK). Although the 
Smith Guidance requires at least three meetings, it encourages more. However, it leaves the 
decision of how often the committee should meet to the committee’s chairman. “It is for the 
audit committee chairman, in consultation with the company secretary, to decide the 
frequency and timing of its meetings. There should be as many meetings as the audit 
committee’s role and responsibilities require” (FRC, 2005, p. 6). 
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Thus, it is believed that more meetings will promote more effective audit committee 
performance – including high-quality disclosure – as a corporate governance mechanism. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is derived:  
H12: There is a positive relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and 
disclosure quality. 
Previous sub-sections discussed the three internal corporate governance mechanisms. The 
remainder of this section explores the external corporate governance mechanism: the firm’s 
auditor. 
5.2.4   External Auditor Literature 
The process of auditing financial statements is considered to be an external mechanism for 
CG (Mangena and Pike, 2005). External auditors may act as an independent third party that 
helps resolve agency conflict between managers and stakeholders. This assumption is backed 
by agency theory. External auditors assure stakeholders of the credibility of accounting 
information and hence mitigate agency problems (Cohen et al., 2002; and Fan and Wong, 
2005). The role of the external auditor is pivotal in the sense that its attributes are of interest 
to CG structure (Cadbury Report, 1992). External auditors are the keystone of CG as they 
serve as gatekeepers by watching over managerial behaviour for the shareholders (O’Sullivan 
et al., 2008). External audits of a high quality may positively influence corporate reporting in 
general and the extent of disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in 
particular (Willekens et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2007; and Samy, 2011). 
There are two mechanisms, namely threat to auditor independence and audit firm size, which 
affect the quality of the external auditor and its role in CG, and in turn affect the overall 
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disclosure quality. These mechanisms and their relationship with disclosure quality are 
discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. 
Threat to Auditor Independence 
Threat to auditor independence as a concept could be misinterpreted, and mistakenly or 
fraudulently misused. There is no precise definition of threat to auditor independence (Antle, 
1984). It is an elusive and controversial concept in the accounting profession (Swanger and 
Chewning, 2001). Mayhew and Pike (2004) question the relationship between investors’ 
auditor selection and threat to auditor independence. Arguably, “merely being the auditor of a 
public company provides an interest of the audit partner in the client firm” (Kinney, 1999, p. 
73). Kinney (1999) argues that the auditor will always be interested in the success of the 
client’s firm. He justifies his argument in many ways. Firstly, financially successful firms lead 
to growth in audit and non-audit fees. Secondly, those firms will have fewer litigation risks. 
Thirdly, loss of big clients will affect the audit partner’s career.  
In the auditing literature, auditors should have independence in appearance and independence 
in fact47 when providing auditing services for the client. This is to ensure that the audit report 
is fairly stated and provides an accurate opinion about the fair presentation of the financial 
statements, and accordingly be perceived as one of the CG controlling mechanisms.  
Independence in fact refers to the auditor’s unbiased mental behaviour, whereas independence 
in appearance is the perception by a reasonable observer that the auditor has no relationship 
with an audit client that might impose a conflict of interest (AICPA, 1994). It is widely 
accepted that independence in fact is hardly observed. Meanwhile, “research has focused upon 
identifying the factors which potentially influence independence, and assessing their impact 
                                                 
47 For a detailed discussion, see Sutton (1997). 
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upon perceived independence since independence in fact is unobservable” (Beattie et al., 
1999, p. 68). 
Investors will doubt the reliability of financial statements if the auditor’s perceived 
independence is doubted (Hodge, 2003). Moreover, auditor independence is vital to the 
integrity of the financial statements (Kanangaretnam et al., 2010; and Samy, 2011). Firms 
with more independent auditors are more likely to report internal control weaknesses (Zhang 
et al., 2007). Similarly, auditor independence is an important CG mechanism affecting 
disclosure quality (O’Sullivan et al., 2008).  
Surprisingly, the influence of auditor independence on disclosure quality has not been heavily 
tested. Only one study investigates the association between threat to auditor independence and 
disclosure quality, as shown in Table 5.1. 
Agency theory is a solid foundation for explaining the importance of the auditor’s 
independence. This is to say that one vital procedure to restore investors’ confidence is to 
have an independent auditor reporting on the faithful representation of the financial 
statements.  
To sum up, measuring threat to auditor independence can be viewed as a problematic issue in 
the literature. The proportion of fees paid for Non-Audit Services (NAS) is the most common 
measure to proxy for threat to auditor independence. Furthermore, The Code (2008) also 
refers to auditor independence using NAS. Prior literature uses the percentage of non-audit 
fees to total fees paid to the auditor (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2009) or the percentage of non-audit 
fees to audit fees (e.g. Abbott et al., 2003) to measure threat to auditor independence. 
 
  222 
Regulatory guidelines such as SOX and The Code (2008) believe that non-audit services harm 
auditor independence. This is evident in The Code’s provision that asks the board to explain 
to shareholders how the auditor’s objectivity and independence is safeguarded when the 
auditor provides non-audit services (The Code, 2008). Indeed, high non-audit fees are 
negatively related to independence (Gul et al., 2007). Moreover, “the rise in non-audit 
services provides incentives that might jeopardize independence and audit quality” (Lee et al., 
2010, p. 7). Meanwhile, “professional investor participants rated perceived auditor 
independence at around 50% less when the external auditor provided non-audit services either 
through their local office or an associated entity than when the same services were provided 
by a firm unrelated to the external auditor” (Mauldin, 2003, p. 167). 
Although it is evident from the above discussion that the professional bodies view the 
provision of non-audit services as impairing auditor independence, which is also empirically 
supported by many studies, another viewpoint exists. Some scholars argue that while investors 
may perceive the provision of NAS as threatening auditor independence, it might not actually 
affect the client-auditor relationship. For example, Deberg et al. (1991) find that there is no 
association between the decision to change the auditor and the level of non-audit services 
provided. Meanwhile, Lai and Krishnan (2009) document a positive association between firm 
value and the provision of non-audit services by the auditor. In closing, this viewpoint 
suggests that the provision of NAS in fact does not affect the auditor-client relationship in 
terms of the quality of the audit, and might have a positive impact on other aspects of the firm 
such as the market value. Nonetheless, this argument is not widely examined, and neither is it 
largely supported by prior studies (Lai and Krishnan, 2009).  
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In conclusion, as long as corporate governance primarily serves the investors’ interests, who 
in this context – as the literature posits – perceive the provision of non-audit services 
negatively, and with the limited evidence on the positive impact of providing extensive non-
audit services by the auditor, the current study follows the first argument and presumes a 
negative association between the percentage of non-audit services and threat to auditor 
independence. 
Based on the above-discussed views on the importance of auditor independence as a corporate 
governance mechanism which works to improve disclosure quality, the following hypothesis 
is developed: 
H13: There is a positive association between threat of auditor independence and disclosure 
quality. 
Audit Firm Size 
Indeed, “the auditing literature generally concludes that the audit quality of Big 4 auditors is 
superior to that of non-Big 4 auditors” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 260). Investors consider big 
audit firms as providing ultimate auditing quality, and their role of safeguarding investors’ 
rights of having fairly-stated financial statements is much more trusted than that of smaller 
audit firms (Hussainey, 2009). In this vein, big audit firms have more resources than smaller 
firms; these resources enable them to allocate many more resources to the training and 
development of the auditors, which in turn promotes the auditors’ quality (Nekhili et al., 
2010). Firms audited by larger audit firms provide higher-quality financial statements (Becker 
et al., 1998; and Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). Arguably, financial statements audited by 
big audit firms help investors to better anticipate future earnings (Lee et al., 2007).  
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Moreover, investors perceive financial reporting information as being of higher quality when 
firms are audited by big audit firms (Hussainey 2009; Boone et al., 2010). This assumption is 
justified by a number of reasons. First, big audit firms are more likely to invest more to 
maintain their reputation as providers of quality audits, compared to smaller audit firms. In the 
case of reputation damage, big firms stand to lose more than small firms (Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2008; Lai, 2009). Second, large audit firms have many clients and are therefore 
likely to be less dependent on individual clients; thus, this may improve the quality of their 
work to a greater degree than the small audit firms (Barako et al., 2006). Third, big audit firms 
are more likely to constrain opportunistic accounting practices for fear of litigation (Piot and 
Ganin 2007). 
Although this is the common view held in the literature about the relationship between audit 
firm size and audit quality, Lawrence et al. (2011) presents another view. They claim that, 
since the Big 4 and non-Big 4 are subject to the same regulations, a reasonable level of quality 
by both Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms is expected (Lawrence et al., 2011). Recently, Lawrence et 
al. (2011) investigate whether the superior quality of the Big 4 stems from the client 
characteristics rather than the audit firm. They use three proxies for audit quality; 
discretionary accruals, ex-ante cost of equity capital and analyst forecast accuracy. Results 
suggest that there are insignificant differences regarding the three proxies between the Big 4 
and non-Big 4. They consider the difference in the three proxies with regards to client size, 
however, they concluded that their study does not resolve the question as to whether Big 4 
and non-Big 4 firms provide different levels of audit quality.   
In summary, the view commonly held in the literature is that audit firm size reflects audit 
quality. Audit firm size affects both mandatory disclosure (e.g. Abdelsalam and Weetman, 
2007) and disclosure (e.g. Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Big audit firms might 
influence firms to provide more information to increase the perceived audit quality of the 
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annual reports as a whole (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Firms that hire big audit 
firms are normally big firms because they have enough resources to hire big-audit firms. 
Accordingly, based on the institutional theory, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H14: There is a positive relationship between audit firm size and disclosure quality. 
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5.3 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter provided an in-depth review of prior literature on the association between 
different proxies for DQ and CG mechanisms, which are extensively examined in accounting 
literature. The chapter proceeded to develop the current study’s hypotheses on the association 
between disclosure quality and 14 corporate governance mechanisms derived from surveying 
the extant governance accounting literature. The CG mechanisms are divided into internal and 
external mechanisms. 
Notably, in general, CG mechanisms exhibit inconclusive results in the empirical literature as 
to its association with disclosure. One exception of these CG mechanisms is the presence of 
financial expertise in the audit committee, for which the extant literature reports a positive 
association with disclosure quality. Prior studies, with few exceptions, do not justify their 
findings or solve the mixed results phenomenon. Importantly, in developing the hypotheses, 
the current study provides the link between various CG mechanisms and agency theory or the 
theoretical conception supporting each CG mechanism. Moreover, the study employs and 
reinforces the theoretical assumptions made by The Code’s (2008) principles in predicting the 
study’s hypotheses, whenever applicable. 
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6.1 Overview 
Chapter Five reviewed relevant literature and developed research hypotheses for the expected 
associations between disclosure quality and various CG mechanisms. Chapter Five aimed to 
empirically test the previously developed hypotheses for these associations. Chapter Six 
therefore highlights the study design and discusses the results and findings of the study. The 
chapter starts by discussing the study design. Afterwards, in section 6.2, the definitions of the 
variables used in this study are then explained. In section 6.3, the descriptive analysis is 
discussed, the correlation analysis between the dependent variable (DQ) and independent 
variables (CG and control variables) is discussed in section 6.3. In addition, regression 
analysis and relevant interpretation of results are explained. Finally, in section 6.4, robustness 
tests are conducted. The chapter concludes in section 6.5. 
6.2 Study Design 
 This study uses the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model to examine the 
association between DQ and internal and external mechanisms of CG. This is in line with the 
majority48 of studies examining the association between DQ and CG mechanisms. OLS is 
considered optimal in examining such associations because firstly, disclosure quality is not 
considered as endogenous variable in similar studies (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Celik et al., 2006; Beak et al., 2009; and Jiang et al., 2010).  
 
                                                 
48 Refer to Appendix 6, only one study (i.e. Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011) uses fixed effect model to examine 
the association between DQ and CG mechanisms. However, conducting Haussman test suggests that fixed effect 
model does not offer the best estimates since Chi square is very small and insignificant. Some other studies use 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). However, such instrumental variables (IV) method is fraught with some 
limitations as explained  in chapter Two . 
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To check whether there are omitted variables in the model, the Ramsey test is used. This is a 
test for the omitted variables in the model (Goldstein, 1992). Makhija and Patton (2004) also  
utilise the Ramsey test to check the omitted variables in their study where they investigate the 
association between ownership structure and disclosure. Conducting The Ramsey RESET test 
using powers of the fitted values of quality score shows a significant F value of 1.27 with a 
probability of 0.284. Accordingly, it could be argued that the threat of omitted variables in the 
model is minimised. 
 Consequently, the threat of endogeneity is minimised.49 Secondly, OLS model requirements 
(linearity assumptions) and, more interestingly, normality, are perfectly met in the present 
study (see Appendix 7). Thirdly, OLS permits investigation into the cross sectional effect of 
the variables of interest. Given these reasons, there is no valid justification to favour other 
models over OLS. 
6.2.1 Definitions of Variables 
 The following paragraphs define how the dependent and independent variables will be 
measured.  
Disclosure Quality 
Chapter Four introduced a new measure for DQ, based on OFR guidance on the information 
quality dimensions. Accordingly, each firm in the sample is assigned a quality score. In 
analysing the association between CG mechanisms and DQ, this study utilises the same scores 
obtained in chapter Four. 
 
                                                 
49 The endogeneity problem is discussed in details in chapter Two. 
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Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The preceding chapter develops 14 research hypotheses representing various corporate 
governance mechanisms to be tested. Table 6.1 delineates each CG mechanism and identifies 
the relevant data source.  
Column 1 lists the 14 CG mechanisms with the abbreviation written in italics. Column 2 
displays the expected direction of the association between DQ and each of the CG 
mechanisms based on the discussion in the previous chapter.50 Notably, in relation to board 
size, remuneration committee size, and audit committee size, the current study does not expect 
a particular association direction, as discussed in chapter Five. Column 3 defines measures 
used to reflect each of the CG mechanisms. Column 4 presents the data source used to collect 
the CG variables. Data for some of these mechanisms is manually extracted from either the 
annual reports, or from the Boardex database, which is a CG database. The third data group is 
from the Datastream database. 
Control Variables 
In an attempt to provide accurate and generalisable results, efforts have been exerted to 
control for a wide range of firm characteristics. Surveying the literature shows that there are 
eight control variables dominating studies investigating the relationship between CG 
mechanisms and disclosure. These variables are: firm size (SIZE), profitability (PROF), 
liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), investment growth (INVEST), risk (RISK), analyst following 
(ANALYST), dividend policy (DIV), and industry type (INDUST). To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, no prior study controls for this comprehensive set of variables. With 
the exception of dividend policy and industry type, section 4.3.1 discusses the theoretical 
                                                 
50Auditor independence is expected to have a positive association with voluntary disclosure quality. However, following the 
literature, the study measures independence using the percentage of non-audit fees to total fees; therefore, this measure is 
inversely related to auditor independence. 
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underbidding of these variables, measures used to test the control variable and the data source 
of each variable.   
In relation to dividend policy, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) examine the association 
between dividend policy and the extent of forward-looking information as a proxy for 
information asymmetry and find a positive relationship. Easterbrook (1984) argues that the 
dividend could serve to alleviate agency conflicts between management and shareholders. In 
doing so, dividend payout reduces available free cash flow and therefore, managers are forced 
to finance their projects through the financial markets (Sharma, 2011). Based on this 
proposition, if dividend is used to mitigate agency conflicts, firms that pay dividend may not 
heavily depend upon disclosure (Archambult and Archambult, 2003). However, Archambult 
and Archambult (2003) do not find an evidence to support their proposition and maintain that 
such proposition might be valid only for less developed capital markets. Similarly, Naser et al. 
(2006) conclude that dividend is not a determinant of social disclosure. 
In addition to the arguments regarding the association between dividend and disclosure, there 
are some arguments around the relationship between dividend and CG. The corporate finance 
literature offers two opposing hypotheses in explaining the linkage between CG and dividend 
policy (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010). The outcome model of dividend stipulates that the 
better governed firms are associated with dividend payouts because those firms offer stronger 
protection rights to shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). Whereas, the substitution hypothesis 
maintains that better governed firms have lower agency costs and therefore are less likely to 
use dividend to mitigate agency costs (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010). 
Importantly, UK studies support the substitution hypothesis. Dhanani (2005) offers evidence 
that UK managers do not use dividend policy to manage principal–agency conflicts. More 
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recently, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) confirms the same conclusion and find that 
independent directors as a CG mechanism substitute dividends in mitigating agency conflicts.  
Based on prior discussion that in the UK, dividend is not used to mitigate agency conflict, 
following prior literature (e.g. Price et al., 2011), dividend policy is not considered among the 
control variables in the main analysis. Another reason for excluding dividend payout policy 
from the main analysis is that, dividend is usually associated with firm size and profitability 
(Hassan et al., 2009; and Price et al. 2011). Larger firms and profitable firms tend to pay more 
dividends. Moreover, Inchausti (1997, p. 57) maintains that “ if it were considered that a low 
dividend payout ratio has been caused by the low profitability of the firm, two hypotheses, 
payout and profitability, would stand in contradiction to each other”. Accordingly, dividends 
payout and profitability should not be included in the same regression model. Therefore, 
Inchausti (1997), Hassan et al. (2009) and Price et al. (2011) exclude dividend from their 
study. Therefore, dividend payout policy is excluded from the main analysis in the current 
study but rather included in one of the sensitivity tests. Dividend payout ratio (DIV) is 
Datastream item no. WC09504 defined as: dividend per share-last 12 months /earnings per 
share- last 12 months * 100. 
As to industry Classification, usually, it is expected that industry characteristics will impose a 
differentiating behavior on the financial reporting of disclosure. For example, operations of 
financial institutions are significantly different from those of manufacturing and commercial 
companies. Accordingly, disclosure by financial institutions may differ from disclosure by 
non-financial companies (Willekens et al. 2005). 
Thus, the current study also controls for industry sectors using Datastream level 2 industry 
classifications, where a dummy variable is assigned for each sector. The industry sectors are: 
basic materials (BMAT), health care (HEALTH), industrials (INDUST), technology (TECH), 
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telecommunications (TELE), oil and gas (OIL), customer services (CSER), utilities (UTIL), 
and customer goods (CGOODS). 
6.3 Empirical Analysis  
The association between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure quality is 
examined in two ways. First, a univariate analysis is undertaken where the correlation 
coefficients between different corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure quality are 
estimated and matched with the expected direction predicted through hypotheses. Second, a 
multivariate analysis is performed and disclosure quality is regressed on a comprehensive set 
of corporate governance mechanisms and control variables. 
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Table 6.1: Definition of Variables, and Data Sources 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
 Expected 
Sign 
Measure  Source 
Board Independence 
(BIND) 
 + % of independent directors excluding the 
chairman. 
 Annual reports 
Board Size 
(BSIZE) 
 ? Number of board members.  Boardex 
Lack of Separation in 
Leadership Structure 
(LEAD) 
 - Dummy variable 1 for the presence of a board 
member holding both the Chairman and CEO 
roles  and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Boardex 
Board Meeting 
Frequency 
(BMF) 
 + Number of board meetings.  Annual reports 
Remuneration 
Committee Independence 
(REMIND) 
 + % of independent directors.  Annual reports 
Remuneration 
Committee Size 
(REMSIZE) 
 ? Number of committee members.  Board 
Managerial Ownership 
(MOWNER) 
 - % of total shares in issue held by employees, or 
by those with a substantial position in a company 
that provides significant voting power at an 
annual general meeting.  
 
 
 
Datastream 
(code: NOSHEM) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
(CONCEN) 
 - Following Li et al. (2008), % of shares held by 
those owning a 3% or more stake in the firm’s 
after excluding significant directors’ 
shareholdings. The threshold of 3% is chosen as 
this is the level which triggers disclosure in 
accordance with disclosure and transparency rules 
of the UK Listing Authority. 
 
 Annual reports 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
(ACIND) 
 + % of independent members.  Annual reports 
Audit Committee Size 
(ACSIZE) 
 ? Number of committee members.  Boardex 
Accounting  Expertise 
(ACCEXP) 
 + Dummy variable 1 for the presence of accounting 
expertise in the committee and 0 otherwise. The 
study employs the SEC definition of accounting 
expertise, as follows: all directors with experience 
as a public accountant, auditor, principle or chief 
financial officer, controller, or principle or chief 
accounting officer. 
 
 Annual reports 
Audit Committee 
Meeting Frequency 
(ACMF) 
 + Number of meetings.  Annual reports 
Threat to auditor 
independence 
(AIND) 
              + % of non-audit fees to total auditor’s fees.                            Annual reports 
Audit Firm Size 
(ASIZE) 
 + Dummy variable 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 
4 auditing firms and 0 otherwise. 
 Annual reports 
Table constructed by author. The above table sets out the definitions of the main independent variables, where column 1 lists the 14 CG 
mechanisms, and the abbreviations of the independent variables that will be used hereafter in italics. Column 2 displays the expected 
direction of the association between each CG mechanisms and disclosure quality based on the discussion in the previous section; “+” 
represents a positive association, “-” refers to a negative association and “?” denotes an undefined association type. Column 3 defines 
measures used to reflect CG mechanisms. Column 4 presents the data source used to collect each variable.  
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Based on the previous discussion regarding hypotheses development, the current study 
predicts the following model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 16
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     
  
 
Where: 
DIS= disclosure quality (quantity). Disclosure quality is measured through the aggregation of 
seven qualitative information attributes. 
 
BIND= percentage of independent directors, excluding the chairman, on the board. 
 
BSIZE= number of board members. 
 
LEAD= dummy variable 1 for the presence of a board member holding both the Chairman 
and CEO roles and 0 otherwise. 
 
BMF= number of board meetings. 
 
REMIND= percentage of independent directors. 
 
REMSIZE= number of committee members. 
 
MOWNER = percentage of total shares in issue held by employees, or by those with a 
substantial position in a company that provides significant voting power at an annual 
general meeting.  
 
CONCEN= percentage of shares held by those owning 3% or more of a firm’s stake after 
excluding significant directors’ shareholdings. 
 
ACIND= percentage of independent members. 
 
ACSIZE = number of committee members. 
 
ACCEXP= dummy variable 1 for the presence of accounting expertise in the committee and 0 
otherwise. 
ACMF= number of meetings. 
 
AIND= percentage of non-audit fees to total auditor’s fees. 
 
ASIZE= dummy variable 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 firms and 0 otherwise. 
 
Controls= the control variables: j for firm i, in year t, where j = 1 to n. 
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6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Due 
to the nature of the independent variables examined in the current study, descriptive statistics 
are elaborated in two panels. Panel A presents the statistics for continuous variables, whilst 
Panel B displays the descriptive statistics for categorical variables. 
(Quality) is the quality score as calculated and developed. The mean and median of DQ scores 
are 3.139 and 3.149 respectively. The maximum quality score is 3.988, while the minimum is 
2.006. This implies a wide variation in disclosure quality among firms, where some firms 
provide the market with high-quality disclosures and others opt to disclose at low quality.   
Board independence (BIND) reports a mean of 54% and a median of 55.6%. Generally, 
sample firms have on average 54% of their board seats filled by independent directors. These 
percentages show that the average independence percentage in boards is slightly above 50%. 
Referring back to The Code principle discussed in chapter Five, section 5.2.1 which requires 
that at least 50% of the board be composed of independent directors - section A.3.2. in 2003, 
2006, and 2008’s versions of the Code- it is clear that on average, firms tend to just fulfil the 
minimum requirement to show their adherence to The Code. Firms seem to exert few efforts 
to voluntarily improve the board independence image. Board minimum and maximum figures 
are 11% and 89% respectively. With a minimum of 11%, it is obvious that some firms still 
fall below the required independence percentage.  
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics (DQ, CG and Control Variables) 
Panel A Continuous Variables 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum 
QUALITY 3.139 0.395 2.006 2.895 3.149 3.420 3.988 
BIND 0.538 0.120 0.111 0.455 0.556 0.625 0.889 
BSIZE 8.885 2.213 5 7 9 10 20 
BMF 8.867 2.529 3 7 9 10 22 
REMIND 0.934 0.178 0 1 1 1 1 
REMSIZE 3.805 0.989 2 3 4 4 8 
MOWNER 4.107 10.721 0 0 0 0 65 
CONCEN 34.327 17.555 0 22.53 33.7 45.85 92.40 
ACIND 0.962 0.141 0 1 1 1 1 
ACSIZE 3.550 0.893 2 3 3 4 8 
ACMF 4.056 1.398 1 3 4 5 23 
AIND 0.406 0.223 0 0.242 0.386 0.571 0.978 
SIZE 3840 6840 337 509 1552 3705 61245 
PROF 26.146 61.995 -161.55 10.383 18.04 28.568 780.39 
LIQ 1.509 1.077 0 0.94 1.285 1.69 8.65 
LEV 0.745 7.281 0 0.093 0.230 0.351 137.787 
INVEST 0.041 0.298 -0.185 0.001 0.003 0.013 4.268 
RISK 0.315 0.137 0.127 0.230 0.282 0.356 1.071 
ANALYST 11.893 5.849 1 7 11 16 33 
DIV 38.646 21.699 0 27.13 39.5 50.23 99.29 
Panel B Categorical Variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Number 
 
Percentage 
LEAD 26 4.89 
ACCEXP 343 64.47 
ASIZE 529 99.44 
BM 40 .7 52 
HC 24 .4 51 
INDUST 184 34.59 
TEC 36 6.77 
TELE 4 0.75 
OIL 12 2.26 
CSER 136 25.56 
UTIL 24 4.51 
CGOODS 72 13.53 
 
Table constructed by author using data as outlined in Table 6.1, column No. 4. Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables. Panel A shows descriptions for continuous variables. The first column lists the dependent variable; the quality score 
(QUALITY). The first column also lists 14 CG independent variables as follows: board independence (BIND), board size (BSIZE), board 
meeting frequency (BMF), compensation committee independence (REMIND), compensation committee size (REMSIZE), managerial 
ownership (MOWNER), ownership concentration (CONCEN), audit committee independence (ACIND), audit committee size (ACSIZE), 
audit committee meeting frequency (ACMF), and threat to auditor independence (AIND). The table also shows 7 control variables: firm size 
(SIZE), profitability (PROF), liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), investment growth (INVEST), risk (RISK), and the number of analyst 
following (ANALYST). The second column shows the mean. The third column elaborates the standard deviation (Std. Dev.), while the fourth 
column lists the minimum. The fifth column shows the bottom quartile (25%). The sixth column shows the median. The seventh column lists 
the top quartile. Lastly, the eighth column elaborates the maximum. Panel B lists categorical variables. Lack of separation in leadership 
structure (LEAD) represents the duality of the chairman position; (ACCEXP) refers to the presence of accounting expertise in the audit 
committee and (ASIZE) is the size of the external auditor where it is given the value 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 auditing firms and 0 
otherwise. Industries are controlled for using dummy variables. The industries are: basic material (BM), health care (HC), industrial 
(INDUST), technology (TEC), telecommunications (TELE), oil and gas (OIL), consumer services (CSER), utilities (UTIL), and consumer 
goods (CGOODS). The number of observations (n=532). 
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The in-depth analysis of the sample shows that around 28.5% of firms have an independence 
percentage of less than 50%, which is the minimum required by The Code (2008). Firms that 
just maintain a 50% independence level account for 16%, and the rest of the sample represents 
firms with an independence percentage of over 50%. As indicated by the maximum 
percentage, the highest independence level is 89%. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the 
involvement of independent directors on UK boards has increased over time, from only 3.8% 
in 2004 to 54% in 2009 (Abdullah and Page, 2009). 
Board size (BSIZE) has a mean of 8.885 and a median of nine members. Accordingly, on 
average, the sample firms’ boards consist of nine members. This fact is consistent with 
Abdullah and Page’s (2009) findings that the board size of FTSE 350 firms has decreased 
over time from over 10 members to nine members on average. Abdullah and Page’s (2009) 
study was conducted over the period from 1999 to 2004, yet boards seems to have held the 
same trend until 2009. The smallest board is composed of five and the biggest contains 20 
members. This implies a good variety of board sizes in the sample.  
Board meeting frequency (BMF) shows a mean of 8.867 and a median of nine times. Notably, 
there is a wide variation of meeting frequencies in the sample. The maximum number of 
board meetings is 22 times whereas, surprisingly, some firms hold only three meetings yearly. 
It would be interesting to know the percentage of firms with low meeting frequency. Only 
three observations (0.6% of the sample) held three meetings annually; however, this remains 
an odd situation given that these are considered large firms on average.  
In relation to remuneration committee independence (REMIND), the level exhibited by firms 
in the sample is generally high. The mean is 93% and the median is 100%. The independence 
of the remuneration committee has shown an upward trend in independence over time, with 
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FTSE 350 firms having on average 82.1% independent directors in 2004 (Abdullah and Page, 
2009). 
Despite such improvements in remuneration committee independence, it has not yet reached 
the optimum level. The Code (2008) requires a 100% independent remuneration committee, 
yet some firms still hold remuneration committees composed entirely from non-independent 
directors, which is evident from the minimum zero percentage seen in several cases (1.9% of 
the sample is composed of non-independent directors). 
The mean size of the remuneration committee (REMSIZE) is 3.805 and the median is four 
members. The remuneration committees vary in size, ranging from two to four members. The 
Code (2008) calls for a minimum of three members; therefore, a minimum of two members in 
the remuneration committee is not expected. In fact, 5.6% of the sample fails to adhere to the 
minimum size requirements. The trend of remuneration committee size has not dramatically 
changed since 2004, where the average size was 3.6 members (Abdullah and Page, 2009). 
The mean and the median of managerial ownership (MOWNER) over the sample period are 
4.11% and zero% respectively. Based on Abdullah and Page’s (2009) study, the magnitude of 
managerial ownership in FTSE 350 firms has taken a descending trend since 2001. The 
current study further reinforces these observations when comparing the average of 4.05% to 
5.7% as reported by Abdullah and Page (2009) in 2004. Managerial ownership significantly 
varies in the sample with a maximum of 65% and a minimum of zero%. Notably, 78% of the 
firms have zero managerial ownership. This implies an increased agency problem and that 
management should strive to mitigate such problems and provide higher-quality disclosure 
(Eng and Mak, 2003).  
The mean of ownership concentration (CONCEN) is 34.33% while the median is 33.7%. 
Generally, the percentage of shares held by those owning a 3% or higher stake in the firm 
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after excluding significant directors’ shareholdings is around 33%. This percentage has 
increased compared to the reported percentage (27%) in 2004 (Abdullah and Page, 2009).  
Similar to managerial ownership, these figures suggest that there is a wide variation of 
ownership concentration in the sample where some firms lack concentration (4.3% of the 
sample) and others have a high degree of ownership concentration (92%).  
Similar to the improvement in independence level noted for the remuneration committee, 
audit committee independence (ACIND) level has increased from an average of 81.4% in 
2004 (Abdullah and Page, 2009) to 96.2%. The median is 100%, reflecting a high degree of 
code compliance, though some firms still do not have a fully independent audit committee as 
required. The minimum is Zero%, showing that some audit committees are fully composed of 
non-independent directors.  
Comparing audit committee size (ACSIZE) with that of the remuneration committee, it is 
notable that the first is relatively small. The mean and median are 3.55 and three members 
respectively. However, the size widely differs across firms with a minimum of two and a 
maximum of eight members. Comparing the current study statistics with a similar one 
conducted in 2009 (i.e. Abdullah and Page) shows the steady size of the audit committee since 
2004, where the authors report a mean of 3.5 members for UK FTSE 350 firms. 
Similar to the remuneration committee, some firms still do not conform to The Code’s 
requirement of a minimum of three members (6.6% of the sample). Once again, the non-
compliance ratio is higher than that of the remuneration committee (6.6% versus 6%). 
With respect to the frequency of audit committee meetings (ACMF), the mean is 4.05 times 
and the median is 4 times. Indeed, FTSE 350 non-financial firms held four audit committee 
meetings on average per year. The range greatly varies with a maximum of 23 meetings and a 
minimum of only one meeting.   
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Concerning threat to auditor independence (AIND), it is worthy clarifying that the study 
measures independence, as mentioned earlier, using the percentage of non-audit fees to total 
fees paid to the auditor. This measure is negatively related to threat to auditor independence. 
The higher the ratio, the less independent the auditor is. Nevertheless, threat to auditor 
independence is expected to have a positive relationship with disclosure quality. The mean of 
threat to auditor independence is 40.6% and the median is 38.6%. This is a relatively high 
ratio. On average, 40% of auditors’ remuneration comes from non-audit services (NAS). 
Since some firms hire another auditing firm to provide NAS, the minimum is zero%. 
Meanwhile, other firms extensively pay for NAS with the maximum being 97.8%. Generally, 
these statistics are consistent with the rapidly increasing trend of NAS provided to the client 
firm. Zhang et al. (2007) report a mean of 22% for the percentage of non-audit fees to total 
fees, whilst Gosh et al. (2009) report a mean of 35.3% and median of 32.6%.  
With respect to the control variables, descriptive statistics show that firm size (SIZE) – 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets – has a mean of 3840 million and a median 
of 1552 million. Although the sample is mainly composed of FTSE 350 firms, which are 
therefore relatively large, firm size varies widely across the sample. The minimum is 337 
million and the maximum is 61254 million.  
Profitability (PROF) has a mean of 26.146% and a median of 18.04%. This implies that, on 
average, firms in the sample enjoy a 26% profitability level. The sample’s profitability 
significantly varies with a minimum of -161.16%, indicating loss-making firms, and a 
maximum of 780.39%. Therefore, the sample reflects a good combination of highly profitable 
firms and also some loss-making firms.  
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Liquidity ratio (LIQ) has a mean of 1.509% and a median of 1.28% respectively, reflecting a 
satisfactory liquidity level in general. The sample has some healthy firms and others with a 
critical liquidity problem. The maximum and minimum are 8.65% and 0% respectively.  
Leverage ratio (LEV) has a mean of 0.745% and a median of 0.23%, with a minimum of 0% 
and a maximum of 137.787%. Investment growth (INVEST) shows a mean of 0.041 and a 
median of 0.003. It ranges from -0.185 to 4.268. The mean of risk (RISK) is 0.315 and the 
median is 0.282, and it ranges from 0.127 to 1.071, indicating the variety of risk-seeking and 
risk-averse firms. 
In general, the number of analysts following a firm (ANALYST) is 12 on average (the mean is 
11.83 and the median is 11). The least attractive firm (0.9% of the sample) has only one 
analyst following it whilst the most attractive firm has 33 analysts following it. This shows 
that firms in the sample have different attractiveness degrees to analysts. 
Lastly, dividend payout (DIV) shows a mean and median of 38.646% with a minimum of 
zero% and a maximum of 99.29 %. This indicates a variety in dividend policy applied in the 
sample.  
Panel B of Table 6.2 presents the statistics for categorical variables -The numbers reported are 
for firm years-, namely lack of separation in leadership structure (LEAD), the presence of 
accounting expertise in the audit committee (ACCEXP) and the audit firm size (ASIZE). 
Additionally, the panel presents the industry sector dummies. The lack of separation in 
leadership structure description shows that 95.11% of firms exhibit the “0” dummy variable. 
This means that the majority of firms in the sample comply with The Code’s (2008) 
requirements relating to the separation of roles of the chairman and the CEO.  
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Notably, results of the association between the existence of a board member holding both the 
Chairman and CEO roles and disclosure quality should be interpreted with caution since there 
are few observations exhibiting duality in the Chairman and CEO roles. 
 In comparing this percentage with that of Abdullah and Page’s (2009) on the FTSE 350 
sample, it appears that more firms are complying with these requirements (95.11% in 2010 
versus 92.7% in 2004). At the other extreme, 4.89% of firms suffer from a leadership duality 
problem. Although the duality of CEO role is not widely observable, it is worth saying that it 
is unexpected to have some firms in the FTSE 350 who are not adhering to such a clear 
principle of The Code, which calls for separation between the chairman and CEO positions.  
The second binary corporate governance variable is the presence of accounting expertise in 
the audit committee (ACCEXP). Descriptive statistics suggest that 64.47% of firms have an 
accounting expert on their audit committees, although this is not a requirement by The Code 
(2008). This implies that many firms are confident about the benefits of having such expertise 
and thus are voluntarily applying this as a corporate governance mechanism.  
The third variable is the external auditor’s size (ASIZE). Clearly, most of the firms in the 
sample are hiring one of the Big 4 firms. Therefore, results related to audit firm size should be 
interpreted with caution because there are few observations with small audit firms. 
Consequently, the association between small audit firms and disclosure quality is not clear. 
Finally, panel B details the different industry sectors in the sample. The industrial (INDUST) 
sector constitutes the biggest industry sector in the sample (34.59%), while the 
telecommunications (TELE) sector is the smallest (0.75%).  
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6.3.2 Univariate Analysis (Correlation Matrix) 
Table 6.3 reports the Pearson correlation between all variables. Interestingly, all correlations 
between the dependent variable (disclosure quality) and various corporate governance 
mechanisms are consistent with agency theory – coefficients are in line with the expected 
signs – except for managerial ownership (MOWNER), and ownership concentration 
(CONCEN).
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Table 6.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix (DQ, CG and Control Variables) 
 
Table constructed by author using  data extracted from the IBM SPSS analysis. Table 6.3 displays the correlation analysis.  (QUALITY) quality score, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) board size, (LEAD) lack of separation in leadership structure, (BMF) board meeting 
frequency,(COMIND) remuneration committee independence, (REMSIZE) remuneration committee size, (MOWNER) managerial ownership, (CONCEN) ownership concentration, (ACIND) audit committee independence, (ACSIZE) audit committee size, (ACCEXP) the 
presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee, (ACMF) audit committee meeting frequency, (AIND) threat to auditor independence, (ASIZE) the size of the external auditor, (SIZE) the firm size, (PROF) profitability, (LIQ) liquidity, (LEV) leverage, (INVEST) 
investment growth, (RISK) risk, and (ANALYST)  the number of analyst following, (DIV) dividend payout,. Number of observations (n=532), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively
 
 
QUALITY BIND BSIZE LEAD BMF REMIND REMPSIZE MOWNER CONCEN ACIND ACSIZE ACCEXP ACMF AIND ASIZE SIZE PROF LIQ LEV INVEST RISK Analyst 
BIND 0.086**                      
 0.048                      
BSIZE 0.118*** 0.028                     
 0.007 0.520                     
LEAD -0.140*** -0.062 -0.028                    
 0.001 0.156 0.524                    
BMF 0.049 0.064 -0.061 -0.016                   
 0.257 0.139 0.134 0.719                   
REMIND 0.001 0.326*** -0.056 0.015 0.042                  
 0.977 0.000 0.200 0.738 0.330                  
REMSIZE 0.030 0.253*** 0.358*** -0.043 0.101** 0.004                 
 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.318 0.020 0.925                 
MOWNER 0.044 -0.195*** -0.022 0.022 -0.123*** -0.064 -0.123***                
 0.317 0.000 0.611 0.610 0.005 0.138 0.005                
CONCEN 0.031 -0.045 -0.181*** 0.087** -0.119*** -0.104** -0.112** 0.059               
 0.475 0.296 0.000 0.045 0.006 0.016 0.010 0.171               
ACIND 0.087** 0.292*** 0.024 0.002 0.105** 0.550*** 0.004 -0.031 -0.105**              
 0.043 0.000 0.589 0.970 0.016 0.000 0.919 0.483 0.015              
ACSIZE 0.090** 0.265*** 0.514*** -0.013 0.066 0.007 0.681*** -0.110** -0.118*** -0.031             
 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.123 0.871 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.482             
ACCEXP 0.023 0.028 0.066 0.114*** -0.014 -0.014 0.024 0.010 0.105** 0.020 0.066            
 0.601 0.520 0.127 0.009 0.741 0.740 0.580 0.827 0.015 0.645 0.126            
ACMF 0.125*** 0.176*** 0.246*** 0.010 0.196*** -0.002 0.173*** -0.088** -0.032 0.041 0.221*** 0.027           
 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.826 0.000 0.968 0.000 0.042 0.464 0.349 0.000 0.532           
AIND -0.006 -0.062 -0.017 -0.030 -0.012 -0.023 -0.027 -0.002 0.026 -0.030 -0.020 0.003 0.012          
 0.898 0.150 0.690 0.489 0.778 0.605 0.539 0.969 0.558 0.490 0.651 0.953 0.777          
ASIZE 0.096** 0.159*** 0.064 0.017 -0.093** -0.023 0.138*** -0.015 0.044 -0.020 0.131*** 0.101 0.021 -0.047          
 0.026 0.000 0.139 0.695 0.031 0.605 0.002 0.733 0.311 0.644 0.003 0.019 0.629 0.283         
SIZE 0.237*** 0.319*** 0.554*** -0.111** 0.056 -0.028 0.270*** -0.127*** -0.143*** 0.094** .0421*** 0.080* 0.285*** 0.035 0.137***        
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.196 0.522 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.418 0.002        
PROF -0.001 0.050 -0.012 -0.016 0.015 -0.032 0.086* 0.015 -0.081* 0.032 0.016 -0.049 -0.002 -0.049 0.007 -0.054       
 0.972 0.245 0.786 0.720 0.727 0.460 0.047 0.735 0.062 0.459 0.710 0.262 0.960 0.258 0.867 0.218       
LIQ 0.006 -0.046 -0.207*** 0.038 -0.140*** -0.056 -0.133*** 0.094** 0.141*** 0.047 -0.095*** -0.113*** -0.078 0.145*** -0.054 -0.198*** -0.072      
 0.887 0.295 0.000 0.384 0.001 0..196 0.002 0.031 0.001 0.280 0.030 0.009 0.710 0.001 0.218 0.000 0.109      
LEV 0.075* 0.023 0.075** -0.017 0.005 -0.008 0.182*** 0.080* -0.064** 0.012 0.113*** -0.090** 0.047 -0.001 0.008 -0.127*** 0.011 -0.036     
 0.087 0.592 0.085 0.703 0.917 0.858 0.000 0.064 0.142 0.777 0.009 0.040 0.275 0.997 0.860 0.003 0.805 0.405     
INVEST -0.103** -0.097** -0.174*** -0.021 0.039 0.021 -0.164*** -0.030 0.125*** 0.028 -0.162*** -0.121*** -0.059 -0.010 -0.006 -0.257*** -0.031 0.136*** -0.013    
 0.017 0.025 0.000 0.637 0.370 0.632 0.000 0.490 0.004 0.527 0.000 0.005 0.174 0.826 0.900 0.000 0.475 0.002 0.770    
RISK 0.024 -0.015 -0.185*** -0.020 0.033 0.014 -0.227*** 0.062 0.240*** -0.024 -0.180*** -0.030 0.015 0.056 0.091** -0.148*** -0.120*** 0.129*** -0.071 0.205***   
 0.586 0.726 0.000 0.651 0.452 0.755 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.495 0.725 0.195 0.036 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.103 0.000   
ANALYST 0.118*** 0.166*** 0.329*** -0.100** 0.054 -0.081* 0.145*** -0.056 -0.224*** -0.024 0.253*** 0.072* 0.173*** -0.045 0.072** 0.489*** 0.137*** -0.137*** 0.026 -0.131** -0.144***  
 0.006 0.000 0.000 0021 0.218 0.061 0.001 0.194 0.000 0.578 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.210 0.099 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.554 0.003 0.001  
DIV -0.032 0.074* -0.011 0.025 -0.021 0.094** 0.116*** -0.047 -0.124*** 0.063** 0.038* 0.023 -0.040 -0.031 -0.033 -0.038 0.088** -0.161*** 0.089** -0.137*** -0.471*** -0.038 
 0.469 0.087 0.805 0.568 0.627 0.030 0.008 0.277 0.004 0.146 0.383 0.600 0.361 0.474 0.454 0.387 0.044 0.002 0.039 0.002 0.000 0.378 
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Clearly, board independence (BIND), audit committee independence (ACIND), threat to 
auditor independence (AIND), and auditor size (ASIZE) are significantly positively correlated 
with disclosure quality. On the other hand, lack of separation in leadership structure (LEAD)) 
are significantly negatively correlated with disclosure quality.  
With respect to the board, remuneration committee and audit committee sizes, as discussed 
earlier in the hypotheses development section, no specific theory posits the influence of size 
on the effectiveness of the board committees; instead, two contradictory views exist. The 
correlation matrix, however, shows a significant positive association between board and 
affiliated committees’ size and disclosure quality. This supports the view proposing that larger 
boards or committees normally have a greater knowledge base to fulfil their advisory role and 
are less likely to be dominated by management.  
The first control variable is firm size (SIZE), which is measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Overall, the results show that firm size is positively associated with disclosure 
quality with a coefficient of 0.237 at the 1% significance level. This suggests that large firms 
disclose information at a high standard level of quality. Firms are more likely to follow a 
sound disclosure practice and conform to institutional expectations by adopting institutional 
norms (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). By adopting the recommendation of OFR best 
practice, firms will send a message of trustworthiness to the financial market. Accordingly, 
large firms in the market would conform to OFR best practice to maintain market confidence, 
and to raise capital.  
Analyst following (ANALYST) is positively associated with disclosure quality, with a 
coefficient of 0.118 at the 1% significance level. This suggests that the higher the quality of 
information disclosed, the more analysts follow the firm. This is consistent with Yu (2010) 
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findings that firms disclosing more information enjoys better information environment 
through attracting more analysts. Thus, firms release information at the highest level of 
quality to attract financial institutions and financial analysts’ attention (Holland, 1998) and to 
attract more financial analysts (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy et al., 1999; and Yu, 2008). 
Leverage (LEV) is positively correlated with disclosure quality. The correlation is 0.074 at the 
10% significance level. This suggests that firms that disclose at higher quality are more likely 
to raise fund through debt financing. 
On the other hand, investment growth (INVEST) shows a negative association with disclosure 
quality. The coefficient is 0.103 at the 5% significance level. The negative association 
between INVEST and disclosure quality is consistent with Core’s (2001) suggestion that 
although high-growth firms provide more disclosure, they still have greater information 
asymmetry than low-growth firms. The interpretation of this result is that firms concentrate on 
disclosure quantity rather than disclosure quality. This explains the high level of information 
asymmetry.  
Additionally, correlation analysis shows that profitability, liquidity, risk, and dividends payout 
ratios do not affect a firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose information at a high quality level. 
Finally, the correlation analysis Table 6.4 suggests that industry type is not always a 
determinant for quality of disclosure.  
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Table 6.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix (DQ and Industry Sectors) 
Industry Sector Quality 
BM 0.207*** 
0.000 
OIL 0.032 
0.464 
HC -0.118*** 
0.006 
INDUST 0.031 
0.476 
TEL -0.013 
0.774 
UTIL 0.014 
0.752 
TECH -0.049 
0.264 
CSER -0.109** 
0.012 
CGOODS 0.025 
0.571 
 Table constructed by author using  data extracted from the IBM SPSS analysis (BM) Basic material, (OIL) oil and gas, (INDUST) 
Industrial, (TEL) telecommunications,  (UTIL) utilities, (TECH) technology, (CGOODS) consumer goods, (HC) health care, (BM) basic 
material, (CSER), consumer services, Number of observations (n=532), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Oil and gas (OIL) Industrial (INDUST), telecommunications (TEL), utilities (UTIL), 
technology (TECH), and consumer goods (CGOODS) are not associated with disclosure 
quality. Other industry sectors, however, are correlated with disclosure quality. Particularly, 
two industry sectors are characterised by low disclosure quality, namely: health care (HC) 
with a coefficient of 0.118 at the 1% significance level, and consumer services (CSER) with a 
coefficient of 0.109 at the 5% significance level. Whereas, basic materials (BM) is 
characterised by high disclosure with a coefficient of 0.207 at the 1% significance level. 
In relation to the positive association between basic materials (BM), it is presumed that this 
industry generally requires great capital expenditures. As such, correlation analysis suggests 
that firms belonging to such industry sector need to raise capital, and hence firms try to 
promote their credibility by providing disclosure quality.  
The Pearson correlation matrix (Table 6.3) also gives an overview about the correlations 
among independent variables. The Pearson correlation does not show unexpected 
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associations. The largest correlation (0.680) is between audit committee size and 
remuneration committee size. Such correlation is normal because, on average, the number of 
audit committee members is close to the number of remuneration committee members. This is 
due to the Code provisions with regard to the size of both committees. In relation to the 
remuneration committee, the Code (2008) establishes that “The board should establish a 
remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies  two, 
independent non-executive directors” (FRC, 2008; para. B.2.1). Similarly, with regard to the 
audit committee, The Code (2008) holds that “The board should establish an audit committee 
of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive 
directors”. (FRC, 2008; para. C.3.1). 
The second largest correlation for the independent variables is 0.554 between board size and 
firm size. It is fairly reasonable that the bigger the firm, the greater number of director sat on 
the board because big firms need more monitoring than small ones. Therefore, there is no 
multi-collinearity problem present in the current analysis. This is further reinforced by 
conducting variance inflation factor (VIF) for the independent variables.  
There are multiple ways to test for multi-collinearity, yet the most widely used methods 
include checking the Pearson correlations among the regressors, and assessing the variance 
inflation factor (VIF).  
Empirical literature usually depends on the first (correlation analysis) method and seldom uses 
VIF. However, VIF has a more specific rule in judging multi-collinearity, in contrast to 
correlation matrix which entails a high degree of subjectivity. Accordingly, the extent to 
which multi-collinearity presents a problem in the estimation of the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure quality is further examined through VIF. 
This is especially important when considering such a wide range of variables. 
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 It is argued that “VIF provides a reasonable and intuitive indication of the effects of multi-
collinearity on the variance of the ith regression coefficient” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 674). 
Particularly, VIF “shows directly how much the standard error of the estimation is inflated by 
the multi-collinearity” (Lüchters and Chakrabarty, 2006, p. 1). 
In the statistical literature, arguments vary as to what VIF level denotes a sever multi-
collinearity problem. Two rules of thumb exist. One rule considers a value of 4 as a multi-
collinearity, while the other defends a value of 10 (O’Brien, 2007). In the relevant literature, 
the commonly used cut-off is 10 (Brown and Caylor, 2006). Looking at Table 6.5, it is evident 
that all VIF values are below the lowest cut-off (i.e. 4). Interestingly, corporate governance 
mechanisms in general have low VIF values, with the largest being 2.39 for audit committee 
size. Meanwhile, the control variables have low VIF values, with firm size having the largest 
value of 2.35 VIF, then, suggests that multi-collinearity is not likely to be a major factor 
driving the study’s results.  
In short, when the correlation matrix (Table 6.3) and VIF (Table 6.5) are used to check multi-
collinearity, it is clear that both methods suggest that all independent variable are free from 
the multi-collinearity problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 251 
 
Table 6.5: Collinearity Statistics 
Variable VIF 
BIND 1.54 
BSIZE 1.98 
LEAD 1.07 
BMF 1.16 
REMIND 1.60 
REMSIZE 2.06 
MOWNER 1.10 
CONCEN 1.22 
ACIND 1.56 
ACSIZE 2.39 
ACCEXP 1.10 
ACMF 1.19 
AIND 1.05 
ASIZE 1.11 
SIZE 2.35 
PROF 1.09 
LIQ 1.14 
LEV 1.21 
INVEST 1.160 
RISK 1.51 
ANALYST 1.49 
DIV 1.39 
Table constructed by author using  data extracted from the IBM SPSS analysis See Table 6.1 for definitions of variables  
 
Additionally, the researcher conducts the Durbin-Watson test. The Durbin-Watson test “tests 
the null hypothesis that the residuals from an ordinary least-squares regression are not auto 
correlated”. The Durbin-Watson statistic ranges in value from 0 to 4. A value near 2 indicates 
non-autocorrelation (Field, 2005). The reported Durbin-Watson value is 1.24. This suggests 
that there is no serial correlation in the residuals. 
 
6.3.3 Multivariate Analysis (Regression Results) 
As to fulfil the current study’s objective, a multiple regression analysis (OLS) is used to test 
the hypotheses and determine what specific CG mechanisms help to improve DQ. The 
dependent variable is the DQ scores calculated in chapter Three and the independent variables 
are the 14 CG mechanisms summarised in Table 6.1, plus the control variables. Table 6.6 
delineates the regression results. 
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When interpreting Table 6.6, it is worth noting that empirically – to the researcher‘s 
knowledge – no prior study has examined this comprehensive set of CG mechanisms and 
control variables. Therefore, the current study’s analysis provides deep insights as to those 
CG mechanisms that are really associated with disclosure quality. The R-squared and adjusted 
R-squared values are 11.8% and 8.2% respectively. The model is significant with an F-value 
of 3.250 at the 1% significance level, which implies a good overall model fit.  
 
In general, three hypotheses regarding the association between CG mechanisms and DQ are 
accepted, whereas the remaining 11 hypotheses are rejected. Interestingly, the accepted 
hypotheses (i.e. lack of separation in structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and the 
audit firm size) are consistent with agency theory. This section discusses results of the 
regression analysis, and whether each hypothesis is accepted or rejected in the same order of 
the hypotheses development section 5.2 of chapter Five. In doing so, the section relates the 
accepted hypotheses with agency theory. In addition, the section discusses the rejected 
hypotheses and analyses the potential reasons behind such rejection.  
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Table 6.6: Regressions Results of CG mechanisms on DQ 
 QUALITY Sig. 
Intercept 1.707*** 0.000 
BIND  -0.032 0.850 
BSIZE -0.005 0.630 
LEAD -0.202** 0.019 
BMF 0.011 0.119 
REMIND -0.011 0.921 
REMSIZE -0.030 0.197 
MOWNER 0.002 0.175 
\\ 
\K. 
. 
 
? 
> 
           … 
0.001 0.243 
ACIND 0.213 0.139 
ACSIZE 0.000 0.986 
ACCEXP 0.024 0.493 
ACMF 0.021* 0.098 
AIND -0.022 0.767 
ASIZE 0.426* 0.064 
SIZE 0.131*** 0.002 
PROF 0.000 0.454 
LIQ 0.003 0.860 
LEV 0.006** 0.018 
INVEST -0.130** 0.029 
RISK 0.092 0.498 
ANALYST 0.002 0.610 
       1.553 0.611 
Industry-Controlled YES  
   
 
R-Square 
16.2%  
Adjusted R-Square  11.3%  
F-Value 3.34 *** 
 
0.000 
Table constructed by author using  data extracted from the IBM SPSS analysis. (QUALITY)quality score, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) 
board size, (LEAD) lack of separation in leadership structure, (BMF) board meeting frequency,(REMIND) remuneration committee independence, 
(REMSIZE) remuneration committee independence, (MOWNER) managerial ownership, (CONCEN) ownership concentration,(ACIND) audit 
committee independence, (ACSIZE) audit committee size, (ACCEXP), the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee (ACMF) audit 
committee meeting frequency, (AIND) threat to auditor independence, (ASIZE) the size of the external auditor, (SIZE) the firm size, (PROF) 
profitability, (LIQ) liquidity, (LEV) leverage, (INVEST) investment growth, (RISK) risk, and (ANALYST)  the number of analyst following.  Number 
of observations (n=532), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
The Board Hypotheses 
Agency theory regards a board of directors as one of the vital CG mechanisms, which 
mitigates agency problems through providing high-quality disclosure. However, results of the 
association between different board mechanisms and DQ show that only one board 
mechanism (lack of separation in leadership structure) is effective in improving disclosure 
quality in the UK.   
This conclusion lends itself to the possible justification that the current board characteristics 
of FTSE 350 firms are not strong enough to promote DQ as is hoped by agency theory. 
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Arguably, one of two possibilities could back the weak monitoring role of the board. The first 
possibility is that firms do not conform to the principles and provisions provided by The Code 
(2008). Stated differently, The Code provides sufficient guidance that should stimulate the 
board as an effective CG mechanism, yet in practice, firms do not follow The Code’s 
principles. The second possibility of the insignificant association between the afore-
mentioned board mechanisms and DQ quality is that the current Code’s principles are not 
strong enough to improve DQ. The descriptive analysis Table 6.2 provides a good basis for 
further in-depth evaluation of these two possibilities.  
Board Independence (BIND) 
Although agency theory argues that board independence (BIND) should have a positive 
influence on the firm’s DQ, regression results show an insignificant association between 
board independence and DQ. Therefore, hypothesis number one is rejected. This result is 
usual in the UK context. Long et al. (2005) establish that independent directors in the UK are 
not closely related to firm supervision and rather pursue a very general role. Similarly, 
Ezzamel and Watson (1997, p. 62) recognise that “despite the presence of non-executives, it is 
widely recognised that the boards of directors in UK companies are generally dominated by 
executives”.  
In explaining the regression results as to board independence (BIND), the descriptive statistics 
show that, on average, board independence (BIND) accounts for 54%. The Code (2008) calls 
for a balance of independent and non-independent directors (the minimum is expected to be at 
least at 50% independence). However, the current independence average of 54% suggest that 
firms do not exert much effort with regards to having a more independent board than required 
by The Code (2008) though, on average, they achieve the minimum independence rate 
required. However, the minimum independence rate among the sample firms is 11%, which 
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reveals that some of the large FTSE 350 firms do not even comply with The Code’s minimum 
independence requirement.  
Based on this observation, the insignificance of the (BIND) results is a two-way function; 
namely, limitations in The Code’s principle and improper compliance by firms. Firstly, The 
Code’s (2008) current principle as to board independence is not solid enough since it just calls 
for a balance between independent and non-independent directors. Therefore, calling for a 
higher independence rate than 50% is hoped to increase board independence rate and 
consequently promote boards’ effectiveness, particularly in relation to disclosure quality. 
Secondly, some firms do not even adhere to this principle. In short, the insignificance of the 
results could be jointly justified by these two arguments. Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010, p. 
944) states that: 
“If directors only have access to publicly available information, it is hard to imagine that they 
will be able to evaluate management better than an outside shareholder. In addition, the mere 
fact that directors do not have superior information would in itself likely be the consequence 
of a strained relationship with management, since presumably no information of value would 
have been transmitted during board meetings. The informational advantage of directors over 
outsiders thus presumably provides a measure of the potential for these directors to add 
value”. 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
As to board size (BSIZE), as discussed earlier, there is no agreed-upon theoretical viewpoint 
on its relationship with DQ. The underlying empirical evidence shows that there is no 
association between the number of board members and DQ. Therefore, hypothesis number 
two is rejected. 
Looking at The Code (2008), it is obvious that it does not specify an optimal board size that 
influences the board’s effective role (for instance, promoting disclosure practices). 
Consequently, the first justification of the insignificant association between board size and 
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disclosure quality is backed by the absence of a specific requirement with regards to board 
size. 
 Arguably, the current average board size of nine members does not suit the large FTSE 350 
firms’ nature. Larger boards are expected to positively influence disclosure quality, as 
evidenced by the correlation matrix in Table 6.3. 
Lack of Separation in Leadership Structure (LEAD) 
The first accepted hypothesis is hypothesis number three. It is concerned with the expected 
negative relationship between lack of separation in leadership structure – the presence of a 
board member holding both the Chairman and the CEO roles– and DQ. Regression results 
show that lack of separation in leadership structure (LEAD) has a negative association with 
DQ. This is apparent with a coefficient of 0.205 at the 1% significance level. Accordingly, the 
presence of a dominant member who acts as both chairman and CEO is negatively associated 
with DQ. Consequently, results support the acceptance of hypothesis number three. 
This result is consistent with the agency theory assumption that combining the two positions 
of chairman and CEO distorts the monitoring role of the chairman and allows the CEO to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour, which in turn is associated with disclosure quality. In the 
UK, lack of separation in leadership structure – which stipulates the separate function of 
chairman and CEO – results in fewer agency costs (Brown et al., 2011). 
Board Meeting Frequency (BMF) 
With regards to board meeting frequency (BMF), it is argued that boards that meet more 
frequently are more effective. However, regression results do not support this argument where 
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the analysis reports a positive relationship yet insignificant correlation between board meeting 
frequency and DQ. Accordingly, hypothesis number four is rejected. 
This might be backed with one of two possibilities. Firstly, the efficiency of board meetings 
needs to be improved and directed toward monitoring best practice disclosure practices. 
Stated differently, it is not about how long the board meets, but more importantly, how much 
time is devoted to oversee and promote disclosure practices of the management. Thus, 
although the number of board meetings has a positive relationship, such association is not 
significant enough to enhance DQ. Secondly, the frequency of meetings is not sufficient 
enough to allow effective supervisory role over management disclosure practices.  
The Code (2008) is vague in this context, calling for “sufficiently regular” meetings, with no 
mention of the minimum number of meetings necessary to maintain satisfactory board 
performance. Currently, firms held an average of nine board meetings yearly, with some firms 
having a low meeting frequency of three times. The insignificance of the association suggests 
that there is a room for more effective board monitoring role through more frequent meetings. 
Therefore, the results suggest that The Code needs to revise this principle, and calls for more 
frequent board meetings to improve the board’s overall functioning process.  
Remuneration Committee Independence (REMIND) 
Regarding remuneration committee independence (REMIND), despite the fact that agency 
theory posits a positive relationship with DQ, the results show an insignificant association. 
Therefore, hypothesis number five is rejected.  
Regarding the independence of the remuneration committee (REMIND), firms in general have 
a 93% independence rate. Obviously, this rate is lower than The Code’s (2008) requirement of 
a fully independent remuneration committee. In this vein, The Code (2008) is clear and the 
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problem lies with firms’ application of this requirement. In short, the results hold that a fully 
independent remuneration committee is more likely to influence DQ positively.  
Remuneration Committee Size (REMSIZE) 
The last CG board mechanism is remuneration committee size (REMSIZE). Similar to board 
size, there is no theory, nor a well-acknowledged argument, on the association between the 
number of remuneration committee members and DQ. Results here show no association 
between remuneration committee size and DQ; therefore hypothesis number six is rejected. 
In explaining the insignificant relationship between remuneration committee size (REMSIZE) 
and DQ, it is notable that 5.6% of the sample falls below The Code’s (2008) required size of 
three members. The current insignificance association between remuneration committee size 
and DQ might suggests that, probably, a larger committee size would positively promote DQ. 
In conclusion, there is no strong evidence on the association between remuneration committee 
and DQ. UK studies have repeatedly indicated little evidence on the effectiveness of  
remuneration committees in general (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). 
Ownership Structure Hypotheses 
The second CG mechanism is the ownership structure. Based on the regression results, the 
two hypotheses falling under this mechanism are rejected. In interpreting these results, the 
current study analyses the possibility that The Code’s (2008) principles in relation to 
ownership are vague, and consequently that firms do not apply these principles, which in turn 
weaken the effectiveness of ownership as a CG mechanism. The other side of the coin would 
be that firms do not adhere to The Code’s (2008) principles, although such principles are 
clearly stated. 
 259 
 
Managerial Ownership (MOWNER) 
So as to managerial ownership (MOWNER), agency theory posits a negative association 
between the percentage of managerial ownership and DQ. However, results show an 
insignificant association. Therefore, hypothesis number seven is rejected.  
Ownership Concentration (CONCEN) 
Agency theory points out that the lower the ownership concentration is, the higher the quality 
of disclosure. This notion stems from the belief that “block holders can perform coalitions at 
relatively low cost to influence company behaviour by exercising the power of their combined 
holdings” (Abdullah and Page, 2009, p. 46). Regression analysis, however, documents an 
insignificant relationship between ownership concentration (CONCEN) and DQ. This leads to 
the rejection of hypothesis number eight.  
Audit Committee Hypotheses 
According to agency theory, the audit committee is one of the mechanisms that mitigate 
agency problems through promoting DQ. Regression results show that none of the three audit 
committee mechanisms are associated with disclosure quality. Consequently, the related 
hypotheses are rejected. 
Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) 
Regression results show that the independence of the audit committee members (ACIND) is 
not significantly associated with DQ. Accordingly, hypothesis number nine is rejected. 
Similar to the approach adopted in interpreting results of both the board and ownership 
mechanisms, the following paragraphs analyse the possible reasons for the insignificant 
results of the three rejected audit committee hypotheses. 
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In-depth analysis of audit committee independence reveals that, on average, firms’ audit 
committee are made up of 40% independent directors, although The Code (2008) requires 
fully independent audit committees. Such incompliance with the CG guidance proposed by 
The Code (2008) is argued to be a possible reason for the small magnitude of the coefficient 
reported in the regression analysis. This justification is in line with the findings of existing 
literature that the audit committee serves as an effective CG mechanism only if it is fully 
independent. For instance, Anderson et al. (2004) find that a fully independent audit 
committee is associated with reduced cost of capital. Additionally, Be´dard et al. (2004) 
provide evidence that an audit committee reduces earnings management only when all 
members are independent. Bronson et al. (2009) find that the benefits of audit committees are 
limited unless the committee comprises independent directors only.  
Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) 
Similar to the board and remuneration committee sizes, there is no widely accepted argument 
on whether the size of the audit committee is associated with DQ. Empirically, results do not 
provide evidence on this association. Accordingly, hypothesis number ten is rejected.   
The Presence of Accounting Expertise in the Audit Committee (ACCEXP) 
Hypothesis number 11 deals with the proposition that the presence of accounting expertise in 
the audit committee enhances DQ. Results do not support this hypothesis as regression 
analysis shows positive but, insignificant association between the presence of accounting 
expertise in the audit committee and DQ. The hypothesis is therefore rejected. Notably, there 
is no extensive literature examining the association between this variable and DQ. Although 
results do not suggest an association between the presence of accounting expertise in the audit 
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committee and DQ however, the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee 
could be related to other variables such as firm value (see chapter Eight).   
Audit Committee Meeting Frequency (ACMF) 
Hypothesis number 12 assumes a positive relationship between the number of audit 
committee meetings and DQ. The hypothesis contends that the more frequently the audit 
committee meets, the more likely it is to exercise its role effectively as a CG mechanism 
designed to mitigate agency problems. More specifically, this allows the committee to 
regularly review and appraise management’s performance, which in sum reinforces the 
committee’s overall monitoring and controlling role. Particularly, as mentioned in chapter 
Five, section 5.2.3, one of the audit committee’s roles is to promote overall transparency and 
improve DQ.  
Empirical analysis provides evidence that reinforces this hypothesis, with a coefficient of 
0.021 at the 10% significance level. Therefore, hypothesis number 12 is accepted. 
The Code (2008) is vague in this context, calling for “sufficiently regular” meetings, with no 
mention of the minimum number of meetings necessary to maintain satisfactory audit 
committee performance. Currently, firms held an average of four board meetings yearly, with 
some firms having a low meeting frequency of once a year. The relatively small coefficient 
suggests that there is a room for more effective monitoring role.  
The External Auditor  
The external CG mechanism usually investigated in the literature is mainly the external 
auditor. While empirical investigation reveals a significant association between audit firm size 
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and DQ, no evidence is found as to the association between the threat to auditor independence 
and DQ. 
Threat to Auditor Independence (AIND) 
Hypothesis number 13 claims a positive association between the degree of threat to auditor 
independence and DQ. Theoretically, auditor independence (AIND) is a vital CG mechanism 
which promotes DQ, yet it has not been extensively tested so far in the literature. 
However, regression analysis documents an insignificant association between threat to auditor 
independence and DQ. Consequently, hypothesis number 13 is rejected. Notably, threat to 
auditor independence is measured through the percentage of non-audit service (NAS) 
provided. Given such measure of threat to auditor independence, Results show that the 
provision of non-audit services does not impair the auditor’s independence. Such result is 
similar to that of Deberg et al. (1991). They find that there is no association between the 
decision to change the auditor and the level of non-audit services provided.  
Audit Firm Size (ASIZE) 
Hypothesis number 14 presumes that there is a positive relationship between audit firm size 
(ASIZE) and DQ. Regression results enforce the theoretical assumption and report a positive 
association. Accordingly, hypothesis 14 is accepted. The coefficient is 0.426 at the 10% 
significance level.  
It is commonly held in the literature that, audit firm size reflects audit quality. Audit firm size 
affects both mandatory disclosure (e.g. Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007) and disclosure (e.g. 
Archambault and Archambault, 2003), hence, big audit firms could influence firms to provide 
more disclosure to increase the perceived audit quality of the annual reports as a whole 
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(Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Notably, this association should be interpreted with 
caution as most of the sample contains firms with big audit firms. Meanwhile, the researcher 
repeated the analysis after omitting the audit firm size and results remain consistent to such 
deletion.    
In conclusion, there are three CG mechanisms significantly associated with DQ in the UK, 
namely; lack of separation in leadership structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and 
auditor size. Overall, one can argue that the board, audit committee, and the external auditor 
are more effective in the UK than the ownership structure. This is apparent from having the 
three CG mechanisms proved to be effective in improving DQ belongs to the board, audit 
committee, and the external auditor. On the other hand, none of the ownership structure was 
found to be associated with DQ. Relatively, external auditor is the most effective, then, the 
audit committee, and lastly, the board of directors.  
Interestingly, the arguments derived from the above discussion are supported by the latest 
review of The Code in 2010. This review was conducted as a response to the financial crisis, 
which came to a head in 2008-2009 and which triggered widespread reappraisal, locally and 
internationally. There are two main conclusions based on the review, which, interestingly, are 
in line with the current study’s findings. The recommendations of the review are as follows: 
“First, that much more attention needed to be paid to following the spirit of The Code as 
well as its letter. Secondly, that the impact of shareholders in monitoring The Code could 
and should be enhanced by better interaction between the boards of listed companies and 
their shareholders. To this end, the FRC has assumed responsibility for a stewardship code 
that will provide guidance on good practice for investors” (FRC, The Code, 2010, p. 2). 
 
The first recommendation of the code is consistent with the underlying study’s finding that 
many firms are merely trying to comply with the letter of The Code, with no observable 
actions to contribute to a coherent CG structure. This argument goes in line with that put forth 
by Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010). A very clear example is that the average percentage of 
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board independence is 54%, as discussed previously. Notably, proposing reforms to 
strengthen the role of boards is a common policy response after observing a governance crisis 
(Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). The second recommendation, which is in line with the 
current study’s findings, pertains to the weak role of ownership structure as a corporate 
governance mechanism.  
Up until this point of the analysis, it will be interesting to present the detailed modifications of 
The Code (2008) which are consistent with the current study’s findings. Firstly, The Code 
(2010) calls for external evaluation of board effectiveness every three years. This particularly 
supports the argument concluded from rejecting most of the board mechanisms related 
hypotheses – except lack of separation in leadership structure – that the board currently does 
not function as an effective CG mechanism as it should be; therefore, The Code (2010) 
proposes external independent evaluation. This is relevant to the independence of board and 
related committees, such as the remuneration and audit committees, and might be relevant as 
well to adequate board size based on the complexity and the size of the firm’s operations. 
Secondly, the new code added additional responsibility for the chairman in terms of leading of 
the board while ensuring its effectiveness, achieving the requisite culture of constructive 
challenge by non-executives to the executive and finally, training, evaluation, and board 
composition. Other modifications include more gender diversity, annual re-election of 
directors, and enhancing risk committees’ formations.  
Control Variables 
With respect to the control variables, Regression analysis shows that two firm characteristics 
are associated with DQ. The first is firm size (SIZE), which is positively associated with DQ 
with a coefficient of 0.131 at the 1% significance level. This indicates that larger firms tend to 
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provide high-quality information regardless of their liquidity, leverage and risk position. 
Abdullah and Page (2009) justify this positive association in FTSE 350 firms, maintaining 
that larger firms are exposed to higher levels of media enquiry than smaller firms when they 
fail to comply with regulatory requirements. Based on the institutional theory, large firms are 
more likely to provide high-quality disclosure. The theory holds that firms will be keen to 
conform to institutional expectations by adopting institutional norms (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). Thus, by adopting regulatory guidance, firms will send a message of 
trustworthiness to the stock market. Accordingly, regression results suggest that large firms 
conform to the OFR best practice guide, and provide high-quality disclosure, to maintain 
market confidence and to raise capital. 
The second firm characteristic, which is correlated with DQ is leverage ratio. The coefficient 
is 0.006 at the 5% significance level. This is in line with the argument that firms with high 
leverage are more likely to disclose more information to minimise litigation risk (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). 
The third firm characteristic that is associated with DQ is investment growth (INVEST). 
Regression analysis reports a negative relationship with a coefficient of -0.130 at the 5% 
significance level. This finding is in line with the theoretical arguments by Core (2001), who 
suggest that high-growth firms still suffer from information asymmetry even when increasing 
the quantity of disclosure. Therefore, regression analysis suggests that high-growth firms are 
not keen to focus on the quality of disclosure.  
In short, Firms that disclose information of high quality are characterised by large size, high 
leverage ratio, and low investment growth opportunities. 
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6.3.4 Robustness Tests (Sensitivity Analysis) 
This section presents several sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of the results. The first is 
testing the sensitivity of results to the year of the analysis. This is done in two ways. The first 
way is to include a dummy variable for each of the four years. The second way involves 
including a dummy variable for the global financial crisis. The second robustness test involves 
testing the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of dividend payout policy while excluding 
profitability. The third sensitivity test is using the quantity of information as the dependent 
variable instead of the quality of information disclosed. Finally, the fourth sensitivity analysis 
is concerned with including a dummy variable to account for the mandatory nature of the 
Business Review. The new Business Review requirements are only effective for year-ends 
beginning on or after 1 October 2007 (ABS, 2009, para. 2.1). Stated differently, the 
Companies Act (2006) became completed in its final draft and effective on or after October 
2007. Accordingly, the researcher assigns a dummy variable 1 for the financial years 2008 
and 2009 and zero for the financial years 2006 and 2007 to consider the overlap between the 
mandatory Business Review and the best practice OFR. 
As a first robustness test, this study assesses the sensitivity of results to the year of the 
analysis. The study proceeds to run the regression including dummy variables for the years 
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.   
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Table 6.7: Sensitivity Tests for the association between DQ and CG Mechanisms 
 
            Panel A: Dummy Years   Panel B: Crisis Dummy   Panel C: Controlled for Dividend   Panel D: Quantity Analysis   Panel E : Mandatory Quantity 
 Quality 
Controlled 
for Years 
Sig. Quality 
Controlled 
for Crisis 
Sig. Quality 
controlled 
for dividend 
Sig. Quantity  
Controlled 
for Years 
Sig. Mandatory 
Dummy 
Sig. 
Intercept 1.803***      
1.723*** 
0.000 
0.002  
0.000 
 1.769*** 0.000 .1 841*** 0.000 0.134***    
0.138**** 
 
0.000 1.764*** 0.000 
BIND -0.047 0.783 -0.044 0.796 -0.048 0.776 0.007 0.863 -0.047 0.783 
BSIZE -0.004 0.701 -0.004 0.668 -0.004 0.713 -0.001 0.603 -0.004 0.701 
LEAD -0.214** 0.013 -0.213** 0.013 -0.216** 0.012 0.033* 0.094 -0.214** 0.013 
BMF 0.011 0.131 0.010 0.134 0.011 0.128 0.000 0.829 0.011 0.131 
REMIND 0.004 0.975 -0.001 0.995 0.004 0.970 -0.019 0.485 0.004 0.975 
REMPSIZ
E 
-0.035 0.142 -0.034 0.154 -0.034 0.156 0.005 0.406 -0.035 0.142 
MOWNE
R 
0.002 0.166 0.002 0.172 0.002 0.155 0.000 0.445 0.002 0.166 
CONCEN 0.001 0.412 0.001 0.388 0.001 0.427 0.000 0.159 0.001 0.412 
ACIND 0.191 0.189 0.198 0.170 0.192 0.188 0.002 0.953 0.191 0.189 
ACSIZE 0.005 0.849 0.005 0.867 0.005 0.864 -0.005 0.475 0.005 0.849 
PEECCA 0.018 0.618 0.021 0.566 0.016 0.664 0.012 0.153 0.018 0.618 
ACMF 0.023* 0.076 0.023* 0.076 0.023* 0.075 0.001 0.656 0.023* 0.076 
AIND -0.007 0.927 -0.010 0.895 -0.008 0.916 0.017 0.327 -0.007 0.927 
ASIZE 0.437* 0.057 0.435* 0.058 0.439* 0.057 -0.039 0.459 0.437* 0.057 
SIZE 0.123*** 0.005 0.122** 
88 
0.005 0.120*** 0.006 0.023** 0.024 0.123*** 0.005 
PROF 0.0002 0.463 0.000 0.470   0.0001 0.216 -0.0001 0.463 
LIQ 0.003 0.856 0.003 0.857 0.004 0.837 -0.006 0.156 0.003 0.856 
LEV 0.005** 0.023 0.005** 0.023 0.005** 0.027 0.001 0.265 0.005** 0.023 
INVEST -0.127** 0.032 -0.129** 0.031 -0.127** 0.033 -0.033** 0.017 -0.127** 0.032 
RISK 0.064 0.656 0.092 0.499 0.086 0.582 0.079** 0.018 0.064 0.656 
ANALYST 0.001 0.758 0.002 0.633 0.002 0.664 0.0003 0.967 0.001 0.758 
CRISIS   0.047 0.165       
DIV     0.0004 0.631     
Mandator
y Dummy 
        0.039 0.442 
Ind stry-
controlled 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Time-
controlled 
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
           
R-Square     16.6%  16.5%  16.6%  15.1%  16.6%  
Adjusted 
R-Square 
   11.3%  11.5%  11.2%  9.7%  11.3%  
F-Value    3.110*** 0.000 3.30*** 0.000 3.100*** 
 
0.000 2.780*** 
 
0.000 3.110*** 0.000 
Table constructed by author using  data extracted from the IBM SPSS analysis. (QUALITY) quality score, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) 
board size, (LEAD)  Lack of separation in leadership structure, (BMF) board meeting frequency,(REMIND) remuneration committee independence, 
(REMSIZE) remuneration committee independence, (MOWNER) managerial ownership, (CONCEN) ownership concentration,(ACIND) audit 
committee independence, (ACSIZE) audit committee size, (ACCEXP), the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee, (ACMF) audit 
committee meeting frequency, (AIND) threat to auditor independence, (ASIZE) the size of the external audit firm, (SIZE) firm size, (PROF) 
profitability, (LIQ) liquidity, (LEV) leverage, (INVEST) investment growth, (RISK) risk, and (ANALYST) the number of analyst following. 
(CRISIS), dummy variable of one zero for the before crisis period (i.e. 2006 and 2007) and one for the crisis period (2008 and 2009). Number of 
observations (n=532), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
In the main analysis, i.e. Table 6.6, there was no control for years. In the sensitivity test, Table 
6.7, the time factor is considered in three ways as discussed above. Comparing results of 
Table 6.6 (not controlled for years) with Panels A and B of Table 6.7 (years controlled) 
provides evidence on year’s effect. 
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Results are robust to the dummy years. Stated differently, Results are consistent over different 
years. Panel A of Table 6.7 reports the results of this sensitivity test. Variables that 
significantly influence DQ in the main test (Table 6.6) are persistent after controlling for 
years. Interestingly, even the significance level of these variables is consistent with that 
reported in the main test. The values of the R-square and adjusted R-square are 16.6% and 
11.3% respectively. 
In an additional test for considering the year effect, a dummy variable is introduced to proxy 
for the global financial crisis. Similar to Panel A, Panel B of Table 6.7 shows that results are 
robust. Panel B shows that when introducing the crisis dummy, the findings are quite similar 
to those reported in the main analysis (Table 6.6). The crisis dummy is insignificant. The 
values of the R-square and adjusted R-square are 16.5% and 11.5% respectively. 
The second sensitivity test is focused on including dividends. This is meant to control for the 
probability that firms utilise dividends to mitigate agency conflicts. In doing so, profitability 
is excluded as prior studies (e.g. Inchausti, 1997; Hassan et al., 2009; and Price et al., 2011) 
claim that dividends and profitability are usually associated and represent contradicting 
hypotheses and, accordingly, should not be included in the same regression analysis. 
Panel C shows that variables, which significantly influence DQ in the main test (Table 6.6) 
and after controlling for years dummies (Panel A and B) are persistent after adding dividend 
and excluding profitability. Therefore, results are robust to the inclusion of dividend. The 
values of the R-square and adjusted R-square are 17% and 11.7% respectively whereas, F-
value is 3.201. The coefficient of dividends is insignificant, and thus is not associated with 
DQ. This result confirms previous findings by Dhanani (2005) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey 
(2009) that UK managers do not use dividend to manage principal–agency conflicts. 
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With respect to the third sensitivity test, regression analysis is performed using the quantity of 
disclosure51 (QUANTITY) as the dependent variable, instead of disclosure quality (QUALITY). 
The underlying logic behind this robustness test presumes that since disclosure quantity is not 
correlated with DQ, as evidenced in chapter Four, section 4.3 one should logically expect that 
the determinants of both differ. Bamber and McMeeking (2010) argue that determinants of 
DQ and quantity are different, and therefore, it is expected to have different implications. 
Thus, as a third robustness check, this study investigates whether the CG mechanisms 
associated with DQ will differ if the quantity of information disclosed is used as the 
dependent variable instead of the quality.  
This sensitivity test is also a further important validation of the developed DQ measure. That 
is, if CG mechanisms are the same over the two different measures, it follows that one will be 
indifferent using either quantity-based measures or disclosure quality measures. Panel D of 
Table 6.7 presents the results of this test. 
Obviously, CG mechanisms associated with the quantity of disclosure differ from CG 
mechanisms associated with disclosure quality. While lack of separation in leadership 
structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and audit firm size are associated with DQ, 
only one CG mechanism appeared to be associated with disclosure quantity, namely; lack of 
separation in leadership structure (LEAD). lack of separation in Leadership structure is 
negatively associated with disclosure quantity with a coefficient of 0.041 at the 5% 
significance level.  
Looking at the control variables, apparently, they differ from those control variables 
associated with DQ. Regression results provide evidence that firm size, investment growth, 
and risk are associated with the quantity of information disclosed. The coefficient of firm size 
                                                 
51 See the definition of disclosure quantity in chapter Three, section (3.3.4). 
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is 0.023 at the 5% significance level indicating a positive relationship between firm and 
quantity of information disclosed. This finding confirms most of other studies ‘findings that 
firm size is associated with disclosure quantity.  
Refereeing to Table 6.6, firm size is a common variable associated with both disclosure 
quantity and DQ. However, the relationship is stronger for DQ with a coefficient of 0.131 at 
the 1% significance level. Quality and quantity disclosure analysis suggests that large firms 
provides more disclosure -this is typically expected as the firm’s business is more diversified 
and thus calls for more information released- at a high quality disclosure (refer to section 4.3 
for more explanation).  
Regression results suggest that investment growth is negatively associated with the quantity of 
information disclosed. The coefficient is 0.033 at the 5% significance level. Finally, the risk is 
positively associated with disclosure quantity with a coefficient of 0.079 at the 5% 
significance level. This suggests that, firms with high risk provides more information. This is 
justified in two ways. The first is to maintain shareholders informed about the risks the firm is 
encountering and what strategies the firm is applying to overcome those risks. Second, to rest 
the shareholders assured that the company is not affected by the surrounding risks in order not 
to lose any current and potential shareholders. The quantity regression by itself would not 
help with an in-depth analysis unless combined with the DQ results. Refereeing to Table 6.6, 
results show that risk is not associated with DQ. In other words, UK firms with higher risk, 
tends to mitigate such risks through providing more information rather than more 
informative/high quality information.   
Clearly, with such different results between using disclosure quality/quantity, it is empirically 
evident that using quantity as a proxy for quality is not such a proper measure and causes 
misleading results. In closing, from comparing the quality and quantity regressions it is 
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evident that determinants of DQ differ from those of disclosure quantity. Accordingly, two 
conclusions are reached here; the first presumes that it could be argued confidently that the 
DQ measure developed previously (chapter Four, section 4.3) is a valid quality measurement. 
Secondly, the current study’s results as to the relation between CG mechanisms and disclosure 
are robust.  
Regression results are consistent with those of prior studies. However, as a robustness test, the 
interpretation of results (as discussed above) is focused on the extent to which CG and control 
variables are similar/different regarding quality and quantity of information disclosed. 
Comparing the quantity results reported in this test with those of previous studies is beyond 
the scope of the current study. The decision not to compare regression results for quantity is 
justified in number of ways. Firstly, in relation to disclosure quantity in general, from 
surveying the related literature it is clear that none of the CG mechanisms, nor the control 
variables, gained a consensus as to their association with disclosure quantity. Even where the 
majority of studies suggest a specific association of a certain variable, the significance level 
markedly differs (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).  
Secondly, results vary according to the disclosure score used. This is true even with the 
specific definition of the quantity employed here (the proportion of forward-looking 
information) because the definition of “forward-looking” differs across studies.52 For 
example, Hussainey et al. (2003) and Schleicher et al.’s (2007) forward-looking disclosure 
scores reflect only 55% of the actual forward-looking disclosure released in the investigated 
statements. Bozzolan et al. (2009) do not check the reliability of their coding scheme. In 
addition, some studies using the proportion of forward-looking information as a measure for 
disclosure quantity have methodological limitations restricting the comparability of results. 
                                                 
52 This is evident through having different forward-looking keywords lists in the literature, in addition to the 
subjectivity imbedded in the manual content analysis. 
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Consequently, these studies cannot be regarded as good benchmarks for comparison. Thirdly, 
the different combinations of CG mechanisms and control variables used in each study are 
expected to yield different results. Fourthly, the sample characteristics (size and time period 
of analysis) can also affect the reported findings. 
Panel E reports results of the fourth sensitivity test, which accounts for the mandatory nature 
of the Business Review. Results show that the mandatory nature of the Business Review is 
insignificant. Accordingly, it could be argued that the overlap between the Business Review 
and the OFR does not affect the results. This is apparent from Panel E, where CG mechanisms 
that are associated with DQ are consistent after considering the mandatory nature of The 
Business Review. This is consistent with Abed et al. (2012) who investigate the effect of the 
changing nature of the OFR from a mandatory to a best practice statement. Similar to the 
current study’s findings, Abed et al. (2012)’s did not find any change in the results caused by 
the regulations. 
6.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The current chapter examined the relationship between DQ and CG mechanisms. In doing so, 
this chapter attempted to overcome prior literature limitations. Therefore, the current study 
advances the literature and used an innovative DQ measure – developed in chapter Three – to 
test disclosure quality instead of using the disclosure level as a proxy for quality. 
Additionally, the current study tested a comprehensive CG structure by incorporating 14 CG 
mechanisms as well as controlling for a wide range of variables. 
The findings show that there are primarily three corporate governance mechanisms, which are 
associated with the quality of disclosure statements of UK FTSE 350 non-financial firms. 
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These are lack of separation in leadership structure (LEAD), audit committee meeting 
frequency (BMF), and audit firm size (ASIZE). 
The first CG mechanism improving DQ is the leadership structure (LEAD), where the 
separation between the chairman and CEO positions and responsibilities improve the quality 
of the OFR disclosure. Secondly, the results posit a positive association between audit 
committee meeting frequency (ACMF) –which is a proxy for diligence, as discussed in 
chapter Four – and the audit firm size (ASIZE) and disclosure quality.  
The following Table 6.8 links chapter Five and Six, by listing the 14 hypotheses developed in 
chapter Five along with the results of the analysis conducted in the current chapter (Six). 
Columns 1 and 2 are extracted from chapter Four whereas; columns 4 and 5 are concluded 
from chapter Five. Column 1 reflects the hypothesis number. Column 2 lists the governance 
variables. Column 3 shows the expected association as highlighted in each hypothesis 
(chapter Four). Column 4 lists the actual direction of the relationship found between each of 
the CG variables and DQ. Column 5 shows the result of the analysis (rejecting/accepting the 
hypothesis). 
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Table 6.8: Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 
number 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
 Expected 
Association 
Reported 
Association 
Results of the Analysis 
(Rejecting / Accepting 
the hypothesis) 
1 Board Independence          + Insignificant           Reject 
2 Board Size  ? Insignificant  Reject 
3 Lack of Separation 
in Leadership 
Structure 
 - - Accept 
4 Board Meeting 
Frequency 
 + Insignificant  Reject 
5 Remuneration 
Committee 
Independence 
 + Insignificant Reject 
6 Remuneration 
Committee Size 
 ? Insignificant  Reject 
7 Managerial 
Ownership 
 - Insignificant  Reject 
8 Ownership 
Concentration 
 - Insignificant 
 
Reject 
9 Audit Committee 
Independence 
 + Insignificant Reject 
10 Audit Committee 
Size 
 ? Insignificant Reject 
11 Accounting  
Expertise 
 + Insignificant Reject 
12 Audit Committee 
Meeting Frequency 
 + + Accept 
              13 Threat to auditor 
independence 
              + Insignificant                Reject 
14 Audit Firm Size  + + Accept 
 
To sum up, the current study presents a novel contribution to both CG and disclosure 
literature, being timely and relevant in light of the recent worldwide appraisals of CG 
structure (i.e. The Code, 2010) and disclosure regulations (the latest Management 
Commentary published by the IASB). More specifically, this study also contributes to the two 
research streams (i.e. DQ and CG) by explaining and justifying the mixed results as to the 
association between CG and DQ. Lastly, the study introduces an empirical evidence of what 
CG mechanisms in the UK influence DQ. 
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Chapter Seven : Examining the Joint Effect of DQ 
and CG mechanisms on FV: Review and 
Hypotheses Development 
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7.1 Overview 
Chapter Four highlighted the prominence of having a sound measure for DQ, whilst chapter 
Six showed that certain CG mechanisms improve the quality of disclosed information in the 
OFR in the UK narratives. In this vein, it is reasonable to examine the economic benefits of 
both DQ and CG mechanisms for firms. This area of research should provide policy-maker a 
part of a cost-benefit analysis by exploring the benefits for firms having higher DQ and higher 
quality of CG. The researcher expects that higher DQ and governance quality should lead to 
desirable consequences. Firm value (FV) -measured by Tobin's Q- is used to examine the 
economic consequences of the quality of disclosure and CG. Little research has considered the 
impact of both variables on FV in general and in the UK context in particular. 
Accordingly, this chapter addresses the question of whether the observed FV reflects the 
quality of disclosure and CG structure. The second question, given that FV reflects CG 
structure, is what the CG mechanisms significantly affecting firm value are. The third 
question addressed in this chapter is whether DQ and CG have a substitution or a 
complementary relationship. 
There has been some interest in investigating the effect of disclosure and some CG 
mechanisms on FV.53 This strand of research has received widespread attention invoked by its 
importance. Generally, it is argued that “the importance of this topic is obvious from the 
                                                 
53In early work of governance, few studies used firm performance and FV interchangeably (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Short and 
Keasey, 1997; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Klein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Kiel et al., 2003). However, the literature 
eventually made a clear distinction between both (e.g. Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Researchers normally use historical 
accounting measures such as ROA and ROE (Loderer et al., 2010) in examining the effect of CG on firm performance. 
Examples of these studies include Chen et al., 2005; Cremers and Nair, 2005; and Larcker et al., 2007; Lafuente et al. 2009; 
Elsayed; 2010; and Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010). On the other hand, researchers measure the effect of CG on FV using 
Tobin’s Q (e.g. Larcker et al. 2005; Sheu et al., 2010; and Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011). The difference between ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q is that ROA and ROE have backward-looking perspective whereas Tobin’s Q has forward-looking 
perspective (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
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considerable growth in the empirical literature on CG across accounting, economics, finance, 
management, and corporate strategy literatures” (Larcker et al., 2007, p. 964). 
 However, the existing literature has some voids in investigating these two research avenues. 
On one side, in testing the link between DQ and FV, prior research use two proxies for DQ. 
The first proxy involves scoring quality based on the “occurrence” dimension54 using a 
checklist of items (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009). The second proxy entails a kind of subjective 
scoring such as analyst ratings (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; Jiao, 2010), given the limitations of 
these two proxies (see chapter Two, section 2.4), drawing a persuasive conclusion on the 
association between DQ and CG is difficult. The second gap results from investigating the 
link between disclosure and FV only while ignoring CG, or investigating the association 
between DQ and FV while considering only limited governance mechanisms. 
This study contributes to the extant literature along two dimensions. Firstly, it examines the 
joint effect of both CG mechanisms and DQ on FV. Furthermore, in doing so, it overcomes 
the limitations of different proxies for DQ currently used in the literature by using an 
innovative DQ measure. Secondly, it adds to the knowledge through testing an extensive set 
of CG mechanisms in an effort to mitigate the omitted-variables bias seen in prior studies. 
Such contributions have several policy implications for the interested regulatory bodies of CG 
and DQ, particularly in the UK. 
7.2 Literature Review 
It is widely acknowledged that agency theory explains information asymmetry and adverse 
selection problems. As discussed in Chapter Three, information asymmetry means managers 
have informational advantages over the market participants. The separation between 
                                                 
54 Hassan et al. (2009) refer to this approach as the disclosure level. 
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ownership and management creates an adverse selection problem where market participants 
believe that managers tend to behave to their own benefit. Accordingly, any mechanism 
intended to narrow the information asymmetry gap is profound to the success of the financial 
market (Ronen and Yaari, 2002). Two main mitigation mechanisms have been evolved to 
overcome agency problems (information asymmetry and adverse selection), namely high-
quality disclosure and effective CG. 
7.2.1 Disclosure Quality and Firm Value 
High quality disclosure represents a profound mitigation mechanism with regards to agency 
problems (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In a broad context, accounting information plays a 
vital role in capital markets. Barth et al. (2001, p. 79) posit that “accounting information is 
defined as value relevant if it has a predicted association with equity market values”. There 
are two main roles through which accounting information may serve market participants: the 
valuation role and the stewardship role. Beyer et al. (2010) argue that the valuation role of 
accounting information permits capital providers to evaluate the return potential of a certain 
investment opportunity. They add that the stewardship role allows capital providers to manage 
and utilise their invested capital in a certain firm. Bearing in mind that agency theory results 
in information asymmetry problems, the accounting information role in the market becomes 
even more obvious.   
It is noteworthy to unveil the specific role of disclosure as an example of accounting 
information. In this sense, disclosure provides several benefits; as contended by Healy et al. 
(1999, p. 488), “first, [it] can help correct any firm mis-valuation, and second; [it] can 
increase institutional interest and liquidity for a firm’s stock”.  High-quality disclosure helps 
to reduce information asymmetry among the market participants, as well as between managers 
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and investors (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). It is widely held that “disclosure strategies then provide 
a potentially important means for corporate managers to impart their knowledge to outside 
investors, even if capital markets are efficient” (Healy and Palepu, 1993, p. 1). Generally, 
better information environments are associated with higher market valuation (Lang et al., 
2004). Accordingly, high-quality disclosure adds more credibility to the financial reports and 
enhances investors’ perceptions of firms; in turn, such perceptions are reflected in FV (Healy 
et al., 1999).  
Importantly, this assumption relies heavily on the quality of information disclosed to the 
market. Investors value disclosure if it is of high quality rather than being meaningless talk 
from management.  
Investors can evaluate the quality of DQ directly or indirectly. With the computerisation of 
the current proposed disclosure measure, investors can use the software to calculate the 
quality score for a specific company. Additionally, an investor will need to evaluate the 5 
information items related to KPIs; this should only take a few minutes. Investors can 
indirectly evaluate the disclosure quality via the financial analysts. Indirectly, investors can 
judge on the quality of disclosures through the financial analysts. Financial analysts can easily 
use the proposed DQ measure to evaluate firms on behalf of their investors. Another indirect 
evaluation method is through the public rating companies. Public rating companies can score 
all listed firms (e.g. FTSE 350) and provide this service to the investors.  
Another avenue through which disclosure heightens FV is the minimisation of uncertainties 
regarding the firm’s future performance, which would result in reducing the cost of increasing 
the shareholders’ cash flow (Hassan et al., 2009). Beak et al. (2004) find that during the 1997 
Korean financial crisis, firms that had higher DQ experienced smaller reductions in their 
value. 
 280 
 
 In conclusion, high-quality disclosure is regarded as one of the most influential CG 
mechanisms (Black et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2010; and Sheu et al. 2010). Overall, 
disclosure is presumed to contain value-relevant information (Al-Najjar et al., 2011) and 
consequently affects FV (Haggard et al., 2008). 
In spite of the afore-mentioned arguments on the influence of DQ on FV, the empirical 
evidence is still inclusive. Some studies maintain that voluntarily disclosing information adds 
to firm value (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 1993; Beak et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2010; and Jiao, 
2010) while others (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009) do not find evidence to support this assumption. 
In general, there is little evidence on this research stream to deduct a cohesive conclusion 
(Hassan et al., 2009).  
Importantly, the link between DQ and FV has not been tested in the extant literature, yet, the 
extent literature generally uses either the level of disclosure provided (i.e. Hassan et al., 2009; 
and Cheung et al. 2010) or the analyst ratings (Healy et al., 1999) to proxy for DQ. Obviously, 
results of studies that use proxies for DQ are only valid to the extent that such proxies are 
sound (Hassan et al., 2009). Bearing in mind the empirical evidence derived in chapter Six, 
section 6.3 that disclosure quantity alone is not a proper proxy for DQ; potential concerns 
around the validity of prior research’s findings are raised. 
 According to the above discussion and based on the agency theory, the following research 
hypothesis on the link between DQ and FV is developed: 
H1: Firms disclosing high-quality information exhibit better FV. 
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7.2.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
A strong CG structure is another effective mechanism to capture market participants’ trust in 
the reported financial reports presented by management and mitigate agency problems. 
Indeed, “governance describes the institutional arrangements that regulates financial markets” 
(Hooper et al., 2009, p. 93). In this regard, improving CG restores market confidence and 
results in more equity financing (La Porta et al., 1997). CG increases firm’s cash flow, which 
ultimately is reflected into higher FV (Bozec et al., 2010). In addition, CG increases returns to 
shareholders via reducing transaction and agency costs (Hooper et al., 2009). Therefore, FV is 
a pivotal factor in the success of the financial markets (Beak et al., 2004), as better governed 
firms have higher FV (Gompers et al., 2003; and Sami et al., 2011). La Porta et al. (2002) 
manifest that in countries where laws are in favour of investor protection, investors are willing 
to pay more for a firm’s equity. Therefore, investors recognise that with better legal 
protection, the problem of conflicting investor-management interests will be minimised. This 
argument presents CG as a kind of investor protection mechanism, which mitigates agency 
problems and therefore enhances FV. Consequently, predicting a positive association between 
CG and FV is very common in the relevant literature. 
Despite the vast body of literature examining the influence of individual CG mechanisms on 
FV (Beak et al., 2004), the international evidence on this regard comes to no definitive 
conclusions with regards to what the important CG mechanisms affecting FV are (Black et al., 
2006; Henry, 2008; and Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Generally, Bozec et al. (2010, p. 685) 
maintain that, “overall, prior studies fail to find convincing evidence that CG affects firm 
performance or value”. Accordingly, investigating which CG mechanisms have an effect on 
FV in the UK is an interesting research question, and is addressed by the current study.  
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In analysing the association between CG mechanisms and FV, two main research approaches 
are notable in the literature. The first approach utilises a composite (index-based) measure of 
CG. This measure could be either a self-constructed index or a ready-made index. Examples 
of literature following the second approach include research by Black (2001), who employs a 
ready-made CG index to examine the association between CG and firm value in Russia, and 
documents a positive relationship. Klapper and Love (2004) undertake a cross-country study 
for emerging markets using a composite measure, and conclude a positive relationship in 
general between CG and firm value. Black et al. (2006) demonstrate that CG structure is a 
causal factor in explaining the market value of Korean firms using a constructed index-based 
measure. Brown and Caylor (2006) develop a summary of CG measures and find a positive 
effect of CG on FV in the US. Similarly, Braga-Alves and Shastri (2011) report a positive 
relationship between a composite governance index (NM6) and FV in Brazil. Ammann et al. 
(2011) and Sami et al. (2011) also document a strong and positive relationship between CG 
and FV. 
In contrast, Klein et al. (2005) employ an aggregated CG index developed by the Global and 
Mail Canadian newspaper published in its business report (McFarland, 2002). They conclude 
that using the aggregated CG index does not seem to have an effect on FV. In conclusion, the 
results are still inclusive, as is apparent from the foregoing literature review. 
Although these measures usually include numerous CG mechanisms, composite measures – 
either self-constructed or ready-made indices – are prone to numerous limitations. Firstly, the 
literature points out that, indices incorporating few CG mechanisms are more effective than 
those capturing a vast number of CG mechanisms (Brown et al., 2011). Secondly, if the 
individual CG mechanisms are weighted, the threat of arbitrary assignments of weights 
appears (Klein et al., 2005). Thirdly, when a set of indicators are naively summed up to form 
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some type of governance index, this results in an inconsistent regression coefficient and the 
ability of ready-made indices to statistically reflect managerial behaviours, making 
organisational performance questionable (Larcker et al., 2007). Fourthly, composite measures 
have virtually no predictive power, and the results have difficulty in interpreting conflicting  
results (Dey, 2008; and Daines et al., 2010). Fifthly, the validity of such proxies is doubtful 
(Aguilera and Desender, forthcoming). 
The second approach is to examine the effect of CG on FV using a few CG mechanisms in 
isolation. Clearly, this approach leads to missing variable bias (Beiner et al., 2006). 
Particularly, literature has been focused on board and ownership mechanisms, with limited 
investigations of audit committee and auditor mechanisms (exceptions include Brown and 
Caylor, 2006). Another caveat is the use of different measures for individual CG mechanisms, 
which makes it difficult to obtain a conclusive result. For example, the use of the percentage 
of non-executive directors versus the percentage of independent directors as a measure for 
board independence55 yields incomparable conclusions.  
In comparing the two previously discussed approaches in examining the effect of CG on FV, 
one may conclude that, the first approach – naively summing up CG mechanisms using one 
variable, either via ready-made or self-constructed indices – entails a great deal of 
subjectivity. Additionally, it involves selectiveness bias, and therefore, is likely to be greatly 
contested, especially with its low predictive power (Dey, 2008). Arguably, these statistical 
limitations cannot be mitigated, and thus, using this approach, the results will not be of strong 
predictive power (Larcker et al., 2007). Whereas, research gaps in the second approach could 
be overcame. The first gap – the examination in prior studies of only a few governance 
mechanisms– is mitigated through examining an extensive set of 14 individual CG 
                                                 
55 Refer to chapter Five, Board Independence sub-section for the distinction between the two measures. 
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mechanisms to avoid the measurement error imbedded in examining only a few governance 
mechanisms. The second gap – the use of different measures for CG mechanisms– is 
mitigated by selecting valid and reliable measures of CG. For instance, directors’ 
independence is measured using only the non-executive independent directors’ percentage and 
excluding gray directors.56 
Based on the above comparison, with the ability to mitigate gaps in the second approach and 
the inability to mitigate the limitations of the first, the second research approach is preferable.  
Moreover, identifying the most important CG mechanisms affecting firm value – using the 
second approach – would be more interesting to this research vein and more worthwhile for 
policy-makers and regulators. 
Importantly, one of the difficulties in this research stream is that “there is not well-developed 
theory about the complex, multi-dimensional nature of CG or a conceptual basis for selecting 
the relevant governance mechanisms to include in an empirical study” (Larcker et al., 2007, p. 
965). Additionally, after the latest financial crisis, it is evident that what constitutes good CG 
is still not understood, nor practiced (Bliss, 2011). 
This could be one of the reasons for the ambiguity of empirical results on the relationship 
between CG and FV. Interestingly, the current study would mitigate this problem through 
using the UK governance code – The Code (2008) – as the basis for identifying CG 
mechanisms to be included in this study’s framework.57 Accordingly, the current study uses 
the same 14 CG mechanisms previously identified in chapter Four.  
Chapter Six shows that not all the 14 CG mechanisms are associated with DQ. However, 
these mechanisms will be investigated in the third empirical study (chapter Eight). Stated 
                                                 
56 Table 6.1 defines each measure of CG mechanisms.  
57 This approach was applied in chapter Six as well. See Figure 6.1 for details of these governance mechanisms. 
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differently, both the accepted and the rejected hypotheses investigated in the second empirical 
study (chapter Six) will be tested in the third empirical study. Since the scope and objective of 
the second empirical study differs from that of the third, it is more prudent to include the 14 
CG mechanisms in investigating the joint effect between CG mechanisms and DQ on FV. The 
following figure 7.1 highlights the interrelationships between the three empirical studies. 
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Figure 7.1: The Interrelationships among the Three Empirical Studies  
 
 
 
As shown in the figure above, the DQ measure developed in the first empirical study (circle 
no. 1) is included in the second empirical study (circle no. 2) as the dependent variable. In the 
second empirical study, the researcher investigates the determinants of DQ where 14 CG 
mechanisms are investigated. In the third empirical study, the DQ measure is included as one 
of the independent variables in investigating the determinants of the FV, along with the 14 CG 
mechanisms. Figure 7.2 is a more simplified version of Figure 7.1 where the first circle shows 
that CG mechanisms are used as the independent variable to DQ. The arrows show that circles 
2 (CG) and 3 (DQ) are used as independent variables to the firm value (circle 3).  
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Figure 7.2:   A simplified Figure of the Interrelationships among the Three Empirical 
Studies  
 
 
 
 
The remainder of this section presents the theoretical background underlying the relationship 
between each of these 14 corporate governance mechanisms and firm value.  
7.2.2.1 Board and Sub-Committees Independence 
Overall board independence and the independence of the sub-committees’ directors (Setia-
Atmaja, 2009) is a vital determinant for overall board monitoring role (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010), particularly, by controlling executive directors and pursuing them to act 
for shareholders’ interests rather than assuming self- interest (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 
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2010). Independence is then viewed as an important governance mechanism that promotes 
firm value (Black and Kim, 2011). 
 However, empirical evidence is mixed in this regard. Yermack (1996) reports a negative 
association between board independence and FV, while others do not find any significant 
association (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006; Dahya et al., 2008; and Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). Black and Kim (2011) find a positive relationship between board and audit committee 
independence and FV. Similarly, Chan and Li (2008) find a positive relationship between 
audit committee independence and FV. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to predict the direction of the association between board 
independence, board independence; remuneration committee independence, audit committee 
independence, and FV and the following hypotheses are developed: 
H2: There is a relationship between board independence and FV. 
H3: There is a relationship between remuneration committee independence and FV. 
H4: There is a relationship between audit committee independence and FV. 
7.2.2.2 Board and Sub-Committees Size 
The relationship between board size and FV is ambiguous in the existing literature, with two 
competing theoretical views existing in this regard. From an agency perspective, larger boards 
mean more people reviewing management performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The 
other view is prevailing in the organisational behaviour research, highlighting that 
productivity losses could arise when working groups grow larger (e.g. Jensen, 1993; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Moreover, large boards can destroy corporate value (Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007).  
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Empirically, there is no conclusive evidence on the association between board and sub-
committee size and FV. Yermack (1996) examines the effect of board size as a proxy for CG 
on firm value, and reports a negative relationship. Similarly, Chan and Li (2008) find a 
negative relationship between audit committee size and FV.  On the other hand, Beiner et al. 
(2006) report a positive association between board size and FV. Therefore, it is difficult to 
predict the direction of the expected association between board size and FV, and the following 
hypotheses are derived: 
H5: There is an association between board size and firm value. 
H6: There is an association between remuneration committee size and firm value. 
H7: There is an association between audit committee size and firm value. 
7.2.2.3 Lack of Separation in Leadership Structure 
According to agency theory, the combined functions of the chairman and the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) can significantly impair boards’ pivotal monitoring and controlling functions 
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; and Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, such duality is 
likely to hinder effective CG (Lakhal, 2005; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). This in turn can 
negatively affect FV. The research on the effect of lack of separation in leadership structure 
on FV is scares. Cheung et al. (2010) do not find evidence on the effect of the lack of 
separation in leadership structure on FV. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict the direction of 
the association between lack of separation in leadership structure and FV. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is derived: 
H8: There is a relationship between lack of separation in leadership structure and FV. 
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7.2.2.4 Number of Board and other Sub-Committees Meeting Frequency 
The number of board meetings is usually used as a metric for board activity (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010). Vafeas (1999) argues that board meeting frequency is an essential 
governance mechanism that can influence FV. Accordingly, a positive relationship is 
expected between number of board meeting frequency and FV. 
H9: There is a positive relationship between number of board meetings and firm value. 
H10: There is a positive relationship between number of audit committee meetings and firm 
value. 
7.2.2.5 Managerial Ownership 
The convergence of interest hypothesis presumes that managers are assumed to have less 
incentive to maximise job performance when they are not shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). A lower level of managerial ownership is associated with increased agency problems 
(Eng and Mak, 2003). Thus, the greater the managerial ownership is, the greater the FV firm 
value due to convergence of interest (Ryu and Yoo, 2011). 
In contrast, the entrenchment hypothesis (Fama and Jensen, 1983) holds that managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests are aligned up to a certain level, after which, increased managerial 
ownership results in corporate assets becomes less valuable as managers can entrench 
themselves from maximizing FV (Chen and Steiner, 2000; Ryu and Yoo, 2011). 
 
 291 
 
 Although there is substantial literature examining the association between managerial 
ownership and FV; however, the results are contradictory and the conclusion unclear (Brown 
et al., 2011). 
Having such opposing hypotheses make is difficult to predict the direction of the relationship 
between managerial ownership and FV. Therefore, the following hypothesis is predicted: 
H11: There is a relationship between managerial ownership and FV. 
7.2.2.6  Ownership Concentration 
The theoretical literature provides conflicting views as to whether ownership concentration 
improves management activities. While the incentive-alignment hypothesis maintains that 
block holders have more incentives to maximize firm value, at the other end, it is presumed 
that block holders may utilise their power for self-treatment at the expense of other 
stakeholders and thereby, reduce firm value (Konijn et al., 2011). 
Additionally, the empirical evidence on the effect of ownership concentration on FV is limited 
and is mixed (Konijn et al., 2011). While Desetz and Villalonga (2001), Beiner et al. (2006) 
and Thomsen et al. (2006) find no significant relationship between ownership concentration 
and FV, Konijn et al. (2011) document a negative association. Therefore, it is difficult to 
predict the direction of the expected association between ownership concentration and FV. 
H12: There is a relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. 
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7.2.2.7 Audit Committee Accounting Expertise 
Chan and Li (2008) conjecture that if expert independent expertise have majority in the board 
they can improve FV. However, they use the financial expertise and not the accounting 
expertise on the board to investigate such proposition. Given the preference of accounting 
expertise over financial expertise as discussed previously in chapter Four, the same 
proposition applies for the existence of an accounting expertise in the audit committee. 
Accordingly, it is expected that the presence of an accounting expertise in the audit committee 
to have a positive impact on FV. 
H13: There is a positive association between the presence of an accounting expertise in the 
audit committee and firm value. 
7.2.2.8 Threat to Auditor Independence 
With many recent study considering auditor independence as one of governance mechanisms, 
and knowing that governance mechanisms could impose an influence on FV, the current study 
tests whether threat to auditor independence affect FV. Lai and Krishnan (2009) articulate that 
if investors perceive the provision of non-audit services as impairing auditor independence, 
this would necessarily have a negative effect on FV. Unfortunately, the literature is very 
scarce in this research filed to allow for conclusive evidence. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between threat to auditor independence and FV. 
H14: There is a positive association between threat to auditor independence and firm value. 
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7.2.2.9  Audit Firm Size 
The linkage between audit firm size and firm value has never been tested in the extant 
literature before. However, there is a literature on the effect of audit firm size on stock market   
in general. For example, Hussainey (2009) investigates investors’ ability to predict firm’s 
future earning changes and find that investor’s ability is greater for firms audit by big audit 
firms. He concludes that inventors perceive firms audit by big-audit firms as providing higher 
quality information than firms audited by non-big firms. Wang et al. (2008) maintains that, 
according to the agency theory, big audit firms have stronger incentives for independence and 
to influence stringent and extensive disclosure standards since they have more to lose from 
damage of their reputations and that this influence firm value. Clatworthy et al. (2010) find 
that in UK, investors perceive big 4-audit firms are associated with more value relevant 
information.  
 In the current study, audit firm size is included as one of the external governance 
mechanisms. The study tests whether audit firm size plays a role in improving FV. The 
proposition is that, if investors perceive big audit firms as providing high quality audit,58 it is 
likely that firm value could be positively affected. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
predicted: 
H15: There is a relationship between audit firm size and FV. 
Not all governance mechanisms necessarily affect FV (Brown and Caylor, 2006). There is a 
pervasive consensus that CG structure differs across countries with different regulatory and 
institutional arrangements (Brown et al., 2011). In this sense, some mechanisms might be 
significantly more influential than others in different countries. Additionally, there is a 
                                                 
58Refer to Section 5.2.4 for discussion on this hot debating issue. 
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consensus on the difficulty to predict which CG mechanisms influence better outcomes. For 
example, Larcker et al. (2007) raise this fact when investigating the impact of CG 
mechanisms on managerial behaviour and firm performance.  
does not reveal the circumstances in which CG mechanisms are substitutes, and when they 
complement each other (Abdulla and Page, 2009). Moreover, there is very limited research 
(e.g. Mouselli and Hussainey, 2011; and Al-Najjar et al., 2011) conducted in the UK context 
on which governance mechanisms affect FV. Therefore, there is no reason to expect specific 
governance mechanisms to affect FV in the UK.  
7.3 The Joint Effect of DQ and CG on FV 
The previous sections manifest the link between DQ and FV on one side and the association 
between CG structure and FV on the other. This section discusses the joint effect of both DQ 
and CG on FV. To put it differently, how could disclosure quality and CG structure intersect? 
Although many researchers examine the association between CG and FV, few studies 
examine the link between DQ, CG and FV. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this 
study is the first study to investigate the joint effect of DQ and CG on FV. The trend of 
examining the joint effect of two variables on a third one is new in the accounting literature 
(e.g. Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013; and Cormier and Magnan, 2014).   
One of the ways to improve the overall firm governance is to improve the transparency of 
disclosure (Nowland, 2008). Meanwhile, disclosure and transparency is one of the main 
principles of the OECD principles of CG, which is internationally recognised as an effective 
framework for CG (2004). In addition, the CG ranking in Russia developed by the Brunswick 
Warburg investment bank assigns the biggest weight to the disclosure and transparency aspect 
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(Rutherford and Costello, 1999). Nonetheless, greater transparency prompts corporate 
governance. Furthermore, transparency is hoped to reduce the diversion of cash flow to the 
management and the controlling shareholders (Coffee, 1999). Additionally, corporate 
governance may improve operational transparency by improving the ability of shareholders to 
discern the quality of management and the true value of a firm (Chung et al., 2010). Beekes 
and Brown (2006) report a positive relationship between better-governed firms and 
disclosure59 informativeness. They posit that better CG structure leads to more informative 
disclosure and definitely influences market efficiency. Their results suggest that if the quality 
of CG affects the quality of disclosure, then CG will be valued more highly by the market. In 
this vein, Beekes and Brown (2006) implicitly refer to the importance of considering DQ 
when evaluating the influential nature of CG with regards to the market valuation. 
Interestingly, these arguments are consistent with the findings of chapter Six, whereby the 
study demonstrates the impact of certain CG mechanisms on firms’ disclosure practices.  
Surprisingly, although the link between DQ and CG is well established in the literature and 
the effect of DQ on FV is paramount at least in the theory. Very few studies have examined 
some proxies for disclosure quality in conjunction with CG when assigning the effect of CG 
on FV (Cheung et al., 2010; Shue et al., 2010; Al-Najjar et al., 2011; and Nekhili et al., 2010). 
 Generally, those studies have many caveats, including the use of proxies for quality 
disclosure (i.e. Cheung et al., 2010), or restriction to only one type of disclosure (i.e. Shue et 
al., 2010; Al-Najjar et al. 2011; and Nekhili et al. 2010), the use of a small set of governance 
mechanisms (Chueng et al., 2010), or utilising a composite measure of governance (Al-Najjar 
et al., 2011). In conclusion, the empirical evidence on the joint effect of DQ and CG structure 
on FV is limited and suffers from many limitations.  
                                                 
59 The disclosure here is price-sensitive announcements.  
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Generally, Larcker et al. (2007) attribute the mixed results to a modest level of reliability and 
validity in examining governance measures (few individual mechanisms or composite 
measure). In line with this reasoning, the mixed results regarding the link between DQ and FV 
are likely to hold inaccurate quality measurements. 
The third research objective; determining the extent to which DQ and CG mechanisms are 
substitutes or complements is achieved through model 3. Following Henry (2008), and 
Ernstberger and Grüning (2013), the current study generally proposes three different 
scenarios. First, if the coefficient of the interaction is insignificant, this indicates that the 
effect of DQ on FV does not vary with the existence of a certain CG mechanism. This means 
that, best practice disclosure and CG are different ways of conveying the same information, 
then firms having higher DQ but lower governance quality should exhibit roughly the same 
value as firms with higher DQ and governance quality. Similarly, firms that have higher 
governance quality should have roughly the same value irrespective of their level of 
disclosure quality.  
Second, a positive significant interaction coefficient indicates a complementary effect 
between DQ and a certain CG mechanism. Stated differently, DQ and governance quality 
produces related information that is ‘reinforcing’ (i.e. if there is a multi-applicative effect), 
then FV would be the greatest for firms that have high DQ and governance quality. 
Third, a negative significant interaction coefficient indicates a substitutive effect between DQ 
and a certain CG mechanism. if disclosure quality and governance quality convey related 
information, but some of the information is common to both, i.e. ‘partially additive’, then FV 
for firms that have high levels of disclosure quality and governance quality should be higher 
than firm value when firms have high levels of DQ but with low governance quality or FV. In 
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this case, there is a partial substitution effect and the interaction term should be negative and 
statistically significant. 
The present study tests to see which of these three possibilities is present in the data by 
allowing for an interactive effect in our model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 298 
 
7.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The current chapter reviewed and analysed prior research on the effect of DQ and CG on FV. 
It also developed hypotheses to investigate whether there is a substitution or a complementary 
effect between DQ and CG mechanisms.  
There has been a wealth of research studies on the various outcomes of CG and DQ, which 
justifies why firms would like to strengthen their CG structure and improve their DQ. CG 
serves to improve stock market performance -e.g. equity returns (Giroud and Mueller, 2011). 
In addition, in the absence of the efficient stock market, CG helps in creating portfolios which 
achieve an abnormal return (Bagshi, 2011). Additionally, CG and DQ reduce financing costs. 
In doing so, CG reduces the cost of capital and consequently improves the firm’s external 
financing capacity (Brown et al., 2011). Similarly, high quality disclosure reduces financing 
costs (Botosan 1997; and Hassan et al., 2009), since the cost of capital is influenced by DQ 
(Brown et al., 2011).  
Moreover, CG controls earnings management, detects re-statements and fraud, and enhances 
earnings’ quality, timeliness and informativeness (Brown et al., 2011). Additionally, high DQ 
increases stock liquidity (Healy et al., 1999). Notably, as argued by Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), if CG influences the level of firm transparency (as discussed in chapters Five and 
Six), it will be reflected in increased analyst following, greater precision of earnings forecasts, 
smaller forecast revisions and less disagreement among analysts. Lastly, and which is the 
scope of the current research, CG and DQ improve FV (Cheung et al., 2010; Jiao, 2010; and 
Sami et al., 2011). 
It is widely acknowledged that any mechanism that contributes in mitigating agency problems 
through narrowing the information asymmetry gap is profound to the success of the financial 
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market and influences firm value. Of particular interest are high-quality disclosure (Cheung et 
al., 2010) and effective corporate governance mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003). 
The underlying chapter deals with three research streams, DQ, CG, and FV. High-quality 
disclosure helps to reduce information asymmetry among the market participants (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011). Additionally, better information environments are associated with higher market 
valuation (Lang et al., 2004). Thus, high-quality disclosure helps to correct any firm mis-
valuation (Healy et al., 1999).  
Similarly, CG increases a firm’s cash flow, which is then reflected into higher firm value 
(Bozec et al., 2010). This applies to internal and external CG mechanisms. For instance, board 
independence –as an internal CG mechanism- is regarded as an important governance 
mechanism that promotes FV (Black and Kim, 2011). Another example for an internal CG 
mechanism is board meeting frequency. Board meeting frequency is an essential governance 
mechanism that can influence FV (Vafeas, 1999). As an example of external CG mechanism, 
threat to auditor independence is said to have an influential effect on FV (Lai and Krishnan, 
2009). 
In conclusion, high-quality disclosure is considered as an important CG mechanism (Black et 
al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2010; and Sheu et al. 2010), which improves FV (Haggard et al., 
2008).  
Although this vein of research is growing, however, the current state of research suffers from 
some limitations. The main limitation addressed is the doubts expressed with regard to 
ignoring the joint effect of both DQ and CG on FV. The second limitation is the use of narrow 
proxies for CG mechanisms and/or using proxies for DQ rather than employing a sound 
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quality measure. These limitations therefore raise concerns about the soundness of prior 
research findings and could explain the mixed results issue.  
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Chapter Eight: Examining the Joint Effect of DQ 
and CG mechanisms on FV: An Exploratory Study  
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8.1 Overview 
While the previous chapter builds the theoretical background and develops hypotheses to 
investigate the joint effect of DQ and CG on FV, the current chapter empirically examines this 
association and answers the three research objectives presented in chapter Seven. Section 8.2 
elaborates the study design; mainly, the current study employs panel data to overcome the 
endogeneity problem associated with FV in similar studies. Section 8.3 discusses results of 
the regression analysis, additionally and presents robustness tests. Finally, the chapter 
summarises the findings in section 8.4. 
8.2 Study Design 
In general, FV has always been considered as an endogenous variable in the literature (e.g. 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; and Benson and Davidson, 2010). Chapter Two, section 2.2.4.4 
discusses in details the endogeneity problem and approaches to overcoming this problem, 
with a review and justification of the chosen approach. The following sub-section however, 
retrieve this point in summary again.  
8.2.1 Definition of Variables 
Firm Value 
A common valuation model is Ohlson (1995), where FV is a function of net assets, residual 
income and other information. However, Ohlson and Feltham-Ohlson models have been 
criticised in the literature. The main limitations are that the Ohlson model is of limited 
empirical validity and that the Feltman-Ohlson model is not accurate (Callen and Segal, 
2005). Thus, Ohlson-type models are not widely used as a measure for FV (Lee et al., 2011). 
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This explains why most studies investigating the association between FV and CG use Tobin’s 
Q and not an Ohlson-type model. Moreover, Ohlson-type model is an accounting-based 
valuation model (Lee and Lin, 2010), and market-based valuation model (e.g. Tobin’s Q) is 
more extensively used in the literature as discussed below. 
Tobin’s Q reflects the current stock market value of the firm (Thomsen et al. (2006). It has 
been used in research linking CG with FV (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006; and Cheung et al., 
2011) since the first work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) (Gompers et al., 2003). It has also 
been used in studies linking disclosure with FV (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009; Cheung et al., 2010, 
and Sheu et al., 2010). Tobin’s Q “measures the extent to which the company is expected to 
earn an above average return on its invested capital” (Abdullah and Page, 2009, p. vii). 
Consequently, the underlying study follows this trend and measures firm value using Tobin’s 
Q (Q hereafter). 
Following the most relevant study (i.e. Cheung et al., 2010), which investigates the link 
between a proxy for DQ,60 some CG mechanisms, and FV, Tobin’s Q is defined as: (total debt 
+ market value of equity) / book value of total assets. This definition is widely used by others 
(e.g. Beak et al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; and Beiner et al., 2006). Such kind of 
advanced measures of Tobin’s Q has been introduced in light of complexities involved in the 
more sophisticated measures of Tobin’s Q, such as Lindenberg and Ross (1981)61 (Jiao, 
2010), and also overcomes the data availability problems seen in early adopted measurements 
such as the one used by Lewellen and Bardrinath (1997). 
 
                                                 
60This is a subjective proxy for DQ where disclosure is scored based on 32 criteria with scores ranging from 1 – indicating 
poor – to 3 – which implies higher transparency. For more information on this index see Cheung et al. (2010). 
61 See Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) and Lee and Tompkins (1999) for a detailed discussion of different Tobin’s Q 
measurements. 
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Data on Tobin’s Q is collected from Datastream. Total debt is Datastream item WC03255, 
defined as all interest-bearing and capitalised lease obligations; the sum of long- and short-
term debt. Following Brown and Caylor (2006) and Hassan et al. (2009), market value is 
defined as the number of common shares outstanding at the financial year-end. Datasteam 
item W05301 is defined as the number of shares outstanding at the company’s year-end, 
multiplied by the median of stock prices over three months62 after the annual report date. 
(Stock price is Datastream item UP, defined as the closing price which has not been 
historically adjusted for bonus and rights issues. This figure therefore represents actual or 
“raw” prices as recorded on the day.) In principle, including the median of stock prices three 
months after the annual report date allows prices to capture information revealed in OFR 
statements incorporated in the annual reports. Total assets is Datastream item WC02999, 
representing the sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets. 
Importantly, a common practice is to use an industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q (e.g. 
Bebchuk et al., 2009). One advantage of this approach is controlling for potential bias 
resulting from differences in industry mechanisms and associated operating nature across 
sample firms. Another advantage is to control for variation of Tobin’s Q across different 
industries because, by definition, Tobin’s Q is highly dependent on the future of the firm as 
reflected in the share price, and therefore widely varies from one industry to another 
(Abdullah and Page, 2009). Using the industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q rules out the 
potential for simultaneity (Brown and Caylor, 2006), which helps to mitigate endogeneity. 
                                                 
62 In principle, Hassan et al. (2009) allow six months after the financial year-end, assuming that the annual report is usually 
published three months later, and then allow three months to capture information disclosed. However, investigating our 
sample shows that firms widely vary in the period it takes them to publish the annual report, ranging from a short period of 
two months to up to four months. Accordingly, to be more precise, each firm’s annual report publication date is identified 
when the stock price median over three months is calculated. 
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Accordingly, the current study employs the industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable to measure FV. The industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q is a firm’s Q 
minus the median Q in the firm’s industry in the observation year. As commonly found with 
Tobin’s Q the distribution of industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q does not fulfil the normality 
assumption (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; and Brown and Caylor, 2006). The mean is 0.551, 
the minimum is -0.349 and the maximum is 137.85, indicating a wide variation in firm values 
in the sample. When checking the residuals for the possible existence of outliers, it appears 
that outliers do not represent a problem at all and are at a fairly normal level.63 Therefore, 
following Bebchuk et al. (2009) among others, the industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q is 
transformed using a natural logarithm (Log) to correct for non-normality. 
Disclosure Quality 
As discussed in chapter Four, an innovative measure for DQ has been developed. In essence, 
each firm has been assigned a score representing the quality of its OFR statement. These 
scores are the measures of DQ, the first independent variable in the model. Importantly, in 
testing the FV normality of the model under investigation, it was found that the model is not 
perfectly normal.64 To improve the normality, the quality score was transferred using the LOG 
function. Thus, the quality score is represented by the LOG quality in this chapter. 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As mentioned earlier, one of the approaches to mitigate endogeneity is to include a broad set 
of CG mechanisms.65  Therefore, one of the current study’s contributions is to examine an 
extensive set of CG mechanisms simultaneously. The current study examines 14 CG 
                                                 
63 Outliers are defined as observations with standard deviation values of more than 3 and less than -3. Usually a 1% level is 
acceptable (Pallant, 2007). Outliers only account for 0.19 % 
64 See Appendix no.7 
65 Refer to chapter Five for a detailed discussion of CG mechanisms and mechanisms (see also Figure 5.1). 
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mechanisms.66 These include, board independence (BIND), board size (BSIZE), lack of 
separation in leadership structure (LEAD), board meeting frequency (BMF), remuneration 
committee independence (REMIND), remuneration committee size (REMSIZE), managerial 
ownership (MOWNER), ownership concentration (CONCEN), Audit committee independence 
(ACIND), Audit committee size (ACSIZE), The presence of financial expertise in the audit 
committee (ACCEXP), Audit committee meeting frequency (ACMF), Threat to auditor 
independence (AIND), audit firm size (ASIZE). 
Control Variables 
As mentioned earlier, it is important to account for possible endogeneity problems in 
investigating FV, so as to obtain robust results. In this regard, the current study controls for 
the common variables representing a potential cause for endogeneity, as identified in the 
existing literature. 
The first and most commonly used variable that might cause endogeneity is firm size (SIZE). 
Firm size has a contentious association with FV. On one hand, large firms might suffer from 
greater agency problems because they are harder to manage, and thus respond by adopting a 
better governance structure (Klapper and Love, 2004) as well as higher DQ to restore market 
confidence, both of which result in higher FV. On the other hand, small firms are more likely 
to have growth opportunities and require external finance, and thus improve their governance 
structure to gain market confidence and consequently have high FV, while large firms can 
easily use their assets as collateral and rely more heavily in bank borrowings (Beak et al., 
2004). Accordingly, the current study controls for firm size, measured through the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  
                                                 
66 For definitions of CG variables and associated data sources see Table 6.1. 
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Similar to firm size, the expected direction of the association between leverage (LEV) and 
firm value is ambiguous. Where a positive relationship implies effective usage of debt 
(Myers, 1977), a negative association signals the likelihood of potential financial problems or 
increased cost of capital (Henry, 2008). Basically, leverage is used to control for default risk 
(Klein et al., 2005). Meanwhile, Firms with a high leverage ratio are more likely to elicit 
information to avoid litigation risk (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) and are more likely to have 
a stronger governance structure (Cremer and Nair, 2005). Additionally, firms with high debts 
are perceived to have a better governance structure, which enables them to attract creditors 
and therefore be valued higher (Hassan et al., 2009). In line with many studies (e.g. Bebchuk 
et al., 2009; Benson and Davidson, 2010; and Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011), leverage is 
computed as percentage of total debt divided by total assets. 
Firm profitability (PROF) is the third control for the link between FV, DQ, and CG. It is 
widely recognised that a firm’s profitability positively influences its market value (Yermack, 
1996; Henry, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; and Price et al. 2011). Nonetheless, profitability 
captures the likely interrelationship between FV and CG mechanisms (Beiner et al., 2006). 
Profitability is measured using return on equity (ROE).   
The fourth control variable is firm growth (GROWTH). It is widely established that firms with 
better growth opportunities are more attractive and thus are more likely to receive better 
valuation (Myers, 1977; Klein et al., 2005; and Henry, 2008). Similarly, as presumed by 
agency theory, better governance is assumed to lower the cost of capital and thus, firms with 
growth opportunities tend to maintain a strong governance structure to fulfil their external 
financing needs (Beiner et al., 2006). Therefore, since growth is expected to affect FV, and 
meanwhile influence CG structure, it is likely to cause endogeneity of CG on firm value. 
Consequently, following relevant literature (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; and Beiner et al., 
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2006) the current study controls for growth opportunity via sales growth. Sales growth is 
Datastream item WC08633, defined as: ((current year’s net sales or revenues / net sales or 
revenues four years ago, reduced to a compound annual rate) – 1) * 100.  
Finally, market share may affect a firm’s profitability and consequently affect its governance 
choices, and therefore indirectly affect FV (Black et al., 2006). Thus, the current study 
controls for market share (SHR). Market share is computed as the firm’s market share over the 
total industry sector’s sales in the observation year.  
In sum, drawing on the previous discussion, the current study regresses the industry-median 
adjusted Tobin’s Q on DQ, 14 CG mechanisms, the interaction between DQ and each of the 
CG mechanisms to investigate the joint effect, and lastly control variables using the following 
fixed-effect model (for i firms over t years): 
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                                 = intercept term, 
it
QUALITY
               = natural log of disclosure quality score, for firm i, in year t, 
jit
G ov
                         = individual corporate governance mechanisms, j, for firm i, in year t; where j =1 to n.   
kit
Interaction
               = the interactions between individual corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure  
                                         quality for firm i, in year t; where k =1 to m,            
lit
Control
                  = the control variables, l, for firm i, in year t; where l =1to o. 
t

                                = a vector of 3 dummy variables representing the four sample years. 
i

                                = the firm-specific fixed effects, including a vector of 122 variables to represent the 123 
                                        sample firms. 
it
u
                               = the unobserved error component. 
 
Consistent with Cheung et al. (2010), the 4-years’ time data is used in the fixed-effect for the 
panel data regression model. This is a firm-specific fixed effects model which controls for 
time-invariant omitted variables (Bebchuk et al., 2009) and company-invariants (O’Sullivan 
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and Diacon, 2003). In doing so, the software (Stata 11) asks for the panel settings whereby the 
software controls for the time and firm-invariants. These are two settings: the first is the time 
variable and the second is the firm ID variable. Technically, in fixed effect models researchers 
assign a code for each firm, which is considered as the firm ID by the software. Also 
researchers identify the relevant year for each observation, for example, in this study the 
researcher assigns 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 to the relevant firm observation, this is the 
time variable.    
This type of fixed effects model is suitable to the current study as it controls for the 
unobserved firm heterogeneity over the time series of the panel. In addition, it gives robust 
regression estimates (Henry, 2008). It also controls for invariant-time mechanism (Chi, 2005). 
F statistic, which reports the significance of the model, is provided for each analysis to 
provide an evidence of the appropriateness of employing this fixed effects model. 
8.3 Empirical Analysis 
8.3.1 Univariate Analysis (Correlation Matrix)  
Following the literature (e.g. Henry, 2008), Table 8.1 reports the pair-wise Pearson correlation 
coefficients between Tobin’s Q, D, and the 14 CG mechanisms examined in the underlying 
study.  
Of special interest, and consistent with the foregoing reasoning about the importance of 
disclosure quality in promoting firm value is the positive and statistically significant 
correlation coefficient of 0.083 at the 10% level between disclosure quality (QUALITY) and 
firm value (Q). 
 310 
 
Board independence67 is not correlated with firm value (Q). Notably, most work does not find 
a significant link between board independence and firm value (Dahya et al., 2008; Bebchuk 
and Weisbach, 2010). The same conclusion applies for affiliated committees. As indicated by 
the correlation matrix, remuneration committee independence and audit committee 
independence are not associated with FV.  
The correlation coefficient of 0.074 between remuneration committee size and firm value (Q) 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, audit committee size is positively 
associated with firm value. The coefficient is 0.075 at the 1% level. This is in consistent with 
the agency perspective, that, larger boards mean more people reviewing management 
performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  On the other side, the correlation analysis does not 
indicate an association between board size and firm value. Such relationship is ambiguous in 
the existing literature, with two competing theoretical views existing in this regard.  
Similar to Cheung et al. (2010), the correlation matrix suggests no relationship between lack 
of separation in leadership structure and firm value (Q). Regarding the ownership structure, 
managerial ownership shows a statistical association with firm value (Q). The coefficient is 
0.163 at the 1% significant level. This is in line with the convergence of interest hypothesis, 
the greater the managerial ownership is, the greater the firm value (Ryu and Yoo, 2011). At 
the other end, consistent with Desetz and Villalonga (2001), Beiner et al. (2006) and Thomsen 
et al. (2006) correlation analysis reveals that there is no significant association between 
ownership concentration and FV. 
Correlation analysis does not report a relationship for board meeting frequency (BMF), audit 
committee meeting frequency (ACMF), the presence of an accounting expertise in the audit  
committee and firm value.  
                                                 
67 Board independence is discussed in more detail in the regression analysis. 
 311 
 
Similar to Brown and Caylor (2006), the correlation coefficient of threat to auditor 
independence does not support a relationship with firm value. Similarly, audit firm size 
(ASIZE) is not associated with firm value.    
For control variables, the correlation matrix shows a significant negative association between 
firm size and its value (Q) at the 5% level. As argued by (Beak et al., 2004), small firms are 
more likely to have growth opportunities and require external finance, and thus improve their 
governance structure to gain market confidence and consequently have high FV, while large 
firms can easily use their assets as collateral and rely more heavily in bank borrowings.  
Similar to Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008), leverage is also influential at the 1% 
significance level with a positive coefficient of 0.573. This is consistent with the agency 
theory proposition that better-covered firms will receive higher credit ratings, allowing them 
to raise capital using debt rather than equity. Thus, investors are likely to favourably value 
such firms (Brown et al., 2011). Nonetheless, profitability, sales growth, and market share are 
not significantly associated with FV. 
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Table 8.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix (FV, DQ and CG Mechanisms and Control Variables) 
 
 
 Q QUALITY BIND BSIZE LEAD BMF COMIND COMPSIZE MOWNER CONCEN ACIND ACSIZE ACCEXP ACMF AIND ASIZE SIZE PROF LEV GROWTH 
QUALITY 0.071* 
                   
 
0,066 
                   
BIND 0.015 0.081**                   
 
0.374 0.061 
                  
BSIZE 0.070 0.120*** 0.025 
                 
 
0.345 0.005 0.565 
                 
LEAD -0.202 -0.138*** -0.060 -0.027 
                
 
0,706 0.001 0.165 0.533 
                
BMF 0.011 0.054 0.083* 0.063 -0.014 
               
 
0.581 0.216 0.056 0.147 0.738 
               
REMIND 0.024 -0.002 0.320*** 0.057 0.014 0.040 
              
 
  0.638 0.969 0.000 0.189 0.749 0.351 
              
REMSIZE 0.176* 0.063 0.243*** 0.359*** -0.042 0.104** 0.002 
             
 
0.099 0.407 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.016 0.966 
             
MOWNER 0.790 0.042 -0.193*** -0.023 0.022 -0.120*** -0.064 -0.124***  
           
 
0.000 0.337 0.000 0.598 0.616 0.005 0.142 0.004  
           
CONCEN -0.066 0.016 -0.074* -0.184*** 0-.089** -0.120*** -0.098** -0.121*** 0.062  
          
 
0.849 0.710 0.088 0.000 0.040 0.004 0.023 0.005 0.151  
          
ACIND 0.014 0.087** 0.287*** 0.024 0.001 0.103** 0.550*** 0.003 0.030 0.101**  
         
 
0.782 0.043 0.000 0.575 0.978 0.017 0.000 0.947 0.490 0.020  
         
ACSIZE 0.107* 0.073* 0.253*** 0.515*** -0.012 0.069 0.005 0.682*** -0.110** -0.124*** -0.032  
        
 
0.097 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.785 0.113 0.902 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.464  
        
ACCEXP -0.010 0.021 0.004 0.072* 0.114*** -0.017 -0.015 0.018 0.008 0.103** 0.019 0.063  
       
 
0.740 0.663 0.931 0.095 0.008 0.701 0.726 0.681 0.858 0.017 0.656 0.145  
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Table constructed by author using data from  Stata 14 analysis. (Q) Tobin’s Q, (QUALITY) the quality score, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) board size, (LEAD) lack of separation in leadership structure, (BMF) board meeting frequency,(REMIND) 
remuneration committee independence, (REMSIZE) remuneration committee independence, ,(MOWNER) managerial ownership, (CONCEN) ownership concentration,(ACIND) audit committee independence, (ACSIZE) audit committee size, (ACCEXP), 
the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee, (ACMF) audit committee meeting frequency, (AIND) threat to auditor independence, (ASIZE) external auditor size, (SIZE) firm size,, (PROF) profitability,, (LEV) leverage,, (GROWTH) sales 
growth, and (MSHARE) market share.  Number of observations (n=488), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACMF 0.048 0.130*** 0.182*** 0.247*** 0.011 0.198*** -0.004 0.176*** -0.090** -0.041 0.039 0.224*** 0.026  
      
 
0.614 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.803 0.000 0.930 0.000 0.038 0.341 0.367 0.000 0.550  
      
AIND 0.003 -0.005** -0.093 -0.013 -0.028 -0.003 -0.026 -0.019 -0.002 0.008 -0.032 -0.014 -0.004 0.019  
     
 
0.588 0.911 0.368 0.758 0.583 0.944 0.550 0.668 0.957 0.845 0.455 0.754 0.917 0.653  
     
ASIZE -0.045 0.131*** 0.099** 0.067 0.024 -0.041 -0.015 0.140*** -0.015 -0.064 -0.028 0.125*** 0.069 0.055 0.032  
    
 
0.814 0.002 0.022 0.124 0.758 0.341 0.726 0.001 0.724 0.137 0.514 0.004 0.111 0.207 0.464  
    
SIZE -0.040 0.247*** 0.318*** 0.552*** -0.107** 0.063 -0.004 0.277*** -0.130*** -0.164*** 0.089** .0424*** 0.083* 0.292*** 0.052 0.198***  
   
 
0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.144 0.930 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.227 0.000  
   
PROF 0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.016 -0.017 0.019 -0.026 0.081* 0.018 -0.071* 0.034 0.012 -0.052 -0.002 -0.054 -0.025 -0.062  
  
 
0.951 0.837 0.837 0.406 0.697 0.655 0.550 0.061 0.680 0.099 0.436 0.773 0.229 0.959 0.212 0.667 0.149  
  
LEV 0.999*** 0.075* 0.023 0.075*** -0.016 0.005 -0.021 0.182*** 0.080* -0.064** 0.012 0.113*** -0.088** 0.048 0.001 0.001 -0.123*** 0.010 0.010 
 
 
0.000 0.084 0.590 0.083 0.704 0.908 0.635 0.000 0.064 0.137 0.780 0.009 0.041 0.269 0.986 0.802 0.004 0.814 0.814 
 
GROWTH -0.024 -0.097** -0.068 -0.057 -0.017 -0.148*** 0.081* -0.149*** 0.103** 0.043 -0.001 -0.093** -0.033 -0.007 -0.027 0.035 0.020 -0.073 -0.042 0.076* 
 
0.627 0.032 0.133 0.205 0.701 0.001 0.072 0.001 0.022 0.344 0.985 0.038 0.459 0.871 0.549 0.439 0.656 0.104 0.350 0.093 
SHARE 0.004 0.105** 0.142*** 0.182*** -0.031 0.002 0.023 0.084 -0.054 -0.196*** 0.046 0.159*** -0.085* 0.172*** -0.007 0.035 0.281** -0.040*** 0.029 0.076* 
 
0,912 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.486 0.971 0.605 0.062 0.232 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.870 0.436 0.019 0.000 0.373 0.093 
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8.3.2 Multivariate Analysis (Regression Analysis) 
Most prior studies do not properly address endogeneity (e.g. Black et al., 2006). The present 
study considers the endogenous nature of FV in general, and the omitted-variables bias (i.e. 
the omission of CG mechanisms) in particular. The main purpose of the underlying analysis, 
is to highlight and mitigate the effect of the omitted-variables bias exhibited in the existing 
literature when relating FV to DQ, or CG mechanisms independently. This is accomplished 
mainly through incorporating the joint effect of both DQ and CG mechanisms.  
Table 8.2 reports fixed-effect regression for three models using the natural logarithm of 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (Q) as the dependent variable. Model 1 regresses FV on the DQ 
independently while ignoring the CG mechanisms. Model 2 considers the association between 
CG mechanisms and FV. It regresses Q on CG mechanisms, irrespective of DQ. Both models 
suffer from omitted-variables bias, where Model 1 ignores the governance mechanisms and 
Model 2 overlooks DQ. Apparently, Model 3 is intended to overcome the omitted-variables 
bias and test the combined influence of DQ and each of the CG mechanisms on FV. As 
illustrated earlier in chapter Seven, section 7.3, Model 3 reports results of regressing FV on 
DQ, CG mechanisms and their interaction. 
The idea of testing the interactions of two variables on a specific dependent variable is used in 
the literature to figure out whether the interacted variables have a complementary or 
substitutive effect on the dependent variable (e.g. Ernstberger and Grüning, 2013). 
Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) test whether the legal environment and CG have 
complementary or substitutive effect on the disclosure level. 
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Table 8.2: Fixed-Effect Regression of Industry-Median Tobin’s Q on DQ and Individual1 CG Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table constructed by author using  data extracted from the Stata 14 analysis. Refer to Table 6.1, column No. 4 for the source of  data.  
(QUALITY) quality, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) board size, (LEAD) lack of separation in leadership structure, (BMF) board 
meeting frequency,(REMIND) remuneration committee independence, (REMSIZE) remuneration committee independence, (MOWNER) 
managerial ownership, (CONCEN) ownership concentration, (ACIND) audit committee independence, (ACSIZE) audit committee size, 
(ACCEXP), the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee (ACMF) audit committee meeting frequency, (AIND) threat to 
auditor independence, (ASIZE) external auditor size, (QUALITY*BIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and board 
independence, (QUALITY*BSIZE), the interaction between the disclosure score and board size, (QUALITY *LEAD) the interaction between 
the disclosure score and lack of separation in leadership structure, (QUALITY * BMF) the interaction between the disclosure score and board 
meeting frequency, (QUALITY * REMIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and board remuneration committee independence, 
(QUALITY * REMSIZE) the interaction between the disclosure score and board remuneration committee size, (QUALITY * MOWNER) the 
interaction between the disclosure score and managerial ownership, (QUALITY * CONCEN) the interaction between the disclosure score and 
ownership concentration,  (QUALITY*ACIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and audit committee independence, (QUALITY 
*ACSIZE) the interaction between the disclosure score and audit committee size, (QUALITY*ACCEXP) the interaction between the 
disclosure score and audit committee accounting expertise, (QUALITY*ACMF) the interaction between the disclosure score and audit 
committee meeting frequency, (QUALITY*AIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and threat to auditor independence, 
(QUALITY * SIZE) the interaction between the disclosure score and auditor size, (SIZE)  firm size, (PROF) profitability, (LEV) leverage, 
(GROWTH) sales growth, (MSHARE) market share. Number of observations (n=488), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% 
respectively. Model 1 includes disclosure quality only, model2 regress governance mechanisms only, model 3 includes disclosure quality and 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
 Model 1 
Coef. Est. 
P> |t| Model 2 
Coef. Est. 
P> |t| Model 3 
Coef. Est. 
P> |t| 
QUALITY -0.013 
 
0.883 
  
1.815* 0.084 
BIND  0.127** 0.014 -0.753* 0.065 
REMIND    -0.023 0.538 -0.112 0.731 
ACIND   -0.018 0.642 0.552* 0.081 
BSIZE   -0.001 0.826 -0.034 0.126 
REMPSIZE   0.008 0.286 -0.028 0.641 
ACSIZE   -0.010 0.161 0.109 0.105 
LEAD   -0.026 0.290 -0.060 0.713 
BMF   0.000 0.865 0.004 0.801 
ACMF   -0.001 0.654 -0.002 0.938 
MOWNER   0.000 0.666 0.003 0.418 
CONCEN   0.000 0.234 0.001 0.705 
ACCEXP   0.006 0.488 -0.052 0.479 
AIND   0.012 0.515 -0.009 0.957 
ASIZE   -0.134* 0.063 0.602 0.247 
QUALITY * BIND     0.239** 0.029 
QUALITY * REMIND     0.031 0.733 
QUALITY * ACIND     -0.166* 0.067 
QUALITY * BSIZE     0.009 0.127 
QUALITY * REMSIZE     0.010 0.520 
QUALITY * ACSIZE     -0.033* 0.073 
QUALITY * LEAD     0.007 0.892 
QUALITY * BMF     -0.001 0.781 
QUALITY * ACMF     0.000 0.961 
QUALITY * MOWNER     -0.001 0.446 
QUALITY * CONCEN     0.000 0.797 
QUALITY * ACCEXP     0.016 0.437 
QUALITY * AIND     0.000 0.994 
QUALITY * ASIZE     -0.218 0.187 
SIZE -0.057*** 0.003 -0.064*** 0.001 -0.063*** 0.002 
PROF 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.218 
LEV 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 
GROWTH 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.476 -0.0003 0.251 
SHARE 0.049* 0.062 0.050* 0.056 0.047* 0.076 
Intercept 0.537 0.002 0.7*** 0.000 -0.251 0.654 
R-Squared 61%  63%  64.4%  
F-Value 10.64*** 
 
0.000 
6.52*** 
 
0.000 
6.36*** 
 
0.000 
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8.3.2.1 Model 1 Regressing FV on DQ Independently While Ignoring CG Mechanisms 
In Model 1, DQ is introduced with the control variables. It is worth mentioning that prior 
research does not examine the effect of narrative DQ on FV; rather, it examines the effect of 
one type of disclosure (i.e. Al-Najjar et al., 2011) or uses some proxies of DQ (e.g. Hassan et 
al., 2009) instead of using a direct measure for quality. Therefore, the current study 
contributes to the literature by testing the relationship between a measure for OFR disclosure 
quality and FV in the UK. Results show that DQ is not significantly associated with FV. This 
result highlights the endogeneity problem and enforces the consequences of overlooking the 
complementary/supplementarty relationship between DQ and CG.  
8.3.2.2 Model 2 Regressing FV on the DQ Independently While Ignoring CG 
mechanisms 
In Model 2, CG mechanisms are introduced beside the control variables, to examine what 
would be the association between CG and FV in the absence of DQ.  Model 2 reports two CG 
mechanisms influencing FV (Q), namely; board independence (BIND), and audit firm size 
(ASIZE). The coming paragraphs discuss results of regressing each of the 14 CG mechanisms 
on FV.  
Consistent with the theory, the coefficient estimate for board independence (BIND) provides 
evidence that firms with more independent directors on board, experience higher FV. The 
relationship is significant with a coefficient of 0.127 at the 5% significance level. Such 
finding is similar to that identified by many other studies (e.g. Black and Kim, 2011). 
Accordingly, hypothesis number 2 that there is a relationship between board independence 
and FV is accepted. 
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Generally, it is well known that the board structure could be used to anticipate management’s 
performance and thus in turn, FV. This conclusion is consistent with Dahya and McConnell ’s 
(2007) UK study. They find improved performance for U.K. firms which previously had only 
one or two outside directors, but increased this number to three to comply with the Cadbury 
Committee “comply or explain” recommendation to have at least 3 outside directors. 
Referring to the regression results on chapter Six, results content that in the FTSE 350 
context, board independence does not promote DQ, yet, is positively associated with FV.   
A different conclusion applies for affiliated committees. As shown in Model 2, the 
remuneration committee independence and audit committee independence are not statistically 
associated with FV. Therefore, hypothesis number 3 that there is a relationship between 
remuneration committee independence and FV is rejected. Similarly, hypothesis number 4 
that there is a relationship between audit committee independence and FV is rejected. 
With regard to board size, Model 2 shows that the coefficient estimate for board size (BSIZE) 
is insignificant. The relationship between board size and FV is ambiguous in the existing 
literature, with two competing theoretical views existing in this regard.68 Accordingly, 
hypothesis number 5 that there is a relationship between board size and FV is rejected. 
Similarly, remuneration committee size and audit committee size are not significantly 
associated with FV. Consequently, hypothesis number 6 that there is a relationship between 
remuneration committee size and FV is rejected. Additionally, hypothesis number 7 that there 
is a relationship between audit committee size and FV is rejected. 
 
                                                 
68 See chapter Five, section (5.2.1). 
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Model 2 shows that the lack of separation in leadership structure (LEAD) is not associated 
with FV. This is consistent with Cheung et al. (2010)’s finding. They do not find evidence on 
the effect of the lack of separation in leadership structure on FV. Therefore, hypothesis 
number 8 that there is a relationship between lack of separation in leadership structure and FV 
is rejected. 
With regard to board meeting frequency (BMF), model 2 does not support the notion that 
BMF is an essential CG mechanism that can influence FV.  Accordingly, hypothesis number 9 
that there is a positive relationship between lack of separation in leadership structure and FV 
is rejected. Similarly, Model 2 does not show an evidence for a significant association 
between audit committee meeting frequency (ACMF) and FV, then, hypothesis number 10 is 
rejected.  
Model 2 does not provide an evidence to support hypothesis number 11 that there is a 
relationship between managerial ownership and FV. This is consistent with Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) convergence of interest hypothesis69 that the association between 
managerial ownership and FV takes a non-linear form, where a positive relationship holds for 
a time, until managers start to sacrifice FV for their own benefit (Demsetz, 1983). Results 
suggest that the market is indifferent as to the managerial ownership when perceiving firm’s 
value. Notably, the average managerial ownership percentage in the sample is about 4%.70 
Such a low percentage might explain the insignificant association reported.  
 This conclusion is further supported by the findings of chapter Six, where regressing DQ on 
managerial ownership implies an insignificant relationship. If managers become entrenched, 
this relationship should have been significantly negative. If managers had conflicting interests 
                                                 
69 For more detail on this view and the competing one, see chapter Five, section (5.2.2). 
70 See Table 6.2 for full details on the descriptive statistics of CG mechanisms. 
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with shareholders, they should have been expected to lower DQ to evade monitoring by 
shareholders. 
Model 2 shows that ownership concentration (CONCEN) is not statistically associated with 
FV. The empirical evidence on the effect of ownership concentration on firm value is limited 
and is mixed (Konijn et al., 2011). Accordingly, hypothesis number 12 that there is a 
relationship between ownership concentration and FV is rejected. 
Model 2 shows that the presences of accounting expertise in the audit committee (ACCEXP) 
is not associated with FV. This suggests the hypothesis number 13 that there is a positive 
relationship between the presence of an accounting expertise in the audit committee and FV is 
rejected. The underlying study is the first to examine the effect of the presence of accounting 
expertise on FV. Other studies (e.g. Defond et al., 2005) investigate the link between the 
appointment of accounting expertise and market reaction using cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs), and does not find a positive association. 
Model 2 reports an insignificant relationship between threat to auditor independence and FV. 
The literature is very scarce in this research filed to allow for a meaningful comparison of the 
findings. Based on the reported results, hypothesis number 14 that there is a positive 
relationship between threat to auditor independence and FV is rejected.  
Finally, regression analysis (Model 2) shows an insignificant coefficient for audit firm size. 
Such results suggest that investor do not view the audit firm size as an indicator for audit 
quality and thus do not evaluate firms on this basis. Therefore, hypothesis number 15 that 
there is a relationship between audit firm size and FV is rejected. 
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Up until this point, Model 2 provides evidence that board independence positively influences 
FV. This suggests that shareholders highly value the presence of independent directors in the 
board. Shareholders thus, view independent directors as a powerful CG element that 
safeguards their rights. This is apparently consistent with agency theory suggesting that, 
agency problems are eliminated through independent board, where shareholders view 
independent directors as minimising the agency conflict between the managers and 
shareholders. The remaining CG mechanisms are not statistically associated with FV. 
Having only few CG mechanisms associated with FV is very common in the literature. As 
contented by Brown et al. (2011, p. 118), “overall, research that takes the endogenous 
relationship into account finds at best only weak support for the proposition that better 
corporate governance practices create value”. Because the current study considers the 
endogeneity problem using fixed effects model, and testing many variables including DQ, 14 
CG mechanisms and 5 controls, such result is not surprising. 
Another two reasons justify the reported insignificance of many CG mechanisms. Firstly, the 
rigid nature of CG. Stated differently, most CG mechanisms within firms typically change 
slowly from year to year or do not change over short periods. Secondly, countries with high 
levels of legal protection (e.g. the U.S. and the UK), are less likely to have many CG 
mechanisms influencing FV (La Porta et al., 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Dahya et al., 
2008, Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; and Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011). Similarly, Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) find little evidence for most governance mechanisms investigated in their 
study and FV.  
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8.3.2.3 Model 3: Regressing FV on DQ, CG Mechanisms, and The Joint Effect of Both 
In an effort to account for the endogenous nature of FV in general and the omitted-variables 
bias in particular, the underlying study adopts two approaches. Firstly, DQ and CG 
mechanisms are entered simultaneously to avoid the omitted-variables bias, i.e. ignoring CG 
mechanisms in model 1, and DQ in model 2. Secondly, model 3 incorporates the joint effect 
of both DQ and CG mechanisms on FV. This is hoped to overcome the deficiencies of 
considering DQ or CG mechanisms independently in prior studies. To evaluate the interaction 
of DQ and CG in affecting FV, the current study introduces the interaction terms as defined 
earlier (see section 8.3). Accordingly, Model 3 introduces interaction terms between DQ and 
each of the CG mechanisms as shown below. 
1 1 1
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Where: 
                                 = intercept term, 
it
QUALITY
               = natural log of disclosure quality score, for firm i, in year t, 
jit
G ov
                         = individual corporate governance mechanisms, j, for firm i, in year t; where j =1 to n.   
kit
Interaction
               = the interactions between individual corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure  
                                         quality for firm i, in year t; where k =1 to m,            
lit
Control
                  = the control variables, l, for firm i, in year t; where l =1to o. 
t

                                = a vector of 3 dummy variables representing the four sample years. 
i

                                = the firm-specific fixed effects, including a vector of 122 variables to represent the 123 
                                        sample firms. 
it
u
                               = the unobserved error component. 
 
There are three main reasons behind the structure of Model 3. Firstly, the model considers the 
combined influence of DQ and each of the CG mechanisms on FV. Secondly, the interaction 
terms are employed to examine whether there are complementary or supplementary impacts 
on firm valuation resulting from the interrelationship between DQ and CG mechanisms. 
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Thirdly, it helps to demonstrate how the results would differ in the presence of endogeneity, 
especially, when running the analysis while omitting some variables (CG in Model 1, and DQ 
in Model 2). 
The regression coefficient Bk, measures the interaction of each of the CG mechanisms and DQ 
with respect to affecting FV. A non-significant regression coefficient indicates that the impact 
of DQ on FV does not vary with CG. A significant positive regression coefficient indicates a 
complementary effect between these two variables, and a negative regression coefficient 
indicates a substitutive effect between these two variables. 
The fifth and the sixth columns of Table 8.2 report the coefficients and t-statistics from using 
the fixed–effect regression where, DQ, CG mechanisms and the interaction of these two 
variables are tested. Model 3 shows that the association between disclosure quality 
(QUALITY) and firm value (Q) is improved after mitigating endogeneity issues. Model 3 
shows a statistically positive relationship between DQ and FV. The coefficient is 1.185 at the 
1.% significant level. Notably, in Model 1, considering the DQ independently did not provide 
evidence on a statistical relationship between FV and DQ.    
In relation to the economic impact of incremental DQ change, a one standard deviation 
change in DQ increases industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by 0.710 [0.391 (quality standard 
deviation) ×1.815 (quality coefficient)]. Whereas in Model 1, a one standard deviation change 
in D does not significantly affect industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Thus, DQ has a greater 
association with FV when considering CG mechanisms. This reinforces the general notion 
that, high-quality disclosure conveys value-relevant information, and that such information is 
significantly valued by the market and reflected in FV. Therefore, results support the 
proposition widely claimed in the extant literature that disclosure is one of the fundamental 
elements contributing to restoring market confidence. It is obvious that high-quality disclosure 
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reduces information asymmetry and helps in mitigating agency problems among the market 
participants, as well as between insiders and outsiders.  
This result further supports Healy and Palepu’s (1993 and 1999) arguments that firstly, high-
quality disclosure is a vital approach for corporate managers to impart their knowledge to 
outside investors, even if capital markets are efficient. Secondly, this positively significant 
association indicates that high-quality disclosure adds more credibility to financial reports and 
enhances investors’ perceptions of the firm, which is then represented in high FV. In this vein, 
managers find that the benefits of disclosure outweigh its associated costs (Healy and Palepu, 
2001).71 
Nonetheless, this conclusion provides empirical support to the assumption made by regulatory 
bodies (i.e. the ASB and the IASB) that information provided voluntarily helps users to 
evaluate firms’ prospects and provide more in-depth insights into management performance; 
in turn, investors use such information and consider it when valuing firms in the market. Most 
significantly, since results reveal that investors, and the market in general, evaluate firms’ 
DQ, this strongly underscores the importance of having a valid measure of DQ. Based on 
these results, hypotheses number 1 that there is association between is accepted. 
With respect to the joint effect of different CG mechanisms and DQ, the last two columns of 
Table 8.2 reports the coefficients and t-statistics respectively. The first interaction term is  
D.BIND. This is the interaction between DQ and the first CG mechanism, namely; board 
independence. This interaction term is used to reflect the joint effect of board independence 
and DQ on FV. It also helps to identify if DQ and board independence are supplementary or 
complementary. The coefficient of D.BIND is significantly positive at the 5% significance 
level, indicating that the impact of DQ on FV is higher for firms with more independent 
                                                 
71 See chapter Three for a detailed discussion on the benefits and costs of DQ. 
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boards. The positive sign of this coefficient indicates a complementary relationship between 
DQ and board independence with respect to affecting firm value. The overall impact of DQ 
which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients of D and D.BIND, is positive and significant 
(2.054), providing evidence that disclosure quality has a greater impact on firm value when 
combined with independent board of directors. 
The incremental effect of BIND on the slope which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients 
of BIND and D.BIND (-0.514), where, the coefficient for BIND is negative and greater than the 
combined coefficient of the interaction. Notably, the incremental effect (0.514) is lower than 
the coefficient estimate for BIND (0.753). Therefore, this provides evidence that FV is higher 
for firms with high quality disclosure and independence boards. In conclusion, DQ and board 
independence complement each other in affecting FV. Regression analysis provides an 
evidence to support hypothesis number 2 that board independence is associated with FV. 
The second interaction term is D.REMIND. This is the interaction between DQ and 
remuneration committee independence. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined 
influence of remuneration committee independence and DQ on FV. It also helps to identify if 
DQ and remuneration committee independence are supplementary or complementary.  
The coefficient of is D.REMIND is insignificant, indicating that the impact of DQ on firm 
value does not vary with the remuneration committee independence level. The overall impact 
of disclosure which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients of D and D.REMIND, is 
positive, yet insignificant (1.846), providing evidence that DQ’s impact on FV does not vary 
with the independence level of the remuneration committee. At the other end, the incremental 
effect is REMIND on the slope which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients of REMIND 
and D.REMIND is (-0.081) but insignificant, and is lower than the coefficient estimate for 
REMIND (0.112). 
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To sum up, results do not provide evidence to support hypothesis number 3 that remuneration 
committee independence is associated with FV. Consequently, hypothesis number 3 is 
rejected. Since the interaction term is not significant, results suggest that remuneration 
committee independence is not significantly associated with FV either in firms providing high 
disclosure quality, or in firms with low disclosure quality. Stated differently, remuneration 
committee independence is not associated with FV regardless of the quality of disclosure 
being reported. It also suggests that remuneration committee independence does not 
complement or supplement disclosure quality. 
The third interaction term is D.ACIND. This is the interaction between disclosure quality and 
audit committee independence. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined influence 
of audit committee independence and high disclosure quality on firm value. It also helps to 
identify if disclosure quality and audit committee independence are supplementary or 
complementary.  
The coefficient of D.ACIND is significantly negative at the 1% significance level, indicating 
that the impact of DQ on firm value is higher for firms with more independent audit 
committees. The sign of this coefficient indicates a substitutive relationship between DQ and 
audit committee independence with respect to affecting FV. The overall impact of disclosure 
which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients of D and D.ACIND, is positive and 
significant (1.649), providing evidence that DQ has a greater impact on firm value in firms 
with more independent audit committee. 
At the other end, coefficient of ACIND in the model is significantly positive at the 1% 
significance level. This shows that ACIND is positively associated with FV. The incremental 
effect of ACIND on the slope, which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients of is ACIND 
and D.ACIND is (0.386), and is higher than the coefficient estimate for ACIND (0.552). These 
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conclusions provide evidence that DQ and audit committee independence are substitutive 
mechanisms that influence FV. Apparently, the impact of disclosure quality D on FV is higher 
than that of ACIND. Thus, firms that provide high quality disclosure but less independent 
audit committees enjoy higher firm value than firms with low disclosure quality but more 
independent audit committee. Accordingly, Hypothesis number 4 regarding the association 
between DQ and audit committee independence is accepted.  
The fourth interaction term is D.BSIZE. This is the interaction between disclosure quality and 
board size. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined influence of board size and 
high disclosure quality on firm value. It also helps to identify if disclosure quality and board 
size are supplementary or complementary. The regression coefficient of D.BSIZE is 
insignificant. The insignificant relationship reflects that the impact of DQ on FV does not 
vary with board size. Stated differently, DQ is positively associated with FV regardless of the 
board size. The coefficient of BSIZE is insignificant indicating that board size as a CG 
mechanism is not associated with FV. Accordingly, regression results do not support 
hypothesis number 5 regarding the relationship between board size and firm value is rejected.   
The fifth interaction term is D.REMSIZE. This is the interaction between disclosure quality 
and remuneration committee size. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined 
influence of remuneration committee size and high disclosure quality on FV. It also helps to 
identify if disclosure quality and remuneration committee size are supplementary or 
complementary.  
The regression coefficient of D.REMSIZE is insignificant. The insignificant relationship 
reflects that the impact of DQ on FV does not vary with remuneration committee size. Indeed, 
model 3 shows that DQ is positively associated with FV regardless of remuneration 
committee size. The coefficient of REMSIZE is insignificant indicating that remuneration 
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committee size as a CG mechanism is not associated with FV whether firms disclose 
information at high or low quality. Accordingly, regression results do not support hypothesis 
number 6 regarding the relationship between remuneration committee size and FV is rejected.   
The sixth interaction term is D.ACSIZE. This is the interaction between disclosure quality and 
audit committee size. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined influence of audit 
committee size and high disclosure quality on FV. It also helps to identify the nature of the 
joint effect if any, whether supplementary or complementary. The coefficient of D.ACSIZE is 
significantly negative at the 1% significance level, indicating that the impact of DQ on FV is 
higher for firms with bigger audit committees. The sign of this coefficient indicates a 
substitutive relationship between DQ, and audit committee size structure with respect to 
affecting FV. The overall impact of disclosure which is indicated by the sum of the 
coefficients of D and D.ACSIZE, is positive and significant (1.782), providing evidence that 
DQ has a greater impact on firm value in firms with bigger audit committees. 
At the other end, coefficient of ACSIZE is insignificant. This shows that ACSIZE does not 
significantly affect FV when firms provide high quality disclosure. The incremental effect of 
ACSIZE on the slope, which is indicated by the sum of the coefficients of is ACSIZE and 
D.ACSIZE is (0.076), and is lower than the coefficient estimate for ACSIZE (0.109). These 
conclusions provide evidence that DQ and audit committee independence are substitutive 
mechanisms that influence FV.  Apparently, the impact of disclosure quality D on firm value 
is higher than that of ACSIZE. Thus, firms that provide high quality disclosure and smaller 
audit committee size enjoy higher firm value than firms with low disclosure quality but bigger 
audit committee size. Accordingly, Hypothesis number 7 regarding the association between 
DQ and audit committee independence is accepted.  
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The seventh interaction term is D.LEAD. This is the interaction between DQ and lack of 
separation in leadership structure. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined 
influence of audit committee size and high DQ on FV. It also helps to identify if DQ and lack 
of separation in leadership structure are supplementary or complementary.  
The coefficient of D.LEAD is insignificant, indicating that the impact of disclosure quality on 
FV does not vary with lack of separation in leadership structure. The coefficient of LEAD is 
insignificant suggesting that leadership structure, as a CG mechanism is not associated with 
FV whether firms disclose information at high or low quality. Accordingly, regression results 
do not evidence to support hypothesis number 8 regarding the relationship between 
remuneration committee size and firm value is rejected.   
The eighth interaction term is D.BMF. This is the interaction between disclosure quality and 
board meeting frequency. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined influence of 
board meeting frequency and high disclosure quality on FV. Additionally, it helps to identify 
if disclosure quality and board meeting frequency are supplementary or complementary.  
The coefficient of D.BMF is insignificant, indicating that board meeting frequency is not 
significantly associated with FV, either in firms providing high disclosure quality or firms 
with low disclosure quality. This suggests that board meeting frequency is not associated with 
FV regardless of the quality of disclosure being reported. Similarly, the coefficient of BMF is 
insignificant. Recalling that the coefficient of disclosure quality D shows a positive significant 
association with FV, this suggests that, board meeting frequency does not complement or 
supplement disclosure quality. To sum up, regression results provide no evidence to support 
hypothesis number 9 that board meeting frequency is positively associated with FV, and 
hence, hypothesis number nine is rejected. 
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The ninth interaction term is D.ACMF. This is the interaction between disclosure quality and 
audit committee meeting frequency. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined 
influence of audit committee meeting frequency and high disclosure quality on firm value. It 
also helps to identify if disclosure quality and audit committee meeting frequency, are 
supplementary or complementary.  
The coefficient of D.ACMF is insignificant, indicating that audit committee meeting 
frequency is not significantly associated with FV, either in firms providing high disclosure 
quality or firms with low disclosure quality. This suggests that audit committee meeting 
frequency is not associated with FV regardless of the quality of disclosure being reported. 
Similarly, the coefficient of ACMF is insignificant. Recalling that the coefficient of disclosure 
quality D shows a positive significant association with FV, this suggests that the number of 
audit committee meetings does not complement or supplement disclosure quality.  
In summary, regression results provide no evidence to support hypothesis number 10 that 
audit committee meeting frequency is positively associated with FV, and hence, hypothesis 
number ten is rejected. 
The tenth interaction term is D.MOWNER. This is the interaction between disclosure quality 
and managerial ownership. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined influence of 
managerial ownership and high disclosure quality on FV.  
This suggests that managerial ownership is not associated with FV regardless of the quality of 
disclosure being reported. Similarly, the coefficient of MOWNER is insignificant. Recalling 
that the coefficient of disclosure quality D shows a positive significant association with FV, 
this suggests that managerial ownership does not complement or supplement disclosure 
quality. To sum up, regression results provide no evidence to support hypothesis number 
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eleven that managerial ownership is associated with FV, and hence, hypothesis number eleven 
is rejected. 
The eleventh interaction term is D.CONCEN. This is the interaction between disclosure 
quality and ownership concentration. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined 
influence of ownership concentration and high disclosure quality on FV. It also helps to 
identify if disclosure quality and ownership concentration are supplementary or 
complementary.   
This suggests that ownership concentration is not associated with FV regardless of the quality 
of disclosure being reported. Similarly, the coefficient of CONCEN is insignificant. Recalling 
that the coefficient of disclosure quality D shows a positive significant association with FV, 
this suggests that managerial ownership does not complement or supplement disclosure 
quality. Therefore, regression results do not support hypothesis number 12 that managerial 
ownership is associated with FV, and hence, hypothesis number 12 is rejected. 
The twelfth interaction term is D.ACCEXP. This is the interaction between disclosure quality 
and the presence of an accounting expertise in the audit committee. This interaction term is 
used to reflect the combined influence of accounting expertise and high disclosure quality on 
FV. It also helps to identify if disclosure quality and accounting expertise are supplementary 
or complementary.  
Model 3 suggests that the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee is not 
associated with FV. The coefficient of ACCEXP is insignificant. Recalling that the coefficient 
of disclosure quality D shows a positive significant association with firm value, this suggests 
that managerial ownership does not complement or supplement disclosure quality.  
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To sum up, regression results provide no evidence to support hypothesis number 13 that the 
presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee is associated with FV, and hence, 
hypothesis number 13 is rejected. 
The thirteenth interaction term is D.AIND. This is the interaction between disclosure quality 
and threat to auditor independence. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined 
influence of threat to auditor independence and high disclosure quality on FV. It also helps to 
identify if disclosure quality and threat to auditor independence are supplementary or 
complementary.  
The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant indicating that threat to auditor 
independence is not significantly associated with FV. Similarly, the regression coefficient of 
the threat to auditor independence variable (AIND) in model 3 does not support hypothesis 
number 14 that threat to auditor independence is positively associated with FV. Recalling that 
the coefficient of disclosure quality D, shows a positive significant association with FV, this 
suggests that threat to auditor independence does not complement or supplement disclosure 
quality. To conclude, hypothesis number 14 that threat to auditor independence is positively 
associated with FV is rejected. 
The final interaction term in model 3 is D.ASIZE. This is the interaction between disclosure 
quality and audit firm size. This interaction term is used to reflect the combined influence of 
audit firm size and high disclosure quality on FV. It also helps to identify if disclosure quality 
and audit firm size are supplementary or complementary.  
The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant indicating that audit firm size is not 
significantly associated with FV. Similarly, the regression coefficient of the audit firm size 
variable (ASIZE) in model 3 does not support hypothesis number fourteen that threat to 
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auditor independence is positively associated with FV. Recalling that the coefficient of 
disclosure quality D shows a positive significant association with FV, this suggests that audit 
firm size does not complement or supplement disclosure quality. To conclude, hypothesis 
number 15 that audit firm size is positively associated with FV is rejected. 
Firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and market share (SHAR) show a consistent relationship 
with firm value (Q) over the three models.72 Similar to the common findings in the literature, 
firm size appears to be negatively associated with FV (e.g. Klapper and Love, 2004; Klein et 
al., 2005; Shue et al. 2010; Benson and Davidson, 2010; and Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010), 
implying that large firms defend their extensive assets base as collateral and therefore do not 
need to raise external capital. Investors consequently suspect the governance of these firms, 
and underestimate their value (Beak et al., 2004). Most significantly, this result is consistent 
with a recent study on FTSE 350 firms by Abdullah and Page (2009). The authors confirm the 
underlying study’s findings of the negative relationship between firm size and firm value, 
measured by (Q). They explain these relationships by stating that large firms are less likely to 
have growth opportunities, and therefore require less finance than smaller ones. 
Leverage has a strong positive relationship with FV, supporting the notion contended by some 
scholars that leverage has a role in mitigating agency conflict, as discussed earlier (e.g. Beiner 
et al. 2006; and Aggarwal et al., 2009). As reported in prior studies (e.g. Black et al., 2006), 
Market share is positively associated with FV at the 1% significance level.  
Overall, results of Model 3 support agency theory, that disclosure quality (QUALITY) is an 
effective mechanism that mitigates the agency problem and promotes FV. Additionally, 
results provide evidence that there are two CG mechanisms influencing firm value in the UK, 
                                                 
72 The significance level of firm size is 5% in Model 1 and Model 2, yet, weakly significant at the 10% level in 
Model 3. 
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namely; board independence (BIND) and audit committee independence (ACIND). Both are 
significantly positively associated with FV. Accordingly, the first hypothesis, that firms which 
provide high levels of disclosure exhibit high value, is accepted. Similarly, results suggest that 
hypothesis number 2 that there is a relationship between board independence and FV and that 
hypothesis 4 that a positive relationship between the audit committee independence and FV 
are accepted. The remaining CG variables do not appear to be associated with firm value and 
therefore, the related hypotheses to such mechanisms are rejected. Importantly, as discussed 
and justified above in section 7.3.2, having only a few governance mechanisms affecting firm 
value is very common in the literature (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Henry 2010; and 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010).  
With respect to the joint effect of DQ and CG mechanism, Table 8.2, model 3 shows that, the 
impact of DQ on FV is particularly pronounced in firms with smaller and less independent 
audit committees. Thus, these results provide evidence for a substitutive relationship between 
DQ and CG with respect to effects on firm value. Additionally, results intend to report that the 
impact of DQ on FV is particularly pronounced in firms with more independent board of 
directors. Therefore, such results support a complementary relationship between DQ and CG 
with respect to effects on FV. Accordingly, hypothesis number 16 that relationship between 
DQ and FV varies with the existence of different CG mechanisms in a firm is accepted.  
Notably, the relationship between DQ, CG mechanisms and FV is different across the three 
models. This reports and highlights the effect of omitted-variables bias discussed earlier in 
chapter Seven where only one and/or few variables are considered in evaluating the 
relationship with FV. Particularly, it identifies the limitations of prior studies that examine 
DQ in isolation of other influencing variables on FV, or studies that consider CG 
  
 334 
independently, or studies that use a very limited number of CG mechanisms where the 
possibility of omitted-variables bias is intensified.  
These findings can be regarded as one reason for the mixed evidence in the literature 
investigating factors influencing FV. The different results reported over the three models are 
consistent with the findings of prior literature, where different studies, using different 
variables, provide different results. Nonetheless, while the current study attempts to mitigate 
variable bias, it cannot be confidently argued that the study eliminates such bias completely. 
8.3.3 Robustness Test (Sensitivity Analysis) 
Usually studies of a similar nature, investigating the effect of CG and/or DQ on FV run an 
OLS regression analysis as their main test. Afterwards, the authors run a robustness test using 
instrumental variable equations to tackle the endogeneity problem (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006) or 
run a different regression test (e.g. logit regression). Notably they defend their results on the 
basis of having similar results over different regression analyses. Unfortunately, this approach 
has been criticised and is argued to be imprecise. Larcker and Rusticus contend that: 
“One unusual aspect of the typical robustness analysis is that the researchers frequently 
comment that their results are ‘robust’ to endogeneity if the IV and OLS results produce 
similar estimates. Unfortunately, if there are theoretical reasons to suspect serious 
endogeneity concerns, the similarity of the results may also indicate that the selected IVs are 
inadequate, as opposed to the reported results being unaffected by endogeneity” (2010, p. 
188). 
While Larcker and Rusticus (2010) question using this approach to signal mitigation of 
endogeneity, Lent (2007, p. 202) raises concerns about this approach, stating that in general, 
the fact that “the results do not change in the robustness checks in most papers has less to do 
with the soundness of the research as with self selection”. Lent (2007) questions editors’ 
tendency to reject papers on the premise of changing results in the robustness section. In 
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contrast, arguably, researchers should analyse the data until the results change significantly if 
scientific progress is to be best served (Lent, 2007). 
Drawing on the above concerns about the traditional approach73 of robustness tests, the 
current study responds to Lent’s (2007) call for courageous researchers to implement a new 
approach in robustness tests, and thus this section addresses how the results might differ. 
Specifically, the current study devotes this section to answering the question of whether or not 
investors value a multidimensional quality concept. Or rather, whether investors have some 
preferences in terms of the sub-dimensions of DQ. 
Several possibilities are predicted. The first possibility is consistent with the theoretical 
premise that quality is a multidimensional concept, and that it is hard to tell what specific 
dimensions are most valued by investors (i.e. dimensions that affect firm value). If this is true, 
it is expected that there will be no association between individual quality dimensions and FV. 
The second possibility is that investors concentrate on some individual quality dimensions. In 
this case, there should be a positive significant association between the preferred dimensions 
and FV. The third possibility is that the overall quality contains some individual dimensions 
that investors find less helpful, and therefore, such dimensions would negatively affect FV.  
The most relevant example here is the readability of OFR statements. If investors find it very 
difficult to read the information provided, it is expected that it will affect FV negatively. 
Similarly, if OFR statements are perceived as being very difficult, this is most likely to impact 
the qualitative dimension. Whatever possibility is identified, analysing the individual 
                                                 
73Following Konijn et al. (2011), two traditional robustness tests are conducted. The first is the inclusion of alternative 
measures of control variables and the second involves adding more controls to the model. In applying the first approach, 
earnings per share (EPS) was included as a substitution for return on equity (ROE) in measuring profitability, and  results 
were robust. Additionally, in measuring firm size, sales were included as an alternative to total assets and results were not 
sensitive to this change. Therefore, it is concluded that, results are not sensitive to changes in control variable definitions. As 
a second approach for traditional robustness tests, a new control variable, which is not heavily used in prior research but only 
used by one or two studies (i.e. analysts following), is included in the analysis. Results show consistent findings and are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of analysts following. 
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dimensions of quality would either reinforce the current proposed quality framework or attract 
attention to the specific quality dimensions that are more valued, or those that are less valued 
– for which recommendations could be made to improve the OFR statement’s usefulness. 
To answer the question of whether some quality dimensions are more important for investors 
than others, or rather, whether investors evaluate the overall quality, the current section 
presents comparisons among the seven individual quality dimensions. In doing so, a 
replication of fixed-effect regression is necessary. Therefore, individual dimensions substitute 
the quality score, one at a time. This results in having seven models. For valid and meaningful 
comparisons with the overall quality score, each model includes the following independent 
variables: the individual quality dimension, the same set of CG mechanisms examined in the 
main analysis, and the interactions between the specific individual quality dimension and each 
corporate governance mechanism. Table 8.4 reports the results of the seven models. Table 8.4 
shows the effect of overall and individual DQ attributes on FV. Model 1 shows findings of the 
overall DQ. Models 2 to 8 show results of the individual DQ attributes. 
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Table 8.3: Fixed-Effect Regression of Industry-Median Tobin’s Q (Q) on Individual DQ Dimensions and CG Mechanisms 
 
(FL) the proportion of forward-looking information,(FLQ) the proportion of forward-looking qualitative information, (QUAL)the proportion of qualitative information, (SPREAD)_the spread of topics disclosed, (BLG), the proportion of bad to good news given the industry 
leader n proportion, (I/LIX) readability measure,(QUALITY) the quality score, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) board size, (LEAD)  lack of separation  in leadership structure, (BMF) board meeting frequency,(REMIND) remuneration committee independence, 
(REMSIZE) remuneration committee independence, (MOWNER) managerial ownership, (CONCEN) ownership concentration,(ACIND) audit committee independence, (ACSIZE) audit committee size, (ACCEXP) the presence of accounting expertise in the audit committee, 
(ACMF) audit committee meeting frequency, (AIND) threat to auditor independence, (ASIZE) external auditor size, (QUALITY) quality, (BIND) board independence, (BSIZE) board size, (QUALITY * BIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and board 
independence, (QUALITY * BSIZE), the interaction between the disclosure score and board size, (QUALITY * LEAD) the interaction between the disclosure score and lack of separation  in leadership structure, (QUALITY * BMF) the interaction between the disclosure score 
and board meeting frequency, (QUALITY * REMIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and board remuneration committee independence, (QUALITY * REMSIZE) the interaction between the disclosure score and board remuneration committee size, (QUALITY * 
MOWNER) the interaction between the disclosure score and managerial ownership, (QUALITY * CONCEN) the interaction between the disclosure score and ownership concentration,  (QUALITY * ACIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and audit committee 
independence, (QUALITY * ACSIZE) the interaction between the disclosure score and audit committee size, (QUALITY * ACC*P) the interaction between the disclosure score and audit committee accounting expertise, (QUALITY * ACMF) the interaction between the 
disclosure score and audit committee meeting frequency, (QUALITY *AIND) the interaction between the disclosure score and threat to auditor independence, (QUALITY * SIZE) the interaction between the disclosure score and auditor size, (SIZE)  firm size, (PROF) 
profitability, (LEV) leverage, (GROWTH) sales growth, (MSHARE) market share. Number of observations (n=488), ***, **, * Significant at 1%; 5% and 10% respectively. Model 1 includes disclosure quality only, model2 regress governance mechanisms only, model 3 
includes disclosure quality and corporate governance mechanisms. 
 Overall Quality Score 
QUALITY 
FL 
FL 
FLQ 
FLQ 
Qualitative 
QUAL 
Spread 
SPREAD 
BLG 
BGL 
30/LIX 
LIX 
KPIs 
KPIs Coef. Est. P> |t| Coef. 
Est. 
P> |t| 
 
Coef. Est. P> |t| Coef. Est. P> |t| Coef. Est. P> |t| Coef. 
Est. 
P> |t| Coef. Est. P> |t| Coef. Est. P> |t| 
QUALITY 
1.815* 0.084 
-1.259 0.387 -1.289 0.406 -4.518 0.431 0.359 0.492 -0.138 0.709 -0.790 0.786 0.542 0.200 
BIND -0.753* 0.065 0.304* 0.050 0.090 0.553 -0.054 0.848 0.337 0.268 0.117 0.503 0.753 0.171 -0.066 0.443 
REMIND -0.112 0.731 -0.086 0.444 -0.033 0.698 -0.160 0.343 -0.147 0.549 -0.240 0.169 0.007 0.986 0.002 0.968 
ACIND 0.552* 0.081 -0.033 0.762 0.017 0.872 0.127 0.480 0.142 0.665 0.076 0.577 -0.360 0.486 0.075 0.203 
BSIZE  -0.034 0.126 0.005 0.585 0.0001 0.990 -0.001 0.966 -0.009 0.538 -0.005 0.619 0.046 0.178 -0.008 0.112 
REMSIZE -0.028 0.641 0.012 0.642 -0.022 0.313 0.022 0.533 -0.019 0.660 -0.002 0.941 0.090 0.332 0.001 0.929 
ACSIZE 0.109 0.105 -0.039 0.146 0.008 0.737 0.075* 0.093 0.017 0.722 0.013 0.668 -0.140 0.178 0.009 0.477 
LEAD -0.060 0.713 0.057 0.545 -0.040 0.526 0.001 0.994 0.103 0.458 -0.041 0.460 -0.404 0.178 -0.047 0.135 
BMF 0.004 0.801 -0.006 0.376 0.005 0.479 -0.016 0.230 -0.003 0.788 0.003 0.716 0.024 0.351 0.001 0.880 
ACMF -0.002 0.938 -0.007 0.620 -0.009 0.548 -0.014 0.541 0.013 0.590 0.014 0.369 -0.045 0.318 -0.002 0.781 
MOWNER 0.003 0.418 -0.001 0.393 0.0003 0.862 -0.001 0.664 0.003 0.171 0.001 0.595 0.008* 0.099 0.001 0.451 
CONCEN 0.001 0.705 -0.001 0.490 0.001 0.368 0.0003 0.835 -0.0004 0.804 0.0004 0.710 -0.002 0.615 0.0003 0.450 
ACCEXP -0.052 0.479 -0.005 0.869 0.049 0.107 -0.078 0.149 -0.019 0.742 -0.025 0.407 0.117 0.260 0.003 0.852 
AIND -0.009 0.957 -0.082 0.223 -0.031 0.618 -0.003 0.981 0.140 0.287 -0.013 0.848 0.124 0.598 0.022 0.487 
ASIZE 0.602 0.247 -0.151 0.477 -0.590 0.277 -2.950 0.400 0.014 0.958 -0.165 0.365 -0.895 0.506 0.026 0.836 
QUALITY * BIND 0.239** 0.029 -0.975 0.270 0.092 0.804 0.297 0.530 -0.272 0.478 0.004 0.983 -1.239 0.260 0.515*** 0.002 
QUALITY *REMIND 0.031 0.733 0.398 0.580 0.014 0.946 0.252 0.415 0.158 0.623 0.238 0.203 -0.060 0.940 -0.034 0.797 
QUALITY * ACIND -0.166* 0.067 0.076 0.912 -0.071 0.781 -0.257 0.434 -0.209 0.634 -0.099 0.510 0.683 0.511 -0.310** 0.028 
QUALITY * BSIZE 0.009 0.127 -0.030 0.540 -0.003 0.895 -0.001 0.980 0.012 0.518 0.005 0.609 -0.089 0.179 0.018** 0.043 
QUALITY*REMSIZE 0.010 0.520 -0.026 0.856 0.072 0.163 -0.023 0.706 0.035 0.534 0.012 0.678 -0.171 0.363 0.015 0.507 
QUALITY * ACSIZE -0.033* 0.073 0.180 0.258 -0.042 0.448 -0.148* 0.057 -0.037 0.562 -0.026 0.417 0.266 0.211 -0.045* 0.070 
QUALITY * LEAD 0.007 0.892 -0.455 0.395 0.041 0.781 -0.043 0.860 -0.181 0.339 0.011 0.866 0.733 0.207 0.093 0.206 
QUALITY * BMF -0.001 0.781 0.042 0.299 -0.010 0.511 0.029 0.220 0.005 0.756 -0.003 0.753 -0.049 0.346 -0.004 0.568 
QUALITY * ACMF 0.0003 0.961 0.031 0.686 0.016 0.605 0.022 0.600 -0.017 0.555 -0.016 0.321 0.092 0.328 0.001 0.948 
QUALITY*MOWNER -0.001 0.446 0.009 0.301 -0.0004 0.921 0.002 0.627 -0.004 0.195 -0.001 0.707 -0.015 0.107 -0.001 0.554 
QUALITY *CONCEN 0.000 0.797 0.007 0.278 -0.001 0.633 0.000 0.999 0.001 0.639 -0.0001 0.936 0.004 0.556 -0.0003 0.758 
QUALITY * ACCEXP 0.016 0.437 0.065 0.710 -0.109 0.132 0.139 0.130 0.035 0.645 0.035 0.298 -0.222 0.282 0.002 0.963 
QUALITY * AIND 0.0003 0.994 0.461 0.257 0.046 0.765 -0.016 0.938 -0.199 0.244 0.003 0.969 -0.266 0.573 -0.073 0.296 
QUALITY X ASIZE -0.218 0.187 0.081 0.944 1.311 0.390 4.602 0.421 -0.221 0.538 0.078 0.800 1.516 0.572 -0.494 0.196 
SIZE -0.063*** 0.002 -0.067*** 
sddfzfddffd
gdfgfdgfdfd
fdfddfr rfdt          
drftrt 
trrtrtfgte  
0.001 -0.062*** 0.002 -0.068** 0.001 -0.070*** 0.001 -0.067*** 0.001 -0.064*** 0.001 -0.061*** 0.003 
PROF 0.0002 0.218 0.0001 0.214 0.0001 0.323 0.0001 0.293 0.0001 0.306 0.0001 0.350 0.0001 0.238 0.0001 0.224 
LEV 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 
GROWTH -0.0003 0.251 -0.0002 0.447 -0.0002 0.394 -0.0002 0.459 -0.0002 0.489 -0.0002 0.355 -0.0002 0.405 -0.0003 0.263 
SHARE 0.047* 0.076 0.045* 0.091 0.051* 0.055 0.048 0.074 0.048* 0.070 0.050* 0.062 0.054* 0.043 0.041 0.114 
Intercept -0.251 0.654 0.913*** 0.003 1.127* 0.054 3.509 0.319 0.485 0.275 0.807* 0.011 1.076 0.462 0.512 0.031 
       
       -4.518 
         
R Squared       34.85%        64%         63.8%        64.5%       63.7%         63.5%        64.2%      65%  
F-Value      5.51*** 
 
0.000      17.3*** 0.000        17.2* 0.000 17.7*** 0.000 17.1*** 0.000 6*** 0.000 187.5% 0.000 18.1** 0.000 
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Model 2 shows that the proportion of forward-looking information (FL) is not significantly 
associated with FV. This result implies that investors do not value it in isolation from the 
overall DQ. Bearing in mind that (FL) reflects disclosure relevance, results indicate that 
although relevance contributes to the overall DQ, it is not enough for disclosure to be relevant 
to bear an effect on FV. 
Considering the coefficient of other independent variables does not add to the robustness test, 
as long as this test is condensed to focus on investigating whether investors value one quality 
dimension more than the others do. However, one conclusion merits notice here. (FL) has 
been used by several studies as a proxy for quality, resting on the notion that both measures 
are related and would result in similar conclusions. Significantly, noting the different 
associations between CG mechanisms and FV than the ones reported using the quality 
measure (column one) casts doubt on this proposition. These findings are similar to the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis conducted in chapter Six with regards to identifying 
disclosure quality determinants. Accordingly, there is clear evidence that using disclosure 
quantity (FL) as a proxy for quality is misleading, and is not recognised. 
Model 3 presents results of regressing the second and third quality dimensions, namely future-
looking orientation and verifiability of disclosure measured via the proportion of forward-
looking quantitative information (FLQ). No evidence found that investors rely solely on the 
verifiability of disclosures or its future-orientation scope when making decisions on firm 
value.  
Model 4 of Table 8.4 reports results of regressing the proportion of qualitative (QUAL) 
information as a quality dimension, on FV. Notably, as discussed in chapter Four, the 
proportion of qualitative (QUAL) information is used to measure to what extent the disclosure 
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supplements the financial statements. Accordingly, looking at Model 4, one can conclude that 
supplementing the financial statements, as a quality dimension does not convey value-relevant 
information when other quality dimensions are overlooked.   
When considering how comprehensive the disclosure is, measured through the spread of 
topics disclosed (SPREAD), results reported in Model 5 suggest that being comprehensive is 
not significantly important for users in the absence of other quality dimensions. This is 
evident from the insignificant association between (SPREAD) and FV when controlling for 
CG mechanisms and FV. 
Recalling that this quality dimension is referred to in the extant literature as the “occurrence”, 
and that a vast number of studies use proxies for quality,74 some conclusions that have 
essential implications are worthy of note. 
Firstly, from the investors’ point of view, this dimension by itself does not add valuable 
information that in turn will be reflected in FV. Secondly, from an academic viewpoint, 
having different results in terms of CG mechanisms affecting FV when using this proxy, 
compared to those reported when using the overall quality (Model 1), implies that, using 
“occurrence” as a proxy for quality is fraught with potential problems. More severely, this is 
likely to shift the reported results on different quality aspects away from being accurate, and 
accordingly researchers may draw misleading conclusions. Comparing column five’s 
conclusions with similar ones drawn from Model 1 when using disclosure quantity highlights 
the importance of researchers using DQ rather than proxies in examining research questions 
linked with DQ. 
                                                 
74 See chapter Three for a comprehensive discussion of different proxies for DQ. 
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Column six shows results of regressing FV with regards to different CG mechanisms and the 
balance of disclosure (BGL). Similar to prior findings, the regression shows an insignificant 
relationship between (BGL) and FV. Accordingly, fairly balanced disclosure does not 
influence FV.  
Column seven reports results associated with the readability (LIX) of OFR statements. Again, 
there is no evidence to support the idea that easily readable disclosure positively influences 
FV. Though results show that UK firms’ disclosures are often very difficult to read, this does 
not negatively affect FV. One likely justification could be that investors in the UK market are 
highly experienced, like US investors (e.g. Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). The second 
possibility could be that investors seek advice from financial analysts who are highly 
experienced in reading and analysing annual reports, and that therefore, the readability of the 
disclosure does not negatively affect FV. However, a policy implication is to stress the need 
to simplify the wording of disclosure statements to an acceptable level that would enable 
inexperienced investors to easily comprehend their content. Obviously, the model is 
insignificant as apparent from the F value significance figure; thus, results should be taken 
with caution. 
Model 8 presents results of considering only the comparability of disclosure measured 
through (KPIs) in isolation from other quality dimensions. There is a weak significant 
relationship between the comparability of disclosure statements and FV.  
In sum, the regression models presented in Table 8.4 shows evidence supporting the academic 
and regulatory bodies’ premise that disclosure is a complicated concept that is difficult to sub-
divide. In this sense, DQ gains its powerful impact on different aspects in a broad sense, and 
specifically on FV, in the underlying study, from being a multidimensional concept. Such 
conclusions justify the IASB’s recently introduced framework for high-quality disclosure 
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(known as Management Commentary (2010)), which includes the same dimensions included 
in the disclosure quality measure proposed here. 
8.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter empirically investigated the association between, DQ, CG, and FV using fixed- 
effect model. Results underscore and support the proposition that DQ is a key determinant of 
FV in UK firms. Results also suggest that DQ enjoys a substitutive relationship with two CG 
mechanisms (audit committee independence and audit committee size) and a complementary 
association with board independence. These findings highlight the fact that DQ has been an 
omitted variable in prior studies that test and evaluate the relationship between CG and FV. 
Looking at the result variations across the three models presented in Table 8.2 emphasises the 
importance of controlling for possible endogeneity between FV and CG, either through the 
model used (i.e. fixed-effect) or through including omitted variables (i.e. DQ and 
comprehensive CG mechanisms), to derive a valid causality relationship.  
The following Table 8.4 links chapter Seven and Eight by listing the 15 hypotheses developed 
in chapter Seven, along with  results of the analysis conducted in the current chapter (Eight). 
Columns 1 and 2 are extracted from chapter Seven whereas; columns 4 and 5 are concluded 
from chapter Eight. Column 1 lists the independent variables. Column 2 shows the expected 
association as highlighted in each hypothesis (chapter Seven). Column 3 lists the actual 
direction of the relationship found between each of the CG variables and DQ. Column 4 
shows result of the analysis (rejecting/accepting the hypothesis). 
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Table 8.4: Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 
number 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
 Expected 
Association 
Reported 
Association 
Results of the Analysis 
(Rejecting/Accepting 
the hypothesis) 
1 Disclosure Quality          + Significant          Accept 
2 Board Independence          ? significant          Accept 
3 Remuneration 
Committee 
Independence 
 ? Insignificant  Reject 
4 Audit Committee 
Independence 
 ? significant                Accept 
5 Board Size  ? Insignificant Reject 
6 Remuneration 
Committee Size 
 ? Insignificant Reject 
7 Audit Committee 
Size 
 ? significant                 Accept 
8 Lack of Separation 
in Leadership 
Structure 
 ? Insignificant  Reject 
9 Board Meeting 
Frequency 
 + Insignificant 
 
Reject 
10 Audit Committee 
Meeting Frequency 
 + Insignificant Reject 
11 Managerial 
Ownership 
 ? insignificant Reject 
12 Ownership 
Concentration 
 ? Insignificant Reject 
13 Accounting  
Expertise 
 + significant Accept 
              14 Threat to auditor 
independence 
               +      Insignificant                Reject 
15 Audit Firm Size  ? Insignificant Reject 
      
      
Robustness test shows that investors value overall DQ rather than focusing on individual 
quality dimensions. This re-confirms the validity of the DQ measure developed in chapter 
Four. 
This study puts forward some contributions to the limited, but growing body of literature on 
the joint effect of DQ and CG mechanisms on firm value through multiple dimensions. 
Firstly, the underlying study presents an integrated empirical framework, which measures the 
joint effect of DQ and CG mechanisms proposed by The Code on firm value in the UK.  
Secondly, utilising the fixed-effect model, incorporating extensive sets of CG mechanisms 
and controls using the industry-median adjusted Tobin’s Q provides reasonable assurance that 
the current study’s results are not attributable to simultaneity or other endogeneity issues. 
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Therefore, in contrast to most studies, this study is able to introduce  a clear and strong claim 
regarding the causality of governance on firm valuation, since the findings are not restricted to 
a partial correlation. 
Results of this study have several essential implications. One aspect of these is the academic 
and research implications. Importantly, results highlight the importance of using DQ in 
examining different disclosure-related research areas, because using different proxies is most 
likely to provide spurious conclusions. Therefore, this study opens avenues for re-examining 
disclosure relationships, especially research areas that do not have persuasive conclusions.  
Many policy implications are emphasised through this study. Firstly, having reported an 
influential role of disclosure quality in the market, this study provides empirical support for 
the views put forth by the ASB and the IASB that improving narrative DQ is important for 
investors. For example, the ASB (2006, Objective, para. c) contends that the OFR is 
“prepared to assist to assess the strategies adopted by the entity and the potential for those 
strategies to successes”. Similarly, the IASB (2010, para. 14) states that “Management 
commentary should provide information to help users of the financial reports to assess the 
performance of the entity and the actions of its management relative to stated strategies and  
plans for progress”. 
Secondly, because none of the individual quality dimensions are associated with FV, it is 
apparent that investors value the overall score rather than individual dimensions. This is in 
line with ASB’s argument that a best practice statement is composed of several quality 
dimensions (ASB, 2006, para. b&c). 
One important conclusion is that, in spite of finding evidence supporting the link between 
only a few CG mechanisms and FV, and the conclusion that high-quality disclosure substitute 
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and complements an effective governance structure, the importance of other governance 
mechanisms to other perspectives cannot be underestimated, because CG is not solely directed 
to enhancing FV. Brown and Caylor (2006) maintain that CG mechanisms that are unrelated 
to FV are important for other purposes. For example, results reported in chapter Six on the 
association between CG mechanisms and DQ reveal that the lack of separation in leadership 
structure, the audit committee meeting frequency, and audit firm size are positively associated 
with high-quality disclosure. Future research should investigate other avenues such as the 
governance impact on the cost of equity and future accounting outcomes. 
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9.1 Overview 
This research comprised three inter-related studies, each of which had certain defined 
objective(s). The present chapter, therefore, summarises the main findings of each study and 
the implications of these findings on the literature settings and for policy-makers and public 
interest. The chapter then highlights the limitations of the current research and suggests areas 
for further research. 
9.2 Summary of Research Objectives, Questions and Approach 
Research Objectives 
Prior studies examining the association between DQ, CG mechanisms and FV are limited, 
with inconclusive results. Chapter One presented a preliminary discussion for research 
motivations and elaborated research gaps intended to be overcome by the underlying research. 
To best achieve the research objectives, this research is comprised three inter-related studies. 
The first study (chapters Three & Four) mainly worked to meet three research objectives, 
which represent three research gaps associated with DQ literature.  
The first gap was the absence of a well-defined measure for DQ and, therefore, the first 
objective of this study was to introduce a new valid and reliable measure for DQ. The second 
research objective was to develop a multi-dimensional computerised content analysis 
approach to avoid the limitations of ready-made dictionaries whose suitability to disclosure 
context is questionable (e.g. Berger, 2011), and improve upon the prior attempt (i.e. 
Hussainey et al.’s (2003) regarding the development of a computerised approach to identify 
forward-looking disclosures in UK annual reports). Prior research used measures of disclosure 
quantity as a proxy for disclosure quality (e.g. Beekes and Brown, 2006, Celik et al., 2006, 
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Abraham and Cox, 2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007, and Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), 
assuming that disclosure quality and quantity are positively correlated. This assumption, 
however, has been criticised in prior research (see Beattie et al., 2004 and Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004a; 2008 for more details). Hence, the third objective of this research was to 
empirically examine the extent to which disclosure quantity can be used as a proxy for 
disclosure quality.  
The fourth objective of this research was to explain the mixed results of the association 
between DQ and CG. This objective is achieved in the second study through chapters Five 
and Six.  
The third study (chapters Seven and Eight) handles the most prominent research gap in 
relevant literature by investigating the association between DQ, CG, and FV, namely the 
omitted-variable bias. Generally, studies investigate either disclosure with FV, or CG with FV 
Accordingly, the fifth objective of the underlying research was to bridge the gap in FV 
literature and investigate the joint effect of DQ and CG on FV.  
Research Questions 
Four research questions were derived from the research objectives. The first question 
addressed in the underlying research covered the first and the second objectives. The first 
question was articulated as: is it possible to provide a practical definition and a reliable 
measure for disclosure quality? If so, to what extent are the OFR quality dimensions 
recommended by ASB (2006) measurable?  
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The second question addressed was whether disclosure quantity provides a proper proxy for 
DQ. The third research question dealt with identifying what the CG and firm mechanisms are 
that influence DQ in the UK. The fourth research question concentrated on investigating the 
joint effect of DQ and firm-level CG mechanisms on FV in the UK. Figure 1.1 illustrates the 
interrelation between research objectives and questions. 
 Research Approach  
The current research was built on the positivism philosophy. The research used quantitative 
techniques in answering the research questions. OFR narrative section for each firm was 
downloaded from NorthCote database, available online. CG data are partially hand collected 
from the financial statements; for example, to identify the presence of an accounting expertise 
in the audit committee the researcher read each of the audit committee members’ 
bibliographies to identify background; another example is board and audit committee meeting 
frequency. Some other CG data were collected from the Boardex database after some 
necessary work on the raw data. For example, the researcher summed up the number of 
committee members to identify the overall board size. Managerial ownership was collected 
from Datastream. All firm characteristics data and Tobin’s Q were collected from Datastream. 
In meeting the first and the second research objectives, an innovative computerised75 content 
analysis approach was used and five new keyword lists relevant to the disclosure context were 
developed. Such an approach provided the premise for the proposed DQ measure. This should 
allow for large-scale disclosure studies. Each keywords list was developed through three steps 
and a reliability test was conducted before the final keywords list was reached. 
                                                 
75 Of the seven quality dimensions, only one dimension (comparability) was captured through manual content 
analysis. 
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In achieving the third and the fourth research objectives, the underlying research used an OLS 
regression model in investigating whether disclosure quantity provides a proper proxy for 
disclosure quality. OLS was also used in examining the association between firm-level CG 
mechanisms and DQ. 
The fifth research objective answered the question of whether firm value was jointly affected 
by DQ and certain CG mechanisms in large UK firms. Given the endogenous nature of  FV as 
a dependent variable, the current study used a fixed-effect panel data regression model to 
consider the endogeneity problem. Following Palia (2001), the current study compared three 
estimation methods: OLS, random effect, and fixed effect estimations. In doing so, a 
Lagrangian Multiplier test was conducted, which compared OLS estimations against random 
effect estimations. Results recommended the use of random effect over OLS; this is clear with 
Chi2 = 85.27, at the 1% significance level. Next, the Hausman test of fixed versus random 
effects estimations was conducted, which suggested the use of fixed effect over random effect 
technique. Chi2 = 617.49, at the 1% significance level. Accordingly, and in line with Palia 
(2001), the fixed effect was the optimal estimation method to mitigate endogeneity. 
9.3 Research Findings, Contributions and Implications  
 Summary of Findings 
The first and the second objectives were achieved through chapters Three and Four. In chapter 
Three, the framework used as the basis for the proposed disclosure quality measure, OFR was 
discussed. Afterwards, the proposed definition for DQ was presented with a detailed 
discussion of its seven quality dimensions. Finally, chapter Three ended by elaborating on 
how each quality dimension was captured to reach the overall quality score. This allowed a 
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more considered definition of DQ rather than using proxies. Chapter Four concluded by 
presenting the formula employed to derive the aggregated quality score and discussed 
reliability and validity tests. Accordingly, chapters Three and Four fulfilled the first objective 
and introduced a new, valid and reliable measure of DQ, and presented an innovative multi-
dimensional computerised content analysis approach to avoid the limitations of ready-made 
dictionaries. 
The second study (chapters Five & Six) dealt with the research gap associated with the 
relationship between DQ and CG mechanisms, namely the mixed results problem that even 
sometimes contradicts the theory. The first probable reason for this problem was the use of 
different proxies for DQ, which is likely to mislead the analysis. The second reason was 
argued to be the use of narrow and different combined proxies of governance mechanisms 
(García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). 
Chapter Five discussed the theoretical background of the association between DQ and CG 
chapter Six answered the third and the fourth research questions (objectives) and suggested 
that disclosure quantity is not a proper proxy for DQ. This chapter also presented the 
empirical results of the association between DQ and CG mechanisms. 
Correlation analysis showed that all governance mechanisms are in line with agency theory, 
with no contradictory results. Accordingly, the problem of mixed results is likely to be 
explained by improper DQ measurement and narrow proxies of CG. Regression results 
suggest that the most effective governance mechanisms in improving DQ are leadership 
structure, audit committee meeting frequency, and audit firm size. 
Accordingly, the current study presented a novel contribution to both CG and disclosure 
literature, being timely and relevant in light of the recent worldwide appraisals of CG 
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structure (i.e. The Code 2010) and disclosure regulations (the latest Management 
Commentary published by the IASB). Interestingly, the present developed quality measure 
could be generalised for Management Commentary statements because they involve the same 
quality dimensions proposed by the IASB. 
Chapters Seven and Eight were concerned with achieving the fifth research objective 
(question) on the joint effect of DQ and CG mechanisms on FV. Chapter Seven presented the 
theoretical foundations of the association between DQ, CG mechanisms and FV. Chapter 
Eight empirically investigated such associations. Results suggested that in a UK context, DQ 
enjoys a substitutive relationship with audit committee independence and firm size and a 
complementary association with board independence in relation to firm value. Overall, this 
research introduced the first empirical evidence regarding what CG mechanisms – prevailing 
in the UK – influence disclosure quality, and which of these mechanisms influence FV. 
Contributions 
The current research contributes to the extant disclosure literature along various channels. 
Mainly three types of contributions could be distinguished. These are contribution to 
knowledge, methodological contribution and contribution to the theory. The following 
paragraphs discuss each contribution.   
Firstly, regarding contribution to knowledge, the underlying research responds to continuous 
and recent research calls (e.g. Beyer et al., 2010; Berger, 2011) for developing a sound 
measure for disclosure quality. In doing this, the current research extends prior work done in 
developing a valid measure for disclosure quality. Thus, it improves prior attempts for 
developing a measure of disclosure quality through overcoming current limitations in those 
attempts. There are three remarkable attempts in the relevant literature.  
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The first pioneering attempt is presented by Beattie et al. (2004).  The authors use multiple 
dimensions to define disclosure quality. The second attempt to develop a disclosure quality 
measure is developed by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a). They propose a framework for 
analysing firms’ risk communication processes. Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) introduce the 
third framework for measuring disclosure quality, where they refined their prior risk 
framework.   
In sum, prior attempts to develop a measure for disclosure quality represent a major step 
forward in the construction of a valid measure. However, the three afore-mentioned attempts 
have some limitations. First, there is no clear definition for the concept of disclosure quality. 
Second, there is no justification for the assumption that disclosure quality is a function of the 
stated disclosure quality dimensions. Thus, Botosan (2004) argues that any measure for 
disclosure quality should start with a well-supported and convincing discussion of the 
information dimensions proposed by a regulatory framework. Third, some of these measures 
are restricted to one type of disclosure (i.e. risk disclosure in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004a, 
and forward-looking disclosure in Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008).  
Accordingly, the first contribution of the underlying research is developing a proposed 
measure of DQ that mitigates existing limitations. This research is distinguished from prior 
work in that it responds to Botosan’s (2004) argument that any measure for DQ should start 
with well-supported information dimensions proposed by a regulatory framework. Therefore, 
the proposed DQ measure is mainly based on the qualitative dimensions of information issued 
by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB, 2006), which aims to enhance the usefulness of 
information to stakeholders.  
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As a second contribution, the current research adds to the disclosure literature by developing a 
highly reliable computerised content analysis approach. Arguably, current attempts to develop 
a computerised approach for content analysis do suffer some weaknesses (Berger, 2011). The 
most common limitation is the use of ready-made language processing software (e.g. Kothari 
et al., 2009; and Li, 2010a). The ability of such general dictionary software to analyse the 
special corporate filling language is, however, questionable (Berger, 2011). Therefore, the 
underlying study uses a customised approach for content analysis. The second limitation in 
similar studies is that reliability is not considered (e.g. Grünin (2011) introduces an artificial 
intelligence measurement of disclosure (AIMD) but its reliability is not examined). 
 A prior attempt was Hussainey et al. (2003) who developed a customised forward-looking 
keywords list. However, Hussainey et al.’s approach had some limitations. The most 
important is that it is able to correctly capture only 55% of what they could have captured if 
the narratives are manually analysed. Additionally, the keywords list was only for the 
forward-looking context. 
Accordingly, the current study further improves Hussainey et al.’s (2003) approach. Through 
employing a more conservative approach in constructing the customised forward-looking 
keywords list, the developed forward-looking list captures 95.3% of forward-looking 
disclosures, compared to Hussainey et al.’s (2003) 55%. 
In an attempt to eliminate the manual coding to the minimum, the current research introduces 
five keyword lists relevant to the OFR disclosure context. These lists are: forward-looking, 
quantitative, good news, bad news, and scope. Each of these keywords lists is examined for 
reliability. Regarding the overall reliability of the suggested computerised approach, the 
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correlation between manual and computerised content analysis shows a strong association of 
is 98.5%.  
Importantly, as a third contribution, the underlying research has some reflection as to agency 
theory, which is used as the main platform in explaining the association among DQ, CG 
mechanisms and FV. The first sub-contribution is related to the association between CG and 
DQ, and the second sub-contribution is related to the association between the joint effect of 
DQ and CG mechanisms on FV. 
The nature of an agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Agency theory models the relationship between the principal and 
agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) establish that managers have advantages over shareholders 
by virtue of having access to information not available to other users (i.e. information 
asymmetry problem). Consequently, any mechanism intended to narrow the information 
asymmetry gap is profound to the success of the financial market (Ronen and Yaari, 2002), of 
these mechanisms, CG and DQ.  
As contended earlier in chapter One, Section 1.6.3, agency theory is heavily used in 
explaining motivations for disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Agency theory suggests 
that corporate governance induces managers to provide high quality disclosure to mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem. In this sense, disclosure should help investors to better 
evaluate the decision-making process, and restores market confidence (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). This association is tested in the second study (chapters Five & Six). Results are mixed 
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with regard to which CG mechanism is associated with DQ, either worldwide or at the UK 
level. 
In relation to the first sub-contribution to the theory, regression analysis confirms the agency 
theory viewpoint regarding the association between three CG mechanisms and the DQ of 
OFR section of the UK FTSE 350 non-financial firms. These are: leadership structure, audit 
committee meeting frequency and audit firm size.  
As to the leadership structure, based on the agency theory, the combined functions of both the 
chairman and the Chief Executive Officer can significantly impair boards’ pivotal monitoring 
and controlling functions (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). 
While prior literature does not provide conclusive evidence on this, the current study confirms 
the theory underpinning the association between leadership structure and disclosure quality. 
The combined roles of both the chairman and the Chief Executive Officer are negatively 
associated with disclosure quality. Nonetheless, results should be taken with caution because 
there are few observations exhibiting duality in the Chairman and CEO roles. 
The second CG mechanism, which is associated with DQ, is audit committee meeting 
frequency. From an agency perspective, for effective disclosure decisions, boards need to 
devote a significant amount of time and resources (Laksamana, 2008). Results reinforced this 
agency view and reported a positive association between audit committee meeting frequency 
and DQ. 
The third CG mechanism correlated with DQ is audit firm size. Arguably, big audit firms 
might influence firms to provide more information to increase the perceived audit quality of 
the annual reports as a whole (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Therefore, from an 
agency perspective, audit firm size can mitigate the information asymmetry problem by 
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providing high quality disclosure. Moreover, big audit firms have more resources than smaller 
firms; these resources enable them to allocate many more resources to the training and 
development of the auditors, which in turn promotes the audit quality (Nekhili et al., 2010). 
Results support this notion and a positive association between audit firm size and DQ is 
documented.  
The second sub-contribution to the theory is related to the association between DQ, CG 
mechanism and FV. Agenic theory frames the association between disclosure quality, 
corporate governance, and firm value (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Beyer et al. (2010) argue that 
the valuation role of accounting information permits capital providers to evaluate the return 
potential of a certain investment opportunity. In addition, better information environments are 
associated with higher market valuation (Lang et al., 2004). High-quality disclosure is 
regarded as one of the most influential CG mechanisms (Black et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 
2010; and Sheu et al. 2010). Overall, disclosure is presumed to contain value-relevant 
information (Al-Najjar et al., 2011) and consequently affects FV (Haggard et al., 2008). 
Similarly, agency theory assumes that corporate governance increases returns to shareholders 
via reducing transaction and agency costs (Hooper et al., 2009). In addition, better governed 
firms have higher firm value (Gompers et al., 2003). While theoretically such association is 
clear however, the literature provides inconclusive evidence.  
The third study (chapters Six & Seven) provides explanation for the agency theory. Results 
confirm the agency view that high quality disclosure helps investors to accurately evaluate 
firms. Additionally, results show that managerial ownership and the presence of accounting 
expertise in the audit committee works as effective corporate governance mechanisms, and 
both mechanisms contain value relevant information which investors use in valuing firms. 
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Results support the theory that when managers have a high ownership percentage in the firm, 
their interests will be consistent with those of the investors. In this case, investors will have 
more confidence and give high value to these firms.  
Interestingly, results also document a complementary effect between disclosure quality and 
managerial ownership in high quality disclosure firms. This suggests that both disclosure 
quality and managerial ownership contain value-relevant information that affects market 
value.  
The second governance mechanism that affects firm value is the presence of accounting 
expertise in the audit committee. This variable is not previously tested in the literature 
investigating the association between disclosure quality, corporate governance, and firm 
value. The results suggest that investors value firms, which have accounting expertise in their 
audit committee more than firms that do not have such expertise in their audit committee. 
Notably, few CG mechanisms were empirically found associated with either DQ or FV. 
Having said that, the literature shows that this is very common. This could be justified in three 
different ways. First; research that takes the endogenous relationship into account finds at best 
only weak support for an association between CG and different dependent variables (see for 
example Brown et al., 2011). Second; the rigid nature of CG that typically change slowly 
from year to year does not allow for capturing a significant association over short-term. Third, 
with high levels of legal protection in UK, it is less likely to have many CG mechanisms 
influencing FV (La Porta et al., 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Dahya et al., 2008, Bebchuk 
and Weisbach, 2010; and Braga-Alves and Shastri, 2011).  
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In terms of the adequacy of the agency theory as a platform for investigating the various 
relationships in this research, correlation analysis showed that all governance mechanisms are 
in line with agency theory, with no contradictory results. Therefore, agency theory remains 
the best theory to provide explanation regarding DQ and CG. 
Implications 
The present research serves the interest of many groups and has several essential implications. 
At the academic and research level, many implications are noticeable. Firstly, developing a 
novel and valid DQ measure evokes the possibility of re-shaping some unsettled disclosure 
inter-relationships, because using different proxies is most likely to provide spurious 
conclusions. Therefore, this study opens avenues for re-examining disclosure relationships, 
especially in research areas that do not have persuasive conclusions. 
Secondly, the present study successfully develops five highly reliable keyword lists pertaining 
to narrative reporting (forward-looking, quantitative, bad news, good news and scope), which 
allows for the computerisation of the content analysis. Importantly, the study provides an 
innovative measure for evaluating the balance of disclosure tone. This is hoped to promote the 
efficiency of the related research areas with a low-cost, time-saving approach. Moreover, this 
would help in undertaking large-scale studies and hence, derive more reliable results than 
previous findings based on small-sample, manual analysis studies.  
Thirdly, this research has implications pertaining to three research streams (i.e. DQ, CG and 
FV). The extant literature suffers from mixed and contradictory results on the determinants of 
DQ, as well as on the association between DQ, CG mechanisms, and FV. Through using a 
reliable measure for DQ and using a wide proxy for CG, the current study provides 
explanations for such mixed results. 
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Additionally, many policy implications are emphasised through this study. Firstly, having 
reported the influential role of DQ on the market, this study provides empirical support for the 
views put forth by The ASB and The IASB that investors pay special attention to the quality 
of disclosure provided. Secondly, the study provides in-depth empirical feedback on the 
practical implementation of a multidimensional quality concept. The results highlight the 
difficulty imbedded in OFR statements in the UK. The ASB is advised to highlight to firms 
the preference of having easily readable disclosures. Additionally, findings reveal that UK 
firms tend to be biased against bad news disclosure. Such findings are of interest to policy-
makers in the UK in general. Thirdly, with the new DQ score, policy-makers could measure 
the applicability of their guidance and accordingly make informative decisions to promote 
current reporting standards or induce new modifications. Fourthly, results show deficiencies 
in some principles in the UK governance code that need modification in order to improve the 
overall governance structure of firms. 
Finally, the computerised approach for scoring disclosure quality facilitates the evaluation 
process of the narratives’ (i.e. OFR) reporting quality. This improves the efficiency of 
analysts’ work and enables other stakeholders, for example creditors, to easily evaluate the 
disclosure practices of different firms.  
9.4 Research Limitations 
As is the case with any research, the current research has some limitations. Firstly, it is 
focused on large firms. Small firms might have different disclosure patterns, and thus results 
of this study might be inapplicable to small firms. For example, small firms might not find it 
economically beneficial to provide disclosure at high quality. Consequently, those firms might 
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use firm level CG mechanisms different from those employed by large firms to mitigate 
agency conflicts and consequently influence FV. 
Secondly, while the present study uses a comprehensive set of 14 CG mechanisms, it focuses 
only on CG from an accounting perspective. The CG from a finance perspective (for example, 
different compensation related research strands, including level and structure of executives’ 
compensations) is beyond the scope of the current research.  
Thirdly, some data items are few and thus, results related to those items should be interpreted 
with caution. This is audit firm size. Firms in the sample are big firms (FTSE 350), and 
therefore big firms are more likely to have resources to higher big audit firms. However, it 
was necessary to include this variable in the research because it is extensively investigated in 
the related literature without any clear evidence provided. Additionally, one approach through 
which the current research mitigates the endogeneity problem is by testing a wide set of CG 
mechanisms. 
The fourth limitation is related to the KPI’s calculation. Two information elements about KPIs 
are not evaluated due to their inapplicability and assessment difficulty. There are cost and 
time constraints surrounding these two elements. This requires extensive manual coding and 
such extensive manual coding would hinder the applicability of this research, at either the 
academic level, or the practical level. When the researcher compares the benefits and 
limitations of extensive manual coding, as discussed earlier in chapter Three, the limitations 
outweigh the benefits. 
Finally, the researcher investigates the usefulness of DQ through an economic measure (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) through a quantitative approach. An alternative approach would be to utilise a 
qualitative approach. A questionnaire could be used to determine what the quality dimensions 
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are that investors use in valuing firms. Another questionnaire could be distributed to financial 
analysts to identify their view on which quality dimensions they use in valuing firms. The 
qualitative approach gives a practical view of which quality dimensions users of the 
disclosure statements (i.e. investors and financial analysts) utilise in valuing firms. However, 
this research by itself will entail a high degree of subjectivity and its generalisability is 
doubtful. Therefore, the best approach would be to supplement the underlying research by a 
qualitative approach. This is an interesting point that could be covered in future research. 
9.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The current study opens various research avenues. Firstly, the newly-developed DQ measure 
offers a promising research area where researchers could re-investigate research questions 
previously tested through different quality proxies (for example, the association between 
disclosure quality and cost of capital; and informativeness of stock prices).  
Secondly, while FV is one indicator of investors’ perceptions of information content, it would 
be interesting to investigate other models that consider investor reaction, such as the event 
study method. This will help in examining the investors’ reaction around the date of releasing 
annual reports to users. Other models, such as the return-earnings association models, will 
help in examining the degree to which DQ increases the investors’ ability to better anticipate 
future earnings changes.  
Thirdly, the present study focuses on the overall quality score because, based on the literature, 
and confirmed by the empirical findings, stakeholders are interested in the overall quality of 
disclosure. However, from another angle – perhaps from policy-makers’ and professional 
bodies’ perspectives – it would be interesting to analyse how individual quality dimensions 
are related with specific firm characteristics. This is a wide area of research, with many 
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research questions that could be examined; for example, one research strand would be when 
firms are usually biased towards good or bad news. This could be linked with many variables, 
including firm characteristics such as profitability and liquidity. Another link could be 
addressed through examining whether the tone of voluntarily disclosed information is related 
to the type of auditor report. Similarly, one can investigate circumstances where firms provide 
disclosure that is comprehensive, future-oriented, comparable, and so on. 
Fourthly, at the time of starting this research, only one guide for disclosure quality had been 
issued (ASB, 2006); consequently, the study is UK-focused. On December 2010, The IASB 
issued a similar guidance statement (Management Commentary, 2010), which interestingly 
has almost the same quality dimension as the OFR statement. Accordingly, the present study’s 
proposed quality measure is applicable to firms using Management Commentary. 
Consequently, with the possibility of worldwide generalisation of the proposed quality 
measure, a new research avenue is to replicate the present study into the context of different 
countries and identify how governance mechanisms differ across these countries.  
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Consider the following examples on the calculation of KPIs: 
Cent (2009) 
This firm provides the maximum expected information about KPIs. These are: source of data, 
purpose, description, a comparison with the previous year, and the target. See the following 
information provided for adjusted basic earnings per share (EPS): 
 
KPI Source Purpose Description Result Target  
Adjusted 
basic 
earnings 
per share 
(EPS) 
The measure 
of adjusted 
basic EPS is 
reported in 
note 14 of 
the audited 
Financial 
Statements. 
EPS is an industry 
standard 
determining 
corporate 
profitability for 
shareholders.  
 
This measure is 
used as one of the 
performance 
conditions in the 
Long Term 
Incentive Scheme, 
outlined on pages 
50 and 51. 
 This measure of 
performance is 
calculated as profit 
before other costs 
and depreciation of 
fair value uplifts to 
property, plant and 
equipment from 
Strategic 
Investments and 
exceptional items 
and certain re-
measurements for 
the year, 
attributable to 
equity shareholders 
of the parent 
company, divided 
by the weighted 
average number of 
shares in issue 
during the year. 
In 2009 EPS 
remained 
unchanged at 21.7 
pence despite a 
22% increase in the 
average number of 
shares 
in issue. 2007 was 
an exceptional year 
as a result of 
favourable 
commodity prices 
experienced in the 
first half of 2007 
which 
drove profitability 
in the residential 
supply business 
To 
deliver 
growth 
in 
adjusted 
EPS 
over a 
three-
year 
period. 
 
Accordingly, the score is 5/5 = 1 
Below are examples for firms providing only four information items about each KPI 
 Anglo American (2006) 
The maximum information this firm provides about KPIs is four information items. These are: 
purpose, description, a comparison with the previous year, and the target. Below is one 
example of a KPI for which the company provides the four information items. 
 
KPI Purpose Description Results  targets (if 
applicable) 
Lost time 
injury 
frequency 
rate 
(LTIFR) 
Measuring 
Safety  
The number of lost time injuries (LTIs) per 200,000 
hours worked. An LTI is an occupational injury 
which renders the person unable to perform his/her 
duties for one full shift or more the day following 
the one on which the injury was incurred, whether a 
scheduled work day or not. 
2006: 
1.16 
2005: 
0.94 
 
2007 target: 
0.94 
 
Accordingly, the score is 4/5 = 0.8 
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Compas (2007) 
The maximum information this firm provides about KPIs is four information items. These are: 
purpose, a comparison with the previous year, and the target. Below is one example of a KPI 
for which Compas (2007) provides the four information items. 
 
Purpose Result Target  
Measuring energy 
efficiency  
 
 Energy consumption 
(gas & electricity) of our 
corporate offices of our ‘Top 
Ten’ countries was reduced by 3% against a baseline of 
2007-2008 
3% reduction against 
2008-2009 baseline 
 
Accordingly, the score is 4/5 = 0.8 
 
Below are examples for firms providing only three information items about each KPI 
BG (2008) 
The maximum information this firm provides about KPIs is three information items. These 
are: purpose, description, and a comparison with the previous year. Below is one example of a 
KPI for which the company provides the four information items. 
 
Purpose KPI Description Results  
BG Group 
believes that 
measuring 
its TSR 
performance 
relative to that 
of its industry 
peers provides a 
more 
meaningful 
indicator of 
shareholder 
return. It is also 
used to 
determine 
vesting levels 
under the 
Group’s 
long-term 
incentive plans. 
 
Total 
shareholder 
return (TSR) 
Total shareholder return (TSR) is defined as the return on 
investment obtained from holding BG Group shares over a period 
of time. It includes dividends paid, the change in capital value of 
the shares and any other payments to or by shareholders. The 
absolute level of TSR varies with stock market performance, 
commodity price changes and other extraneous factors. 
The graph shows 
the annualised 
US Dollar TSR of 
BG Group shares 
over 
a three year 
performance 
period and 
the corresponding 
average TSR of 
its 
industry peer 
group over the 
same 
period. For the 
three year 
performance 
period ending 1 
September 2008, 
BG Group was 
ranked first 
within its 
peer group, 
reflecting BG 
Group’s 
continuing 
delivery of its key 
strategic 
aims. 
Accordingly, the score is 3/5 = 0.6 
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SIG (2009) 
The maximum information this firm provides about KPIs is three information items. These 
are: purpose, description, and a comparison with the previous year. Below is one example of a 
KPI for which the company provides the three information items. 
 
KPI Purpose Description Results  
Like for 
Like 
Sales 
Growth 
The measure reflects the underlying 
sales growth in the business which 
typically arises from increased sales 
volumes to both new and existing 
customers, product price inflation and 
selling new products through the 
existing infrastructure. The growth is 
supported by investment in new 
Brownfield trading site openings and 
trading site relocations into larger 
premises with additional stockholding 
capability. Maintaining positive like-
for-like growth in every business is a 
key target by which every business is 
measured and is a key component of 
being able to drive profit growth. 
 
Like-for-like sales growth is defined 
as the percentage growth/(decline) in 
the sales of the Group excluding the 
impact of current year and prior year 
acquisitions. Given the significant 
exchange rate volatility in recent 
years, the percentage is calculated on a 
constant currency basis to provide a 
realistic understanding as to 
underlying performance. 
Like-for-like 
sales growth 
rates/(rates of 
decline) on a 
constant 
currency basis 
are set out 
below: 
 
 
Accordingly, the score is 3/5 = 0.6 
 
Note: 
 
The above examples are selected randomly by the supervisor. 
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The following examples elaborate how the aggregated score is calculated: 
 
 
 
Refer to Table (3.14) for the descriptive statistics for the overall quality score and the 
individual quality dimensions. Below are three examples for calculating the score. The first 
example shows a very low quality score (eleventh lowest firm). The second example presents 
a below average quality. The third firm displays the highest quality score). 
 
Example 1: Seve (2006)  
 
This is the eleventh lowest firm in disclosure quality. The total quality score attained= 2.724. 
This score is the submission of the above seven measures; the details of the calculations are 
explained below. 
 
 
Forward-Looking Quantitative (FLQ): (Forward-Looking Orientation) = 0.390 
 
The frequency of forward-looking quantitative  setnetnes (34) scaled by the frequency of 
forward-looking sentences (87) 
 
 
Forward-Looking (FL): (Relevance) = 0.193 
 
The frequency of forward-looking sentences (87) divided by the total number of sentences 
(451). 
 
Qualitative Percentage (QUAL): (supplement the financial statement) = 0.494 
 
The frequency of qualitative sentences (223) divided by the total number of sentences (451).  
 
Where; Qualitative sentences = total number of sentences - number quantitative sentences  
                                                       451-228 = 223 
 
Spread: (Comprehensiveness) = 0.867 
 
The number of topics addressed in the OFR statement (13) divided by (15)  
 
 
The breakdown of the spread: 
 
Objective: 1, Strategy: 1, Market: 1, Competition: 1, Regulation: 1, Capital Structure:          
Zero, Present Performance: 1, Resources: 1,Commercial Risk: Zero, Financial Risk                 
Forward-
Looking 
Quantitative 
Percentage 
Forward-
Looking 
Percentage 
Qualitative 
percentage 
Spread Balance KPIs Readability 
(30/LIX) 
Total 
Score 
0.390 0.193 0.494 0.867 0.27 0 0.51 2.724 
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1, Relations:  1, Accounting policy: 1, Treasury: 1, Financial Instruments: 1, Liquidity: 1, 
Total: 13.                    
 
BGL (Balance and Neutrality): 0.27 
 
Number of bad news sentences (18) over number of good news sentences (144) =0.125.  
 
The percentage of bad to good news for the industry leader = 0.46, and therefore, Seve’s 
balance dimension is 0.125/ 0. 46 = 0.27  
 
 
 
30/ LIX (Readability) = 30/58 = 0.051 
 
KPIs (Comparability) = None of the 5 items about KPIs are disclosed, 0/5 = 0 
 
Notable, the score is not driven by the spread dimension. In the above example, although the 
firm (Seve) has a high spread score of 0.867, it is the eleventh lowest firm in the overall 
disclosure quality. If the spread was the driver of the score, this firm would have been 
assigned a high score. 
 
 
Example 2: First (2009) 
 
This is a below average disclosure quality firm (the average quality score = 3.13). The total 
quality score attained= 2.374. This score is the submission of the above seven measures; the 
details of the calculations are explained below. 
 
 
Forward-Looking Quantitative (FLQ): (Forward-Looking Orientation) = 0.339 
 
The frequency of forward-looking quantitative  setnetnes (40) scaled by the frequency of 
forward-looking sentences (118) 
 
 
Forward-Looking (FL): (Relevance) = 0.195 
 
The frequency of forward-looking sentences (118) divided by the total number of sentences 
(605) 
 
Qualitative Percentage (QUAL): (supplement the financial statement) = 0.519 
 
The frequency of qualitative sentences (314) divided by the total number of sentences (605) 
 
Forward-
Looking 
Quantitative 
Percentage 
Forward-
Looking 
Percentage 
Qualitative 
percentage 
Spread Balance KPIs Readability 
(30/LIX) 
Total 
Score 
0.339 0.195 0. 519 0.733 0.57 0 0.53 2.886 
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Where; Qualitative sentences = total number of sentences – number quantitative sentences  
                                                       605-291 = 314 
 
Spread: (Comprehensiveness) = 0.733 
 
The number of topics addressed in the OFR statement (11) divided by (15)  
 
 
The breakdown of the spread: 
 
Objective: 1, Strategy: 1, Market: 1, Competition: Zero, Regulation: 1, Capital Structure:          
Zero, Present Performance: 1, Resources: 1, Commercial Risk: Zero, Financial Risk:                 
1, Relations: 1, Accounting policy: Zero, Treasury: 1, Financial Instruments: 1, Liquidity:                          
1, Total =  11. 
 
 
BGL (Balance and Neutrality): 0.57 
 
Number of bad news sentences (39) over number of good news sentences (179) =0.218.  
 
The percentage of bad to good news for the industry leader = 0.38, and therefore, First 
balance dimension is 0.218/ 0.38 = 0.57 
 
 
KPIs (Comparability) = 0/5= 0 
 
30/ LIX (Readability) = 1/57 = 0.53 
 
 
Example 3: Ctne (2008): 
 
This is the highest firm in disclosure quality. The quality score = 3.988. As observed from the 
above table, the firm is achieving high scores in almost every quality dimension. 
 
 
Forward-Looking Quantitative (FLQ): (Forward-Looking Orientation) = 0.358 
 
The frequency of forward-looking quantitative  setnetnes (43) scaled by the frequency of 
forward-looking sentences (120) 
 
 
Forward-Looking (FL): (Relevance) = 0.184 
Forward-
Looking 
Quantitative 
Percentage 
Forward-
Looking 
Percentage 
Qualitative 
percentage 
Spread Balance KPIs Readability 
(30/LIX) 
Total 
Score 
0.358 0.184 0.563 0.867 1 1 0.652 
 
4.624 
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The frequency of forward-looking sentences (120) divided by the total number of sentences 
(652) 
 
Qualitative Percentage (QUAL): (supplement the financial statement) = 0.563 
 
The frequency of qualitative sentences (367) divided by the total number of sentences (652) 
 
 
Where; Qualitative sentences = total number of sentences – number quantitative sentences  
                                                       652-285 = 367 
 
Spread: (Comprehensiveness) = 0.867 
 
The number of topics addressed in the OFR statement (13) divided by (15)  
 
 
The breakdown of the spread: 
 
Objective: 1, Strategy: 1, Market: 1, Competition: 1, Regulation 1, Capital Structure:          
Zero, Present Performance: 1, Resources: 1, Commercial Risk: Zero, Financial Risk:                 
1, Accounting policy: 1, Treasury: 1, Financial Instruments: 1, Liquidity: 1, Total = 13. 
 
 
BGL (Balance and Neutrality): 1 
 
Number of bad news sentences (92) over number of good news sentences (148) =0.622  
 
Since Cent is the industry leader therefore, Cetn’s balance dimension equals to 1.  
 
 
KPIs (Comparability) = 5 (numbers of items disclosed)/5 = 1 
 
30/ LIX (Readability) = 30/46 = 0.652 
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Examples of doubtful forward-looking keywords accompanied by other 
forward-looking keyword(s)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking ahead, 2007 production is expected to move well ahead of 2006 levels and the company 
remains on target to increase production capacity to 40,000 hoped by the end of the year (Dana – OFR, 
2006). 
 
Shell expects to be able to renew or increase these facilities on commercially acceptable terms (Royal – 
OFR, 2007). 
 
Should either the first option or the second option not be exercised, all or some of these later payments 
will be expensed immediately (Astrazeneca – OFR, 2007). 
 
Globally, new additions to industry capacity coupled with the prospect of suppressed economic growth are 
expected to put continued downward (Royal – OFR, 2008). 
 
There has been significant government investment to provide longer platforms, which will enable ATW to 
run longer trains at some time in the future (Arriva – OFR, 2007) 
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An example of words that are generally perceived as bad news keywords when in fact they are 
not is the word “weak”. Weak comes in a bad news context only in 55% of the sentences. The 
following example illustrates this: 
 
 
 
 
This sentence is not a bad news one; rather; it is a good news sentence indicating that the 
company is taking action to maintain its competitive position. 
 
The reliability result shows that “below” denotes a bad news context only in 14% of the 
sentences. By observation, the word “below” is usually used to summarise figures, introduce a 
table, and so on.  Even if it is not used in this manner, it still does not primarily come in a bad 
news context. The following examples clarify this point: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The word “poor” is used by oil firms as the name of a debt rating agency. The next two 
examples demonstrate this fact: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Significant bus and train tender contracts are compared with current experience to identify 
weaknesses and potential improvements in the tender process (Arriva – OFR, 2007). 
 
In calculating the net present value of the future cash flows, certain assumptions are required to be 
made in respect of highly uncertain matters, as noted below (Vodafone – OFR, 2007). 
 
Operating profit increased 17% at constant exchange rates and the margin increased 2.4 
percentage points, reflecting SG&A growth below the rate of turnover growth (Glaxosmithkline 
– OFR, 2006). 
 
The Group’s current long-term credit rating is A1 by Moody’s and AA- by Standard and Poor’s, 
both with a stable outlook (Astrazeneca – OFR, 2008). 
 
On September 1, 2008, Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P) raised its corporate 
credit rating for Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its related subsidiaries to AA+ stable outlook from 
AA positive outlook (Royal – OFR, 2008). 
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Although “hard” is considered a bad news keyword by Hussainy and Walker (2008), it often 
comes in a good news context in OFR statements.  The following example highlights this 
observation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The remaining examples support the previously discussed facts: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will be working hard to ensure our operations make the most of this passenger growth and 
will be looking to expand our bus operations and build upon our rail presence in Sweden (Arriva 
– OFR, 2008). 
 
To help reverse this problem, Sainsbury’s is funding an exclusive project aimed at boosting 
bumblebee numbers by as much as 600 per cent. If our strategy follows the wrong direction or is 
not effectively communicated then the business may suffer (Sainsbury’s – OFR, 2008). 
 
We have clear processes for crisis management, pulling together expert teams should we need to 
respond quickly on issues (Tesco – OFR, 2007). 
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APPENDIX 5 : Constructing Good News Keyword 
List 
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Increase is an example of a word that is usually recognised as a good news keyword. Similar 
to decrease, “increase” could be good as well as bad depending on the object being increased. 
This would justify why it comes in a good news context in only 46.6% of the cases. See the 
following examples, where in the first one “increase” comes in a neutral context, while in the 
second, it comes in a bad news context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The word “above” is normally used to refer to tables, pages, and so on.  
 
 
 
 
 
The next examples present three more words that are not considered as good news keywords 
in the OFR context: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first example illustrates a sentence where “great” comes in a positive rather than a good 
news context. In the second example “desirable” is preceded by “not”, which converts it into a 
bad news sentence. The third sentence represents an example where “significant” is associated 
with a bad news context 
 
 
Higher demand goes hand in hand with increasing passenger expectations for safe, reliable and 
timely services (Arriva – OFR, 2007). 
 
Recent insurance loss experience, including pharmaceutical product liability exposures, has 
increased the cost of, and narrowed the coverage afforded by, insurance for pharmaceutical 
companies in general including the group (Glaxosmithkline – OFR, 2008). 
 
For more details for the above three items, see the Financial Review page 30 (Arriva – OFR, 
2008). 
 
We aim to become a truly global software-driven services company, with a great global brand, 
helping our customers get the best from globalisation (BT Group – OFR, 2007). 
 
The significant impact from the impairment of 89.5 million means that the group has reported 
an operating loss from operations of 70.1 million (Kcom Group – OFR, 2006). 
 
 
 
This is not a desirable outcome given the projected demand/supply tension still predicted early 
in the next decade (Dana – OFR, 2008). 
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APPENDIX 6 : Studies Investigating the Association between Disclosure and Corporate Governance 
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Study 
Sample Size and 
Type 
Country Disclosure Type 
Proxy for DQ 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Independent Variable(s) Methodology Results Limitations 
Ho and Wong 
(2001) 
 
98 firms for the 
year 1997. 
China Overall 
Self-constructed  
voluntary 
disclosure 
index. 
1. Board composition. 
2. Leadership structure. 
3. Existence of audit committee. 
4. Percentage of family members. 
 
1. Questionnaire for 610 firms’ chief financial 
officers, and 535 financial analysts to identify 
the existence of the audit committee. 
 
2. Traditional content analysis. 
 
3.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Board composition (?). 
2. Leadership structure (?). 
3. Existence of audit committee (+). 
4. Percentage of family members (-). 
 
1. The short analysis period. 
2. More disclosed 
information does not 
necessarily imply disclosure 
quality. 
3. Weighting the disclosure 
based on the analysts’ 
viewpoints which may imply 
subjective judgement. 
 
Anderson et al. 
(2004) 
1,241firms during 
2001. 
US NA 
Informativeness 
of earnings. 
1. Board size. 
2. Board composition. 
3. Meeting frequency. 
4. Leadership structure. 
5. Independence of audit committee 
members. 
6. Meeting frequency. 
7. Audit committee size. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Board size (?). 
2. Board composition (+). 
3. Meeting frequency (+). 
4. Leadership structure (-) 
5. Independence of audit committee members 
(+). 
6. Meeting frequency (+). 
7. Audit committee size (-). 
1. The short analysis period 
of one year. 2. Examining 
only two sets of corporate 
governance elements. 
 
Evans 
(2004) 
513 firms for the 
year 2001. 
US Corporate 
Modified 
Botosan’s 
(1997) 
disclosure 
index. 
1. Board size. 
2. Board composition. 
3. Audit committee independence. 
4. Leadership structure. 
5. Managerial ownership. 
6. Institutional ownership. 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.   Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Board size (?). 
2. Board composition (?). 
3. Audit committee independence (?). 
4. Leadership structure (?). 
5. Managerial ownership (?). 
6. Institutional ownership (?). 
 
 
1. One year analysis period. 
2. No clear justification is 
mentioned for the results 
which ultimately contradict 
all previous literature. 
3. Claiming the use of the 
quality of disclosure as the 
dependent variable, while it 
is a quantity-based proxy. 
Willekens 
et al. 
(2005) 
70 firms for the 
year 2001. 
Belgium Corporate 
A balanced-
scorecard 
disclosure 
index. 
1. Board composition. 
2. Big audit firms. 
3. Internal audit department. 
4. Board size. 
5. Existence of audit committee. 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
 
2.   Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Board composition (+). 
2. Big audit firms (+). 
3. Internal audit department (+). 
4. Board size (?). 
5. Existence of audit committee (?). 
 
1. Limited analysis period. 
2. Using quantity based 
score as a proxy for 
disclosure quality. 
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Frankel et al. 
(2006) 
75,875 firm-
quarter 
observations from 
1988 to 2002. 
US NA 
Street earnings 
as an example 
of voluntary 
disclosure but 
represented by 
street 
exclusions. 
Where: Street 
Exclusions = 
Street 
Earnings – 
GAAP 
Earnings. 
1. Board composition. 
 
Logistical regression analysis. 
1. Board composition (-). 
 
1. Using IBES database 
which is based on analyst 
forecasts as a proxy for 
firm's disclosure on Wall 
Street Journal. Usually 
analysts’ forecasts are a 
highly subjective way of 
determining disclosure. 
Karamanou 
and Vafeas 
(2005) 
1,274 firm years 
for the year 2000. 
US NA 
Management 
earning 
forecasts 
1. Board independence. 
2. Board size. 
3. Meeting frequency. 
4. Institutional ownership. 
5. Managerial ownership. 
6. Audit committee size. 
7. Audit committee independence. 
8. Audit committee financial 
expertise. 
9. Audit committee meeting 
frequency. 
 
Logistical regression analysis. 
1. Board independence (-). 
2. Board size (?). 
3. Meeting frequency (?). 
4. Institutional ownership (+). 
5. Managerial ownership (-). 
6. Audit committee size (-). 
7. Audit committee independence (?). 
8. Audit committee financial 
expertise (-). 
9. Audit committee meeting frequency (?). 
 
1. Limited investigation 
period of one year. 
 
2. Indirect measure of 
disclosure quality. 
Lakhal 
(2005) 
 
207 firms from 
1998 to 2001. 
France  
Earnings 
disclosure. 
1.  Board composition. 
2. Board size. 
3. Board leadership structure. 
4. Institutional ownership. 
5. Foreign institutional ownership. 
6. Stock option compensation. 
1. Traditional analysis of number of voluntary 
earning-disclosure. 
2.  Logistical regression analysis. 
1. Board composition (?). 
2. Board size (?). 
3. Board leadership structure (-). 
4. Institutional ownership (-). 
5. Foreign institutional ownership (+). 
6. Stock option compensation (+). 
 
The main limitation is the 
method used for measuring 
disclosure, giving 1 for firms 
having at least 1 disclosure 
and zero otherwise, this 
biases the results. 
Mangena and 
Pike 
(2005) 
 
262 firms for the 
period 2001-
2002. 
UK 
Corporate interim 
reporting 
Self-constructed 
weighted and 
un-weighted 
disclosure 
scores. 
1. Shareholding of audit committee. 
2. Financial expertise. 
3. Size of audit committee. 
4. Board composition. 
5. Ownership structure. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Shareholding of audit committee (-). 
2. Financial expertise (+). 
3. Size of audit committee (?). 
4. Board composition (?). 
5. Institutional ownership (+). 
1. Limited time span may 
bias the results. 
2. Possibility of omitted 
variables in the regression 
model. 
3. Analysis of interim reports 
only rather than the annual 
reports. 
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Barako et al. 
(2006) 
 
34 firms analysed 
from 1992 -2001. 
Kenya Corporate 
Self-constructed 
disclosure score. 
 
1. Governance attributes (board size, 
composition, leadership structure, 
audit committee). 
2. Ownership structure (shareholder 
concentration, foreign ownership, 
institutional ownership). 
 
 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Audit committee   (+). 
2. Board size (+). 
3. Board composition (-). (Unlike most studies.) 
4. Leadership structure (?). 
5. The foreign ownership (+). 
6. Institutional Ownership (+). 
7. Ownership dispersion (+). 
 
1. The study uses annual 
reports for constructing 
information; other sources 
such as internet, business 
press, etc. are not analysed. 
2. The sample size is too 
small for generalisation. 
Beekes and 
Brown 
(2006) 
 
250 firms for the 
year 2002. 
Australia  
1. Frequency of 
disclosure. 
2. Timeliness of 
share price 
reflection on the 
net effect of 
value relevant 
information. 
3. Analysts’ 
earnings 
forecasts. 
Corporate governance quality. 
1. Using Horwath Report which ranks the 
Australian top 250 firms depending on the 
fulfilment of the “Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice” report of 
ASX’s. 
 
2. Disclosure frequency tested by number of 
documents submitted to the ASX’s. 
 
3.   Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Frequency of disclosure (+). 
2. Timeliness of share price reflection on the net 
effect of value relevant information (+). 
3. Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts (+). 
1. It is not obvious which 
elements of corporate 
governance strongly affect 
disclosure. 
2. Disclosure 
informativeness is being 
tested by counting the 
number of documents 
submitted without analysing 
the content of such 
documents, since the number 
does not represent the quality 
of the content. 
Brammer and 
Pavelin 
(2006) 
 
447 firms for the 
year 2000. 
UK Environmental 
Disclosure 
index based on 
PIRC 
Environmental 
Reporting 
(2000). 
1. Board independence. 
2. Ownership concentration. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2. Probit estimation model. 
1. Board independence (?). 
2. Ownership concentration (-). 
1. Limited analysis period. 
2. One type of disclosure 
(environmental). 
3. One quality dimension 
(occurrence). 
Celik et al. 
(2006) 
 
233 firms for the 
year 2004. 
Turkey Corporate 
1. Number of 
sentences 
reflecting 
forward-looking 
voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
2. Number of 
sentences 
reflecting 
financial 
forward-looking 
voluntary 
disclosure. 
1. Ownership diffusion. 
2. Foreign investment. 
3. Institutional investors. 
. 
1. Traditional content analysis for disclosure. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Total forward-looking voluntary 
disclosure: 
1. Ownership diffusion (-). 
2. Foreign investment. (-). 
3. Institutional investors (-). 
Financial forward-looking voluntary 
disclosure: 
1. Ownership diffusion (-). 
2. Foreign investment. (-). 
3. Institutional investors (?). 
 
1. The researchers didn’t 
provide explanations for the 
different impact of 
independent variables in the 
two models. 
2. The analysis period is 
limited to only one year. 
3. Examines only one aspect 
of corporate governance 
(ownership structure). 
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Cheng and 
Courtenay 
(2006) 
115 firms for 
2000. 
Singapore Corporate 
Luo at al.’s 
(2006) 
disclosure 
index. 
1. Board independence. 
2. Board size. 
3. Leadership structure. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
 
 
1. Board independence (+). 
2. Board size (?) 
3. Leadership structure (?) 
1. One dimension of quality 
(occurrence). 
2. Small sample size and a 
limited analysis period of 
one year. 
 
Abraham and 
Cox 
(2007) 
 
71 firms for the 
year 2002. 
UK Risk 
Number of 
sentences 
reflecting risk 
disclosure. 
1. Board composition. 
2. Institutional ownership. 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Logistical regression analysis. 
1. Board composition (+). 
2. Institutional ownership (+). 
 
 
1. Testing risk information 
disclosed in annual reports 
only. 
2. Short time analysis of one 
year. 
3. Measuring disclosure 
quantity. 
Aljifri and 
Hussainey 
(2007) 
 
46 firms for 2004. UAE Corporate 
The percentage 
of FL 
information. 
1. Auditor size. 
 
1. Computerised content analysis. 
2. Backward cross sectional regression (OLS 
regression). 
1. Auditor size (?). 
 
 
1. Examining information in 
the annual reports only 
without looking at other 
channels of disclosure. 
2. Considering the auditor 
firm size as one firm 
characteristic although it is 
generally used as a corporate 
governance element since 
the issuance of corporate 
governance principles. 
3. Examining the firm 
characteristics by itself isn’t 
enough as the most 
important point is to examine 
corporate governance 
variables – firm 
characteristics are only 
control variables. 
4. The one-year analysis 
period is too short for the 
purpose of results 
generalisations. 
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Boesso and 
Kumar 
(2007) 
 
72 firms for one 
year. 
Italy, 
US 
KPIs 
Voluntary 
disclosure: 
 
Percentage of 
Key 
Performance 
Indicators 
(KPIs). 
 
Disclosure 
score capturing 
some KPI 
characteristics; 
1. Quantitative 
vs. qualitative. 
2. Financial vs. 
non-financial. 
3. Historical vs. 
forward-
looking. 
1. Board composition. 
2.Company emphasis on stakeholder 
engagement. 
 
1. Traditional Content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
 
 
 
1. Board composition (?). 
2. Company emphasis on stakeholder 
management (+) with disclosure quantity. 
3. Company emphasis on stakeholder 
management (?) with disclosure quality. 
4. Company emphasis on stakeholder 
engagement is the stronger driver for disclosing 
voluntary information. 
1. The small sample size. 
2. The time period of one 
year is not suitable for 
generalising results. 
3. The researchers measure 
quality by weights which are 
not representative. 
4. No definition of good 
corporate governance is 
addressed. 
5. Using one element only as 
a proxy for corporate 
governance structure (board 
composition). 
 
 
Lim et al. 
(2007) 
 
181 firms for 
2001. 
 
Australia Corporate 
1.  Modified 
disclosure score 
of Meek et al. 
(1995) based on 
Australian 
regulations. 
 
Total voluntary 
disclosure. FL 
quantitative 
disclosure. 
 
Strategic 
disclosure. 
Historical 
disclosure. 
1. Board composition. 
2.Firm characteristics firm size, 
industry classification, and 
investment growth. 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2. Two-stage least square regression 2SLS. 
1. Board independence (+) with total FL 
quantitative information, and strategic 
disclosure. 
 
1. Disclosure is based on the 
bases of quantity not quality. 
2. Information is extracted 
from annual reports only; 
other sources such as 
continuous, internet and 
press disclosure are not 
considered. 
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Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti 
(2007 
145 firms for the 
period of 2002-
2004. 
Europe 
Intellectual 
Capital 
1. Score for total 
amount of 
disclosure. 
 
2. Score for the 
amount of 
intellectual Fl 
disclosure. 
 
3. Score for the 
amount of 
intellectual 
historical 
disclosure. 
 
4. Score for the 
amount of 
intellectual 
positive 
disclosure. 
 
5. Score for the 
amount of 
intellectual 
negative 
disclosure. 
 
6. Score for the 
amount of  FL 
disclosure. 
1. Board independence. 
2. Board size. 
3. Leadership structure. 
Poisson random effect estimation. 
1. Board independence (+). 
2. Board size (-). 
3. Leadership structure (-). 
1. Narrow proxy for CG. 
 
2. One industry sector 
(biotechnology). 
Donnelly and 
Mulcahy 
(2008) 
51 firms for 2002 Ireland Corporate 
Eng & Mak 
disclosure 
Index. 
1. Board size. 
2. Board independence. 
2. Institutional ownership. 
3. Managerial ownership. 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2. Poisson regression analysis. 
1. Board size (+). 
2. Board independence (+). 
2. Institutional ownership (?). 
3. Managerial ownership (?). 
 
One year analysis. 
1. One dimension of 
disclosure (occurrence). 
2. Using quantity as a proxy 
for disclosure quality. 
3. Short analysis period. 
4. Examining only two 
aspects of corporate 
governance. 
Kelton and 
Yang 
(2008) 
248 firms over 
2003 
US 
Corporate 
internet reporting 
FASB 2002, 
chapter two 
index. 
1. Board Independence. 
2. Managerial ownership. 
3. Audit committee financial 
expertise. 
4. Audit committee meeting 
frequency. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Poisson regression analysis. 
1. Board Independence (+). 
2. Managerial ownership (?). 
3. Audit committee financial expertise (+). 
4. Audit committee meeting frequency (+). 
1. Limited investigation 
period of one year. 
 
2. Limited proxy for CG. 
 
3. One quality dimension 
(occurrence). 
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Chen et al. 
(2008) 
 
1311 firms for 
four years from 
1996 to 2000 
forming 4415 
firm years. 
US NA 
Management’s 
forecasts. 
1. Institutional ownership. 
2. Ownership concentration. 
3. Board independence. 
4. Board size. 
 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Logistical regression analysis 
1. Institutional ownership (+). 
2. Ownership concentration (?). 
3. Board independence (?). 
4. Board size (+). 
 
 
Management forecasts is a 
subjective proxy for quality. 
 
Laksamana 
(2008) 
 
218 firms for 
the year 1993 
and 232 for 
the year 2002. 
Firms are 
located in 6 
industries: 
manufacturing, 
wholesale and 
retail, service, 
transportation, 
mining, and 
construction. 
US 
 
Management 
compensation 
Self-
constructed 
index for 
management 
performance 
and rewards. 
1. Board size. 
2. Board and compensation 
committee meeting frequency. 
3. Board composition. 
4. Leadership structure. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. 
1. Board size (+). 
2. Board and compensation committee 
meeting frequency. (+). 
3. Board composition (+). 
4. Leadership structure (-). 
Investigating only two 
variables for board 
quality. 
Li et al. 
(2008) 
 
100 firms for 
financial year-
ends between 
March 2004 
and February 
2005. 
UK 
Intellectual 
capital 
Haniffa and 
Cooke 
(2005) 
disclosure 
index. 
 
1. Board composition. 
2. Shareholdings concentrations. 
3. Leadership structure. 
4. Size of audit committee. 
5. Frequency of audit committee 
meetings. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. 
 
1. Board composition (+). 
2. Shareholdings concentrations (+). 
3. Leadership structure (?). 
4. Size of audit committee (+). 
5. Frequency of audit committee meetings 
(+). 
1. Small sample size. 
2. Short analysis period. 
3. Disclosure quantity. 
Beak et al. 
(2009) 
374 firms for 
the period 
June- 
September 
2000. 
US Corporate 
The overall 
percentage 
score for 
Standards 
and Poor’s 
(S&P) 
Transparency 
and 
Disclosure 
Survey 
 
1. Board independence. 
2. Institutional ownership. 
3. Managerial ownership. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Board independence (+). 
2. Institutional ownership (+). 
3. Managerial ownership (?). 
1. Subjective measure of 
DQ. 
2. Small sample size. 
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Felo et al. 
(2009) 
121firms from 
the AIMR 
disclosure 
ratings in 
1994, 1995, 
and 1997. 
US NA 
AIMR 
disclosure 
ratings as a 
measure for 
corporate 
disclosure 
level. 
1. Independence of Financial 
expertise. 
2. Board composition. 
3. Institutional ownership. 
4. Audit committee meeting 
frequency. 
5. Audit committee size. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Independence of financial expertise (?) 
2. Board composition (+). 
3. Institutional ownership (?). 
4. Audit committee meeting frequency (?). 
5. Audit committee size (+). 
 
1. Using AIMR scores is 
criticised for its 
subjectiveness as a 
measure for disclosure 
quality. 
2. The two periods of 
analysis are before the 
execution of the Blue 
Ribbon report (1998), 
which set 
recommendations for the 
audit committee. 
Chau and 
Gray 
(2010) 
273 listed 
firms in Hong 
Kong for the 
year 2002. 
Hong Kong Corporate 
Meek’s et al. 
(1995) 
disclosure 
index. 
 
1. Family ownership. 
2. Independent directors. 
3. Leadership structure. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
1. Family ownership (-). 
2. Independent directors (+). 
3.  Leadership structure (+). 
 
1. Short analysis period. 
2.Disclosure quantity 
Cheung et 
al. 
(2010) 
100 largest 
listed firms 
from 2004 
until 2007. 
China Corporate 
Three 
different 
indexes 
based on the 
OECD 
principles. 
1. Board independence. 
2. Leadership structure. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Logistical regression analysis 
1. Board independence (?). 
2. Leadership structure (-). 
One dimension of quality 
(occurrence). 
 
Jiang et al 
(2010) 
103 firms for 
the period of 
2001 to 2005. 
New 
Zealand 
Corporate 
Botosan’s 
(1997) 
disclosure 
index. 
1. Institutional ownership. 
2. Managerial ownership. 
3. Ownership concentration. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. 
1. Institutional ownership (-). 
2. Managerial ownership (-). 
3. Ownership concentration (-). 
1. One dimension of 
quality (occurrence). 
 
2. Narrow proxy for CG 
structure. 
Hussainey 
and Al-
Najjar 
(2011) 
357 non-
financial firms 
for the period 
from 1996 to 
2002 
inclusive. 
 
UK Corporate 
The 
percentage of 
FL 
information. 
1. Board size. 
2. Board composition. 
3. Insider ownership. 
 
Computerized content analysis. 
 
Fixed effect, Tobit, and Logit regression 
models. 
 
1. Board size (+). 
2. Board composition (+). 
2. Insider ownership (?). 
 
1. Analysis is restricted to 
year 2002. 
2. Only non-financial 
firms are included. 
3. Using a quantity-based 
score. 
 
Wegener et 
al 
(2013) 
319 Canadian 
firms from 
2006 until 
2009. 
Canada Environmental 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project 
(CDP)’s 
questionnaire 
1. Institutional 
shareholders. 
2. Litigation risk. 
3. Low cost puplicity. 
 
1. CDP’s questionnaire. 
2. Logistic regression analysis. 
1. Institutional shareholders 
(?). 
2. Litigation risk (-). 
3. Low cost puplicity (-). 
 
The use ot the CDP 
questionnaire which only 
measures the occurrence 
of disclosure, i.e. whether 
firms respond to the 
questionnaire and 
disclosure tier 
environmental disclosure 
or not. 
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Khiari 
(2013) 
46 Tunisian 
firms for the 
period of  
2001 to 2010. 
Tunis Corporate 
Botosan’s 
(1997) 
disclosure 
index. 
1. Board size. 
2. Independent 
directors. 
3. Leadership structure . 
4. Directors mandatory. 
5. Managers mandatory. 
6. Ownership structure. 
7. Audit committee size. 
8. Audit firm size 
1. Traditional 
content analysis. 
2. Decision tree 
method. 
Results are unique for each 
firm.  
The use of the Decision 
tree method does not 
allow for generalising 
results. 
Ernstberger  
and 
Gruning 
(2013) 
1014 
European 
firms for the 
year 2007.  
EU Corporate 
Artificial 
intelegence 
measurement 
of disclosure 
(AIMD) 
Agregated corporate governance 
score 
1. Computerised content 
analysis. 
2. Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression. 
Corporate governance 
improves disclosure in less 
regulated environments. 
1. The use of  
factor analysis 
to aggregate 
the disclosure 
score. 
2. The use of one 
composite 
measure for 
corporate 
governance. 
Hyun et al 
(2014) 
634 firms for 
the nperiod 
from 2000 to 
2009. 
Korea 
Executive 
compensation 
A disclosure 
score of 1 if 
a firms 
disclose the 
level of 
executive 
pay. 
1. Board meeting 
frequency. 
2. Board size. 
3. 3. Institutional 
ownership. 
4. Independent 
directors. 
1. Traditional content 
analysis. 
2. Probit regression analysis. 
1. Board meeting 
frequency (-).. 
2. Board size (+).. 
3. Institutional 
ownership 
4. Independent 
directors (-). 
1. The study does not 
examine the economic 
consequence of strategic 
executive pay disclosure.  
 
3. Not 
controlli
ng for 
omitted  
variables
. 
Khan et al. 
(2013) 
119 firms for 
the period 
from  2005 
and 2009. 
Bangladeshi Environmental 
Modefied 
Haniffa and 
Cook (2002, 
2005) 
disclosure 
index  
1.Managerial ownership. 
2. Public ownership.  
3. Forign ownership. 
4. Board independence. 
5. Dual 
6. The presence of an audit 
committee. 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. 
 
1. Managerial ownership (-). 
2. Public ownership (+). 
3. Forign ownership (+). 
4. Board independence (+). 
5. Dual (?). 
6. The presence of an audit committee (+). 
 
Mendes-Da-
Silva, and 
Onusic 
(2014) 
314 firms from 
Augest to 
October 2011  
Brazil Corporate Index Score 
An aggregated index for corporate 
governance 
1. Traditional content analysis. 
2.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. 
 
An aggregated index for corporate 
governance (?) 
The use of an aggregated 
score for corporate 
governance which 
eliminates the ability to 
identify the specific 
governance mechanism 
that influence e -
disclosure. 
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Up to the researcher’s knowledge, the literature does not investigate the relationship between 
mandatory narratives disclosure and corporate governance, yet, articles on mandatory 
disclosure and corporate governance are either use IFRS reporting or earnings management 
for the disclosure side, which is irrelevant to the current  research, therefore, the above table 
lists some studies on best practice disclosure only.  
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APPENDIX 7 : Normality Tests 
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Second Study: The effect of CG mechanisms on DQ 
 
 
To examine the normality assumption, four main tests were conducted: 1- Skewness/Kurtosis 
tests for Normality, 2- Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data, 3- Histogram, 4- P-P Plots for 
Regression Residuals. All of which show that the model meets the normality assumption as 
follows: 
 
1- Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2- Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
    Variable |        W                 V             z              Prob>z 
 -------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
     quality |       0.99062     3.337     0.00184      2.905                Normal 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Variable |   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    quality |     0.0051         0.5878        7.84         0.0198            Normal     
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Third Study: The Joint Effect of DQ, and CG mechanisms on FV 
 
 
To examine the normality assumption, four main tests were conducted: 1- Skewness/Kurtosis 
tests for normality, 2- Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data, 3- Histogram, 4- P-P Plots for 
Regression Residuals.  Tests show that normality assumption is not perfectly met. To improve 
the normality of the model, the researcher follows the most popular procedure, i.e 
transformation. Quality is transformed using Log to rule the potential for simultaneity, which 
helps to mitigate endogeneity. Conducting Skewness/Kurtosis tests and Shapiro-Wilk W test 
on the transformed quality score shows an improvement in the normality. 
 
 
1- Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
 
   Variable |   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 quality |              0.0143         0.3897               6.65                 0.0361 
 
  Lg  quality |       0.0000         0.3409             21.06                 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
2- Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 
 
          Variable |        W                 V             z       Prob>z 
 -------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
     quality |       0.99155      2.780     2.455    0.00705 
  Lg quality |      0.97688      7.610     4.873    0.00000 
       
 
3- Histogram 
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4- Normal Probability Plots 
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